In re Oliver F. CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 In re Oliver F. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re OLIVER F., B352325 a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP03598)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANA F., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed. John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________ Appellant Dana F. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over her son Oliver F. (born 2019). The child’s presumed father, Justin C. (Father), did not participate in the proceedings below and is not a party to this appeal. As substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We summarize only those portions of the record pertinent to our consideration of Mother’s jurisdictional challenge. A. Initial Referral and Investigation At the time relevant to this appeal, Oliver lived with Mother. Father was absent; he had an extensive criminal history, had absconded from a halfway house in Missouri, and was a fugitive with an outstanding warrant for his arrest. On November 18, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging general neglect of Oliver by Mother. Neighbors had told police officers conducting a welfare check at Mother’s apartment that Mother appeared mentally ill and had been acting erratically and breaking things for the past six months. Neighbors also reported hearing the child inside Mother’s home sounding distressed, scratching a wall, and saying “ ‘ let me out.’ ” When police arrived, no one was at Mother’s apartment but the front door was open. When later contacted about what police had 2 observed, one of the officers told DCFS that he saw both sliding bolt and chain locks outside what appeared to be the child’s bedroom. On November 18, 2025, DCFS spoke to staff at Oliver’s school, who said that his attendance was sporadic and that Mother had checked the child out of school the previous week. DCFS went to Mother’s apartment; the front door was broken off its hinges and no one appeared to be home. One neighbor said she had recently seen the child on the balcony alone at 4:30 a.m. talking to himself. Another neighbor told DCFS that she had called police based on concerns about the child’s safety. While in her own apartment above Mother’s, the neighbor heard the child scream “let me out” from what the neighbor believed was the child’s bedroom. Maternal aunt Chelsea B.,1 who lived in Florida, told DCFS that Mother had diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and that Chelsea did not believe Mother was taking her medication. Chelsea reported that a few weeks earlier Mother had left California in an electric car. Mother abandoned the car in Kentucky after it lost charging power, and Mother and Oliver were taking buses back to California. Chelsea learned of Mother’s travel when Mother unexpectedly showed up at the home of another maternal aunt, Shannon M., in Missouri. Shannon told Chelsea that Mother appeared to be manic and suffering from mental health issues, and that Oliver was autistic and kept misbehaving. Mother told Shannon that Mother had taken the child out of school because of his behavioral issues and 1 The record sometimes also spells maternal aunt’s first name as “Chelsey.”

3 had deactivated her Facebook account. After staying for a while, Mother and Oliver left Shannon’s home abruptly and departed for California. After hearing from Shannon, Chelsea reached out to a family friend who lived in Southern California, R.C., asking if he could check on Mother. R.C. went to Mother’s apartment, but no one responded when he knocked on the door. Saying he did so at Chelsea’s request, R.C. forced the door open (which knocked it off its hinges) and found Mother sitting in the dark. Mother appeared to be “high.” R.C. did not see Oliver. Upon hearing this from R.C., Chelsea wondered if Mother was abusing Adderall as Mother was addicted to it in the past. When DCFS contacted R.C., he confirmed Chelsea’s account but said Mother appeared either “high as a kite or depressed.” He also stated that he saw a deadbolt lock outside a bedroom door in the apartment. When DCFS returned to Mother’s home later on November 18, 2025, no one answered the door. DCFS then saw the garage door open and Mother exit through it looking disheveled. When DCFS attempted to speak to Mother, she refused to engage, got in her car with Oliver, and drove off. During DCFS’s investigation, Oklahoma Child Protective Services (OCPS) contacted DCFS. OCPS stated that local police in Oklahoma had received calls about Mother when she and the child were in the state, including a report on October 18, 2025, that Mother was seen hitting the child in a parking lot and having difficulty controlling his behavior. When local police in Oklahoma contacted Mother, she told them that she and Oliver were using ride shares to go to Missouri to visit family. Mother asked the officers for OCPS’s phone number so she could ask 4 about “custody and possible adoption” of the child because she could not control his behavior. DCFS spoke to maternal aunt Shannon about Mother’s visit. Shannon reported that in mid-October 2025, Mother called in a manic state needing somewhere to stay as Mother had abandoned her electric car after running out of money to recharge it. Mother said she was trying to get Oliver’s attention deficit disorder (ADD) medication refilled. Mother admitted to abusing ADD medication, and said she was suffering from withdrawal symptoms which were causing her erratic behavior. Shannon said that when Mother showed up at Shannon’s house in Missouri, “nothing made sense.” Mother had no change of clothes for her or the child, said she had accidentally smashed her cellphone, and was very vague about what was going on. Shannon said Oliver acted like a “ ‘Tasmanian devil’ ” and often caused trouble while at Shannon’s home. After staying a week, Mother left to retrieve her car. Shannon later received a text message from Mother indicating that she and Oliver had returned to California. B. Dependency Petition and Initial Proceedings On November 24, 2025, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300 petition alleging Oliver was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm based on Mother’s failure or inability to adequately supervise him and/or Mother’s inability to regularly care for him as a result of her untreated mental illness.

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

5 That same day, DCFS executed a removal order at Mother’s home with police officers present. Upon entering the home, a DCFS social worker observed that it smelled of smoke and was in disarray, including broken mirrors, the mattress in the child’s bedroom flipped on its side along with carved scratches in the wall, and a hammer near the kitchen sink. A police officer informed DCFS that the smoke had resulted from Mother smashing her cellphone. DCFS then observed Mother’s broken cellphone submerged in water to prevent it from reigniting. After Oliver was taken into protective custody, DCFS learned Mother had been involuntarily hospitalized due to concerns with self- harm. On November 25, 2025, the juvenile court held an initial hearing at which Mother was not present due to her hospitalization. The court ordered the child to remain detained from parental custody and to be suitably placed by DCFS. On December 2, 2025, Mother met with DCFS. Mother denied any mental health diagnoses or current substance abuse. Mother believed that the people DCFS previously interviewed during its investigation “had hacked into her phone and stolen her identity.” Mother also believed unnamed people from Texas had stolen her identity a few months earlier. Mother explained that she took the child with her when she ended up in Missouri because she wanted to see family in-person due to concerns that the messages Mother was receiving from purported family members were instead coming from those who hacked her phone. Mother asserted DCFS had spoken with people impersonating the maternal aunts rather than Chelsea and Shannon. Mother said when she spoke to police in Oklahoma, she was feeling stressed from “everything that had happened to her” including 6 the child’s misbehavior. Mother said she took the child out of school after returning to California because she was concerned about his safety “due to the people watching her and hacking into her phone.” On December 3, 2025, DCFS spoke to Ms. G, one of the child’s then-current resource parents. Ms. G. said Oliver was very nervous about his visit with Mother that day, and stated he did not want to return to Mother’s home and instead remain with the resource family. Later that same day, a social worker met with Oliver before the child visited Mother at DCFS’s offices. When asked if he knew why he was removed from Mother’s care, the child replied, “ ‘Because my mom hammered her phone and smoke came out and the fireman came to put out the fire.’ ” After the visit began, Mother watched some videos on her cell phone. When the child asked if he could also watch, Mother told him not to touch the phone’s screen because “this is how they stole their identity.” On December 4, 2025, Ms. G. informed DCFS that the child had returned from his visit with Mother with a backpack, dog harness, and shoes that Mother had given him. While emptying out the backpack, Ms. G. “felt something strange and heard a bing sound,” and discovered a tracking device sown into the backpack’s lining. Ms. G. later also discovered tracking devices secreted inside the dog harness and one of the shoes. Fearful that Mother now knew her address, which was confidential, Ms. G. requested that the child be placed in a new home. When asked about these devices, Mother claimed she forgot there was a tracking device in the backpack and asserted it was not active. Mother also told the DCFS social worker who called about the tracking devices that Mother would like to forward false 7 information written by the original investigating DCFS worker, and “information about her incident of ‘identity theft’ and ‘burglary.’ ” In mid-December 2025, DCFS spoke again with maternal aunt Chelsea. Chelsea reported that Mother had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues. Mother’s mental health issues included being diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia “a long time ago,” and having periodic manic episodes and hallucinations. One recent hallucination was that both maternal aunts “were AI” and “people [were] hacking into her accounts.” Mother’s substance abuse included using methamphetamine when she did not have her prescribed Adderall and abusing drugs when pregnant with Oliver. During DCFS’s investigation, Oliver displayed concerning outbursts. During a monitored visit with Mother on December 23, 2025, the child became upset when not allowed to play games on Mother’s phone. He threw Mother’s purse and stomped on it; he then found a bottle of water, dumped the water on the floor, and refused to clean it up. After Mother left to get some towels, the child tried to block the door and called Mother a “fucking asshole.” Mother again asked the child to clean up the water; the child refused and remained upset, telling Mother “ ‘I hate you,’ ” and “ ‘I never wanted you [to] be [my] mom.’ ” Eventually the child calmed down. Outbursts also occurred with others besides Mother. On January 12, 2026, the child’s placement changed. During a medical visit in connection with that change, the child had a violent outburst that included hitting, kicking, and biting. DCFS also conducted a forensic interview in connection with the change in placement. Although calm during the interview, the child 8 later became aggressive and violent when he was unable to find games on the social worker’s phone. The child “trashed the whole exam room,” “throwing furniture” and “br[eaking] equipment” despite the social worker’s attempts to redirect him and calm him down. On January 14, 2026, the child’s then-current resource parents requested a change in placement following an incident earlier that same day. The resource parents had asked Oliver to get ready because they needed to take another child in their care to an appointment. Oliver “began to scream” that he did not want to leave because he would lose his internet connection. The resource parent replied they could reconnect to the internet at the appointment facility and proceeded to buckle Oliver into his car seat. The child unbuckled himself twice and threw items at the resource parent. He also hit, scratched, and cursed at the resource parent. The resource parent was unable to calm the child down. A DCFS social worker advised an emergency psychiatric evaluation, which occurred. The next day, January 15, 2026, a social worker at the child’s elementary school reported to DCFS that Oliver kicked another student in the face and shoved two others while having a tantrum; he referred to the children he injured as “ ‘fucking asshole[s]’ ” and said “ ‘I want to kill them.’ ” The child also injured four adults, including biting the school social worker so hard that he broke her skin, and had previously punched, kicked, and spat at others at the school. Also on January 15, 2026, DCFS met with Mother and the child’s wrap-around care team to discuss how best to address the child’s behavioral issues and Mother’s goals to reunify.

9 C. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing On January 22, 2026, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The day before that hearing, DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition. Count b-1, which was carried over from the original petition, continued to allege that Mother’s mental health issues rendered her incapable of providing regular care and supervision for the child, and that Mother had failed to consistently participate in mental health treatment services and to regularly take prescribed psychotropic medication. A new count, count b-2, alleged that Mother had demonstrated a limited ability to provide appropriate parental care and supervision in response to the child’s assaultive behavior. In connection with the jurisdiction portion of the hearing, Mother called A.G. (a DCFS social worker involved with the family) as a witness. A.G. testified that Oliver “can be very violent towards staff at the school, his mother, caregivers, and other children. He can hit, spit, kick, bite, and throw things. There’s been multiple occasions where he’s left marks and bruises on other staff at the school, kids, and the caregiver.” These behaviors resulted in approximately five changes of placement. A.G had monitored Mother’s visits, and testified Mother would “[s]ometimes” “de-escalate Oliver” when he had tantrums or outbursts during visits. Mother responded to the child’s behavioral issues in different ways, including (1) trying to calm the child down, (2) not engaging with the child, which was sometimes effective, and (3) leaving the visitation room, which included one instance where Mother left for over an hour due to her not being able to deal with the child’s behaviors.

10 Counsel for both DCFS and the minor asked the court to sustain the amended petition and assume jurisdiction over the child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the amended petition in its entirety. The juvenile court struck count b-1 and sustained count b- 2. As to count b-1, the court found DCFS failed to prove a nexus between Mother’s history of mental and emotional problems and the child being at the defined risk of harm. As support for its ruling on count b-2, the court pointed to evidence that Mother had barricaded the child in a room so that he could not leave, resulting in the child screaming for help and to be let out, and evidence of Mother hitting Oliver in Oklahoma before bystanders. As to disposition, the juvenile court declared the child a dependent of the court, ordered him returned to Mother’s physical custody, granted Mother family maintenance services, and denied Father any services based on his whereabouts being unknown. DISCUSSION Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s sustaining of count b-2. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) permits a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over a child if a preponderance of the evidence shows that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A); see also § 355, subd. (a).) “A jurisdiction 11 finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires [DCFS] to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) does not require “a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624.) We review whether substantial evidence supports a challenged jurisdictional finding. (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) “Substantial evidence is a deferential standard, but it is not toothless.” (Id. at p. 892.) “ ‘To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) “We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (Ibid.) B. Substantial Evidence Supports Count b-2 Mother acknowledges Oliver’s behavioral issues “presented challenges for her” and she made “less-than-perfect efforts to manage them.” But she asserts that to demonstrate Oliver was at substantial risk of serious physical harm, DCFS had to (and failed) to show she “had a complete inability to manage these behaviors.”

12 There is substantial evidence that Oliver presented behavioral challenges to his caregivers and engaged in behavior that endangered himself and others. Those behaviors posed significant challenges for all involved, including Mother. The evidence also shows that Mother repeatedly demonstrated an inability to manage these behaviors, and that inability posed a substantial risk of serious injury to the child. Mother had a deadbolt and a chain lock on the outside of the child’s bedroom, and repeatedly imprisoned the child inside his room for long enough that neighbors became concerned. Oliver was forced to claw at the walls and scream to be let out. Locking a six-year-old in a room unsupervised for an extended period poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to that child. So did Mother’s excessive physical discipline such as that observed in Oklahoma. Mother’s lack of supervision also included allowing Oliver to be alone on an apartment balcony at 4:30 a.m.; for a child with impulse control issues, that also posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the child. Mother contends that Oliver was no longer at risk by the time of the jurisdictional hearing because she was taking advantage of DCFS referrals for services. We commend Mother for engaging with these services, but we decline her invitation to reweigh the evidence. Although the evidence Mother highlights about her participation in services favored her position, other evidence before the juvenile court pointed in the opposite direction. Mother had been inconsistent with her psychotropic medication and mental health treatment. When contacted by the police in Oklahoma, Mother did not request help in managing Oliver’s behavior but asked for information about how she could give him away to state authorities. She sabotaged one of Oliver’s 13 placements (causing more emotional disruption to him) by attempting to secret tracking devices in items she gave him; that in turn appears to have exacerbated Oliver’s outbursts rather than helped to limit or manage them. During one supervised visit, Mother left Oliver in the care of the monitor for over an hour rather than attempt to manage Oliver’s behavior.3 The underlying tenor of Mother’s argument appears to be that her inability to handle Oliver’s outbursts was no worse (and in fact better) than anyone else’s, and that his outbursts were more frequent with others rather than with her, such that it was unfair for the court to single her out. But as already explained, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) “authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) Our affirmance of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings does not cast blame Mother’s way. “ ‘The loss of parental control is rarely if ever attributable solely to the parent or the child. It is instead the result of a long and complicated chain of actions and reactions culminating in the child’s refusal to submit to parental authority. To attempt to affix responsibility on one party or the other is alien not only to the spirit and letter of the juvenile court 3 These facts stand in contrast to those In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, on which Mother relies. In that case, the Court of Appeal held a section 300, subdivision (b)(1) charge unsupported where there was no evidence that a mother with mental illness had hit her child or “left [him] alone or unsupervised,” and was instead “ ‘very attentive’ to her son’s needs” and cared for him appropriately. (In re Joaquin C., at pp. 562-563.)

14 laws, but to any realistic view of family relationships.’ ” (Id. at p. 635.) DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s jurisdiction order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.