In re J.R. CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 In re J.R. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.R., B350626 a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02493)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Affirmed. Sarah Vanessa Perez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________ Jonathan R. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over his son J.R. (born 2023), as well as a dispositional order removing J.R. from his care. The child’s mother, M.G. (Mother), is nonoffending and not a party to this appeal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. DCFS Investigation Mother and Father had a dating relationship that began in 2022. Father was in prison when J.R. was born but, according to Mother, all three of them lived together beginning in October 2024. The parents’ relationship ended, and they stopped living together in May 2025. DCFS gathered information from Mother and from police reports about domestic violence incidents that occurred following the end of the couple’s relationship. We summarize those incidents, and the facts about them, only as necessary to explain our disposition. At the time of these incidents, Father was living with paternal grandmother, who resided in the same apartment complex as Mother. On either May 23 or 24, 2025, Mother left her apartment on foot and saw Father walking towards her in a common area of their apartment complex. As Mother passed Father, he struck her in the back of the head and called her either a “ ‘stupid whore’ ” or a “ ‘fucken hoe.’ ” Mother did not report the incident 2 to police until one or two days later, on May 25, 2025, after Father had hit her again. On May 25, 2025, Mother was parked at her apartment complex and looking for a phone charger inside her car. Father approached the car, opened the passenger door, and sat inside. He then opened the glove compartment, broke it, and spilled its contents. Mother and Father began arguing. Mother got out of the car, walked around to the passenger side, and attempted to pull Father out of the car. In response, Father struck Mother’s face with a closed fist leaving a visible injury. Mother called the police, and Father left the scene before officers arrived. On June 9, 2025, Mother texted Father to move his car after he had parked it in her residential designated parking spot. Father responded by accusing Mother of stealing from him. Father then came to Mother’s apartment demanding money and for her to let him in. When Mother refused, Father forced his way through the home’s front door, damaging the door frame and molding. Once inside, he demanded to take J.R. When Mother (who was holding J.R.) tried to push Father towards the door, Father struck her face three times with his right fist and grabbed her by the underarm. Father also stepped on Mother’s feet as she was holding J.R. and attempted to grab the child from her arms. J.R.’s six-year-old half-sibling P.M. was present for the entire incident. Both J.R. and P.M. were crying and screaming. At one point, P.M. jumped in front of Mother and told Father to stop hurting Mother. Father fled after Mother called 911. A responding officer observed visible injuries to Mother’s face, underarm, and feet.

3 Prior to a July 1, 2025 incident,1 Mother received more than 50 calls from a “ ‘No Caller ID’ ” number she believed came from Father. Because of Father’s past abuse, Mother did not answer; she later heard messages he had left calling her a hoe and a bitch. On July 1, 2025, Father appeared at the front door of Mother’s residence asking for his clothes. After Mother provided them, Father began arguing about a purse he had given Mother as a gift that he now wanted back. Father also asked to see J.R., who was in the home with Mother. To avoid further confrontation, Mother closed the door on Father. Father responded by striking the door with his hands and kicking it with his feet to force it open. Father damaged the door and managed to force the lock, but Mother and her niece stood behind the door and held it closed so that he could not enter. Father threatened that if they did not open the door “he would ‘fuck them up.’ ” Father overheard Mother calling 911 and fled. He was later arrested. When interviewed by DCFS shortly after his arrest, Father stated that he only hit Mother in self-defense after she got physical with him. Regarding the incident on June 9, 2025, Father denied kicking in the door, hitting Mother, or trying to grab J.R. Father was unable to answer how Mother’s door came to be open if Father did not break it down. As to the July 1, 2025 incident, Father stated he was attempting to retrieve money from Mother and banged on the door when no one answered. The DCFS interviewer stated that Father stumbled on his words 1 A police report in the record refers to this incident as occurring on “Tuesday, 07/02/25.” Tuesday was in fact July 1 and not July 2, 2025.

4 when answering her questions and his explanations made little sense. On July 7, 2025, Father was charged with attempted first- degree residential burglary, injuring a spouse or cohabitant, and vandalism related to the May 25, June 9, and July 1, 2025 incidents, and was served with a criminal protective order (CPO) listing Mother as a protected person. Father thereafter declined to provide any further statements to DCFS because of the pending criminal proceeding. After Father’s domestic violence began, Mother took steps to protect herself and J.R. from it. Mother did not resume her relationship with Father and tried to keep him out of the home where she and J.R. lived. She asked for and was issued an emergency protective order after the May 25, 2025 incident, but police were unable to serve Father with a copy of it. As just mentioned, Mother was given a CPO as protection against Father on July 7, 2025. B. Dependency Proceedings On August 21, 2025, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300 petition alleging J.R. was at a substantial risk of serious physical harm as the result of Mother and Father engaging in violent altercations in the child’s presence. The petition contained two counts, one under section 300, subdivision (a) (count a-1) and one under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (count b-1). Both counts set forth identical supporting allegations: “[Mother and Father] have a history of engaging in violent altercations in the presence of the child. On [July 1, 2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

5 ]2025, [F]ather forcefully attempted to enter [M]other’s home by striking and kicking the door and pushing the door with [F]ather’s body while [M]other and [her] niece . . . held the door close[d] from the inside. [F]ather threatened to physically harm [M]other and niece. [F]ather stalked [M]other by repeatedly calling [her] cell phone over [50] times and leaving [M]other demeaning and derogatory voicemail messages. On [June 9, ]2025, [F]ather forcefully entered [M]other’s home by breaking the door frame in the presence of the child and the child’s sibling [P.M.] [F]ather repeatedly struck [M]other’s face with [F]ather’s fists while [M]other held the child in [M]other’s arms and then attempted to grab the child from [M]other’s arms. The child’s sibling P.M. intervened during the altercation by throwing herself over [M]other and child. [F]ather stepped on [M]other’s feet and attempted to grab the child from [M]other’s arms. On [May 25, ]2025, [F]ather forcefully entered [M]other’s vehicle from the passenger side and broke the vehicle’s glove compartment. [M]other exited the vehicle and grabbed [F]ather by [his] shirt and attempted to pull [F]ather out of the vehicle. [F]ather struck [M]other’s face with [F]ather’s fists inflicting swelling and redness to [M]other’s face. On [May 23, ]2025, [F]ather struck the back of [M]other’s head with [F]ather’s arm. On prior occasions, [M]other struck and scratched [F]ather. . . .” At the initial hearing on September 5, 2025, the juvenile court ordered the child detained from Father and released to Mother. On October 31, 2025, DCFS updated the court about Father’s criminal case. DCFS reported that on October 30, 2025, the criminal court found Father had violated his parole by failing 6 to report to his probation officer as ordered and sent him to jail for 100 days, with 74 days of custody credit. On November 5, 2025, at what was scheduled to be an adjudication hearing, Father’s attorney stated that Father had been released from custody the previous day. At Father’s request, the hearing was continued. On November 13, 2025, the juvenile court held the adjudication and disposition hearing. Minor’s counsel asked the court to sustain the petition, stating Father was the primary aggressor and that the child had been present at some of the domestic violence incidents. Counsel for DCFS and Mother joined in the argument from minor’s counsel. Father’s attorney asked the court to dismiss the petition, or in the alternative to strike the allegations regarding the May 25 and July 1, 2025 incidents as the child was not present on May 25 and (according to counsel) slept through the July 1 incident. The juvenile court sustained the petition as pled. With regard to the hearing on disposition, Mother’s attorney asked the court to immediately close the case with a juvenile custody order. Counsel for the minor, DCFS, and Father all asked the court to order a case plan and continue supervision, although they differed on specifics. A portion of DCFS’s recommendation was to remove J.R. from Father’s care; Father’s counsel submitted on that portion of the recommendation. The court found DCFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent removal, and ordered the child removed from Father and released to Mother. Finding no reason to keep the case open, the court indicated it would close the case via a family law order granting Mother sole legal and physical custody, with monitored visitation for Father.

7 On November 14, 2025, the court signed the juvenile custody order and terminated jurisdiction. The order provides that Father’s visitation will be monitored and occur three times per week. The court found monitored visitation appropriate based on Father’s need to attend and make substantial progress in a 52-week domestic violence program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. DISCUSSION A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Assertion of Jurisdiction The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over J.R. under both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. As substantial evidence supports the assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 300, we address only that ground. “When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether . . . the other alleged statutory ground[] for jurisdiction [is] supported by the evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 300, subdivision (a) permits the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (Ibid.) “[I]ncidents of domestic violence between a 8 child’s parents, if they occur in the child’s immediate presence, may support a jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a). [Citation.] For example, if a father strikes an infant’s mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as nonaccidental.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603.) “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) 2. Analysis Father admits that “[t]he record establishes, without dispute, that Father perpetrated sporadic intimate partner violence against Mother from May through July 2025.” There is also substantial evidence that J.R. was not only present during the June 9 domestic violence incident but right in the middle of it—Father tried to rip J.R. out of Mother’s arms as he assaulted her. J.R.’s six-year-old half-sibling tried to intervene to stop Father’s brutality; fortunately, she was not injured but Mother was. Father returned to Mother’s apartment on July 1, where J.R. was present, and broke down the door demanding to see J.R.

9 The only reason J.R. did not again end up in the middle of Father’s violence against Mother is that Mother and her niece managed to hold the door closed despite Father’s attempt to force his way in. These facts are sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) Father contends that the June 9 incident was an isolated one and that J.R. was no longer at risk at the time of the November 2025 adjudication hearing because (1) Mother and Father no longer resided together, (2) no incidents occurred after July 1, 2025, and (3) a CPO was in place protecting Mother and there was no evidence Father violated that order. The parents did not live together at any point during Father’s violence towards Mother; all the violence occurred after Father moved out. Thus, the parents’ lack of cohabitation did not minimize the risks to J.R. Although no incidents happened after July 1, 2025, Father ignores that he was in jail for a significant period between his arrest on July 7 and the November 13, 2025 adjudication hearing. His inability to attack Mother while in custody hardly demonstrates a lack of risk once Father was released from custody. Father’s adherence to the CPO was a factor in his favor, but evidence of past conduct can demonstrate a current risk of harm if there is a reason to believe the conduct will recur. (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411 [“in a domestic violence situation, past violence is highly probative of the risk that violence may recur”].) Father’s violence not only continued but escalated before his eventual arrest and dependency court intervention. Given the relatively short amount of time between the last incident and the adjudication hearing, and the fact Father had not yet attended any program 10 for domestic violence offenders, the juvenile court could reasonably infer there was a substantial risk such violence would recur. J.R. was approximately two and a half years old and constantly with Mother. The juvenile court thus had substantial evidence at the time of the adjudication hearing from which it could find J.R. remained at substantial risk of serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally. B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review A juvenile court may remove a child from a parent’s physical custody where clear and convincing evidence shows that there is a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child, or there would be if the child were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without removal from the parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) When reviewing “ ‘a dispositional order removing a child from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard of review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’ ” ’ ” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520-521.) 2. Analysis Father makes the conclusory assertion that “the trial court failed to consider less drastic measures than removal.” Before the juvenile court, Father did not argue that any reasonable means existed to protect J.R. from Father short of removal;

11 indeed, Father did not even oppose that portion of DCFS’s recommendation. Father’s appellate brief likewise fails to identify any potential reasonable means to protect J.R. short of removal. The same substantial evidence of Father’s domestic violence that supports the court’s exercise of jurisdiction also supports its decision to remove J.R. from Father’s care. Father’s claim that the court’s assessment of him “paints a skewed picture that completely overlooks [his] significant redeeming qualities” asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Father’s primary complaint seems to be that the court closed the case instead of continuing to assert jurisdiction and giving him time to complete a case plan. Such complaints might go to the propriety of issuing a juvenile custody order with monitored visitation for Father, which Father does not challenge; they do not cast doubt on the removal order. The lack of time to make progress with a case plan does not show that, as of the time of the disposition hearing (when the court had not yet established any case plan), the court erred in removing J.R. from Father’s care.

12 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and removal order are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.