Meza v. CoWorx Staffing Services CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 Meza v. CoWorx Staffing Services CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ELDA MEZA, D085734

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024- 00029634-CU-OE-CTL) v.

COWORX STAFFING SERVICES LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Marcella O. McLaughlin, Judge. Affirmed. Ongaro, David R. Ongaro, Cara R. Sherman, Glen Turner, and Kirsten McNelly Bibbes for Defendant and Appellant. Pancer Law, Ian Pancer, Janine R. Menhennet, and Joe Virgilio for Plaintiff and Respondent. CoWorx Staffing Services LLC (CoWorx) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Elda Meza’s individual claims for civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). We find no error in the trial court’s ruling that CoWorx failed to meet its ultimate burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. We therefore affirm the order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Prior Individual Action In a prior non-PAGA action, Meza sued CoWorx in an individual action for failure to provide her with access to employee records in response to her requests dated March and May 2024 under Labor Code sections 226, 1198.5 and 432.1 On November 4, 2024, CoWorx made an offer to settle the matter for $2,000 under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Meza accepted the offer on November 20, 2024. B. PAGA Action Meza filed this PAGA action in May 2024 and amended her complaint in August 2024. The operative complaint alleges that Meza “is not suing in her individual capacity” but as “an individual in her capacity as the State of California’s designated proxy under the Private Attorneys General Act and on behalf of all Aggrieved Employees . . . .” She asserts PAGA claims for multiple Labor Code violations, including failure to provide access to employee personnel records, failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to timely pay wages, meal and rest break violations, wage statement 1 Meza’s motion to augment the record filed December 23, 2025 is denied as to Exhibits 1 and 2 because those exhibits are already included in the record as Exhibits 1 and 4 to CoWorx’s motion to augment, which we granted on November 21, 2025. We previously granted Meza’s motion to augment as to Exhibit 3. We deny Meza’s motion to augment as to Exhibits 4-9 because they post-date the trial court’s order at issue in this appeal and they are not relevant to our disposition of the appeal.

2 violations, failure to maintain payroll records, failure to reimburse, and other miscellaneous violations. C. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Individual Claims in PAGA Action In September 2024, CoWorx filed a motion to (1) compel arbitration of Meza’s “individual employment-related claims” in the PAGA action based on an arbitration agreement she allegedly signed when her employment began in May 2021, and (2) stay the litigation of Meza’s non-individual claims pending completion of the individual arbitration. CoWorx attached a copy of the arbitration agreement to its motion. The agreement had what purported to be a digital signature with an e-mail address as follows:

Meza filed an opposition asserting that: (1) the motion was moot because she had already settled her individual claims against CoWorx in the prior action and there was nothing left to arbitrate; and (2) CoWorx had not provided competent evidence that Meza signed the arbitration agreement. Meza submitted a declaration in opposition to the motion asserting: “I have no recollection of signing any such agreement, and I do not believe I signed an agreement to arbitrate my claims against CoWorx.” In reply, CoWorx submitted the declaration of Jessica Cardinale, its “Senior Director” of “Operations Excellence,” to establish the authenticity of Meza’s digital signature. Cardinale stated that CoWorx uses an online onboarding technology platform called “OB365.” She believed OB365 was a “widely used” and “reputable creator of signature authentication software 3 with a solid pedigree” and “a reputation in the staffing industry as a reliable and secure method of obtaining electronic signatures.” According to Cardinale, CoWorx initiates the onboarding process by sending a request to a “known email” for the candidate to log into OB365 and fill out any required onboarding paperwork. A person who receives the request follows the link and logs into the OB365 portal with their personal e-mail address provided during the application process. The employee then reviews all required onboarding documents and policies for employment and affixes her electronic signature to be returned to CoWorx through OB365. Cardinale further stated that CoWorx received many signed documents from Meza as part of this process, including signed tax and withholding documents, acknowledgment of policies, an emergency contact form, and the arbitration agreement. Cardinale attached to her declaration the arbitration agreement with the digital signature received from “Elda M. Meza” through OB365 (Exhibit A), as well as an audit log of the transactions CoWorx subsequently received from OB365 (Exhibit B). Cardinale declared she was “confident that the electronic signature attached hereto as Exhibit A was actually created by Elda Meza using the OB365 candidate onboarding process.” D. Trial Court’s Ruling After a hearing, the court confirmed its tentative ruling and denied CoWorx’s motion to compel arbitration in a written order. In its order, the court cited Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 (Gamboa) and other California cases applying a three-step burden-shifting procedure for determining the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate. As the trial court explained, the moving party must first produce prima facie evidence of a written agreement to 4 arbitrate. If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. Finally, if the opposing party meets this burden, “the moving party must establish a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” The trial court found that CoWorx met its initial prima facie burden by submitting a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing Meza’s electronic signature. The court also found that Meza met her opposing burden by providing evidence that she did not remember signing the arbitration agreement. The court concluded that the burden shifted back to CoWorx “to prove the authenticity of [Meza]’s electronic signature.” The court stated that “[t]o authenticate an electronic signature on an arbitration agreement, the moving party must show that the electronic signature ‘was the act of the person’ opposing the petition to compel arbitration.” (Quoting Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) Quoting Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545 (Bannister), the court further explained: “The moving party may make this showing ‘by presenting evidence that a unique login and password known only to that person was required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and the accompanying security precautions.’ ” The trial court summarized Cardinale’s declaration and then concluded it was “insufficient to show that the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was ‘the act of’ plaintiff.” The court explained its ruling as follows: “First, Cardinale does not explain how plaintiff’s electronic signature came to be placed on the agreement. See 5 Bannister, 64 Cal.App.5th at 545. Second, the declaration fails to establish that only plaintiff could have electronically signed the arbitration agreement. Although plaintiff had to use her personal email address to log into OB365, there is no evidence of any other security measures – such as a unique password – to prevent someone else from accessing the onboarding documents and/or altering plaintiff’s information in OB365. Accordingly, defendant has not established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. See Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165–66; see also Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069–70 (affirming order denying arbitration where defendant left a ‘critical gap’ in its evidence by failing to provide specific details about the circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution and to explain how the electronic signature could only have been placed on the contract by plaintiff).” (Boldface omitted.)

DISCUSSION I The Appeal is Not Moot The parties each refer to various arguments without asserting them properly under a separate argument heading with citation to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(A) & (B).) For her part, Meza suggests that this appeal is “pointless” because she settled her individual claims in the prior action and thus “CoWorx can never receive any relief in the form of arbitration in this lawsuit, which is PAGA-only.” To the extent Meza means to argue this appeal is moot, we disagree. Meza has only settled her own Labor Code claims for failure to provide access to employee personnel records. She has not settled the “individual” component of her PAGA claims for civil penalties recoverable on behalf of the state for the alleged Labor Code violations sustained by her individually.

6 Even though a PAGA plaintiff sues in a representative capacity on behalf of the state, “[i]n PAGA parlance, Labor Code violations suffered by the plaintiff are ‘individual claims.’ ” (Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 121, 127.) Under the current PAGA statute, the civil penalties which would otherwise belong to the state are distributed 65 percent to the state and 35 percent to the aggrieved employees as a kind of bounty to encourage enforcement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (m).) No such PAGA claim on behalf of the state was asserted or settled in Meza’s prior action. Moreover, this “individual” component of Meza’s PAGA claims is subject to arbitration under a mandatory arbitration agreement. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117–1119.) We therefore conclude that the appeal is not moot.2 II The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard For its part, CoWorx suggests in passing (without an argument heading) that the trial court failed to apply the governing preponderance of the evidence standard for determining the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. We easily dispose of this contention. The court’s final order explicitly stated that “the moving party must establish a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Italics added.) The court ultimately concluded that CoWorx had “not established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Italics added.) As CoWorx itself states in its reply brief: “The order admits that 2 We express no view on the claim preclusion effect of the settlement in Meza’s prior action. If Meza were required to arbitrate her individual PAGA claim, this would be an issue on the merits for the arbitrator to decide.

7 ‘preponderance of the evidence’ was the proper standard.” Thus, the court applied the correct standard. In its reply brief, CoWorx pivots to a new argument by asserting that the trial court failed to follow the “substantial evidence” standard. But this is a standard of appellate review, not a standard for the factfinder to apply in adjudicating the facts in the first instance. To the extent CoWorx is arguing that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling, we address that question in the next section of this opinion. III The Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Order Refusing to Compel Arbitration A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “A trial court must grant a petition to compel arbitration only ‘if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.’ ” (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 583 (Brockman).) The trial court makes this determination using a summary procedure in which “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) “While public policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so. Thus, a court, before granting a petition to compel arbitration, must determine the factual issue of the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. An arbitration agreement is subject to the same rules of construction as any other contract.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–585 [cleaned up].)

8 “Although the burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 586.) “First, the moving party bears the burden of producing ‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’ ” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Ibid.) “If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party.” (Id. at pp. 165–166.) “When, as here, the court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration is based on the court’s finding that the moving party failed to carry its burden of proof with respect to the ultimate question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. Unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing party, we presume the trial court found the party’s evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it 9 must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588 [cleaned up].) It is “ ‘almost impossible’ ” for an appellant who bore the burden of proof in the trial court to prevail under this standard because we have no power to judge the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067 (Fabian); accord Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 53 (Garcia); Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) B. Meza Met Her Burden of Producing Evidence to Challenge the Authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement The trial court ruled that (1) CoWorx met its initial burden of producing prima facie evidence of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and (2) Meza met her opposing burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. Meza does not dispute that CoWorx met its initial burden, but CoWorx contends the trial court erred in ruling that Meza met her opposing burden. We disagree. Meza’s declaration stated: “I have no recollection of signing any such agreement, and I do not believe I signed an agreement to arbitrate my claims against CoWorx.” This was sufficient to shift the burden back to CoWorx. In this step of the analysis, the party opposing arbitration may meet their burden by “declar[ing] under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, italics added; accord Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 587; see also Espejo v. Southern California Permanente 10 Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054 [plaintiff did not recall seeing or signing document]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846 (Ruiz) [“In the face of [plaintiff]’s failure to recall signing the [arbitration] agreement, [defendant] had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic.”].) In arguing to the contrary, CoWorx relies on two cases: Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747 (Iyere) and Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821 (Ramirez). But those cases both involved handwritten signatures, not electronic signatures, and they expressly distinguished authorities involving electronic signatures. As the court explained in Iyere: “An individual cannot confirm or deny the authenticity of an electronic signature by viewing a computer printout of the person’s printed name followed by the words ‘(Electronic Signature)’. In such a case, the individual’s inability to recall signing electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that the person did not do so. However, an individual is capable of recognizing his or her own personal signature. If the individual does not deny that the handwritten personal signature is his or her own, that person’s failure to remember signing is of little or no significance.” (Iyere, at p. 757, italics added.) The Ramirez court quoted this passage from Iyere with approval and went on to state: “We agree with this conclusion and the underlying rationale.” (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 834, 835.) The court summarized its holding as follows: “We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that 11 person’s failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature’s authenticity.” (Id. at p. 825, italics added.) This case involves an electronic signature, not a handwritten signature. Iyere and Ramirez both acknowledged that an individual’s inability to recall signing a document electronically may be treated as evidence that the person did not do so. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) Meza stated under oath that she did not remember electronically signing the arbitration agreement. This was sufficient to shift the burden back to CoWorx.3 C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That CoWorx Failed to Prove the Existence of an Arbitration Agreement by a Preponderance of the Evidence Finally, CoWorx contends the trial court erred by ruling it failed to meet its ultimate burden of establishing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. The proponent of an electronic signature bears the burden of authenticating it by showing that it was “the act of the person” in question. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) This “may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Ibid.) Because CoWorx bore the burden of proof and lost in the trial court, it can prevail on appeal only by establishing that its evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached, 3 In its reply brief, CoWorx claims that Meza’s declaration “lacks foundation and is inadmissible.” This claim is forfeited because no such evidentiary objection was made in the trial court or raised in the opening brief.

12 and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding against CoWorx. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588.) For several reasons, we conclude that CoWorx’s evidence does not meet this high standard. First, CoWorx provided only general information about its use of OB365 and did not present any evidence specific to Meza’s application or onboarding. Cardinale is a senior director of CoWorx who did not claim to have any personal knowledge of the specifics of Meza’s onboarding. Critically, Cardinale’s declaration stated that CoWorx initiates the onboarding process by sending a request to a “known email” for the candidate to log into OB365, but she did not say how CoWorx requested or obtained a “known email” for Meza in the first place. Cardinale’s declaration contained no information about who sent this initial request to Meza, how the request was sent, or the manner of Meza’s response. There is no evidence in the record regarding how or when Meza provided her e-mail address to CoWorx. Because the e-mail address is ultimately what CoWorx is relying on to identify Meza’s digital signature as her own, the trial court could reasonably have viewed this as a vital missing piece in CoWorx’s proof of authenticity. Other appellate courts have relied on the absence of such specifics in affirming similar rulings. (See, e.g., Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 170; Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069–1070; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838–839.) Second, there is no evidence in the record that Meza had exclusive use of either this e-mail address or the OB365 account. It is possible for people to share e-mail addresses or allow others to access their e-mail accounts or fill out forms for them. CoWorx does not argue that arbitration would be compelled even if someone other than Meza signed the arbitration agreement 13 using the digital signature without her knowledge or consent. Moreover, Cardinale’s declaration made no mention of any other private username or password required to access the OB365 account. (Cf. Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 547 [affirming finding that employer failed to authenticate electronic signature on arbitration agreement where its “evidence did not establish that Bannister was assigned a unique, private username and password such that she is the only person who could have accessed the onboarding portal and signed the agreement”].) As the trial court observed, CoWorx’s evidence therefore did not establish “that only plaintiff could have electronically signed the arbitration agreement.” CoWorx suggests the trial court erred by requiring it to prove that “only” Meza could have electronically signed the arbitration agreement. But the trial court merely mentioned this as a relevant fact; it did not treat this as the governing legal standard. Even CoWorx’s counsel agreed in the trial court that this was “an important fact.” Other appellate courts have relied on the same fact in finding that the employer failed to meet its ultimate burden of proof on the authentication issue. (See, e.g., Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53 [employer’s evidence “did not show that only Garcia could have placed the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement”]; Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 [employer’s evidence “did not suggest how the electronic signature could have only been placed on the Contract by Fabian”]; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 [employer’s evidence “did not explain that an electronic signature in the name of ‘Ernesto Zamora Ruiz’ could only have been placed on the [form] by a person using Ruiz’s ‘unique login ID and password’ ”].) Thus, the trial court properly relied on this as a relevant fact.

14 Finally, as we have explained, Meza’s “inability to recall signing electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that [she] did not do so.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) Thus, CoWorx’s evidence was not uncontradicted and unimpeached. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 587.) It was for the trial court to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine whether CoWorx ultimately met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. CoWorx nevertheless contends that its own evidence was “weightier” than Meza’s. We do not reweigh the evidence in conducting our appellate review. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588.) We merely determine whether the evidence compelled a finding in CoWorx’s favor as a matter of law even when viewing the record in the light most favorable to Meza. (Ibid.) “It is not our role to second guess the trial court’s factual determinations.” (Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.) We therefore find no error in the trial court’s ruling that CoWorx failed to meet its ultimate burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. DISPOSITION The order denying CoWorx’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Meza is entitled to recover her costs on appeal. BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.