People v. Ramirez CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Ramirez CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B348258

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA075509) v.

DARIO DANIEL RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed. Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 2011, a jury found Dario Daniel Ramirez guilty of second degree murder, mayhem, and attempted voluntary manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of attempted murder). The convictions related to Ramirez’s involvement in gang-related violence in which he was not the actual shooter. At Ramirez’s trial, the court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences theories of liability. The court sentenced Ramirez to 15 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement; a consecutive term of four years for mayhem, plus 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement; and a term of three years (which the court stayed pursuant to Penal Code2 section 654) for the attempted voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Ramirez (Mar. 26, 2013, B232114) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2019, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.3 In 2022, the superior court determined Ramirez had made a prima facie showing for relief as to the murder conviction and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The court also determined Ramirez had not made a prima facie showing as to either mayhem or attempted voluntary 1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1. 2 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

3 As initially enacted the law was codified in section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For ease of reference, we use the current citation throughout.

2 manslaughter, concluding that section 1172.6 did not apply to those convictions. After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition for resentencing, finding the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramirez acted with malice aforethought as a direct aider and abettor of the murder. Ramirez appealed the denial of resentencing relief as to his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, and we affirmed. (People v. Ramirez (Sept. 25, 2024, B328259) [nonpub. opn.].) We rejected Ramirez’s claim that his trial conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter qualified for relief under section 1172.6 because the statute’s plain language does not enumerate it as eligible for relief. (Ibid.; see § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2) [requiring petitioners who went to trial to have been “convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter”].) On April 24, 2025, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three decided People v. Luu (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted July 16, 2025, S291235. Recognizing the plain language of section 1172.6 does not reference attempted manslaughter, Luu held that a person charged with attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine who is then convicted at trial of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 because “[a] contrary rule would frustrate the intent of the Legislature” and “manifestly lead to unjust and ‘ “absurd results.” ’ ” (Luu, at pp. 1055-1056.) Approximately one month later, on May 23, 2025, Ramirez filed another section 1172.6 petition in the superior court. The court denied the petition, stating, “The petition presents a claim that was raised and rejected in a previous petition . . . . The trial court’s denial of the petition was upheld on appeal on 3 September 25, 2024, and the remittitur was issued on December 3, 2024.” Ramirez now appeals the denial of his second section 1172.6 petition, again focusing only on his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. He asserts the law of the case doctrine does not bar his successive petition because Luu constitutes an intervening change in law, and adhering to our prior decision denying him relief will result in an unjust decision. We are not persuaded. Ramirez had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether section 1172.6 applied to his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, and we decided that it did not. The law of the case doctrine applies in criminal cases, and promotes finality and judicial economy by preventing a party from relitigating questions previously decided by a reviewing court. (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 196.) The rule is not an ironclad one. We do not adhere to the law of the case doctrine “ ‘where its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a “manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice” [citation], or the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations’ [citation]. The unjust decision exception does not apply when there is a mere disagreement with the prior appellate determination.’ ” (Id. at p. 197, quoting People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 787.) These exceptions do not apply here. We did not manifestly misapply the principles of law that existed at the time of our prior decision regarding Ramirez’s section 1172.6 petition. Nor have the controlling rules of law been altered since the time of our prior decision. Luu is pending before our Supreme Court;

4 despite Ramirez’s suggestions to the contrary, the high court has not yet weighed in on the merits of Luu’s reasoning. Until it does, a single decision from a sister court—which is not binding on us—does not constitute a change in the controlling rules of law sufficient to avoid the bar on relitigation of issues already decided. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787; Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 127, 146.) The law of the case doctrine thus bars Ramirez’s attempt to relitigate an issue already decided against him in People v. Ramirez, supra, B328259. We express no opinion on what remedies might be available to Ramirez should the Supreme Court eventually agree with Luu’s reasoning. DISPOSITION The order denying resentencing relief is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.