Jorge Gonzalez Valencia v. Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — ¶¶ 31–33.) He was then transferred to immigration 1 custody in Miami before being transferred to Imperial
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an immigration detainee who argued his detention violated the INA and the Fifth Amendment. The court granted the petition, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner and requiring a bond hearing prior to any future re-detention.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, which held that noncitizens apprehended in the interior are subject to the discretionary detention regime of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than the mandatory detention regime of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because the petitioner was apprehended in the interior after residing in the U.S. for several years, § 1226(a) applies. The court also correctly noted that Respondents did not oppose the order. The decision to grant immediate release rather than just a bond hearing is supported by the cited district court cases (E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, Domingo v. Kaiser) which argue that post-deprivation hearings are inadequate procedural safeguards for erroneous detention. The court's reliance on the specific facts of the petitioner's interior apprehension and the binding Ninth Circuit precedent makes the decision legally sound. |
TRO Motion denied as moot“The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.” | agree with court Since the court granted the underlying petition for habeas corpus and ordered immediate release, the request for a temporary restraining order is no longer necessary or relevant. Denying a motion as moot when the underlying relief has been granted is standard procedural practice. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable statutory regime (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) based on the petitioner's status as an interior apprehension, relying on the binding and recent Ninth Circuit precedent in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock. The court's decision to order immediate release rather than merely a bond hearing is supported by persuasive district court authority arguing that post-deprivation hearings are inadequate remedies for erroneous detention. The court also properly incorporated the requirements from Hernandez v. Sessions regarding the consideration of financial circumstances and alternative conditions in any future bond hearings. The reasoning directly addresses the motion with the correct authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JORGE GONZALEZ VALENCIA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04284-RBM-GC 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Imperial Regional Detention [Docs. 1, 2] Facility, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Before the Court are pro se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez Valencia’s (“Petitioner”) 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and 20 Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the 21 reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and DENIES as moot the TRO Motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in or 24 about April 2024. (Doc. 1-2 [Decl. of Jorge Gonzalez Valencia (“Valencia Decl.”)] ¶¶ 2, 25 6.) He has resided in Florida continuously since then, establishing strong community ties 26 and working in construction. (See id. ¶¶ 9–21; Doc. 1-3 at 9–21 (letters of support from 27 family members and community members).) On June 24, 2026, Petitioner was arrested 28 during a traffic stop. (Valencia Decl. ¶¶ 31–33.) He was then transferred to immigration 1 custody in Miami before being transferred to Imperial Regional Detention Facility, where 2 he remains today. (Id. ¶¶ 37–41.) Petitioner has not received a bond hearing (see id. ¶ 63) 3 because immigration judges lack jurisdiction to hold them under agency precedent (see 4 Doc. 1 at 4). 5 On July 27, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition and TRO Motion. (Docs. 1, 2.) The 6 Court set a briefing schedule shortly thereafter. (Doc. 3.) Respondents filed their Response 7 on August 3, 2026. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner filed his Reply on August 7, 2026. (Doc. 6.) 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 10 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 11 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 12 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 13 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 14 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 15 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 16 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 17 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act and 20 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 7–11.) Respondents, citing the 21 Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, — F.4th —, 2026 WL 22 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), “do[ ] not oppose an order from this Court directing a 23 bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a).” (Doc. 5 at 1–2.) 24 In Rodriguez Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit concluded that noncitizens “present without 25 admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to the 26 detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” 2026 WL 2196424, at *3. Because 27 there is no dispute that Petitioner was detained in the interior of the United States after 28 having resided here for several years (see Valencia Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6, 31), the discretionary 1 detention procedures of § 1226(a) govern Petitioner’s detention. Therefore, and in light of 2 Respondents’ non-opposition, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 3 The Court also finds that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, is the 4 appropriate remedy. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 5 2025) (“Although the Government notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing while 6 detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard 7 because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge 8 M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“if Petitioner is detained, 9 he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”); Domingo v. Kaiser, 10 Case No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even 11 if Petitioner[] received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 12 was released at that point, he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his 13 motion; that is, his potentially erroneous detention.”). 14 IV. CONCLUSION1 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 16 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody. 17 2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall 18 receive a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether detention is 19 warranted. At any such hearing, the noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of 20 establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not a danger to the 21 community or a risk of flight.2 22 3. At any such hearing, if the immigration judge determines that bond is appropriate, 23 the immigration judge SHALL consider alternative conditions of release and the 24 25 26 27 1 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief. 28 1 noncitizen’s ability to pay. 2 3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||DATE: August 10, 2026 eet Baerrnudln, Mittasyyes □ 6 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 || 26 See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A bond determination 27 ||process that does not include consideration of financial circumstances and alternative 28 release conditions is unlikely to result in a bond amount that 1s reasonably related to the government’s legitimate interests.’’).