Jones v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 Jones v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

EMERTHA JONES, B349611

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STCP02187) v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Doreen B. Boxer, Judge. Affirmed. Emertha Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Dana L. Stenvick; Manning│Kass and Chris Datomi for Defendants and Respondents.

__________________________ INTRODUCTION Emertha Jones initiated an arbitration against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and Southern California Permanente Medical Group (collectively, Kaiser) for alleged medical malpractice by their physicians. The arbitrator concluded that Jones’s claim was time-barred and issued an award in favor of Kaiser. Jones filed a petition in superior court to vacate the award. Kaiser filed a cross petition to confirm the award. The superior court denied the petition to vacate, granted the petition to confirm, and entered judgment in Kaiser’s favor. Jones now appeals. Judicial review of an arbitration award is limited, and we do not find any merit to Jones’s challenges to the award in this case. Code of Civil Procedure1 section 340.5 sets forth the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, which is “three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” Jones asserts she was denied the opportunity to present evidence that the three-year limit was tolled, but both her pleadings below and in this court show that more than one year lapsed after she discovered her injury before she brought her action against Kaiser. As section 340.5 requires applying the one-year limit if it “occurs first,” Jones’s claim is time-barred regardless of her arguments about the three-year limit.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We summarize only those portions of the arbitration and superior court proceedings relevant to our resolution of this appeal. A. The Arbitration 1. Jones Files an Arbitration Demand Alleging Medical Malpractice On November 30, 2023, Jones filed a demand for arbitration against Kaiser.2 The demand alleged, in relevant part, as follows: Jones underwent a routine cervical examination at Kaiser on January 9, 2019, and “[her] tests came back [n]ormal.” In February 2019, she “began to experience light streaks of blood when [she] had a bowel movement,” and was examined by Dr. Benjamin Dacula. At Jones’s request, Dr. Dacula provided a referral for a colonoscopy. Dr. William Go performed the colonoscopy on May 21, 2019. After the colonoscopy, Dr. Go informed Jones that she had cancer and referred her to Kaiser’s radiation oncology department. Jones saw Dr. Joan Ryoo on June 5, 2019, and saw Dr. Seyed Monemian on June 26, 2019. Jones underwent chemotherapy and radiation treatments which she completed in September of 2019. After completing her treatments, Jones “was never advised that [she] needed to insert a vaginal dilator daily to prevent [her]

2 Jones’s demand named Kaiser Permanente Medical Groups, but Southern California Permanente Medical Group was treated as the proper respondent in the arbitration.

3 vagina from complet[e]ly closing nor was [she] ever exam[ined] for it.” (Capitalization omitted.) Jones saw Dr. Ryoo on February 3, 2022 for a follow-up examination. Jones later began experiencing abdominal pain and, on March 9, 2022, was seen at urgent care, where she underwent tests and was sent home. She called Dr. Go on March 11, and was seen by Dr. Dacula on March 18, 2022, complaining about “excruciating pain.” Dr. Go referred Jones to a gynecologist. Before she was seen by the gynecologist, Jones went to urgent care twice, where CT scans were performed and she was prescribed pain medication. Medical staff attempted to insert an instrument into Jones’s vagina but were unable to do so because Jones bled and experienced pain. The CT scans showed that Jones had a fibroid. On April 27, 2022, gynecology surgeon Dr. Malaika Williams Amneus discovered that Jones’s vagina had closed. On May 9, 2022, Dr. Amneus performed a surgery for the fibroid. At a follow-up appointment on June 6, 2022, Dr. Amneus informed Jones that her vagina was closed and she needed to see her oncologist. Jones saw Dr. Ryoo on August 4, 2022, and was given a vaginal dilator and prescribed hydrocortisone cream to use twice a day. This was the first time Jones had heard of a vaginal dilator. Jones tried using the dilator for a year but it was painful. During a medical examination on September 21, 2023, Jones told the doctor she could no longer continue using the dilator because “it was painful and not working.” The doctor told Jones there was no cure and she was sorry. Jones alleged she had suffered discomfort, depression, and emotional distress.

4 2. The Arbitrator Concludes Jones’s Claim is Time- barred and Issues an Award to Kaiser According to Jones, between January and April 2024 the parties to the arbitration exchanged discovery. On May 19, 2024, Kaiser filed a motion in the arbitration for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Jones’s demand for arbitration was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 340.5. Section 340.5 provides, in relevant part: “In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person.” The arbitrator held a telephonic hearing on Kaiser’s motion on June 11, 2024. The arbitrator granted Kaiser’s motion in a detailed written decision dated and delivered to the parties on June 14, 2024. The arbitrator first found that Jones was alleging medical malpractice with respect to treatment she received between January 9, 2019 and August 4, 2022, which resulted in “scarring and strictures in [Jones’s] vaginal canal.” The arbitrator then concluded that Jones’s claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period set forth in section 340.5. Citing Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, the arbitrator explained that this 5 one-year period “begins when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that their injury was caused by wrongdoing, regardless of whether they know the precise nature of the wrongdoing.” The arbitrator found, based on the treatment chronology Jones had alleged in her arbitration demand, that “[Jones] discovered the alleged malpractice on any[ ]one or all of four dates in 2022. The last of the possible discovery dates was August 4, 2022, and thus [Jones] had one year from that date to file a [c]laim. The best outcome cutoff date (and liberally construing [Jones’s] chronology) was in August 2022, which would require [Jones] to file her claim no later than in August 2023.” The arbitrator also found that Jones’s claim was time- barred under the three-year limitations period set forth in section 340.5, stating, “The most liberally construed limit in this case based upon [Jones’s] arguments would have been when [Jones] should have been proscribed [sic] the dilator after completing [radiation therapy] in September 2019. This would make the three-year cutoff date September 2022.” The arbitrator acknowledged that the three-year limitations period was subject to tolling and addressed Jones’s claim the statute of limitations had been tolled under section 340.5 due to fraud or concealment. The arbitrator rejected Jones’s tolling claim, concluding that “[Jones] would need to establish that the physicians knew that vaginal dilation following [radiation therapy] was effective treatment and that the physicians intentionally misled or failed to inform [Jones]. Proof of the efficacy of vaginal dilation following radiotherapy treatment would be necessary to establish that material information was concealed from [Jones]. [Jones] has not introduced any evidence of efficacy of dilation and that 6 [r]espondent physician(s) would or should have been aware of the treatment in order to establish that there was a willful intent to conceal the treatment.” The arbitrator noted that Jones had requested leave to amend and implicitly denied the request. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of Kaiser based on her ruling that Jones’s claims were time-barred. 3. Jones Reiterates Her Request for Leave to Amend after Receiving the Arbitrator’s Decision The arbitrator delivered her decision to the parties by e- mail on June 14, 2024. Jones responded to the e-mail requesting the arbitrator put “[the arbitration] decision . . . on hold” so that she could allege or submit facts to “prove [she] should be granted the three[-]year statute [of limitations] instead of the one[-]year statute [of limitations].” (Capitalization omitted.) On June 17, 2024, the arbitrator responded that her decision was final and stated, in part, “The outcome of the [m]otion [for judgment on the pleadings] was based upon [Jones’s] version of the dates and facts . . . . Those facts . . . established the prima facie evidence for application of [section 340.5].” B. Superior Court Proceedings 1. Jones’s Petition to Vacate On July 10, 2024, Jones filed a petition in superior court pursuant to section 1286.2 to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator refused Jones’s request to amend her claims and failed to consider facts regarding fraud and concealment supporting Jones’s claim the statute of limitations should be tolled. Jones claimed the award should be vacated because “the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority, and the award cannot be fairly corrected,” and because “the arbitrator 7 unfairly refused to postpone the hearing or to hear evidence useful to settle the dispute.”3 Jones attached documents from the arbitration, including the arbitrator’s ruling on the statute of limitations issue and Jones’s subsequent e-mail to the arbitrator asking to “put on hold” that decision for the arbitrator to consider Jones’s evidence supporting her claim that the three-year statute of limitations applied instead of the one-year period. Jones summarized the chronology of her medical care beginning on April 27, 2022, when she was informed by Dr. Amneus that her vagina was closed, including Dr. Amneus referring Jones to an oncologist on June 6, 2022, Dr. Ryoo “document[ing] . . . [s]ignificant [v]aginal [s]tenosis ([s]carring)” on August 4, 2022, and Dr. Ryoo informing her on September 21, 2023, that the “scarring . . . was irreversible.” Jones also asserted that Dr. Ryoo had “documented and concealed pertinent information when she discovered fibrosis (scarring)” on five dates beginning on November 16, 2020, and “it should have been disclosed to [Jones] that scarring was discovered by Dr. Ryoo, before [Jones] discovered it [on April ]27[, 20]22.” Jones contended that the three-year statute of limitations “should be extended . . . to toll the repose period when [she] discovered the injury [on] April[] 27, 2022.” Jones filed an amended petition to vacate on September 4, 2024, again alleging the arbitrator had denied Jones’s request to 3 Jones utilized a form petition and made these claims by checking boxes next to standard language asserting claims for vacatur of an arbitration award under section 1286.2. The two claims asserted by Jones corresponded to the grounds for vacatur set forth in subdivision (a)(4) and (5) of section 1286.2.

8 amend and did not consider the facts Jones had proffered. Jones continued to claim that the arbitration award should be vacated because “the arbitrator unfairly refused to postpone the hearing or to hear evidence useful to settle the dispute,” and also added the claim that the award should be vacated because it “was obtained by corruption, fraud, or other unfair means.”4 Jones stated the petition was being amended to remove any reference to the arbitration administrator and to “correct[] the names of the Kaiser entities involved.” 2. Kaiser’s Petition to Confirm On October 16, 2024, Kaiser filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award.5 3. Jones’s Opposition to Kaiser’s Petition to Confirm On October 28, 2024, Jones filed a response to Kaiser’s petition to confirm. She contended the arbitration award should be vacated, and not confirmed, because she had sought leave to amend in the arbitration based on “additional evidence of fraud and concealment” but the arbitrator nonetheless decided the arbitration. Jones sought vacatur of the arbitration award under section 1286.2, subdivisions (a)(3) (for “misconduct of [the] arbitrator”) and (a)(5) (for the arbitrator’s failure “to postpone the 4 As noted, Jones utilized a form petition and made these claims by checking boxes on the form. The two claims asserted by Jones in her amended petition corresponded to the grounds for vacatur set forth in subdivision (a)(1) and (5) of section 1286.2. 5 Kaiser filed an amended petition to confirm on October 31, 2024, and on November 19, 2024 filed a further amended petition, which included as attachments Jones’s enrollment forms and the applicable arbitration agreements.

9 hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor” or “refus[ing] . . . to hear evidence material to the controversy”). 4. Kaiser’s Opposition to Jones’s Petition to Vacate and Response to Jones’s Opposition to Kaiser’s Petition to Confirm On October 31, 2024, Kaiser filed an opposition to Jones’s petition and a response to Jones’s opposition to Kaiser’s petition. In both pleadings, Kaiser argued that the arbitrator correctly determined that the applicable statute of limitations barred Jones’s medical malpractice claim and appropriately denied Jones leave to amend her allegations, and that Jones failed to establish any of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award under section 1286.2 she relied upon. 5. Jones’s Reply in Support of Her Petition to Vacate On November 5, 2024, Jones responded to Kaiser’s opposition to her petition. She contended the arbitrator’s “refusal to allow [Jones] to amend [her] complaint compromised the fairness of the arbitration process.” 6. Jones Provides Additional Argument and Documents In a March 7, 2025 filing, Jones contended that “[d]uring [d]iscovery [in the arbitration process she] discovered that [her] cancer-treating doctor was fully aware and documented that [she] was scar[r]ed for life.” (Boldface omitted.) She further “argue[d] that the statute [of limitations] should start when [she] discovered in March 2024 during discovery, the doctor’s intentional concealment and awareness of the scarring and medical negligence” and that “the doctor’s failure to inform [her] about the necessary aftercare treatments [was] a continuing violation, which tolls the statute of limitations until the violation 10 ceases. The doctor’s omission prevented [Jones] from discovering the full extent of [her] injury and taking timely legal action.” Jones attached medical records which she contended supported her argument. 7. The Superior Court’s Ruling At the beginning of the August 6, 2025 hearing on the cross petitions, the superior court indicated it had issued a tentative ruling. Jones stated she had not received the tentative ruling, so the court paused the hearing and arranged for the tentative ruling to be printed and provided to Jones. The tentative ruling was to grant Kaiser’s petition to confirm and deny Jones’s petition to vacate. When the hearing resumed, Jones argued the court should vacate the arbitration award “because [Jones] discovered in March of 2024 that [her] physician knew of this, an irreversible injury that took place long before 2023, and that they were aware in 2020 and concealed it.” Jones contended that the arbitrator’s refusal to allow her to amend based on this “new evidence” “violat[ed] [section] 1286.2[, subdivision ](a)(5).” Jones confirmed that “[she] discovered [her] injury in April of 2022 . . . [and] filed a formal complaint in November of 2023.” At the conclusion of the hearing the court took the matter under submission, and later that day issued an order denying the petition to vacate and granting the petition to confirm the award. The court concluded that, based on the limited scope of judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision, “it [was] not authorized to address the merits of the [a]rbitrator’s granting [j]udgment on the [p]leadings for [Kaiser], which was based on the [s]tatute of [l]imitations applicable to healthcare providers, commencing upon accrual of [Jones’s] malpractice claim, and calculated based on [Jones’s] [d]emand for [a]rbitration on November 30, 2023.”

11 The court further stated that resolution of a motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly based on the allegations made by the claimant, in this case Jones’s allegations in her demand for arbitration. The court entered judgment on August 22, 2025, from which Jones timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review “California law favors alternative dispute resolution as a viable means of resolving legal conflicts.” (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916.) “[I]t is the general rule that parties to a private arbitration impliedly agree that the arbitrator’s decision will be both binding and final.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9, fn. omitted.) “Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces the parties’ intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 10.) “[A]n arbitrator’s decision is not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law, whether or not such error appears on the face of the award and causes substantial injustice to the parties.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 6.) Instead, “judicial review of private, binding arbitration awards is generally limited to the statutory grounds for vacating (§ 1286.2) or correcting (§ 1286.6) an award.” (Moshonov v. Walsh (2000) 22 Cal.4th 771, 775, citing Moncharsh, at pp. 8-28.) Thus, there are three types of petitions available—to vacate, correct, or confirm an award. (§ 1285.) As relevant here, when a petition is filed, “the court shall confirm the award as made . . . unless . . . it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the 12 award or dismisses the proceeding.” (§ 1286.) “If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith. . . .” (§ 1287.4.) Jones sought to vacate the arbitration award under section 1286.2. “To determine whether an arbitration award should be vacated under . . . section 1286.2, we review the trial court’s decision de novo.” (Bacall v. Shumway (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 950, 957.) We likewise “review de novo [a] trial court’s order confirming [an] arbitration award.” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1435.) “ ‘Issues of statutory interpretation and the application of that interpretation to a set of undisputed facts are questions of law subject to independent review . . . .’ ” (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1087.) “We apply the substantial evidence test to the trial court’s determination of disputed factual issues.” (Ibid.) B. Arbitration Terms As relevant here, the parties’ arbitration agreement required “[b]inding [a]rbitration” for, among others, “any claim for medical or hospital malpractice (a claim that medical services or items were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently, or incompetently rendered).” The agreement provided, “A claim shall be waived and forever barred if [among other reasons] on the date the [d]emand for [a]rbitration of the claim is served, the claim, if asserted in a civil action, would be barred as to the [r]espondent served by the applicable statute of limitations.” It also provided, as relevant here, “Arbitrations shall be governed by [the parties’ arbitration agreement], [s]ection 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act[ (FAA)], and the California Code of Civil Procedure provisions relating to 13 arbitration that are in effect at the time the statute is applied . . . .” C. Analysis Jones claims the arbitrator denied her a fair hearing by refusing to consider evidence which Jones asserts showed that Kaiser physicians concealed their knowledge of the injury from her, and by denying Jones the opportunity to amend her allegations. Jones further claims that because of the concealment she was entitled to tolling of the three-year limitations period under section 340.5, which undermined the arbitrator’s conclusion that Jones’s claims were time barred by section 340.5. Based on these claims, Jones contends the superior court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1) and (5), as well as under the FAA. Jones also contends the superior court erred in issuing its ruling denying her motion to vacate (and granting Kaiser’s petition to confirm) before the hearing on the motion.6 6 At oral argument, Jones argued for the first time that the arbitration provision in her agreement with Kaiser was unenforceable on statutory grounds. Jones has forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court or in her opening brief on appeal. (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 888, fn. 5 [party forfeited argument raised for the first time at oral argument “by failing to raise it in a timely manner”]; Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it” ’ ” ’ ”].) Although a party may challenge a court’s fundamental jurisdiction to 14 1. Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(5) The grounds for vacatur under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) most closely mirror Jones’s claims, and thus we address this provision first. As relevant here, subdivision (a)(5) requires vacatur where “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the arbitrator[] to hear evidence material to the controversy.” (Ibid.)7 This provision “was designed as a ‘safety valve in private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’ [Citation.] It comes into play, for example, when an arbitrator, without justification, permits only one side to present evidence on a disputed material issue.” (Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368.) “Where, as here, a party complains of excluded material evidence, the reviewing court should generally focus adjudicate a matter at any point (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339), Jones’s claim regarding the enforceability of the parties’ arbitration agreement does not implicate the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction to confirm an award in an arbitration that she initiated. 7 Jones also asserts this theory under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, which provides for vacatur of an arbitration award, in relevant part, “where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).) Jones has forfeited any claim under this statute by failing to assert it in her petition to vacate or otherwise raise it before the superior court. (Keener v. Jeld- Wen, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 264.) Even if Jones had not forfeited her claim under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, she has not shown how the claim is any different from her claim under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5).

15 first on prejudice, not materiality. To find substantial prejudice the court must accept, for purposes of analysis, the arbitrator’s legal theory and conclude that the arbitrator might well have made a different award had the evidence been allowed.” (Hall v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 427, 439.) Jones’s claim under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) fails because it is clear, based on the arbitrator’s decision, that even if the arbitrator had considered Jones’s evidence of alleged concealment, the arbitrator would have reached the same conclusion that Jones’s malpractice claims were time-barred under section 340.5. The arbitrator concluded that Jones’s claims were time-barred under both the one-year and three-year limitations periods set forth in section 340.5. Under the statute, a claim is time-barred if it was not asserted within either the one- year period or the three-year period. Jones’s concealment claim only applied to the three-year limitations period. Thus, even if Jones had been able to show the three-year period should have been tolled, under the arbitrator’s analysis the one-year limitations period still barred Jones’s malpractice claims. Jones’s theory was that Kaiser physicians concealed their knowledge of her injury before Jones discovered it. But once Jones discovered her injury—which she conceded below and repeats in her appellate briefing occurred in April of 2022—the one-year period began to run and Jones was required to assert her malpractice claim by April of 2023. Jones argues that under Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103 and Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, “the statute of limitations is tolled when a defendant’s conduct conceals the cause of injury.” This argument fails because, under section 340.5, the tolling provisions only apply to the three-year period 16 and not to the one-year period. (See § 340.5.) The argument also misunderstands the applicable rule, known as the “ ‘discovery rule.’ ” (Fox, at p. 807.) Under this rule “plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have ‘ “ ‘information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry’ ” ’ or if they have ‘ “ ‘the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In other words, plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Id. at pp. 807-808, fn. omitted.) Here, based on Jones’s allegations, not only was she aware of her injury by April of 2022, but she was aware of the alleged cause of the injury by August of 2022, more than a year before she asserted her medical malpractice claim. The facts here are analogous to those in Hall, where “[t]he arbitrator received an informal offer of proof, determined that even if presented the evidence would not persuade him against the [parties who ultimately prevailed in the arbitration], and denied [the losing party] the opportunity to replace his offer of proof with actual testimony.” (Hall v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.) The court concluded that, under these circumstances, section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) did not apply because the “[t]he arbitrator did not prevent [the losing party] from fairly presenting his defense. Instead, the arbitrator concluded that [the losing party’s] defense, even with the proffered evidence, lacked merit.” (Hall, at p. 439.)8 8 Jones requests judicial notice of documents showing she submitted a complaint to the California Medical Board about the 17 2. Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(1) Jones alleges that Kaiser “fail[ed] to timely disclose critical medical records—evidence that was essential to establishing fraudulent concealment and the tolling of the statute of limitations under [section] 340.5.” Jones contends Kaiser’s conduct requires vacatur of the arbitration award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1), which provides for vacatur of an award that “was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.” Jones has forfeited this claim because she has raised it for the first time in her appeal. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 264.) Even if Jones had not forfeited this claim, it fails because the allegedly withheld records in no way relate to when Jones herself discovered her injury and the one-year statute of limitations began to run.

medical treatment at issue in her claim against Kaiser. We deny that request. “Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court” absent “exceptional circumstances.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) No such exceptional circumstances are present here. In addition, judicial notice is inappropriate because the documents are “not relevant to dispositive issues on appeal.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.). Jones contends that the fact the California Medical Board opened an investigation shows the records which she sought to submit to the arbitrator were “material.” They might be material to the California Medical Board’s inquiry about the standard of care provided, but they have nothing to do with whether the one-year statute of limitations bars Jones’s claim.

18 3. Jones’s Claim Under Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA and Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(3) Jones contends the superior court erred in failing to vacate the award under section 10(a)(2) of the FAA (“evident partiality . . . in the arbitrator[]”) and section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(3) (“misconduct of [the] arbitrator”) on the ground the arbitrator favored Kaiser by denying amendment and refusing to consider new evidence. Jones has forfeited this claim because she did not raise a claim under the FAA or section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(3) in her petition to vacate or her amended petition to vacate. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 264.) Even if Jones had raised this argument before the superior court, it is not persuasive. Jones’s claims regarding partiality and misconduct relate to her arguments regarding the tolling of the three-year prong of section 340.5. They cast no doubt on the applicability of the one-year statute of limitations, which as already noted Jones’s own appellate briefing makes clear applies here to bar her claims. Jones also failed to raise below, and has therefore forfeited, her claim that the arbitration should be vacated under Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, for failing to “meet ‘minimum standards of fairness.’ ” (Boldface omitted.) Even if Jones had not forfeited this claim, it fails because the court in Armendariz addressed issues “related to the validity” of an agreement to arbitrate, not the grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award. (Armendariz, at p. 90.) The Armendariz court did not establish new grounds for vacating an arbitration award in addition to those set forth in section 1286.2.

19 4. Jones’s Claim that the Superior Court Denied Her a Hearing Jones contends the superior court acted improperly by issuing its ruling before holding a substantive hearing on the parties’ petitions. This contention appears to be based on a procedural misunderstanding. Prior to the hearing the court issued a tentative ruling based on the parties’ written submissions, not a final ruling. Jones received a printed copy of the tentative ruling at the beginning of the hearing and the court allowed her time to review it before presenting her oral argument. After both parties presented argument, the court took the matter under submission and issued a final ruling later that day. The court informed Jones at the hearing that the document it provided to Jones before the hearing began was “a tentative ruling to help [the parties] understand the law that the court [saw] right [then],” and Jones could “tell [the court] something, perhaps, that [she thought] that [the court] missed or [was] misconstruing or [the court] should consider something different.” Jones then presented her arguments to the court. There is nothing wrong with the practice of providing a tentative ruling, which courts routinely do to give the parties information on how the court views the issues based on the briefing. This allows the parties to focus their arguments on what they believe is most important and what they believe the court has incorrectly considered. Nothing suggests that the 20 superior court did not consider Jones’s arguments made during the hearing before issuing its final ruling.9 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

9 Jones asserted at oral argument that the trial court had signed its tentative ruling before providing it to her at the beginning of the hearing. This claim is not supported by the record. The transcript of the hearing shows that the court signed an order to appoint a court reporter to transcribe the hearing; this order was separate from the court’s ruling on the parties’ petitions.