Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HUNTER JORDAN CARTER- Case No.: 3:25-cv-3636-JES-DDL RIMBACH, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO Plaintiff, 13 DISMISS v. 14 CHULA VISTA POLICE [ECF Nos. 11, 13, 19] 15 DEPARTMENT; STATE OF 16 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES; SAN DIEGO 17 SUPERIOR COURT, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff Hunter Jordan Carter-Rimbach (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Chula 22 Vista Police Department (“CVPD”), the State of California Department of Motor Vehicles 23 (“the DMV”) and San Diego Superior Court (“the Superior Court”) (collectively, 24 “Defendants”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly issued 25 and attempted to enforce a traffic citation against him. Id. Defendants now move to dismiss 26 this action. ECF Nos. 11, 13, 19. The motions have been fully briefed by the parties. For 27 the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motions and DISMISSES the entire 28 action with prejudice. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On August 18, 2025, Officer Ed Christopher (“Officer Christopher”) of the Chula 3 Vista Police Department initiated a traffic stop on Plaintiff for speeding and issued a traffic 4 citation. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. During the stop, Plaintiff’s motor vehicle’s plate read “PRIVATE- 5 NOT FOR HIRE” and did not carry a Motor Vehicle Registration Sticker. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. 6 Plaintiff argues that Officer Christopher’s citation is unenforceable because it is a 7 “performance bond attached to Driver’s License and Motor Vehicle Registration 8 contracts.” Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff states that a standard California driver’s license is an adhesion 9 contract and that he mistakenly registered his vehicle “without full disclosure” of what he 10 characterizes as “the commercial contractual nature of this transaction.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff 11 alleges that he did not need to register his vehicle or obtain a driver’s license because he 12 does not intend to use his vehicle in a “commercial capacity.” Id. ¶ 32. He claims the State 13 of California engaged in fraud by taking a security interest in his automobile that was never 14 disclosed as a term of this contract and that “[f]raud vitiates everything.” Id. ¶ 36. 15 Plaintiff alleges he sent the Superior Court an “affidavit of distinguishment” and an 16 “affidavit of truth” dated August 18 and 19, 2025, respectively, and that the Superior Court 17 responded by stating that said documents are “frivolous documents being submitted for an 18 improper purpose and are of no legal force or effect.” Id. ¶¶ 49-51. He alleges that he sent 19 another affidavit and a motion to dismiss to the Superior Court, and the court has not 20 responded. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. 21 Plaintiff states the Superior Court “alleges and continues to allege that Plaintiff owes 22 a debt of $1409.00 for failing to meet contractual requirements” and that the Superior Court 23 “sold the alleged debt to Alliance One Receivables Management, Inc.” Id. ¶¶ 54-55. 24 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that he sent a cease and desist letter to the Superior Court 25 regarding the collection of the alleged debt. Id. ¶ 56. 26 Plaintiff now brings claims for Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, Fraud 27 and Misrepresentation, and Forced Labor. Id. ¶¶ 60-65. 28 // 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted when the 3 allegations do not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Aschroft v. Iqbal, 4 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 5 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 6 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 7 alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard ... asks 8 for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten 9 Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must 11 accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in 12 the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 13 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); see Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th 14 Cir. 2010). Allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 15 action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to 16 enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 17 (9th Cir. 2011). While the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual 18 allegations in favor of the plaintiff, Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 19 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), the court need not credit legal conclusions that are 20 couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is subject to dismissal because 23 18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute that does not give rise to civil liability. The Court 24 evaluates the remaining claims below. 25 A. Claims Against the Superior Court and the DMV 26 The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 27 shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 28 against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 1 any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 2 courts from hearing suits brought against a nonconsenting state or arm of the state. 3 Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 1. The Superior Court 5 The Superior Court argues that it is entitled to immunity from this suit under the 6 Eleventh Amendment. ECF. No. 11-1 at 6-7. The Court agrees. 7 The Ninth Circuit has previously held that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies 8 to the Superior Court because it is an arm of the state. Munoz v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles 9 Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Courts in this district have applied this rule to 10 dismiss claims against the San Diego Superior Court specifically. See, e.g., Ashford v. 11 California Superior Ct. of Cnty. of San Diego, No. 26-CV-1032 TWR (MSB), 2026 WL 12 777969, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026). 13 Plaintiff argues that the Superior Court is a “corporation” without sovereign 14 immunity. ECF No. 14 at 13. He bases his argument on the contention that the Superior 15 Court ignored notarized documents and that “ignoring notarial acts and admitting that the 16 only acceptable documents are specific administrative forms listed on [the Superior 17 Court’s] website…. inadvertently [prove] that [the Superior Court] was NOT acting in any 18 judicial capacity.” ECF No. 14 at 13, 14. Plaintiff provides no legal support for his position. 19 Additionally, Plaintiff’s contention is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent that the 20 Superior Court is an arm of the state and, thus, not a corporation. See Munoz, 91 F.4th at 21 980. 22 In conclusion, the Superior Court is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh 23 Amendment. The Court GRANTS the Superior Court’s motion to dismiss on the basis that 24 the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against it. The Court finds that leave to 25 amend claims against the Superior Court would be futile because the immunity issue cannot 26 be cured, and thus dismisses them with prejudice. 27 // 28 // 1 2. The DMV 2 The DMV argues that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment 3 because it is a state agency and the State of California has not waived its immunity from 4 common-law tort claims or federal statutory claims. ECF No. 19 at 3. The Court agrees. 5 It is well established that the California DMV is a state agency with Eleventh 6 Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Bailey v. Root, No. 10cv0367 BTM (CAB), 2010 WL 7 2803950, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (“All of Plaintiff's claims against the DMV are 8 barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits against a state or its agencies or 9 departments for legal or equitable relief.”); see also Banks v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles for 10 Cal., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193–94 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Sykes v. State of Cal. (Dep't of 11 Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1974). 12 Plaintiff argues that the DMV does not have sovereign immunity because it is “a for- 13 profit business […] operated under the Commerce Clause delegated.” ECF No 20 at 9, 10. 14 Plaintiff cites Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 607 U.S. 509 (2026), to argue that the 15 DMV is a state affiliated corporation and cannot claim sovereign immunity. Id. at 9. In 16 Galette, the Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Transit Corporation was not an arm 17 of the state because it was created as a legally separate entity with corporate powers, liable 18 for its own debts and liabilities. Galette, 607 U.S. at 529-30. 19 The DMV argues that Plaintiff provides no authority for his claims that it is a 20 “corporation” and “for-profit business,” and that he does not give cause for the Court to 21 stray from the longstanding recognition of the California DMV as a state agency with 22 Eleventh Amendment immunity. ECF No. 23 at 3. The Court agrees. The factors the Court 23 cited in Galette are not present in the California DMV. See Galli v. State of California, 98 24 Cal. App. 3d 662, 675 (1979) (holding that the term “State” includes state agencies); Sykes, 25 497 F.2d at 202 (explain that the DMV is a state agency, not a corporation). Since the DMV 26 is part of the State of California and is not a legally separate corporate entity, it is entitled 27 to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The DMV’s motion to dismiss is therefore 28 GRANTED with prejudice, for the reasons stated above. 1 3. Claims Against CVPD 2 CVPD argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it because his own 3 allegations do not show that it engaged in any conduct giving rise to liability. ECF No. 13- 4 1 at 9-14. The Court agrees. 5 Plaintiff’s claims against CVPD are based upon his allegation that his traffic stop 6 and citation were unlawful. 1 However, Plaintiff’s complaint states that he had a license 7 plate stating “PRIVATE – NOT FOR HIRE,” which alone is grounds for an officer to stop 8 a car for lack of compliance with state law. Compl. ¶ 8; see also United States v. Lopez- 9 Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining the reasonable suspicion standard 10 applicable to traffic stops). Plaintiff also states that he was stopped for speeding, and that 11 he refused to produce a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance over the course 12 of the stop. Id. ¶¶ 14, 24-25. Officer Christopher issued Plaintiff a traffic citation based on 13 these issues in compliance with applicable regulations. Id. ¶¶ 26, 44. Based upon Plaintiff’s 14 own recitation of facts, Officer Christopher and the CVPD acted reasonably in the course 15 of Plaintiff’s traffic stop. See generally, Compl. Thus, even under the lenient treatment 16 afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff has alleged no facts which would give rise to a claim 17 for unlawful detention, excessive force, unreasonable seizure, malicious prosecution, or 18 forced labor as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. See Graham v. Connor, 19 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that an objective reasonableness standard governs fourth 20 amendment claims); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 n.5 (2003) (holding the same 21 for fourteenth amendment claims); Siebel v. Mittlesteadt, 41 Cal. 4th 735, 740 (2007) 22 23 1 In the interest of judicial economy, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s arguments 24 regarding the authority of states to regulate certain categories of drivers. See generally, 25 Reply. States may create regulations governing drivers. Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). Driving and travelling are not matters of word play or legalese, but 26 take their plain language definitions. The statutes and regulations at issue here are 27 constitutional and apply to the activity Plaintiff was doing at the time of his traffic stop, which was driving. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 28 1 (explaining that malicious prosecution requires a prior action brought without probable 2 ||cause); 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(4) (explaining that the TVPRA requires a showing of 3 ||serious harm through abuse of legal process). Because there is no colorable basis for any 4 || underlying claim giving rise to a section 1983 violation, the Court finds that leave to amend 5 || would be futile. The Court thus DISMISSES all claims against CVPD with prejudice. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 8 || Plaintiff's clams are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is ORDERED 9 ||to CLOSE this case. 10 IT ISSO ORDERED. 11 12 Dated: August 11, 2026 7 Se 4. 13 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28