In re S.S. CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 In re S.S. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re S.S. et al., Persons Coming B347949 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01148)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENESIS M., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Appeal dismissed. Thomas Stephens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________________ We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) Genesis M. (Mother) filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s June 16, 2025 disposition orders concerning her four children. She seeks reversal of all jurisdictional findings, made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), against her and Anthony C. (the father of three of her children). The findings include that Mother and Anthony abused methamphetamine and marijuana, failed to protect the children from each other’s substance abuse, and their infant child was born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. In her opening appellate brief, Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings. Anthony did not file a notice of appeal from the disposition orders. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a respondent’s brief, addressing the merits of Mother’s contentions and arguing that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings. Simultaneously, DCFS filed a request for judicial notice of juvenile court minute orders showing that on April 16, 2026, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of the eldest child and awarded Mother and Anthony joint legal and physical 2 1 custody of their three children. No parent appealed from these April 16, 2026 orders, and the statutory deadline for doing so has passed. “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the [appellant] must complain of an ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) To establish the appeal is not moot, the appellant must “demonstrate[] a specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional finding[].” (Id. at p. 273.) Absent such a specific legal or practical consequence, we may still exercise our discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal in a dependency case. (Id. at pp. 282-283, 286 [setting forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing “whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal,” and noting that “no single factor is necessarily dispositive”].) “As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s determination.’ (Id. at p. 282.) In the dependency context, specifically, “Courts may consider whether the challenged jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for 1 We grant this unopposed request for judicial notice.

3 [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) Moreover, “The exercise of discretionary review may . . . be informed by whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) Because neither Mother nor DCFS addressed mootness in their initial appellate briefing, we requested that the parties file supplemental briefing addressing whether this appeal is moot and should be dismissed on that basis. In her supplemental brief, Mother concedes her appeal is moot, acknowledging she suffers no ongoing harm since dependency jurisdiction was terminated and the juvenile court awarded her legal and physical custody of her children. She asks us to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of her moot appeal, arguing this case presents issues of “ ‘broad public interest’ ” that are “ ‘likely to recur,’ ” such as “the reliance state agencies may have in the ruling,” “not having families inappropriately intruded upon,” and “not having erroneous rulings evade review.” As Mother does not claim the jurisdictional findings are stigmatizing or could be prejudicial to her, DCFS argues in its supplemental brief that “discretionary review of [M]other’s moot appeal is not warranted.” In determining whether to exercise our discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal, we are “guided by the overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) “[K]eeping in mind the[se] broad principles and [the] nonexhaustive factors discussed” in D.P. (id. at p. 287), we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal, and we dismiss it. Mother has reunified with her 4 children; she has not suggested a potential, prejudicial consequence arising from the jurisdictional findings; and we disagree with her assertion that her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings presents an issue of broad public interest that would warrant discretionary review of this moot appeal.

DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.