In re: Ashkan Rajaee and Nassim Rajaee v. Tyler Brandon Davis
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Outcome
- other — Ban
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Robert Steven Huie (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion for rehearing filed by the appellant, Ashkan Rajaee, seeking to overturn a prior order dismissing his bankruptcy appeal. The court denied the motion, finding that the appellant was attempting to reargue issues not properly raised in his appellate briefing and to collaterally attack unrelated judgments.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Rehearing Denied“Accordingly, the motion [ECF No. 10] is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard that a motion for rehearing is not a vehicle for rearguing the case or presenting new arguments. The order notes that the appellant's specific contentions regarding the automatic stay were not established in his appellate briefing, and that his attempt to overturn the Chapter 7 conversion order was procedurally barred because he failed to timely appeal that specific order. The denial follows from the procedural rules cited (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 and Fed. R. App. P. 40). |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable rule for motions for rehearing in bankruptcy appeals (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022) and aligns it with the standard for petitions for rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40). The court provides specific reasons for the denial: the appellant failed to establish the automatic stay violations in his initial briefing, and he is attempting to use the rehearing motion to overturn a separate, unappealed order (the Chapter 7 conversion) and to collaterally attack an unrelated state court judgment. The reasoning directly addresses the motion's deficiencies.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 In re: Case No.: 25-cv-2850-RSH-JLB 12 ASHKAN RAJAEE and NASSIM (Appeal from S.D. Cal. Bankr. 13 RAJAEE, Case No. 3:24-bk-00617-CL) Debtors. 14 _________________________________ ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S 15 MOTION FOR REHEARING ASHKAN RAJAEE, 16 Appellant, 17 [ECF No. 10] v. 18 TYLER BRANDON DAVIS and 19 TOPDEVZ LLC, 20 Appellees. 21 22 Pending before the Court is a motion by debtor and appellant Ashkan Rajaee 23 (“Appellant” or “Rajaee”) requesting rehearing pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 of this 24 Court’s April 23, 2026 order of dismissal. ECF No. 10. 25 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022, a party may move for rehearing of a district court’s 26 order on a bankruptcy appeal. “[T]he motion must state with particularity each point of law 27 1 or fact that the movant believes the district court or BAP has overlooked or 2 misapprehended and must argue in support of the motion.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2). 3 A motion under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 is similar to a petition for rehearing under Fed. R. 4 App. P. 40. See In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of 5 motion for rehearing where district court applied Rule 40 standard in bankruptcy matter); 6 In re Silver, No. 23-60004, 2024 WL 838698, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (citing Fowler 7 as setting forth the standard of review on a Rule 8022 motion). 8 “[A] petition for rehearing is not a vehicle for a party to ‘study and reargue his case 9 anew.’” United States v. Mageno, 786 F.3d 768, 775 (quoting Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 10 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1962)); see also Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2008) 11 (collecting cases for the proposition that Fed. R. App. P. 40 “is not a vehicle for presenting 12 new arguments, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, [courts] shall not entertain 13 arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing”). 14 In his motion for rehearing, Rajaee contends that both the Bankruptcy Court and this 15 Court failed to analyze Rajaee’s contentions that the following acts violated the automatic 16 stay in this case: “Davis holding himself out as TopDevz manager, retaining Hays for 17 TopDevz, instructing Hays to prepare papers for TopDevz, and causing TopDevz to act in 18 bankruptcy based only on judgment-derived authority.” ECF No. 10 at 5. Rajaee’s 19 appellate briefing did not establish that such acts violated the automatic stay in this case. 20 Rajaee appears to be using the instant appeal as a means to overturn the Bankruptcy 21 Court’s May 9, 2024 order converting Rajaee’s bankruptcy to Chapter 7. See ECF No. 5 at 22 47. But he did not timely appeal that conversion order. See Case No. 25-cv-667, Dkt. No. 23 23 (Oct. 31, 2025 order affirming Bankruptcy Court’s denial of reconsideration of 24 conversion order), at 10-12. More broadly, he is seeking to use this appeal as a means to 25 collaterally attack an earlier San Diego Superior Court judgment that is simply unrelated 26 to the automatic stay in this case. See ECF No. 5 at 35. 27 // 1 The Court has considered the arguments made in Rajaee’s motion for rehearing and 2 ||determines that they are without merit. Accordingly, the motion [ECF No. 10] is 3 || DENIED. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ 5 Dated: August 10, 2026 [eb 7 Howe 6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || OO 27 The Court takes notice of the records submitted by Rajaee. 28