People v. Villalba CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Villalba CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B345034

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. KA076786)

ANTHONY MICHAEL VILLALBA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Neil J. Rosenbaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________________ Anthony Villalba appeals the denial of his petition for relief under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code1 after an evidentiary hearing. The trial court’s finding that appellant was a direct aider and abettor for purposes of implied malice murder is not supported by substantial evidence. We reverse the denial and remand this matter with directions to vacate appellant’s murder conviction and to resentence him in accordance with subdivision (e) of section 1172.6. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1. Facts2 On October 17, 2006, about 14 men were at the basketball courts at Hilda Solis Park. Ten were playing a game on the court, while the remaining sat on a bench, next to a pile of the players’ belongings. Appellant and his codefendant Cruz Soto Lopez (Lopez) approached the courtside bench wearing hoods, Lopez armed with a rifle. Lopez pointed the gun at the players on the bench, and the two men grabbed the players’ cell phones and wallets. The men on the court were alerted to the ongoing robbery and asked appellant and Lopez why they were taking their phones. Lopez responded by firing eight to 10 shots in the direction of the court, which did not hit anyone. Someone yelled that the shooter had no bullets left, and another yelled that it sounded like a BB gun. The players then chased after appellant and Lopez. Filiberto Moreno Hernandez chased Lopez about 15 meters before Lopez turned and shot him in the foot. Filiberto’s brother 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 These facts are drawn from the preliminary hearing transcript.

2 Sabas Moreno Hernandez continued the chase and eventually grabbed ahold of appellant. As Sabas held onto appellant, Lopez shot Sabas in the chest, killing him, and the men absconded with their loot. 2. Procedural history In March 2007, appellant was charged by information with one count of murder, two counts of robbery, and numerous counts of assault with a firearm. In April 2008, appellant pleaded guilty to murder and admitted a firearm allegation in exchange for a sentence of 16 years to life. On March 11, 2021, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel, found a prima facie showing had been made, and set the matter for an OSC. Before the evidentiary hearing, appellant was released from prison on parole. The court convened the hearing on March 24, 2025. It considered the preliminary hearing transcript; neither party submitted additional evidence. The court stated its view that the evidence was “insufficient to support felony murder.” After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court denied appellant’s petition, finding him guilty of murder under a theory of implied malice direct aiding and abetting. It reasoned that appellant “knew of the dangerous nature of Lopez’s conduct and still he aided and facilitated that conduct by continuing to hold onto the property [after Sabas grabbed him], continuing to make efforts to get away” while knowing that Lopez was armed and capable of shooting appellant’s captor.

3 DISCUSSION 1. Section 1172.6, generally The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 in 2018, abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legislature amended section 188 to require that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Section 1172.6 contains the procedure for vacating the murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be convicted because of the amendments to section 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959, 971.) After appointment of counsel (if requested), the trial court must permit briefing and hold a hearing “to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 971.) “If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a prima facie case is made—that is, if the petitioner is not ineligible as a matter of law—the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.

4 (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 543 (Coley).) At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder” under the law as amended by the changes to sections 188 and 189, made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the prosecution does not meet this burden, “the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges” “in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence . . . is not greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (3).) Relevant here, where the murder “was charged generically, and the target offense was not charged,” the “conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (e); People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 474, fn. 5 (Arellano) [“What matters for purposes of subdivision (e)’s requirement that . . . the underlying felony or target offense ‘was not charged’ is that the defendant was neither convicted of the underlying felony or target offense nor was either crime actually litigated”].) We review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) 2. The trial court’s finding that appellant is guilty of implied malice murder as a direct aider and abettor is not supported by substantial evidence. Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of murder liability after Senate Bill No. 1437. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) It “ ‘is based on the combined actus reus 5 of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991 (Reyes).) In the context of implied malice, “ ‘the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of the life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 991; accord, Garcia v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1022.) The record here may support the finding that appellant had the requisite mens rea, but it does not show the actus reus required for direct aiding and abetting. (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712 (Powell) [“ ‘An aider and abettor must do something and have a certain mental state’ ”].) Lopez shot Sabas in the chest to free appellant from Sabas’s grasp. It is too far of a stretch to consider appellant’s circumstance of being physically restrained to be an “act” of his that aided the commission of Lopez’s fatal shooting, even if appellant wanted Lopez to shoot Sabas so he could be freed. Nothing in the record shows appellant told Lopez to shoot, or acted at all to facilitate the shooting—aside from his planning and participation in the underlying robbery. Although direct aiding and abetting liability has been extended to cases where someone has a legal duty to act but fails to do so, we are unaware of any such case outside the 6 context of parent-child or caregiver relationships. (See People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1101; People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 312; People v. Zemek (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 313, 339.) To the extent the People argue that appellant’s conduct of “continuing in the robbery and escape” after Lopez fired his gun qualifies as the actus reus, we are not convinced. “[T]he actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act,” and “[t]he relevant act is the act that proximately causes death.” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 & fn. 27.)3 There is no dispute here that the life-endangering act was Lopez’s shooting Sabas in the chest. Although it was conceivable that continuing with an armed robbery could result in someone’s death, particularly after Lopez had already shot someone, appellant’s act of running away with the stolen goods did not carry the requisite “ ‘ “high degree of probability that it will result in death” ’ ”—if anything, it was an effort to avoid further confrontation between the robbers and the victims. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989; ibid. [“the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense”].) We do not see fit to remand for reconsideration of appellant’s liability for felony murder because the trial court 3 Powell also explained that “there is a dearth of decisional law on aiding and abetting implied malice murder, [which] may be the heretofore availability of the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” which “did not require that the aider and abettor intend to aid the perpetrator in committing a life- endangering act.” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 711, fn. 26.)

7 expressly rejected that possibility. (Cf. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 477 [declining to remand where it “would be an idle act” as shown by the trial court’s statement].) We instead remand for the trial court to vacate appellant’s murder conviction, and to redesignate the conviction as the underlying felony or felonies consistent with section 1172.6, subdivision (e).4 (See People v. Tyus (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 798, 817 [reversing trial court’s decision to simply dismiss the case after vacating a manslaughter conviction (from a plea); the trial court was required to redesignate the conviction as an underlying felony].)

4 Our Supreme Court has not reached the issues of whether a trial court has discretion “to redesignate a murder conviction as multiple underlying felonies or target offenses or whether a court must redesignate an underlying offense in any particular degree.” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 474.) We express no views on those issues either.

8 DISPOSITION The order is reversed and this matter is remanded for the trial court to vacate appellant’s murder conviction and resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (e). NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.