Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUARTE BARCIA, Case No.: 26cv4163-LL-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARRERO, et al., 15 Respondents. [ECF No. 1] 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Argel Noel Duarte Barcia’s Petition for a Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a Response. 20 ECF No. 4 (“Ret.”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition for 21 Writ of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS an immediate release. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua. Pet. ¶ 1. On June 15, 2024, Petitioner entered 24 the United States via Miami International Airport after the Department of Homeland 25 Security (“DHS”) authorized Petitioner’s travel under the Nicaragua humanitarian parole 26 process. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. He presented himself for inspection and was paroled into the United 27 States. Id. ¶ 2. According to Petitioner, his parole was valid until June 12, 2025. Id. 28 Respondents agree that “Petitioner was previously released from immigration custody on 1 parole issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)” but that they “have insufficient information 2 regarding termination of that parole.” Ret. at 2. 3 On May 18, 2026, Petitioner was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement 4 (“ICE”) custody. Pet. ¶ 3. According to Petitioner, ICE “did not provide advance notice, a 5 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, or a determination that changed circumstances 6 made confinement necessary.” Id. On July 21, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition 7 alleging DHS violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. ¶¶ 29–37. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 10 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 11 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 12 that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 13 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 14 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the 15 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, 16 “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 17 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542 18 U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Immigration officials may parole certain noncitizens into the United States 21 “temporarily under such conditions [immigration officials] may prescribe . . . for urgent 22 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). DHS’s 23 implementing regulations provide that parole is automatically terminated without written 24 notice at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized. 8 C.F.R. § 25 212.5(e)(1)(ii). Here, Petitioner does not dispute that his parole expired on June 12, 2025 26 (Pet. ¶ 2), and Respondents state that they “have insufficient information regarding 27 termination of that parole” (Ret. at 2). Nevertheless, Petitioner claims that his detention, 28 even after his parole expired, “without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” 1 violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Pet. ¶¶ 29–40. Respondents do 2 not address this constitutional claim. See generally Ret. 3 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, 4 or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that 5 the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation 6 proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 7 292, 306 (1993)). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing 8 before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 9 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over 10 whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in 11 their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations 12 omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 13 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 14 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 15 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 16 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original). 17 Indeed, the expiration of parole does not extinguish a petitioner’s entitlement to due 18 process. See Quiroz, v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-866 JLS-DEB, 2026 WL 673822, at *2 n.1 19 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026) (rejecting Respondents’ argument that “because Petitioner’s 20 parole expired after a year, any due process arguments are foreclosed”) see also Astafev v. 21 Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Ctr., No. 3:26-CV-00313-RBM-AHG, 2026 WL 654247, 22 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026) (“That the express terms of the [§ 1182] parole notice 23 allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow obviate the need for 24 the Government to provide [an] individualized hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”); 25 Osaretin v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-CV-3612-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 280077, 26 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (“Courts have repeatedly held that liberty interests do not 27 expire when parole does.”); see also D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 28 2026 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026); Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV- 1 01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025); Ramirez 2 Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136–37 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Rodriguez 3 Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1179 (D. Nev. 2025). 4 Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in 5 remaining out of custody even after his parole expired. Upon arrival, he was released on 6 humanitarian parole after he was determined not to be a danger to the community or a flight 7 risk. There is no evidence that this determination has changed since Petitioner’s arrival. 8 See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after 9 her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither 10 a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in 11 remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”). And though his parole 12 expired approximately one year before his detention, Respondents offer no evidence that 13 during that time officials tried to detain Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner justifiably continued to 14 rely on and take advantage of his continued freedom. 15 Because Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 16 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 17 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 18 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors: 19 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an 20 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 21 if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s 22 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 23 additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 24 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that Petitioner’s detention 25 without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard denied Petitioner of his due 26 process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in 27 remaining out of custody. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has 28 the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after 1 that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining 2 out of custody.” (citations omitted)). Freedom from detention is a fundamental part of due 3 process protection. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) 4 (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 5 Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))). 6 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high. After the initial 7 determination that Petitioner should be released on parole because he posed no danger to 8 the community and was not a flight risk, Respondents have not produced any argument or 9 evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 10 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th 11 Cir. 2018) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not 12 a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). There is no indication that Petitioner has 13 failed to abide by the conditions of his release. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the 14 law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal 15 proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially 16 changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has 17 become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is 18 high because neither the government nor Petitioner has had an opportunity to determine 19 whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation 20 omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, such as 21 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high. 22 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 23 and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has 24 articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre- 25 detention hearing.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01206-KES-SKO (HC), 26 2025 WL 2817795, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 27 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any 28 point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a 1 || hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a pre- 2 || deprivation hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on the government. 3 || See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody hearings are routine 4 ||and impose a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO 5 ||(HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025))). 6 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release without 7 ||notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is 8 || unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 9 || at *4 (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice and a hearing and without 10 ||a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due process rights and rendering 11 detention unlawful). The proper remedy for the unlawful detention is Petitioner’s 12 ||immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting parole. See Noori v. 13 ||LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163-66 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (finding DHS violated the 14 || petitioner’s due process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a hearing and 15 |/ordering his immediate release); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering immediate 16 |/release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond without notice or pre- 17 || deprivation hearing). 18 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition. 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 21 Corpus and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody subject 22 || only to the conditions of his preexisting parole. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: August 7, 2026 NO 25 QF | 26 Honorable Linda Lopez 57 United States District Judge 28