gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03506 · 2026-08-10 · Unknown

In re: Ashkan Rajaee and Nassim Rajaee

Proceeding
appeal
Outcome
other — As set forth below, the Court grants the Trustee’s 2 motion for sanctions, and denies Rajaee’s motion for rehear
Area
civil
Panel
Robert Steven Huie (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:22Z · confidence high

The court considered the Trustee's motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 and the Debtor's motion for rehearing of a prior dismissal order. The court granted the motion for sanctions and denied the motion for rehearing.

What the court decidedThe model
Granting Appellee's Motion for Sanctions
“The Trustee’s motion for sanctions [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for frivolous appeals under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the underlying order was non-final and the appellant lacked standing (having prevailed on the underlying motion). The court cited *In re Westwood Plaza North* to support the proposition that sanctions are appropriate for appeals that are wholly without merit and lack jurisdiction. The court also correctly limited the scope of the fee award to direct costs of defending the appeal, excluding costs of seeking sanctions, in accordance with *Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC*. The finding of bad faith is supported by the recited history of repetitive, unsuccessful litigation.
Denying Appellant's Motion for Rehearing
“Rajaee’s motion for rehearing [ECF No. 18] is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for rehearing under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, which is similar to Fed. R. App. P. 40. The appellant's arguments were re-arguments of issues previously decided or based on meritless legal theories (e.g., that a non-final order on which he prevailed was appealable). The court correctly noted that rehearing is not a vehicle for re-arguing the case anew.

The order itself: sound — The order is well-reasoned and cites the correct binding authorities for both the sanctions and rehearing standards. It correctly identifies the jurisdictional defect (lack of finality and standing) and the meritless nature of the appeal. It properly limits the fee award to direct defense costs, excluding sanctions-related costs, as required by Ninth Circuit precedent. The factual findings regarding the appellant's history of repetitive litigation support the bad faith inference.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 In re: Case No.: 25-cv-3506-RSH-GC 12 ASHKAN RAJAEE and NASSIM (Appeal from S.D. Cal. Bankr. 13 RAJAEE, Case No. 3:24-bk-00617-CL) Debtors. 14 _________________________________ ORDER (1) GRANTING APPELLEE’S 15 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ASHKAN RAJAEE, (2) DENYING APPELLANT’S 16 MOTION FOR REHEARING Appellant, 17 v. 18 [ECF Nos. 10, 18] CHRISTOPHER R. BARCLAY, 19 Chapter 7 Trustee, TYLER DAVIS, and 20 TOPDEVZ, LLC, 21 Appellees. 22 23 Pending before the Court are two motions. Appellee Christopher R. Barclay 24 (“Appellee” or “Trustee”) moves for monetary sanctions against debtor Ashkan Rajaee 25 (“Appellant” or “Rajaee”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8020. ECF 26 No. 10. Rajaee moves for rehearing pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 of this Court’s April 27 1 23, 2026 order of dismissal. ECF No. 18. As set forth below, the Court grants the Trustee’s 2 motion for sanctions, and denies Rajaee’s motion for rehearing. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 The underlying case is In re Ashkan Rajaee & Nassim Rajaee, No. 3:24-bk-00617- 5 CL (S.D. Cal. Bankr.) (the “Bankruptcy Case”). 6 The instant appeal arises in connection with the Bankruptcy Court’s August 15, 2025 7 order denying the Trustee’s motion for sanctions against Rajaee. See Bankruptcy Case, 8 Dkt. No. 569. Despite prevailing on that motion, on August 29, 2025, Rajaee filed a motion 9 requesting that the Bankruptcy Court make further findings and conclusions with respect 10 to its order. Dkt. No. 579. Rajaee’s motion was based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, made 11 applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Id. at 5-6. The motion requested that the Bankruptcy 12 Court make further determinations as to 35 issues that Rajaee identified. Id. at 2-5. The 13 Trustee opposed. Dkt. No. 592. 14 On November 10, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court denied Rajaee’s motion. Dkt. No. 15 648. In that order, the Bankruptcy Court explained that Rajaee’s motion was requesting 16 additional findings on an order on which he prevailed. Id. at 2. The Bankruptcy Court 17 quoted Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3), which provides that “[t]he court is not required to state 18 findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules 19 provide otherwise, on any other motion.” Id. at 2. The Bankruptcy Court stated that under 20 the plain language of the very rule upon which Rajaee’s motion was based, “the court is 21 not obligated to issue further findings.” Id. The Bankruptcy Court added, “[a]nd there is 22 very little value in doing so, especially since [Rajaee] prevailed in the matter.” Id. 23 On November 21, 2025, Rajaee filed a notice of appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s 24 November 10, 2025 order. See ECF No. 1. On April 23, 2026, the Court dismissed Rajaee’s 25 appeal for lack of jurisdiction and determined that the appeal was meritless. ECF No. 16 at 26 5. 27 1 Prior to dismissal of the appeal, the Trustee filed his motion for sanctions, which has 2 been fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 10, 20, 21. On May 6, 2026, Rajaee filed his motion for 3 rehearing. ECF No. 18. 4 Rajaee has filed numerous appeals from the Bankruptcy Case. Rajaee or his spouse 5 and co-debtor have filed at least twenty such appeals, none of which to date has been 6 successful. See Case No. 26-cv-937, ECF No. 17 at 2-3 (listing status of various appeals). 7 Rajaee has also filed several civil lawsuits against one or more of the appellees in this case, 8 none of which have been successful to date. See id. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A. Motion for Rehearing 11 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, a party may move for rehearing of a district court’s 12 order on a bankruptcy appeal. “[T]he motion must state with particularity each point of law 13 or fact that the movant believes the district court or BAP has overlooked or 14 misapprehended and must argue in support of the motion.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2). 15 A motion under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 is similar to a petition for rehearing under Fed. R. 16 App. P. 40. See In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of 17 motion for rehearing where district court applied Rule 40 standard in bankruptcy matter); 18 In re Silver, No. 23-60004, 2024 WL 838698, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (citing Fowler 19 as setting forth the standard of review on a Rule 8022 motion). 20 “[A] petition for rehearing is not a vehicle for a party to ‘study and reargue his case 21 anew.’” United States v. Mageno, 786 F.3d 768, 775 (quoting Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 22 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1962)); see also Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2008) 23 (collecting cases for the proposition that Fed. R. App. P. 40 “is not a vehicle for presenting 24 new arguments, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, [courts] shall not entertain 25 arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing”). 26 27 1 B. Motion for Sanctions 2 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, “[i]f the district court . . . determines that an appeal 3 is frivolous . . . it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” 4 Sanctions are awardable under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, and these costs may include 5 attorneys’ fees. See Benham v. Hagen (In re Benham), 220 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1043 (C.D. 6 Cal. 2016); First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn (In re Ahn), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 282, *27 7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016). 8 “An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or if the claims of error are wholly 9 without merit.” Erde v. Bodnar (In re Westwood Plaza North), 889 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 10 2018) (citation omitted). Courts consider several factors when determining if an appeal is 11 frivolous, including whether the appellant’s argument “addresses the issues on appeal 12 properly; fails to support the issues on appeal; fails to cite any authority; cites inapplicable 13 authority; makes unsubstantiated factual assertions; makes bare legal conclusions; or, 14 misrepresents the record.” Aldana v. Stadtmueller (In re De Jesus Gomez), 592 B.R. 698, 15 709 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Maloni v. Fairway Wholesale Corp. (In re Maloni), 16 282 B.R. 727, 734 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002)). 17 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 is modeled after Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38 18 (Fed. R. App. P. 38). First Fed. Bank v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 297 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). Courts can look to cases applying Fed. R. App. P. 38 when 20 determining whether an appeal is frivolous and an award of costs is appropriate. Id.; In re 21 Ashai, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting cases). “The court may in 22 its discretion impose Rule 38 sanctions for a frivolous appeal against an appellant even if 23 the appellant is proceeding pro se.” In re Westwood Plaza North, 889 F.3d at 977. 24 Additionally, a court may award sanctions for a frivolous appeal over whose merits the 25 court lacks appellate jurisdiction. Id. (ordering sanctions where “[t]he appeal of the district 26 court’s orders was wholly without merit, and sought review of multiple district court orders 27 over which this court lacked jurisdiction”). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Rajaee’s Motion for Rehearing 3 The Court begins with Rajaee’s motion for rehearing. Rajaee contends that the Court 4 erred in dismissing as non-final his appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s November 10, 2025 5 order denying his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, when in fact, he 6 argues, he was also appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s August 15, 2025 order denying the 7 Trustee’s motion for sanctions. See ECF No. 18 at 4. Rajaee contends that the two orders 8 “merged,” such that an appeal of the later-filed order was also an appeal of the earlier-filed 9 order. Id. at 5-6. 10 This argument is meritless. Rajaee did not, and could not, appeal from the 11 Bankruptcy Court’s August 15, 2025 order, because this was a motion on which Rajaee 12 prevailed: The Bankruptcy Court denied the Trustee’s request for sanctions. See In re 13 P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a bankruptcy appellant has 14 standing if “if ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy 15 court’; in other words, the order must diminish the appellant’s property, increase its 16 burdens, or detrimentally affect its rights”) (quoting Fondiller v. Robertson (In re 17 Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983)). Additionally, the denial of the Trustee’s 18 request for sanctions, expressly made without prejudice, was itself a non-final, non- 19 appealable order. See Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020) 20 (“Orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as ‘final’ when they definitively dispose of discrete 21 disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case.”). 22 Rajaee’s motion for rehearing also argues that he was entitled to findings of fact and 23 conclusions of law because Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 “made Rule 7052 applicable to this 24 contested sanctions/pre-filing matter.” ECF No. 18 at 7. But as this Court previously set 25 forth, the Bankruptcy Court did apply Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 and properly determined that 26 Rajaee was not entitled to further findings or conclusions. See ECF No. 16 at 3-5. 27 1 Rajaee’s remaining arguments are without merit. The Court properly declined to 2 grant leave for an interlocutory appeal. Rajaee’s motion for rehearing is denied. 3 B. The Trustee’s Motion for Sanctions 4 The Trustee moves for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 8020, arguing Rajaee’s 5 appeal is frivolous. ECF No. 10-1 at 1. The Court agrees. Even apart from lack of appellate 6 jurisdiction, Rajaee’s appeal is wholly without merit. As set forth in the Court’s April 23, 7 2026 order of dismissal, the applicable rule plainly provides that Rajaee was not entitled to 8 further findings of fact or conclusions of law. See ECF No. 16 at 3, 5. Nor has Rajaee 9 presented any meritorious basis to appeal from the denial of the Trustee’s motion on which 10 Rajaee himself prevailed. 11 The Court considers this appeal in the light of Rajaee’s numerous, repetitive 12 bankruptcy appeals and lawsuits, most of which have been adjudicated, and in none of 13 which has Rajaee prevailed.1 The sheer number of proceedings that Rajaee initiated does 14 not tell the whole story. Within many of these proceedings, Rajaee has made repetitive, 15 lengthy filings, sometimes accompanied by thousands of pages of exhibits. Among the 16 matters that this Court has adjudicated, the same note sounds again and again: Rajaee is 17 bringing federal lawsuits and filing appeals from his own bankruptcy filing to collaterally 18 attack a prior loss he sustained in state court, and so far has been unable to find a legal basis 19 for succeeding with such an attack. In the context of these repeated failures, coupled with 20 the obvious lack of merit in the instant appeal, the Court infers that Rajaee’s appeal is 21 brought and pursued in bad faith and for an improper purpose, namely, to burden his 22 adversaries with prolonged and repetitive litigation. The Court finds that an award of fees 23 and costs is warranted.2 24 25 1 The Court expresses no view herein on the merits of cases or motions the Court has 26 not yet adjudicated. 27 2 The Court notes Rajaee’s pro se status in this case, but also notes that in other cases 1 Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, the award of attorneys’ fees and costs “must be limited to 2 ||appellees’ direct fees and costs for defending against the frivolous appeal and may not 3 ||include the fees and costs incurred regarding the imposition of sanctions.” Blixseth □□□ 4 || Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC, 854 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2017). The Trustee’s current 5 || request appears to include fees and costs incurred in seeking sanctions. See ECF No. 10-2 6 || at 2. The Court will provide the Trustee an opportunity to provide adequate evidence of his 7 || direct costs and fees incurred in defending this appeal, not including fees and costs incurred 8 || regarding the imposition of sanctions, and will provide Rajaee an opportunity to respond.° 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, Rajaee’s motion for rehearing [ECF No. 18] is DENIED. 11 || The Trustee’s motion for sanctions [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED. No later than fourteen 12 || (14) days from the date of this order, the Trustee shall file a claim for its recoverable costs 13 fees supported by adequate evidence. No later than fourteen (14) days after such 14 || filing, Rajaee may file appropriate objections to such evidence or to the Trustee’s fee 15 |} calculation. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ [ekut C Low 17 Dated: August 10, 2026 18 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 || 26-cv-80, 26-cv-3060, 26-cv-3166, 26-cv-3809. Rajaee has had the benefit of access to legal representation and his current pro se status does not insulate him from being sanctioned. 25 The Court takes notice of court filings as appropriate without the need to grant or 36 deny judicial notice. To the extent Rajaee has filed objections [ECF No. 22] to the Trustee’s briefing or argument, those objections are overruled. Rajaee may not use separately-filed 27 || objections to further advance, develop, or repeat arguments that are properly made in his briefing. 28