People v. Dixon CA1/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Dixon CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172079 v. CHRISTOPHER DIXON, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC049585A) Defendant and Appellant.

I. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 2002, a jury convicted Christopher Dixon of the following offenses: (1) residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)2), with special allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that the offense was a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); (2) false imprisonment (§ 236); (3) robbery of an inhabited residence (§ 212.5, subd. (a)), with a special allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); (4) battery resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), with a special allegation that defendant personally 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and (5) receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The trial court found Dixon had suffered a number of prior convictions and had served prior prison terms. The court sentenced Dixon to 62 years to life in state prison, imposing two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the burglary and robbery counts under the “Three Strikes” law3 (while staying the sentences on the remaining counts), plus three years for the special allegation under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), as to the robbery count, five years for a prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a), and two years each for prior prison terms under former section 667.5, subdivision (b). On appeal, this court reduced Dixon’s sentence by two years because former section 667.5, subdivision (b) authorized only a one-year enhancement for each prior prison term. In 2023, Dixon sought resentencing under sections 1172.75 and 1385. The trial court struck his two enhancements for prior prison terms, but declined to strike his prior strike convictions or his remaining enhancements, or to impose his two 25-year-to-life terms concurrently instead of consecutively. Dixon argues the court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard to its analysis and failing to give due weight to three mitigating facts: his sentence included multiple enhancements, his offenses were connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma, and an enhancement was based on a prior conviction that was over five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (E), & (H).) We disagree.

3 “The ‘Three Strikes’ law provides that for a defendant convicted of a felony who has sustained two or more qualifying prior felony convictions— commonly known as strikes—‘the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment,’ with the ‘minimum term [. . .]’ being the greatest of three options” (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 108), one of which is 25 years (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii)).

2 In exercising its discretion under section 1385, the trial court “ ‘shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove’ certain enumerated mitigating circumstances,’ ” proof of which “ ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing [an] enhancement, unless the court finds that [doing so] would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028 (Walker); § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) But as Dixon agrees, even where a mitigating circumstance is present and the court finds no danger to public safety, the court retains its discretion to impose an enhancement based on various factors, including the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (Walker, at p. 1033.) The statute does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement when a mitigating circumstance is present. (Id. at p. 1034.) Rather, the court “must ‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors,’ in which the mitigating factors weigh ‘strongly in favor of . . . dismissal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.) We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093.) Dixon argues that the trial court’s failure to recite particular language in Walker shows it misunderstood the great weight it was to assign to mitigating factors. But we may not presume error from the court’s silence. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) “ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (People v. Nitschmann (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 705, 708–709.) Here the court discussed Walker and said nothing contrary to it. In fact, when referencing its discretion under section 1385, the court expressly recognized that “[a] finding of one of the 3 factors weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement unless” dismissal “would endanger public safety.” We presume the court applied the correct standard. Dixon also contends the trial court failed to recognize that the mitigating factor of multiple enhancements applied in his case, because the court observed after reciting this factor that he had been sentenced under the Three Strikes law. But this observation does not demonstrate the court’s misunderstanding or misapplication of the statute. The court said nothing to suggest it did not understand that Dixon was subject to multiple enhancements. And its statement was also relevant to the next factor, whether applying an enhancement would result in a sentence of over 20 years. The court went on to clarify that this mitigating factor did not apply because it was Dixon’s core sentence under the Three Strikes law, not an enhancement, that caused his sentence to exceed 20 years. Dixon claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the mitigating factor that his offenses were connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma, evidenced by its remark when discussing this factor that Dixon was 31 years old at the time he was sentenced. Assuming the court did find this factor was inapplicable as Dixon argues, it was within its discretion to do so. Dixon’s evidence concerning causation was not compelling, and the court was not bound to accept it. (See People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 601 [court was not bound to accept even uncontroverted expert evidence on this point].) Lastly, Dixon notes that the trial court acknowledged his sentence included an enhancement for a conviction that was over five years old, and then observed he had received a 9-year sentence on that conviction. Dixon interprets these comments to mean the court did not consider this factor to 4 apply because he “was not out of custody for the five years” preceding the offenses at issue. But he “does not contest” that the court “had a substantial, credible reason not to apply the factor in this case.” Dixon thus appears to concede that the court did not abuse its discretion as to this factor. Regardless, the record shows the court understood this factor did apply. Its comment recognizing additional context to Dixon’s prior offense does not suggest it assigned this factor improper weight. In sum, Dixon fails to show the trial court applied the wrong standard to its determination. In rendering its decision, the court discussed the unnecessarily violent nature of the crimes at issue and other disturbing aspects of Dixon’s criminal history. We infer the court found there was “ ‘substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors’ ” that “ ‘neutralize[d]’ ” the great weight assigned to the mitigating circumstances present, such that—as the court expressly found—any further reduction to Dixon’s sentence was not in the interest of justice. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) Finding no abuse of discretion in this decision, we will affirm the judgment. Finally, the People urge that certain corrections to the amended abstract of judgment are required, which Dixon does not contest. First, the amended abstract of judgment fails to reflect that the trial court sentenced Dixon to two consecutive 25-year to life terms for burglary and robbery, plus a three-year enhancement on the robbery count under section 12022.7, a stayed, three-year enhancement on the burglary count under section 12022.7, and concurrent five-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a) on both the robbery and burglary counts. We will direct the trial court to correct this error. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts 5 (including this one) that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.”]) The trial court also failed to recalculate Dixon’s actual custody credits from the date of his arrest to the date of resentencing. (See § 2900.1; People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41 [“under section 2900.1, the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence, should have determined all actual days defendant had spent in custody . . . and awarded such credits in the new abstract of judgment”]; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673 [applying Buckhalter].) A court that modifies a defendant’s sentence “must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, . . . whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.” (Buckhalter, at p. 29.) “The court must also calculate conduct credits for the period before the original sentencing hearing.” (Sek, at p. 673.) II. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to correct the amended abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the oral judgment of sentencing and to update the sentencing credit calculation as directed above. The court shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

6 _________________________ SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________ LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

People v. Dixon / A172079