gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03530 · 2026-08-10 · Unknown

In re: Ashkan Rajaee and Nassim Rajaee

Proceeding
appeal
Outcome
other — As set forth below, the Court grants the Trustee’s 2 motion for sanctions, and denies Rajaee’s
Area
civil
Panel
Robert Steven Huie (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:22Z · confidence high

The court considered the Trustee's motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 and the debtor's motion for rehearing of a prior dismissal order. The court granted the motion for sanctions, finding the appeal frivolous and brought in bad faith, and denied the motion for rehearing.

What the court decidedThe model
Granting Appellee's Motion for Sanctions
“The Trustee’s motion for sanctions [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for frivolous appeals under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 (modeled on Fed. R. App. P. 38). The order recites that the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and was 'wholly without merit' because the appellant sought findings on an order in which he prevailed and lacked standing to appeal an order that benefited him. The court also considered the appellant's history of repetitive, unsuccessful litigation to infer bad faith. The limitation of fees to 'direct fees and costs' for defending the appeal, excluding costs of seeking sanctions, follows Ninth Circuit precedent (Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC).
Denying Appellant's Motion for Rehearing
“Rajace’s motion for rehearing [ECF No. 18] is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for rehearing under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, which requires the movant to state with particularity points of law or fact overlooked or misapprehended. The court found the appellant's arguments meritless, specifically rejecting the 'merger' argument by applying the standing requirement that an appellant must be adversely affected by the order. The appellant was not adversely affected by the abandonment order because it returned property to him.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the legal standards for rehearing and sanctions in the context of a bankruptcy appeal. It applies the standing doctrine correctly to deny the appellant's attempt to appeal an order that benefited him. It correctly limits the scope of recoverable fees under Rule 38/8020. The reasoning is supported by binding Ninth Circuit authority.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 In re: Case No.: 25-cv-3530-RSH-GC 12 ASHKAN RAJAEE and NASSIM (Appeal from S.D. Cal. Bankr. 13 RAJAEE, Case No. 3:24-bk-00617-CL) Debtors. 14 _________________________________ ORDER (1) GRANTING APPELLEE’S 15 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ASHKAN RAJAEE, (2) DENYING APPELLANT’S 16 MOTION FOR REHEARING Appellant, 17 v. 18 [ECF Nos. 11, 18] CHRISTOPHER R. BARCLAY, 19 Chapter 7 Trustee, WEINBERG 20 GONSER FROST LLP, and JORDAN MATTHEWS, 21 Appellees. 22 23 Pending before the Court are two motions. Appellee Christopher R. Barclay 24 (“Appellee” or “Trustee”) moves for monetary sanctions against debtor Ashkan Rajaee 25 (“Appellant” or “Rajaee”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8020. ECF 26 No. 11. Rajaee moves for rehearing pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 of this Court’s April 27 1 23, 2026 order of dismissal. ECF No. 18. As set forth below, the Court grants the Trustee’s 2 motion for sanctions, and denies Rajaee’s motion for rehearing. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 The underlying case is In re Ashkan Rajaee & Nassim Rajaee, No. 3:24-bk-00617- 5 CL (S.D. Cal. Bankr.) (the “Bankruptcy Case”). 6 The instant appeal arises in connection with the Bankruptcy Court’s July 10, 2025 7 order approving the Trustee’s abandonment to Rajaee of the estate’s claims against 8 attorney Jordan Matthews and the law firm of Weinberg Gonser Frost, LLP (collectively, 9 the “Weinberg Defendants”). See Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. No. 512. 10 On July 24, 2025, Rajaee filed a motion seeking further “findings of fact and 11 conclusions of law” with respect to that July 10, 2025 order. Dkt. No. 539. Rajaee’s motion 12 was based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Id. at 6. The 13 motion requested that the Bankruptcy Court make further determinations as to ten issues 14 that Rajaee identified. Id. at 8-10. The Trustee opposed. Dkt. No. 558. 15 On November 12, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court denied Rajaee’s motion. Dkt. No. 16 654. In that order, the Bankruptcy Court explained that Rajaee’s motion was requesting 17 additional findings on an order on which he prevailed. Id. at 2. The Bankruptcy Court then 18 turned to Rule 52(a), which requires findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection 19 with a bench trial. Id. at 2. The Bankruptcy Court explained that a bench trial did not take 20 place here, and that Rule 52(a) therefore does not mandate additional findings. Id. 21 On November 26, 2025, Rajaee filed a notice of appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s 22 November 12, 2025 order. See ECF No. 1. On April 23, 2026, the Court dismissed the 23 appeal for lack of jurisdiction and determined that the appeal was meritless. ECF No. 16 at 24 5. In the dismissal order, the Court further stated, “[i]n light of this disposition, the Court 25 also denies … motions Rajaee filed after briefing on the merits was completed, seeking to 26 ‘dismiss’ adverse parties from Rajaee’s own appeal, or to transfer the appeal to the 27 Bankruptcy Appellate Panel because the Trustee should not be a party to Rajaee’s appeal. 1 The Trustee is clearly a party to Rajaee’s appeal and as such was entitled to elect district 2 court review of the appeal.” Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted). 3 Prior to dismissal of the appeal, the Trustee filed his motion for sanctions, which has 4 been fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 11, 20, 21. On May 6, 2026, Rajaee filed his motion for 5 rehearing. ECF No. 18. 6 Rajaee has filed numerous appeals from the Bankruptcy Case. Rajaee or his spouse 7 and co-debtor have filed at least twenty such appeals, none of which to date has been 8 successful. See Case No. 26-cv-937, ECF No. 17 at 2-3 (listing status of various appeals). 9 Rajaee has also filed several civil lawsuits against one or more of the appellees in this case, 10 none of which have been successful to date. See id. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A. Motion for Rehearing 13 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, a party may move for rehearing of a district court’s 14 order on a bankruptcy appeal. “[T]he motion must state with particularity each point of law 15 or fact that the movant believes the district court or BAP has overlooked or 16 misapprehended and must argue in support of the motion.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2). 17 A motion under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 is similar to a petition for rehearing under Fed. R. 18 App. P. 40. See In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of 19 motion for rehearing where district court applied Rule 40 standard in bankruptcy matter); 20 In re Silver, No. 23-60004, 2024 WL 838698, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (citing Fowler 21 as setting forth the standard of review on a Rule 8022 motion). 22 “[A] petition for rehearing is not a vehicle for a party to ‘study and reargue his case 23 anew.’” United States v. Mageno, 786 F.3d 768, 775 (quoting Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 24 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1962)); see also Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2008) 25 (collecting cases for the proposition that Fed. R. App. P. 40 “is not a vehicle for presenting 26 new arguments, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, [courts] shall not entertain 27 arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing”). 1 B. Motion for Sanctions 2 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, “[i]f the district court . . . determines that an appeal 3 is frivolous . . . it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” 4 Sanctions are awardable under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020, and these costs may include 5 attorneys’ fees. See Benham v. Hagen (In re Benham), 220 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1043 (C.D. 6 Cal. 2016); First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn (In re Ahn), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 282, *27 7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016). 8 “An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or if the claims of error are wholly 9 without merit.” Erde v. Bodnar (In re Westwood Plaza North), 889 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 10 2018) (citation omitted). Courts consider several factors when determining if an appeal is 11 frivolous, including whether the appellant’s argument “addresses the issues on appeal 12 properly; fails to support the issues on appeal; fails to cite any authority; cites inapplicable 13 authority; makes unsubstantiated factual assertions; makes bare legal conclusions; or, 14 misrepresents the record.” Aldana v. Stadtmueller (In re De Jesus Gomez), 592 B.R. 698, 15 709 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Maloni v. Fairway Wholesale Corp. (In re Maloni), 16 282 B.R. 727, 734 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002)). 17 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8020 is modeled after Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38 18 (Fed. R. App. P. 38). First Fed. Bank v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 297 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). Courts can look to cases applying Fed. R. App. P. 38 when 20 determining whether an appeal is frivolous and an award of costs is appropriate. Id.; In re 21 Ashai, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting cases). “The court may in 22 its discretion impose Rule 38 sanctions for a frivolous appeal against an appellant even if 23 the appellant is proceeding pro se.” In re Westwood Plaza North, 889 F.3d at 977. 24 Additionally, a court may award sanctions for a frivolous appeal over whose merits the 25 court lacks appellate jurisdiction. Id. (ordering sanctions where “[t]he appeal of the district 26 court’s orders was wholly without merit, and sought review of multiple district court orders 27 over which this court lacked jurisdiction”). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Rajaee’s Motion for Rehearing 3 The Court begins with Rajaee’s motion for rehearing. Rajaee’s motion appears to 4 accept that the Court properly dismissed his appeal as non-final, but takes issue with the 5 Court’s denial of motions that Rajaee filed after briefing on the merits was complete, in 6 which he challenged whether the Trustee was a proper party to the appeal. See ECF No. 18 7 at 7. Yet Rajaee’s motion for rehearing appears to concede that the Court, having concluded 8 that it lacked jurisdiction, should have denied that ancillary motion. See id. at 8 (“If the 9 Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, the ordinary consequence would be a dismissal that 10 avoids merits determinations and denies collateral motions as moot or without prejudice.”). 11 In any case, as the Court previously determined, Rajaee’s argument that the Bankruptcy 12 Court-appointed trustee is not a party to Rajaee’s bankruptcy appeal is meritless. 13 In arguing for rehearing, Rajaee also contends that the Court erred in dismissing as 14 non-final his appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s November 12, 2025 order denying his 15 request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, when in fact, he argues, he was also 16 appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s July 10, 2025 order approving the Trustee’s 17 abandonment to Rajaee of the estate’s claims against the Weinberg Defendants. ECF No. 18 18 at 13-16. Rajaee contends that the two orders “merged,” such that an appeal of the later- 19 filed order was also an appeal of the earlier-filed order. Id. at 16. 20 This argument is meritless. Rajaee did not, and could not, appeal from the 21 Bankruptcy Court’s July 10, 2025 order approving the abandonment of property; as the 22 Bankruptcy Court explained in denying Rajaee’s subsequent motion for findings, the July 23 10, 2025 order benefited Rajaee by returning property to him. See In re P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 24 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a bankruptcy appellant has standing “if ‘directly 25 and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court’; in other words, the 26 order must diminish the appellant’s property, increase its burdens, or detrimentally affect 27 its rights”) (quoting Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1 1983)). There is no indication in the record that Rajaee is actually seeking to overturn the 2 abandonment order; instead, his objective in this appeal appears to be collaterally attacking 3 a judgment previously entered against him in San Diego Superior Court confirming an 4 arbitration award. See ECF No. 18 at 10 (“Appellant’s rehearing point is precise: the issue 5 is whether the San Diego court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm a non- 6 compliance arbitration ruling.”). This objective has no relationship to the Bankruptcy 7 Court’s approval of abandonment of property to Rajaee. 8 The Court declines to grant rehearing. 9 B. The Trustee’s Motion for Sanctions 10 The Trustee moves for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 8020, arguing Rajaee’s 11 appeal is frivolous. ECF No. 11-1 at 1. The Court agrees. Even apart from lacking appellate 12 jurisdiction, Rajaee’s appeal is wholly without merit. As set forth in the Court’s April 23, 13 2026 order of dismissal, the applicable rule plainly reflects that Rajaee was not entitled to 14 further findings of fact or conclusions of law. See ECF No. 16 at 3, 5. Nor has he presented 15 any meritorious basis to appeal from the abandonment order which approved the transfer 16 of property to him. 17 The Court considers this appeal in the light of Rajaee’s numerous, repetitive 18 bankruptcy appeals and lawsuits, most of which have been adjudicated, and in none of 19 which has Rajaee prevailed.1 The sheer number of proceedings that Rajaee initiated does 20 not tell the whole story. Within many of these proceedings, Rajaee has made repetitive, 21 lengthy filings, sometimes accompanied by thousands of pages of exhibits. Among the 22 matters that this Court has adjudicated, the same note sounds again and again: Rajaee is 23 bringing federal lawsuits and appeals from his own bankruptcy filing to collaterally attack 24 a prior loss he sustained in state court, and so far has been unable to find a legal basis for 25 26 1 The Court expresses no view herein on the merits of cases or motions the Court has 27 1 succeeding with such an attack. In the context of these repeated failures, coupled with the 2 obvious lack of merit in the instant appeal, the Court infers that Rajaee’s appeal is brought 3 and pursued in bad faith for an improper purpose, namely, to burden his adversaries with 4 prolonged and repetitive litigation. The Court finds that an award of fees and costs is 5 warranted.2 6 Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, the award of attorneys’ fees and costs “must be limited to 7 appellees’ direct fees and costs for defending against the frivolous appeal and may not 8 include the fees and costs incurred regarding the imposition of sanctions.” Blixseth v. 9 Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC, 854 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2017). The Trustee’s current 10 request appears to include fees and costs incurred in seeking sanctions. See ECF No. 11-2 11 at 2. The Court will provide the Trustee an opportunity to provide adequate evidence of his 12 direct costs and fees incurred in defending this appeal, not including fees and costs incurred 13 regarding the imposition of sanctions, and will provide Rajaee an opportunity to respond.3 14 // 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 20 21 2 The Court notes Rajaee’s pro se status in this case, but also notes that in other cases 22 he or his spouse have been represented by counsel. See Case Nos. 25-cv-777, 25-cv-778, 26-cv-80, 26-cv-3060, 26-cv-3166, 26-cv-3809. Rajaee has had the benefit of access to 23 legal representation and his current pro se status does not insulate him from being 24 sanctioned. 3 The Court takes notice of court filings as appropriate without the need to grant or 25 deny judicial notice. To the extent Rajaee has filed objections [ECF No. 22] to the Trustee’s 26 briefing or argument, those objections are overruled. Rajaee may not use separately-filed objections to further advance, develop, or repeat arguments that are properly made in his 27 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Rajace’s motion for rehearing [ECF No. 18] is DENIED. 3 || The Trustee’s motion for sanctions [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED. No later than fourteen 4 || 14) days from the date of this order, the Trustee shall file a claim for its recoverable costs 5 fees supported by adequate evidence. No later than fourteen (14) days after such 6 || filing, Rajaee may file appropriate objections to such evidence or to the Trustee’s fee 7 || calculation. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ 9 Dated: August 10, 2026 [bee 7 ‘ Foe 10 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28