gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:24-cv-00511 · 2026-08-11 · Unknown

Sharp Memorial Hospital, et al. v. Medi-Excel, S.A. de C.V., et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Jill L. Burkhardt (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:22Z · confidence high

The court considered Defendant Medi-Excel's motion to compel supplemental production of account notes and its motion to seal confidential patient medical records. The court denied the motion to compel based on lack of proportionality and existing access to the information, and granted the motion to seal based on good cause.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied.
“Based on the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion to disallow it in light of its limited additional value when weighed against the burden of production.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(1). It found that the requested information was already available through the updated Disputed Claims List (DCL) and a forthcoming deposition, rendering the additional burden of producing updated account notes (estimated at over 100 hours) disproportionate to the likely benefit. The denial is supported by the record recited in the order.
Defendant's Motion to Seal is granted.
“Having reviewed and evaluated these materials, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated good cause for sealing Exhibits 1, 3-10.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the materials were attached to a discovery motion and thus subject to the 'good cause' standard rather than 'compelling reasons.' It found good cause based on the confidential nature of the patient medical records and the need to protect patient privacy. This follows Ninth Circuit precedent.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly applies the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors to deny the motion to compel, noting that the information is already available through other means (DCL and deposition) and that the burden of production outweighs the benefit. It correctly applies the 'good cause' standard for sealing materials attached to a discovery motion, citing the appropriate Ninth Circuit authority (Center for Auto Safety). The reasoning is clear and supported by the record recited.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Case No.: 24-cv-00511-WQH-JLB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 13 v. MEDI-EXCEL’S MOTION TO COMPEL AND GRANTING 14 MEDI-EXCEL, S.A. DE C.V., et al., DEFENDANT MEDI-EXCEL’S 15 Defendants. MOTION TO SEAL 17 [ECF No. 100, 101]

18 Before the Court is a Motion to Compel and Motion to Seal filed by Defendant 19 Medi- Excel, S.A. De C.V. (“Defendant”). (ECF Nos. 100, 101.) Defendant’s Motion to 20 Compel “seeks an order compelling a supplemental production of documents called 21 ‘account notes’ from Plaintiff[s] Sharp [Memorial Hospital, Sharp Chula Vista Medical 22 Center, Sharp Coronado Hospital, and Grossmont Hospital Corporation dba Sharp 23 Grossmont Hospital (collectively ‘Plaintiffs’)].” ECF No. 100-1 at 4. Defendant’s Motion 24 to Seal “seeks to seal the confidential patient medical records and data in . . . Exhibits 1 25 and 3-10 to the Declaration of Andrew Dane.” ECF No. 101 at 2. 26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Compel 27 and GRANTS the Motion to Seal. (ECF Nos. 100, 101.) 28 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Plaintiffs own and operate four general acute care hospitals in San Diego County 3 that have provided and continue to provide emergency and post-stabilization services to 4 patients who are insured through Defendant. ECF No. 104 at 4. Although Defendant’s 5 members are required to get non-emergency healthcare in Mexico, they may use any 6 hospital for emergency services. Many of Defendant’s members have used one of 7 Plaintiffs’ emergency departments when they experience a medical emergency. The 8 parties do not have a contract that sets forth the rate Defendant must pay Plaintiffs for 9 medical care given to Defendant’s members. (Id.) Plaintiff “has identified 1,000 separate 10 accounts where [its] hospitals have treated [Defendant’s members] in the emergency 11 department and where [Defendant] has paid . . . very low amounts for that care.” ECF No. 12 104-2 at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs claim under California law, Defendant owes the reasonable value 13 of emergency and post-stabilization services provided to Defendant’s members. (ECF No. 14 104 at 4.) 15 On February 13, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the 16 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego: Case No. 37-2024-00006620-CU-BC- 17 CTL. (ECF No. 1-2.) The Complaint alleges five causes of action: (1) breach of an 18 implied-in-law contract for emergency services; (2) breach of an implied-in-law contract 19 for post-stabilization services; (3) breach of an implied-in-fact contract for post- 20 stabilization services; (4) a claim for services rendered; and (5) a claim for declaratory 21 relief seeking a judicial determination in favor of Plaintiffs regarding the payment 22 obligations. (Id. ¶¶ 4-47.) 23 On March 15, 2024, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On 24 May 7, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer, which included eighteen (18) affirmative 25 defenses. (ECF No. 11.) 26 On March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs produced a disputed claims list (“DCL”) that included 27 roughly 870 claims. (ECF No. 100-2 at ¶ 2.) On June 3, 2024, Plaintiffs produced a second 28 1 DCL that included roughly 1000 claims. (Id.) These DCLs did not include any detail 2 regarding how much Plaintiff claimed it was owed for each claim. Id. 3 On May 23, 2024, the discovery period opened. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) 4 In May 2025, Plaintiffs produced claim files for 999 of the 1000 claims at issue. 5 (ECF No. 104-2 at ¶ 1.) This production included “over 140,000 pages of claims 6 documents, organized by account number and stay type (i.e., inpatient or outpatient), 7 including billing documents (uniform bills (“UBs”), Explanations of Benefits (“EOBs”), 8 account notes, and appeals correspondence) and medical records.” Id. Plaintiffs then 9 produced a third DCL because “due to some kind of sorting error, the charges and payments 10 for some of the claims were not reflected properly” in the prior version. ECF No. 100-2 at 11 ¶ 2. 12 On August 18, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 13 which was opposed by Plaintiffs. (ECF Nos. 47, 55.) Defendant argued it was entitled to 14 summary judgment on: 15 (1) all causes of action related to the medical care of 551 patients in this action because the applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs from seeking 16 recovery related to their medical care and (2) the second, third, fourth, and 17 fifth causes of action related to the medical claims of twenty-one patients because individualized circumstances related to their care release [Defendant] 18 from payment obligations pursuant to one of the undisputed exemptions from 19 reimbursement. 20 ECF No. 66 at 6. On January 9, 2026, the Hon. William Q. Hayes denied Defendant’s 21 motion except “with respect to claims arising from the medical care of three (3) patients 22 about whom the parties do not dispute that reimbursement claims were denied in full based 23 on non-emergency care.” Id. at 17. 24 On January 29, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer to 25 add two affirmative defenses, unjust enrichment and unclean hands, claiming it “learned 26 that [Plaintiff] has solicited and accepted payment for some of the claims at issue in this 27 litigation from sources other than [Defendant]” after review of Plaintiffs’ May 2, 2025, 28 1 document production. ECF No. 80 at 3. District Judge Hayes granted Defendant’s motion 2 and Defendant filed its Amended Answer on March 12, 2026. (ECF Nos. 80, 82.) 3 On March 20, 2026, Plaintiffs moved to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of 4 permitting it to conduct discovery on the two new affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 87.) 5 Defendant opposed the motion. (ECF No. 88.) On April 2, 2026, the Court held a 6 Discovery Conference and ordered counsel to meet and confer further and “advise the 7 Court . . . if issues related to time and extent of proposed discovery remain.” ECF No. 91. 8 Thereafter, counsel met and conferred. Defendant requested Plaintiffs “clarif[y] 9 what [they are] (and [aren’t]) seeking reimbursement for . . . [because Plaintiffs] intend[] 10 to count payments from patients or other insurers toward the reasonable and customary 11 value of services[,] [b]ut, [has not produced] any statement on the record . . . to that effect.” 12 ECF No. 104-3 at 14. Defendant took the position that “until [it] gets confirmation on 13 [Plaintiffs’] position, [Defendant] will have to assert the unjust enrichment and unclean 14 hands affirmative defenses against virtually all of the patient claims at issue.” Id. During 15 the meet and confer process Plaintiffs “agree[d] to credit all payments to each account.” 16 Id. at 13. On April 14, 2026, Defendant’s counsel “agree[d] that updating the [DCL] to 17 reflect those payments is the cleanest way” to resolve the dispute. Id. at 12. 18 On April 15, 2026, the Court held an informal Status Conference and confirmed 19 “[t]he parties’ dispute regarding the time and scope of additional discovery was 20 appropriately resolved.” ECF No. 96. 21 On April 22, 2026, Plaintiffs produced a fourth DCL, which was updated from the 22 prior version to “reflect[] all payments from entities other than [Defendant].” ECF No. 23 104-2 at 4-5. Subsequently, the parties informed the Court they had not resolved their 24 dispute regarding Plaintiffs’ supplemental production of account notes, and an informal 25 Discovery Conference was held on May 22, 2026. (ECF No. 99.) Following the 26 conference, the parties were unable to resolve the discovery dispute, and a briefing 27 schedule was set. (ECF No. 99.) Defendant duly filed it Motion to Compel (ECF No. 100) 28 and Plaintiff timely opposed (ECF No. 104). 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Court will begin by addressing Defendant’s Motion to Compel before turning 3 to its Motion to Seal. 4 A. MOTION TO COMPEL 5 Defendant requests the Court “compel[] a supplemental production of . . . “account 6 notes” from [Plaintiff] because these documents reveal evidence that [Defendant] is not 7 liable to [Plaintiffs] as it relates to certain patient claims.” ECF No. 100-1 at 4. 8 Plaintiffs’ account notes are essentially a log of billing information across the life of 9 the claim including Plaintiffs’ contact with a patient’s insurer, billing invoices, and 10 payments received. (Id. at 7.) The account notes also include Plaintiffs’ internal notes 11 regarding patient claims, including amounts Plaintiffs believe they are owed for a particular 12 claim, what they expect, and from what person or entity Plaintiffs expect payment. 13 Because Plaintiffs produced the account notes in early May 2025, they do not include any 14 entries since that time. (Id.) 15 In support of its motion Defendant argues the account notes “are squarely relevant 16 to [Plaintiffs’] claims that [Defendant] underpaid for the services rendered to [Defendant’s] 17 members,” and “are also relevant to [Defendant’s] newly-asserted affirmative defenses of 18 unclean hands and unjust enrichment, as well as [Defendant’s] earlier affirmative defenses 19 including, inter alia, set-off.” Id. at 9. Defendant contends Plaintiffs have a duty under 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) to supplement its May 2025 production of account notes “[b]ecause 21 the previous production of account notes contain no information about determinations and 22 communications over the last year.” Id. at 4. 23 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue production of “additional account notes is 24 unnecessary, duplicative, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the 25 case.” ECF No. 104 at 12. 26 1. Legal Standard 27 “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery . . . .” 28 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). “Parties may obtain discovery 1 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 2 proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Even after the 2015 3 amendments to Rule 26, “discovery relevance remains a broad concept.” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 4 Ass’n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 14-cv-02046-JAD-PAL, 2016 WL 778368, at *2 n.16 5 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2016). 6 Information must also be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the 7 scope of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). When analyzing the 8 proportionality of a party's discovery requests, a court should consider the importance of 9 the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to 10 the information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 11 issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 12 benefit. Id. 13 The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing its request 14 satisfies the requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 15 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1995). “Once the propounding party establishes that the request seeks 16 relevant and proportional information, ‘[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to 17 show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and 18 supporting its objections.’” Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv 491-BAS-AHG, 19 2020 WL 1332485, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting Superior Commc’ns v. 20 Earhugger, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 215, 217 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). 21 2. Discussion 22 Defendant requests the Court “compel[] a supplemental production of . . . “account 23 notes” from [Plaintiff] because these documents reveal evidence that [Defendant] is not 24 liable to [Plaintiffs] as it relates to certain patient claims.” ECF No. 100-1 at 4. Defendant 25 contends Plaintiffs have a duty under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) to supplement its May 2025 26 production of account notes “[b]ecause the previous production of account notes contain 27 no information about determinations and communications over the last year.” Id. 28 1 Defendant “only seeks this information if it was not already reflected in the previously- 2 produced account notes” and requests Plaintiffs be compelled to produce 3 updated account notes [only] if they show [Plaintiffs]: (1) made changes to allocation of financial responsibility for the claim; (2) made additional 4 attempts to collect payment from an entity other than [Defendant]; (3) actually 5 collected additional amounts from an entity other than [Defendant]; (4) agreed to accept less than the full billed charges from a payor other than [Defendant] 6 (including a patient); or (5) made an assessment regarding the strength or 7 likelihood of success of an appeal of [Defendant’s] payment determination. 8 Id. at 4-5. Defendant argues these records “are squarely relevant to [Plaintiffs’] claims that 9 [Defendant] underpaid for the services rendered to [Defendant’s] members,” and “are also 10 relevant to [Defendant’s] newly-asserted affirmative defenses of unclean hands and unjust 11 enrichment, as well as [Defendant’s] earlier affirmative defenses including, inter alia, set- 12 off.” Id. at 9. 13 A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) or responded to a written 14 discovery request has an ongoing duty to supplement or correct its disclosure or response 15 “if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete 16 or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 17 known to the other parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). 18 Defendant has not shown the information it seeks through a supplemental production 19 of account notes is “proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 20 Defendant’s new affirmative defenses–unclean hands and unjust enrichment–are 21 predicated on the theory that Plaintiffs “solicited and accepted payment for some of the 22 claims at issue in this litigation from sources other than [Defendant].” ECF No. 80 at 3; 23 see also ECF No. 85 at 13 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine 24 of unclean hands because Plaintiffs have engaged in improper and potentially unlawful 25 billing practices related to the claims at issue in this case, including but not limited to, 26 billing [Defendant] for claims that Plaintiffs know are not [Defendant’s] financial 27 responsibility, ascribing financial responsibility for portions of claims to other payors 28 without notifying [Defendant], and accepting additional payments on claims without 1 notifying [Defendant]. If Plaintiffs are successful in their claims, any recoverable amounts 2 must be reduced to the extent by which Plaintiffs have ascribed financial responsibility to 3 other payors and/or accepted payment from other payors to prevent Plaintiffs from being 4 unjustly enriched at [Defendant’s] expense.”). Plaintiffs, however, have 5 (1) “agree[d] to credit all payments to each account” [ECF No. 104-3 at 13];

6 (2) produced a DCL that “reflects all payments from entities other than 7 [Defendant]” [ECF No. 104-2 at ¶ 9]; and 8 (3) “agreed to produce a witness [for deposition who will] authenticate and 9 describe the [DCL] . . . and the ‘who, why, when, where, and how’ behind [it]” [ECF No. 104 at 12]. 10 11 Defendant, therefore, already has access to the information it seeks. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 26(e)(1) (requiring supplemental production “if the additional or corrective information 13 has not otherwise been made known to the other parties”). 14 Moreover, Plaintiffs estimate “[l]ogging into and downloading copies for the 15 account notes for the 1,000 accounts . . . would take [Plaintiffs’] personnel over 100 hours 16 . . . to accomplish, if not more.” ECF No. 104-1 at ¶ 8. The information that could be 17 obtained from this undertaking is not essential to underlying question of what payments 18 Plaintiffs have collected and from whom, when this information already exists on 19 Plaintiffs’ DCL and Defendant will have the opportunity to depose Plaintiffs’ witness about 20 the DCL. The expense of obtaining updated account notes, therefore, outweighs its likely 21 benefit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (When analyzing the proportionality of a party’s 22 discovery requests, a court should “consider[] the importance of the issues at stake in the 23 action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 24 parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 25 burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”). 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court exercises its discretion to disallow it in light of its 27 limited additional value when weighed against the burden of production. See Strategic 28 Partners, Inc. v. FIGS, Inc., No. 19-cv-2286-GW-KSx, 2021 WL 4813646, at *4 (C.D. 1 Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) (“In resolving discovery disputes, the court may exercise its discretion 2 in determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing 3 those facts in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.”) (quotation omitted); 4 McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-01058-JAD-GWF, 2017 WL 5 3174914, at *9 (D. Nev. July 26, 2017) (“If the requirement for proportionality in discovery 6 means anything . . . it must mean that burdensome, tangential discovery should not be 7 permitted based on the mere possibility that something may turn up to support what is 8 otherwise only speculation.”). 9 B. MOTION TO SEAL 10 Defendant’s Motion to Seal “seeks to seal the confidential patient medical records 11 and data in . . . Exhibits 1 and 3-10 to the Declaration of Andrew Dane.” (ECF No. 101 at 12 2.) Plaintiffs do not oppose the request. 13 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 14 presumption of public access. See Nia v. Bank of Am., No. 21-cv-1799-BAS-BGS, 15 2024 WL 171659, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan.12, 2024); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 16 LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). The showing required to meet this burden 17 depends on whether the materials to be sealed are “more than tangentially related to the 18 merits,” in which case the “compelling reasons” standard applies. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 19 809 F.3d at 1096-98. When the materials involved do not surpass the tangential relevance 20 threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. In Center for Auto Safety, the Ninth 21 Circuit held that when sealed materials are attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the 22 merits of the case, application of the “good cause” standard is appropriate. Id. at 1097. 23 Therefore, the parties’ requests to file under seal the designated materials for the purpose 24 of this Motion to Compel Supplemental Document Production, a discovery motion, are 25 reviewed for good cause. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 26 Defendant advances valid arguments in support of filing Exhibits 1 and 3-10 under 27 seal. Regarding Exhibits 1, 3-10, Defendant contends that these documents are 28 “confidential patient medical records and patient data.” (ECF No. 101 at 2.) Defendant 1 || proffers that the exhibits should be sealed to protect patient privacy rights and that same 2 ||information or similar information was previously sealed. (/d. at 4.) 3 Having reviewed and evaluated these materials, the Court finds that Defendants have 4 ||demonstrated good cause for sealing Exhibits 1, 3-10. See, e.g., Stafford v Rite Aid Corp., 5 17-cv-1340-AJB-JLB, 2019 WL 3818015, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019) (granting 6 ||request to file personal health information under seal). Thus, with respect to these 7 materials, the Court therefore GRANTS the request.' 8 CONCLUSION 9 Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Compel is DENIED. (ECF No. 10 |} 100.) 11 It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Seal is GRANTED. (ECF No. 12 ||}101.) The Court further ORDERS as follows: 13 1. The Clerk of Court shall file the following documents under seal: ECF Nos. 14 102-1 (Exhibit 1), 102-2 (Exhibit 3 (Pt 1)), 102-3 (Exhibit 3 (pt 2)); 102-4 15 (Exhibit 3 (Pt. 3)), 102-5 (Exhibit 3 (Pt 4)), 102-6 (Exhibit 4), 102-7 (Exhibit 16 5), 102-8 (Exhibit 6 (Pt. 1)); 102-9 (Exhibit 6 (pt 2)); 102-10 (Exhibit 7), 102- 17 11 (Exhibit 8), 102-12 (Exhibit 9) and 102-13 (Exhibit 10). 18 |}Dated: August 11, 2026 - bande 19 n. Jill L. Burkhardt 20 ited States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 ' Defendant does not move to seal the Declaration of Andrew Dane. Mr. Dane’s 26 Declaration is filed on the open docket at 100-2. The Declaration has also been filed at 27 || 102 under seal. This seems to have been inadvertent. Neither the Defendant nor the Court need correct this oversight because the exact same declaration is available to the public at 28 |! 100-2. 10