Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 In re: Case No.: 25-cv-3260-RSH-GC 12 ASHKAN RAJAEE and NASSIM (Appeal from S.D. Cal. Bankr. 13 RAJAEE, Case No. 3:24-bk-00617-CL) Debtors. 14 _________________________________ ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S 15 MOTION FOR REHEARING ASHKAN RAJAEE, 16 Appellant, 17 [ECF No. 22] v. 18 TOPDEVZ, LLC, TYLER DAVIS, and 19 CHRISTOPHER R. BARCLAY, 20 Chapter 7 Trustee, 21 Appellees. 22 23 Pending before the Court is a motion by debtor and appellant Ashkan Rajaee 24 (“Appellant” or “Rajaee”) requesting rehearing pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 of this 25 Court’s April 23, 2026 order of dismissal. ECF No. 22. As set forth below, the Court denies 26 the motion. 27 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On October 30, 2025, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 3 California (the “Bankruptcy Court”) denied Rajaee’s “motion for findings and 4 conclusions” on the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration 5 of an order granting the Trustee’s motion for a protective order.1 On November 13, 2025, 6 Rajaee filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s October 30, 2025 order. The 7 Trustee elected to proceed with this appeal in U.S. District Court. See ECF No. 1-9. 8 On April 23, 2026, this Court dismissed Rajaee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 9 finding the appeal did not challenge a final order of the Bankruptcy Court. ECF No. 20 at 10 5. The Court also denied the motions Rajaee filed after briefing on the merits was 11 completed, seeking to dismiss adverse parties from Rajaee’s appeal, or to transfer the 12 appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Id. 13 This is one of Rajaee’s numerous bankruptcy appeals. Rajaee or his spouse and co- 14 debtor have filed at least twenty separate appeals from his Bankruptcy Case, none of which 15 appeals have been successful to date. See Case No. 26-cv-937, ECF No. 17 (listing status 16 of various appeals). Rajaee has also filed several civil lawsuits against one or more of the 17 appellees in this case. See ECF No. 20 at 2 n.1. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, a party may move for rehearing of a district court’s 20 order on a bankruptcy appeal. “[T]he motion must state with particularity each point of law 21 or fact that the movant believes the district court or BAP has overlooked or 22 misapprehended and must argue in support of the motion.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2). 23 A motion under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 is similar to a petition for rehearing under Fed. R. 24 App. P. 40. See In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of 25 26 1 The underlying case is In re Ashkan Rajaee & Nassim Rajaee, No. 3:24-bk-00617- 27 1 motion for rehearing where district court applied Rule 40 standard in bankruptcy matter); 2 In re Silver, No. 23-60004, 2024 WL 838698, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (citing Fowler 3 as setting forth the standard of review on a Rule 8022 motion). 4 “[A] petition for rehearing is not a vehicle for a party to ‘study and reargue his case 5 anew.’” United States v. Mageno, 786 F.3d 768, 775 (quoting Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 6 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1962)); see also Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2008) 7 (collecting cases for the proposition that Fed. R. App. P. 40 “is not a vehicle for presenting 8 new arguments, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, [courts] shall not entertain 9 arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing”). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 Rajaee contends that the Court erred in dismissing as non-final his appeal of the 12 Bankruptcy Court’s order denying Rajaee’s motion to have the Bankruptcy Court make 13 findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with the Bankruptcy Court’s denial 14 of reconsideration of its earlier order granting the Trustee’s motion for a protective order. 15 See ECF No. 22 at 4 (Rajaee’s motion for rehearing); see also Bankruptcy Case, Dkt. Nos. 16 402 (May 14, 2025 order granting Trustee’s motion for a protective order); 537 (July 22, 17 2025 denying Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration); 628 (Oct. 30, 2025 order denying 18 Rajaee’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with denial of 19 reconsideration). 20 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(3) requires that a notice of appeal “be accompanied by the 21 judgment—or the appealable order or decree—from which the appeal is taken.” Rajaee’s 22 notice of appeal stated that he was appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of his motion 23 for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and only attached the Bankruptcy Court’s order 24 denying the motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See ECF No. 1 (notice of 25 appeal). In moving for rehearing, Rajaee argues that all three Bankruptcy Court orders 26 “merged”—such that he was appealing not only the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of his 27 motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, but also the order granting the Trustee’s 1 motion for a protective order, and the order denying Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration. 2 ECF No. 22 at 4. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(4) provides that “[t]he notice of appeal 3 encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into the identified judgment or 4 appealable order or decree.” 5 Rajaee did not argue in his opening brief that he was appealing these three orders. 6 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014(a)(4) requires an appellant to provide a jurisdictional statement that 7 includes the “relevant facts establishing jurisdiction,” but Rajaee’s jurisdictional statement 8 was conclusory and did not identify what he was appealing. See ECF No. 8 at 10. His 9 opening brief did not advance the theory of merger he asserts in his motion for rehearing. 10 Instead, he focused on the same question that has been the hallmark of Rajaee’s repeated 11 appeals and lawsuits—an effort to collaterally attack an arbitration that he lost and a 12 subsequent San Diego Superior Court judgment that was entered against him. In Rajaee’s 13 view, the San Diego Superior Court judgment was “void” and so every subsequent adverse 14 order in the Bankruptcy Case is also “void” because they “give effect” to the earlier 15 judgment against him. ECF No. 8 at 26-35. 16 Although Rajaee’s reply briefly raised his theory of “merger” in responding to the 17 Trustee’s argument that Rajaee was appealing from a non-final order, Rajaee did not 18 contend, much less establish, that the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting the Trustee’s 19 motion for a protective order, or its order denying Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration, 20 were appealable orders either. See ECF No. 12 at 6. They were not appealable orders. See 21 In re Royce Homes LP, 466 B.R. 81, 89 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (noting “extensive case law 22 holding bankruptcy discovery orders to be interlocutory” and non-appealable); Hoffenberg 23 v. Cohen (In re Towers Fin. Corp.), 164 B.R. 719, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Bankruptcy court 24 orders granting or denying discovery do not finally dispose of an entire claim on which 25 relief may be granted, and therefore are generally treated as interlocutory and not 26 appealable as of right.”); see also Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1490 27 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Discovery orders are not final appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1 courts have refused interlocutory review of such orders under the collateral order 2 || doctrine.”) (citation omitted); Branson v. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 3 || 1990) (“[W]hen an underlying judgment is not final for purposes of section 1291, the denial 4 ||of a motion to alter such judgment cannot be final for such purposes either.”). Here, there 5 || was no final judgment or other appealable order into which any of the orders not mentioned 6 ||in Rajaee’s notice of appeal could “merge.” 7 Whether Rajaee’s instant appeal is construed as challenging the Bankruptcy Court’s 8 orders denying of Rajaee’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting the 9 || Trustee’s motion for a protective order, or denying Rajaee’s motion for reconsideration, or 10 of these orders, he does not challenge a non-final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 11 || 158(a)(2), and there is no basis for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). As 12 Court previously stated, ECF No. 20 at 5, Rajaee’s appeal is meritless. It is unmoored 13 || from any ruling of the Bankruptcy Court, and represents Rajaee’s effort to use unrelated, 14 interlocutory rulings in his bankruptcy case to undo his state-court loss. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, Rajaee’s motion for rehearing [ECF No. 22] is DENIED. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ 18 Dated: August 10, 2026 [Robe 7 Howe 19 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28