Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 KEITH EOLL, an individual, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02310-WQH-JLB Plaintiff, 9 ORDER v. 10 11 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 12 Defendant. 13 14 HAYES, Judge: 15 The matter before the Court is the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses 16 filed by Plaintiff Keith Eoll. (ECF No. 20.) 17 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 18 On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff Keith Eoll (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing a 19 Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Superior Court 20 of California for the County of San Diego, Case No. 25CU040560C. (ECF No. 1-2.) 21 Plaintiff’s claims arise from his purchase of an allegedly defective automobile on June 18, 22 2018. (ECF No. 20 at 8.) Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of warranty under the Song- 23 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq., 24 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., and the California 25 Commercial Code. (ECF No. 1-2 at 4–9.) 26 On September 4, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) 27 On the same day, Defendant filed an Answer. (ECF No. 3.) 28 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 8.) 1 On October 17, 2025, the case settled, apart from attorneys’ fees, at an Early Neutral 2 Evaluation Conference (“ENE”) before Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt. (ECF No. 11 3 at 1.) 4 On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, 5 and Expenses. (ECF No. 20.) On March 20, 2026, Defendant filed a Response in 6 Opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 23.) On March 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (ECF 7 No. 24.) 8 II. CONTENTIONS 9 In the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses, Plaintiff states that, pursuant 10 to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer, the parties “agreed [that] ‘Plaintiff’s 11 attorney’s fees, expenses and costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to 12 California Civil Code § 1794(d) may be determined by the Court via noticed motion. For 13 purposes of any such motion, [Defendant] will agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.’” 14 (Pengilley Decl., ECF No. 20-1 ¶ 52.) 15 Plaintiff contends that he made “good faith attempts” to resolve attorneys’ fees, 16 costs, and expenses without a motion, including offering to “reduce[] [his] reasonably 17 incurred fees and costs by over $3,000.00,” but Defendant rejected the offer. (ECF No. 20 18 at 7.) 19 Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of 20 $26,798.19. Id. at 7–8. Plaintiff contends that a calculation of his attorneys’ fees results in 21 an amount of $21,909.00, based on 30.8 hours of work.1 Id. Plaintiff further contends that 22 a lodestar multiplier of 0.2 supports his request of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 23 $26,290.80. Id. Plaintiff requests reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount of 24 $507.39. Id. at 8. Plaintiff seeks a total amount of $26,798.19. Id. 25 Plaintiff contends that the request for attorneys’ fees is supported by reasonably 26 incurred billed time, reasonable hourly rates, the complexity of this action, and the 27 1 Plaintiff also anticipated billing five hours for work related to the instant motion, for an additional 28 1 contingent-fee arrangement his attorneys used in this case. Id. at 15–20. In support, Plaintiff 2 submits the Declaration of Stephanie S. Pengilley and its related exhibits. (Pengilley Decl., 3 ECF No. 20-1.) The first exhibit (the “Billing Table”) describes the work, hours, rates, and 4 total fees incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel for the purposes of calculating the lodestar 5 amount. (Exhibit A to Pengilley Decl., ECF No. 20-2.) The Billing Table describes 30.80 6 total hours of work performed by six different “Team Member[s]” and identifies an 7 “Amount Due” of $22,416.39 for their services. Id. These Team Members include 8 “attorneys, paralegals, and support staff.” (ECF No. 20 at 21.) The Team Members’ rates 9 vary. (Exhibit A to Pengilley Decl., ECF No. 20-2.) Plaintiff also submits invoices for his 10 court filing fees. (Exhibit C to Pengilley Decl., ECF No. 20-4.) 11 Defendant, in its Opposition, requests that the Court “sharply reduce[]” Plaintiff’s 12 calculated fees because Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees rates are “unsupported [and] 13 fundamentally inconsistent with prevailing standards for lemon law litigation.” (ECF No. 14 23 at 6.) Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s “flat fee” request for pre-litigation work, contending 15 that Plaintiff fails to provide time sheets to support this request and charges an 16 unreasonable amount. Id. at 7–9. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s time sheets for 17 litigation work demonstrate excessive hours spent on simple tasks. Id. at 10. Defendant 18 requests that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees to $250 per hour because of his 19 counsel’s limited experience, the relatively simple nature of the case, and the absence of 20 evidence to support the requested hourly rates. Id. at 11–13. In support, Defendant submits 21 the Declaration of Thomas Wynsma and its related Exhibits. (ECF No. 23-1.) Defendant 22 requests that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees by $17,912.00 and 23 award attorneys’ fees in the adjusted amount of $4,887.50. (ECF No. 23 at 16.) Defendant 24 also requests that the Court decline to apply a lodestar multiplier. Id. at 14–15. 25 III. LEGAL STANDARD 26 Defendant removed this action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) 27 When a federal district court exercises diversity jurisdiction over a case, the “law of the 28 state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is entitled to attorney fees, 1 and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by federal law.” 2 Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer: 4 shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based 5 on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably 6 incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. 7 Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The Song-Beverly Act requires that a district court “make an 8 initial determination of the actual time expended; and then [] ascertain whether under all 9 the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge 10 being made for the time expended are reasonable.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 11 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 12 “Courts calculate attorneys’ fees under § 1794(d) using the ‘lodestar adjustment 13 method.’” Aispuro v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-CV-2045 DMS (KSC), 2020 WL 4582677, 14 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (quoting Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., 15 Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). “The lodestar calculation ‘begins 16 with a touchstone or lodestar, based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable 17 hourly compensation of each attorney.’” Id. (quoting Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 18 1132 (Cal. 2001)). After determining the reasonable hourly rate for comparable legal 19 services in the community, courts may adjust that amount based on the following factors: 20 “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in 21 presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other 22 employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum, 23 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. “[T]he purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market 24 value for the particular action.” Id. 25 “The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees sought were allowable, 26 reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and reasonable in amount.” 27 Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18cv2202 JM (KSC), 2020 WL 1820126, at *1 (S.D. 28 1 Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (citing Karapetian v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 2 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). “If the reasonableness of fees is challenged,” the opposing party must 3 “demonstrate the hours spent are duplicative or excessive.” Id. (citing Premier Med. Mgmt. 4 Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 562, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)). 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 1794(d) 7 as the prevailing party in this action. (ECF No. 23 at 6.) The issue is whether Plaintiff’s 8 request is reasonable. 9 A. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees 10 The Court considers Plaintiff’s requested award of attorneys’ fees based on the 11 reasonableness of requested rates and hours expended in this action. 12 1. Reasonable Rates 13 In determining a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees, “the burden is on the fee 14 applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits— 15 that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 16 services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. 17 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The relevant community is that in which the 18 district court sits.” Carr v. Tadin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 970, 978 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting 19 Weeks v. Kellogg Co., No. CV 09-08102(MMM) (RZx), 2013 WL 6531177, at *32 (C.D. 20 Cal. Nov. 23, 2013)). 21 “Fee applicants may provide affidavits of practitioners from the same forum with 22 similar experience to establish the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought.” Base v. FCA 23 US LLC, No. 17-cv-01532-JCS, 2020 WL 363006, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020). Courts 24 may also draw upon “[d]ecisions by other courts regarding the reasonableness of the rate 25 sought,” as well as the court’s “own experience in determining what constitutes a 26 reasonable rate.” Id. “Once the fee applicant has proffered such evidence” of the prevailing 27 market rate in the community, “the opposing party must produce its own affidavits or other 28 evidence to rebut the proposed rate.” Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 3:20-CV-2432 1 JLS (BLM), 2023 WL 173921, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2023) (quoting Cortes v. Metro. 2 Life Ins. Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 3 Plaintiff contends that the following hourly rates are reasonable: 4 Name Title Hourly Rate 2025 Hourly Rate 2026 5 Stephanie Pengilley Senior Counsel $545.00 $575.00 6 Michelle Yang Founding Partner $525.00 Not Billed 7 Andrea Plata Associate Attorney $450.00 $500.00 8 Vivian Chen Associate Attorney Not Billed $475.00 9 Paralegals, Legal Roxana Rosas $125.00 $150.00 10 Assistants, Case Samuel Castelan 11 Managers 12 (Pengilley Decl. ¶¶ 4–14; Billing Table at 4–5.) Defendant contends that because Plaintiff’s 13 attorneys “are not seasoned litigators,” “Song-Beverly cases are not complex,” and Plaintiff 14 cites “little, if any, evidence” to support the billing rate, Plaintiff’s requested rates are 15 unreasonable. (ECF No. 23 at 12.) Defendant requests that the Court adjust Plaintiff’s rates 16 to a blended rate of $250 per hour. Id. at 11. In response, Plaintiff contends that the rates 17 “are reasonable and consistent with prevailing market rates for attorneys of comparable 18 skill, experience, and expertise.” (ECF No. 24 at 11.) 19 In cases related to allegedly defective automobiles, federal courts in this district have 20 recently approved hourly rates between $225 and $600. See Cabrera v. Ford Motor Co., 21 No. 23-CV-1775-WQH-LR, 2025 WL 2462442, at *4–*6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) 22 (approving hourly rates for attorneys between $395 and $595); Garcia v. Ford Motor Co., 23 No. 22-CV-1474-GPC, 2023 WL 3961090, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023) (approving 24 hourly rates for attorneys between $475 and $605); Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., No. 25 18CV2202 JM (KSC), 2020 WL 1820126, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (approving 26 hourly rates between $350 and $550 for partners and between $275 and $375 for associate 27 attorneys); Aispuro v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-CV-2045 DMS (KSC), 2020 WL 4582677, 28 1 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (approving hourly rates of $350 for partners and $225 for 2 associate attorneys); Pappas v. Ford Motor Co., No. 321CV00584BENKSC, 2021 WL 3 5810661, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021) (approving hourly rate of $510 for experienced 4 counsel); Beauschesne v. Ford Motor Co., No. 25-CV-69 JLS (DEB), 2026 WL 734533, 5 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2026) (approving hourly rates of $595 for shareholders, $375 for 6 associate attorneys, and $175 for paralegals); Nguyen, 2023 WL 173921, at *2–*3 7 (approving hourly rates of $525 for partners, between $325 and $375 for associate 8 attorneys, and $140 for paralegals); Kotulski v. FCA US LLC, No. 317CV00527AJBBGS, 9 2020 WL 7013587, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020) (approving hourly rates between $200 10 and $650 for attorneys); Kik v. Ford Motor Co., No. 25-CV-02479-WQH-DDL, 2026 WL 11 926712, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026) (approving hourly rates of $605 for partners and 12 $475 for associate attorneys). 13 Defendant cites Fischer v. FCA US, LLC to contend that a blended rate of $250 for 14 all of Plaintiff’s attorneys is appropriate here because of the attorneys’ minimal experience 15 and the straightforward nature of lemon law. (ECF No. 23 at 11–13.) However, the court 16 in Fischer distinguished lawyers based on their experience and awarded different amounts 17 of attorneys’ fees correlating to “each attorney’s respective experience.” Fischer v. FCA 18 US, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00707-H-JLB, 2020 WL 14084621, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020). 19 And, in Moron v. General Motors LLC, a court in this district approved hourly rates of 20 $450 to $545 for attorneys with seven to ten years of practice and adjusted the hourly rate 21 for an attorney with three years of practice to $250. No. 3:25-CV-02458-H-BLM, 2026 22 WL 357534, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026). Because courts award different hourly rates 23 depending on an attorney’s years of practice, the Court declines to apply a blended rate for 24 all of Plaintiff’s attorneys. Id. 25 Here, Plaintiff requests hourly rates at the upper end of the range of rates typically 26 awarded by courts in this district for similar cases. The Court finds reason to revise the 27 requested rates based on the experience of each attorney. 28 / / / 1 i. Stephanie Pengilley 2 In her declaration, Stephanie Pengilley discusses the experience of Plaintiff’s 3 attorneys. Ms. Pengilley has practiced consumer warranty litigation since 2017, “has 4 obtained plaintiffs’ verdicts in three cases she has tried as lead trial counsel,” and cites 5 several cases approving her hourly rate. (Pengilley Decl. ¶ 4.) Earlier this year, the court in 6 Moron found Ms. Pengilley’s hourly rate of $545 reasonable. 2026 WL 357534, at *3. Ms. 7 Pengilley’s hourly rate has increased by $30 since the Moron holding, but the increase is 8 in accordance with fluctuation that other courts have found reasonable. See Zamora v. 9 BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 20-838-KS, 2023 WL 8896264, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 10 2023) (approving Ms. Pengilley’s rates, which increased by $20 within the same year); 11 Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *4–*6 & n.5 (approving attorney’s rate increase of $45 12 over a few months). 13 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s counsel “cites cases predominantly from other 14 jurisdictions which command higher rates, such as Los Angeles.” (ECF No. 23 at 12.) 15 However, a court in the Southern District of California also found Ms. Pengilley’s rate— 16 somewhere between $475 and $605 per hour—reasonable and “similar to rates that have 17 been upheld in this District and in California state court.” Garcia, 2023 WL 3961090, at 18 *4. Additionally, Ms. Pengilley’s requested hourly rate of $575 for 2026 is only $10 higher 19 than an hourly rate that a court in the Central District of California found reasonable three 20 years ago. Zamora, 2023 WL 8896264, at *7. Here, Ms. Pengilley’s rates of $545 and $575 21 fall within the range that courts in this district have deemed reasonable for attorneys with 22 comparable experience. See, e.g., Garcia, 2023 WL 3961090, at *4; Moron, 2026 WL 23 357534, at *3. The Court finds Ms. Pengilley’s hourly rates reasonable. 24 ii. Michelle Yang 25 Plaintiff states that Michelle Yang is a partner and has “negotiated settlements 26 totaling millions of dollars on behalf of consumers.” (Pengilley Decl. ¶ 5.) Earlier this year, 27 a court in this district found Ms. Yang’s requested rate of $525 per hour reasonable. Moron, 28 2026 WL 357534, at *3. The Court agrees and declines to adjust Ms. Yang’s 2025 rate. 1 iii. Andrea Plata, Vivian Chen, and Gary Balyezyan 2 Plaintiff states that Andrea Plata became licensed to practice law in 2022 and has 3 “prosecuted thousands” of consumer warranty litigation cases. (Pengilley Decl. ¶ 7.) In 4 Moron, a court in this district adjusted Ms. Plata’s hourly rate from $450.00 to $250.00 5 because her practice experience totals less than five years. 2026 WL 357534, at *4. Ms. 6 Plata requests a $500 hourly rate in 2026 with only a few more months of experience, 7 which is $50 per hour more than the amount the Moron court deemed unreasonable earlier 8 this year. (See Pengilley Decl. ¶ 7.) The Court will adjust Ms. Plata’s hourly rates for both 9 2025 and 2026 to $250.00 to reflect her limited practice experience. See Moron, 2026 WL 10 357534, at *4. Additionally, the Court will reduce the hourly rates of associate attorneys 11 Vivian Chen and Gary Balyezyan, given that they have less experience than Ms. Plata. 12 (Pengilley Decl., ¶¶ 7–9; see Blood v. Mercedez-Benz, USA, LLC, No. 23-cv-1463-WQH- 13 AHG 2024 WL 4875265, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2024) (finding a $250 hourly rate 14 reasonable for a first-year associate).) 15 iv. Paralegals and Support Staff 16 Plaintiff contends that the paralegal, legal assistant, and case managers’ hourly rates, 17 at $150, are “lower than hourly rates approved by other California courts.” (ECF No. 20 18 ¶ 14.) Defendant requests that the Court reduce the paralegal, legal assistant, and case 19 managers’ hourly rates to $125 per hour. (ECF No. 23 at 16.) Neither party cites any cases 20 from the relevant legal community (the San Diego area) discussing rates for paralegals and 21 other support staff. “The Southern District of California has upheld paralegal rates ranging 22 from $155/hour to $265/hour in recent ‘lemon law’ cases.” Blood, 2024 WL 4875265, at 23 *5 (collecting cases from 2020 through 2023). The Court accordingly finds the hourly rates 24 of $125 and $150 for paralegals, legal assistants, and case managers reasonable. 25 The Court adjusts the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s counsel as follows for the purpose 26 of determining a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees: 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Name Title Adjusted Hourly Adjusted Hourly 2 Rate 2025 Rate 2026 Stephanie Pengilley Senior Counsel $545.00 $575.00 3 Michelle Yang Founding Partner $525.00 Not Billed 4 Andrea Plata Associate Attorney $250.00 $250.00 5 Vivian Chen Associate Attorney Not Billed $250.00 6 Paralegals, Legal 7 Roxana Rosas $125.00 $150.00 Assistants, Case 8 Samuel Castelan Managers 9 10 2. Hours Expended 11 Plaintiff contends that the number of hours his counsel expended is reasonable based 12 on the work required to litigate this action. (ECF No. 20 at 15–17.) Plaintiff submits the 13 Billing Table in support of his contentions. The Billing Table contains detailed time entries 14 for work beginning with the filing of the Complaint but identifies a “flat rate” of $7,000 15 for pre-litigation services. (Billing Table at 6.) The total number of hours purportedly 16 expended by each attorney is described here: 17 Name Title Hours Expended 18 Stephanie Pengilley Senior Counsel 7.5 19 Michelle Yang Founding Partner 0.4 20 Andrea Plata Associate Attorney 17.4 21 Vivian Chen Associate Attorney 5.2 22 Paralegals, Legal 23 Roxana Rosas 0.3 Assistants, Case 24 Samuel Castelan Managers 25 26 See id. at 2–6. 27 The prevailing party is entitled to “an award of fees for all time reasonably expended 28 in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally 1 is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.” 2 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431 (1983) (quotation omitted). “A fee applicant must 3 provide records documenting the tasks completed and the amount of time spent.” Scott v. 4 Jayco Inc., No. 1:19-cv-0315 JLT, 2021 WL 6006411, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021) 5 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424). “If a court determines that some hours billed are not 6 reasonable, it may exclude them using one of two methods: the court may either conduct 7 an ‘hour-by-hour analysis’ of the fee request or make an ‘across the board percentage cut.’” 8 Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting 9 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013)). The court may exclude 10 “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Yarovoy v. Tesla Motors, 11 Inc., No. 23-cv-04182-JSC, 2024 WL 2412547, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2024) (quoting 12 Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). 13 i. Excessive Billing 14 Defendant contends that the 30.8 hours of billed work set forth in the Billing Table 15 is excessive. (ECF No. 23 at 13, 16.) Defendant identifies the following time entries as 16 problematic: (1) 0.8 hours for Ms. Plata to review Defendant’s Notice of Removal on 17 September 5, 2025; (2) a total of 2.5 hours for Ms. Plata to prepare the Motion to Remand 18 in September; (3) a total of 4.7 hours for Ms. Plata to prepare for the ENE; and (4) a total 19 of 7.0 hours for Ms. Chen and Ms. Pengilley to prepare the instant fees motion in 20 September and October. Id. at 10, 13; see also ECF No. 20-2 at 2–6. 21 Defendant contends, specifically, that Ms. Plata’s billing 0.8 hours to “review and 22 analyze” the Notice of Removal and 2.5 hours to prepare the Motion to Remand is 23 unreasonable because the Motion to Remand was “a copy of hundreds of similar motions 24 in Plaintiff counsel’s other cases” and should be reduced to one billable hour. (ECF No. 23 25 at 10.) Defendant also argues that Ms. Plata’s entry for 4.7 hours to prepare for the ENE is 26 “at best duplicative, but is also plainly just a padding of the bill” and “did not need to take 27 more than two hours.” Id. Lastly, Defendant contends that the instant fees motion is a 28 1 “boilerplate motion” that “largely replicates filings [Plaintiff’s attorneys] have submitted 2 in thousands of other cases,” and thus billing seven hours is excessive. Id. at 14. 3 The time expended related to the Motion to Remand, ENE, and instant fees motion 4 is commensurate with the work described. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s counsel 5 copied the Motion to Remand and instant fees motion from ones used in other cases but 6 provides no evidence to support this contention. The Court accordingly finds the 0.8 hours 7 spent reviewing and analyzing the Notice of Removal and the 2.5 hours spent preparing 8 the Motion to Remand reasonable. Compare Moron, 2026 WL 357534, at *4 (finding 2.9 9 hours reasonable to complete the same tasks), and Garcia, 2023 WL 3961090, at *3 10 (finding 13 hours reasonable to prepare and file motion to remand), with Tapia v. Ford 11 Motor Co., No.: 3:20-cv-01510-W-MSB, 2021 WL 5863597, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 12 2021) (holding that 20.2 hours to prepare a motion to remand was excessive). The Court 13 also declines to adjust the 4.7 hours Ms. Plata expended to prepare for the ENE. (ECF No. 14 23 at 13.) See, e.g., Hellenberg, 2020 WL 1820126, at *4 (finding 12.9 hours to prepare 15 and attend an ENE reasonable). Lastly, the Court finds the 6.9 hours billed to prepare the 16 instant fees motion reasonable. Compare Ovesepyan v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC, No. 17 2:21-cv-01410-FWS-AFM, 2023 WL 8586384, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (finding 18 no more than 9 hours spent on fees motion reasonable), and Moron, 2026 WL 357534, at 19 *5 (adjusting time billed on fees motion to 10 hours), with Evazyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 20 LLC, No. 2:22-cv-06032-JLS-MRW, 2023 WL 11197079, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2023) 21 (finding 15.3 hours billed to prepare fees motion unreasonable). 22 The Court finds the 30.8 total billed hours reasonable. 23 ii. Flat Fee for Pre-Litigation Services 24 Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s request for a flat fee for services rendered before the 25 Complaint was filed. (ECF No. 23 at 7–9.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff improperly 26 “lump[s] fees” together and fails to meet his burden of providing a proper basis for his fee 27 request that is “based on actual time expended.” Id. at 8 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d)). 28 Defendant further contends that, lack of transparency aside, Plaintiff charges an 1 unreasonable amount for simple pre-litigation tasks. Id. at 8–9. In response, Plaintiff 2 contends that the Billing Table sufficiently describes the pre-litigation work and that Ms. 3 Pengilley’s declaration explains the flat-fee structure. (ECF No. 24 at 3–4.) Plaintiff further 4 contends that, even if the Court finds that the flat fee constitutes improper block billing, 5 the Court should merely reduce the flat fees, not eliminate them entirely. Id. at 4–5. 6 “‘Block billing is the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant 7 enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended 8 on specific tasks.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) 9 (quotations and citation omitted). Under California law, “block billing is not objectionable 10 ‘per se,’ though it certainly does increase the risk that the trial court, in a reasonable 11 exercise of its discretion, will discount a fee request.” Jaramillo v. Cnty. of Orange, 200 12 Cal. App. 4th 811, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Christian Rsch. Inst. v. Alnor, 165 Cal. 13 App. 4th 1315, 1325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)). “Block billing is especially troublesome when 14 it exacerbates ‘the vagueness of counsel’s fee request, a risky choice since the burden of 15 proving entitlement to fees rests on the moving party.’” Farmers & Merchs. Bank of Long 16 Beach v. Willemsen, No. EDCV 13-00609-JGB (SPx), 2014 WL 12593981, at *3 (C.D. 17 Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 1325). 18 “[C]ourts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them 19 from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC 20 v. Monroy, 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). “Reducing 21 block billed hours by a certain percentage is warranted because ‘block billing makes it 22 more difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular activities.’” Ussery v. 23 Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00952-DAD-SCR, 2025 WL 2840832, at *3 (E.D. 24 Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (quoting Welch, 480 F.3d at 948). A district court can impose a 10% 25 reduction—a “haircut”—on block billed fees “based on its exercise of discretion and 26 without a more specific explanation.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 27 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 1 The Billing Table contains two entries charging a “flat rate” of $4,500.00 and 2 $2,500.00, respectively. (Billing Table at 6.) The challenged entries read as follows: 3 [$4,500.00] [f]lat rate for all services rendered prior to the preparation of the Pre-litigation Letter and related documents in this matter, including all 4 communications with client, including, but not limited to, case facts, merits 5 of case, applicability of Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act to case facts, client’s contacts to Defendant, attorney-client retainer agreement, and 6 pertinent evidentiary documentation; attorney review of client’s repair orders, 7 purchase contract, current registration, vehicle payment information, and incidental damages; the preparation of the Attorney-Client Retainer 8 Agreement; computation of client’s actual damages; and review of all written 9 and verbal communications with Defendant’s representative(s) outside the context of litigation. 10 11 [$2,500.00] [f]lat rate for all services rendered relating to the preparation of the pre-litigation demand letter required by the Song-Beverly Consumer 12 Warranty Act in order to seek civil penalties, including but not limited to, 13 communications with the Manufacturer, communications with the client, analysis of any offers or responses made by the manufacturer, drafting of the 14 pre-litigation demand letter, compiling all necessary documents for the 15 demand letter, and calendaring deadlines associated with the pre-litigation stage required by the law. 16 Id. 17 In her declaration, Ms. Pengilley states that the firm charges the $4,500.00 flat rate 18 for services rendered prior to the pre-litigation demand letter because it “would be 19 impractical to keep track of billables during the intake stage because many cases do not 20 move forward.” (Pengilley Decl. ¶ 18.) Ms. Pengilley further states that the flat rate of 21 $2,500.00 represents “services rendered between May 15, 2025 to August 1, 2025, relating 22 to the pre-litigation demand letter.” Id. 23 The Court can only award fees for “actual time reasonably billed.” See, e.g., 24 Dalmacio v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 22-1204-KS, 2023 WL 8042566, at *10 (C.D. 25 Cal. Oct. 18, 2023) (citations omitted). However, the “flat rate” entries lump together so 26 many distinct tasks that “the Court has no way to disaggregate the activities to determine 27 whether the time billed for any particular task was reasonable.” Zamora, 2023 WL 28 1 8896264, at *9. The second challenged entry also bills attorney time for “calendaring 2 deadlines associated with the pre-litigation stage.” (Billing Table at 6.) This constitutes 3 clerical work, which is not recoverable as part of an attorneys’ fee award. See, e.g., Acereto 4 v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Case No. EDCV 23-0042 JGB (SPx), 2024 WL 6962875, at 5 *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2024) (holding that “calendaring dates” is a non-compensable, 6 “purely clerical” task). 7 Although the challenged entries are vague, from what the Court can discern, they 8 report an unreasonable number of hours for the work performed. Ms. Pengilley states that 9 the first flat rate equals nine hours of time at a rate of $500 per hour. (Pengilley Decl. ¶ 18.) 10 She does not describe the hourly breakdown of the second flat rate, but it would amount to 11 five hours if billed at the same $500 hourly rate. Id. Fourteen hours is an unreasonable 12 amount of time to spend on pre-litigation tasks, which mostly include reviewing case 13 documents in a relatively simple case, preparing form documents, and communicating with 14 the client. The challenged entries also do not specify which attorney performed the pre- 15 litigation work. If it was Ms. Plata or another attorney with a reasonable hourly rate of 16 $250, the number of hours expended on this work would double—making the flat rates 17 even more unreasonable. Because the challenged entries bill for some non-compensable 18 work, contain insufficient information to assess reasonableness, and charge for an 19 excessive number of overall hours, the Court reduces the “flat rate” award by 30%. See, 20 e.g., Grimes v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 22-01896-MWF (JCx), 2025 WL 1140395, at *6 21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2025) (reducing block-billed entries by 30% for vagueness and billing 22 for non-compensable work). The Court awards a total of $4,900.00 for pre-litigation 23 services. 24 3. Lodestar Multiplier 25 Plaintiff contends that the Court should apply a lodestar multiplier of 0.2 to its 26 calculation of attorneys’ fees because the contingency fee arrangement, “recent changes to 27 the Lemon Law,” and the “potentially protracted nature of this case” required Plaintiff’s 28 counsel to incur “significant financial and operational risks.” (ECF No. 20 at 23.) Plaintiff 1 also notes that his counsel advanced litigation costs and expenses “without the guarantee 2 of reimbursement.” Id. Defendant contends that the Court should not apply a lodestar 3 multiplier because the case is straightforward, it resolved quickly, and Plaintiff’s counsel 4 submitted “boilerplate filings.” (ECF No. 23 at 6.) Defendant further contends that 5 Plaintiff’s hourly rates already account for contingent risk, so a multiplier is unnecessary. 6 Id. at 14–15. 7 “The lodestar amount is considered presumptively reasonable, and only the ‘rare’ or 8 ‘exceptional’ case will justify an upward adjustment.” Rahman v. FCA US LLC, 594 F. 9 Supp. 3d 1199, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 10 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000)). “[T]he party seeking a fee enhancement bears the 11 burden of proof” and district courts are not required to enhance the lodestar amount. 12 Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138. Courts generally consider four factors when determining 13 whether to add a “multiplier” or “enhancement” to the lodestar: “(1) the novelty and 14 difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent 15 to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] 16 (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 442 F. 17 Supp. 3d 1216, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1128). 18 The Court does not find reason to add a lodestar multiplier to the fee award. This 19 case did not involve unusually complex legal issues and did not appear to impose such a 20 burden on Plaintiff’s counsel that they might be expected to have declined other cases. The 21 time, skill, and complexity required to litigate this action are reflected in the lodestar 22 amount. And although Plaintiff’s counsel took this case on contingency, the Song-Beverly 23 Act “is a mandatory fee-shifting statute which ‘eliminates any uncertainty about whether 24 costs will be awarded to the prevailing party.’” Rahman, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (quoting 25 Arias v. Ford Motor Co., No. EDCV 18-1928 PSG (SPx), 2020 WL 1940843, at *2 (C.D. 26 Cal. Jan. 27, 2020)). The Court accordingly declines to apply a lodestar multiplier. See id. 27 at 1207 (declining to award a lodestar multiplier in a “largely routine lemon law case”); 28 Moron, 2026 WL 357534, at *6 (declining to award a lodestar multiplier in a “routine” 1 case arising under the Song-Beverly Act); Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *12 (declining 2 to award a lodestar multiplier “given the routine nature of th[e] case and the lack of novel 3 or complex issues”). 4 4. Summary of Attorneys’ Fees 5 Based on the adjustments made in the preceding analysis, the following table reflects 6 the reasonable hours spent and hourly rates for Plaintiff’s counsel: 7 Name Title 2025 Hours 2026 Hours Adjusted Adjusted 8 2025 Rate 2026 Rate Stephanie Senior 0.2 7.3 $545.00 $575.00 9 Pengilley Counsel 10 Michelle Founding 0.4 Not Billed $525.00 Not Billed 11 Yang Partner 12 Andrea Plata Associate 16.8 0.6 $250.00 $250.00 13 Attorney 14 Vivian Chen Associate Not Billed 5.2 Not Billed $250.00 15 Attorney 16 Roxana Rosas Paralegals, 0.1 0.2 $125.00 $150.00 17 Samuel Legal 18 Castelan Assistants, 19 Case 20 Managers 21 Flat Pre- $4,900.00 22 Litigation Fee 23 24 The total amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to Plaintiff’s counsel is 25 $15,109.00. 26 B. Costs and Expenses 27 Plaintiff requests costs and expenses in the amount of $507.39. (ECF No. 20 at 8.) 28 1 prevailing plaintiff may recover “a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and 2 || expenses.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to 3 ||recover $507.39 in costs and expenses. 4 Vv. CONCLUSION 5 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and 6 || Expenses (ECF No. 20) is granted, as follows. The Court awards Plaintiff $15,109.00 in 7 ||attorneys’ fees and $507.39 in costs and expenses, for a total amount of $15,616.39. The 8 || Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order and close this case. 9 10 Dated: August 10, 2026 bien he 12 United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28