Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MICHAEL CRIBIER, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01833-RBM-VET 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 13 COMPASS, INC., 14 Defendant. [Doc. 46]

15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Cribier’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 18 Leave to File Amended Complaint (“Motion”). (Doc. 46.) Defendant Compass, Inc. 19 (“Defendant”) filed an Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 47) and Plaintiff filed a Reply in 20 Support of the Motion (Doc. 49). The Court finds this matter suitable for determination 21 without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth 22 below, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 46) is GRANTED. 23 I. BACKGROUND1 24 On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed 25 the operative Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) in the United States District Court, 26 27 1 This factual summary reflects Plaintiff’s allegations, not conclusions of fact or law by the 28 1 Northern District of California. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant engages in and 2 profits from making marketing calls and texts without regard to any recipient’s status on 3 the National Do Not Call Registry (“NDNCR”) in violation of the Telephone Consumer 4 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”). (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9–10.) On Defendant’s motion (see 5 Doc. 16), the action was transferred to this District on July 18, 2026. (Docs. 25–26.) On 6 August 8, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Doc. 28.) The case was 7 transferred to the undersigned on January 16, 2026. (Doc. 43.) 8 On March 13, 2026, almost a year after commencing this action, Plaintiff filed the 9 instant Motion along with the Proposed First Amended Class Action Complaint (“Proposed 10 FACC”) attached as an exhibit. (See Doc. 46; Doc. 46-2.) On June 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed 11 a Notice of Errata “to correct an inadvertent scrivener’s error in the Proposed First 12 Amended Complaint” attached to the instant Motion. (Doc. 53 at 2.) Plaintiff explains 13 that “[d]ue to a scrivener’s error by counsel, the text included in paragraphs 80–81 of the 14 original [Complaint] was unintentionally omitted from the version filed with the Court. . . . 15 [but was] meant to be included and corrected in the Proposed First Amended Complaint.” 16 (Id.) Along with the Notice of Errata, Plaintiff submitted a Corrected Proposed First 17 Amended Complaint (“Corrected Proposed FACC”) as well as a redline comparing the 18 Proposed FACC to the Corrected Proposed FACC. (See Doc. 53-2, Ex. A (Proposed 19 FACC); Doc. 53-3, Ex. B (redline).) 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15 governs amended and supplemental 22 pleadings. Once the time for amendment as a matter of course has passed, “a party may 23 amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 25 requires.” Id. District courts have substantial discretion in determining when an 26 amendment should be allowed. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 27 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997). Courts consider several factors, commonly referred to as 28 the “Foman factors,” in ruling on a motion for leave to amend: “undue delay, bad faith or 1 dilatory motive, futility of amendment, and prejudice to the opposing party.” United States 2 v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 3 (1962)). “[T]he consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest 4 weight.” Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th 5 Cir. 2013) (quoting Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 6 2003)). Absent prejudice, “or a strong showing of any of the remaining . . . factors, there 7 exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence 8 Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. “Defendants carry the burden of showing why leave to amend 9 should not be granted.” Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 10 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 127 F.R.D. 529, 530–31 11 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). 12 “Rule 15(d) permits the filing of a supplemental pleading which introduces a cause 13 of action not alleged in the original complaint and not in existence when the original 14 complaint was filed.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 15 1998) (citation omitted). Under Rule 15(d), the Court “may, on just terms, permit a party 16 to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that 17 happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). “Courts 18 weigh the same factors when deciding motions under Rule 15(d) and Rule 15(a).” Red 19 Hat, Inc. v. VirtaMove, Corp., 785 F. Supp. 3d 603, 611 (N.D. Cal. 2025). “Absent 20 prejudice or a ‘strong showing’ of any other Foman factor, there is a presumption in favor 21 of granting leave to supplement.” Lyon v. ICE, 308 F.R.D. 203, 214 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 22 (quoting Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052). “Courts also consider whether allowing 23 leave to supplement would align with the goal of Rule 15(d), which is to promote judicial 24 efficiency.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an 25 adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of 26 claims which arise after the initial pleadings are filed.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. 27 v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1982). 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Procedural Issues 3 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend under Rule 15(a) to revise certain existing allegations 4 and add a new TCPA claim, a proposed subclass, and supporting factual allegations based 5 on a phone call he allegedly received on February 11, 2026. (Doc. 46 at 7–9; see Doc. 46- 6 3, Ex. B.) As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s proposed amendments 7 related to the new TCPA claim are more properly addressed under Rule 15(d), not Rule 8 15(a), because they are based on conduct that took place after the Complaint was first filed. 9 “Rule 15(a) addresses matters occurring up to the time Plaintiff[ ] filed the original 10 [C]omplaint and Rule 15(d) addresses matters occurring thereafter.” Morrow v. City of 11 San Diego, No. 11–cv–01497–IEG (KSC), 2012 WL 2675454, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 12 2012). Although Rule 15(a) applies to some of Plaintiff’s proposed changes, namely those 13 concerning his existing allegations, the proposed changes relating to the new TCPA claim 14 are based on conduct that took place a year after he filed the Complaint. The proper 15 procedural mechanism for such proposed amendments is therefore a supplemental pleading 16 pursuant to Rule 15(d). See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010). 17 Plaintiff invokes and discusses Rule 15(a) in the Motion but does not address Rule 18 15(d). (See generally Doc. 46.) Defendant also does not address Rule 15(d) or argue that 19 the Motion is procedurally improper as grounds for its denial. (See generally Doc. 47.) 20 “However, this is a distinction without a difference, as the legal standard for granting or 21 denying a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d) is the same as the standard for a Rule 22 15(a) motion to amend.” Ereikat v. Michael & Assocs., PC, No. 14-CV-05339-JSC, 2015 23 WL 4463653, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2015) (citations omitted); see Lyon, 308 F.R.D. 24 at 214 (“The legal standard for granting or denying a motion to supplement under Rule 25 15(d) is the same as for amending one under 15(a).”). “When a party erroneously 26 denominates a supplemental pleading as an amended pleading, a court simply should 27 evaluate allegations involving facts that occurred after the complaint was filed as a 28 supplemental pleading.” Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.U. ex rel. A.D.U., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1 1160, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing United States ex rel. Wulff v. CMA, Inc., 890 F.2d 2 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1989)). “It is Rule 15(d), not Rule 15(a), that governs supplemental 3 complaints, even if the complaint is mislabeled as an amended complaint.” Prasco, LLC 4 v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As such, the Court 5 has “discretion to decide whether or not to allow [Plaintiff’s] supplemental complaint so 6 long as it did so ‘upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just.’” Id. (citing Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 15(d)); see Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that district 8 courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to allow a supplemental pleading). 9 In this case, Plaintiff attached a clean and a redlined version of the Proposed FACC 10 to the Motion filed on March 13, 2026, which provided Defendant with notice of his 11 proposed changes. (See Doc. 46-2, Ex. A at 1–32; Doc. 46-3, Ex. B at 1–34.) Because the 12 standards for deciding Rule 15(a)(2) and Rule 15(d) motions are generally the same, the 13 Parties had ample opportunity to address the applicable Foman factors. Accordingly, and 14 in the interests of judicial economy, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion as under Rule 15 15(a) and Rule 15(d). See PNY Techs., Inc. v. SanDisk Corp., Case No. 11–cv–04689– 16 WHO, 2014 WL 294855, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) (rejecting argument that a motion 17 to amend was procedurally improper, even where Rule 15(d) applied to some of the 18 proposed changes and the motion only addressed Rule 15(a), because “[t]hat is a distinction 19 with little difference”); Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., No. CIV. S-04-1339 LKK/DAD, 20 2011 WL 13366123, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2011) (construing a motion to amend under 21 both Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(d) in light of Ninth Circuit precedent and finding a distinction 22 between such motions was “without merit”) (citing Cabrerea, 159 F.3d at 382). 23 B. Proposed Changes to Existing Allegations 24 Plaintiff requests leave to amend certain existing allegations including those 25 concerning jurisdiction, venue, class action assertions, and Defendant’s former agents. 26 (See Doc. 46-3, Ex. B ¶¶ 13, 15–16, 19, 23, 25, 28, 54, 56, 74, 92–93, 106–13, 120–21.) 27 Because Defendant advances no argument opposing these proposed amendments, Plaintiff 28 1 is GRANTED leave to amend to his existing allegations. 2 C. Proposed New TCPA Claim 3 Plaintiff also requests leave to add factual allegations concerning a prerecorded 4 telemarketing call that he allegedly received in February 2026 as well as a new claim for 5 violations of the TCPA’s prerecorded and artificial voice provisions, an additional request 6 for damages for such violations, and a proposed subclass consisting of individuals who 7 received prerecorded messages from Defendant based on the alleged February 2026 phone 8 call. (Doc. 46 at 7–8, 11; see Doc. 46-3, Ex. B ¶¶ 7, 10, 67–69, 83–84, 104–105, 139–48.) 9 Defendant does not squarely address each Foman factor. Rather, Defendant argues 10 “the proposed amendment is futile and fails to correct errors in the original pleading that 11 have come to light since filing.” (Doc. 47 at 2.) Defendant argues, in particular, that 12 Plaintiff’s proposed changes are futile and not in good faith because the Proposed FACC 13 “would be subject to a motion” to dismiss and “contains allegations that are expressly 14 contradicted by the discovery taken in the action to date.” (Id. at 2, 4.) The Court addresses 15 Defendant’s arguments before turning to the remaining Foman factors. 16 1. Futility 17 Defendant contends the Proposed FACC is futile because Plaintiff: (1) provided 18 express consent to be called which undermines his proposed new TCPA claim; and (2) has 19 no basis upon which to allege vicarious liability because such allegations are contradicted 20 by documents produced in discovery. (See Doc. 47 at 4–5.) 21 A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately “subject to 22 dismissal.” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). Futility 23 alone may warrant denying leave to amend “only if no set of facts can be proved under the 24 25 26 2 Defendant contends that Plaintiff should be required to correct existing agency 27 allegations in the original Complaint “that he knows to be false.” (Doc. 47 at 2–4.) However, Defendant provides no legal support for its contention and, as discussed infra, 28 1 amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” 2 Barahona v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sweaney 3 v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)). The “proper test to be applied when 4 determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the one used 5 when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).” Miller v. 6 Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by 7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (citation omitted). 8 “Denial of leave to amend on this ground is rare.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 9 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of 10 challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is 11 granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Id. (citation omitted). “While courts will 12 determine the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment using the same standard as 13 applied on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, . . . such issues are often more appropriately raised in a 14 motion to dismiss rather than in an opposition to a motion for leave to amend.” SAES 15 Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citations 16 omitted); see Van Steenwyk v. Van Steenwyk, Case No. 2:20-cv-02375-FLA (AFMx), 2021 17 WL 12295260, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2021) (“[F]utility is more properly addressed on 18 a noticed motion to dismiss than in opposition to” a motion to amend). 19 In this case, Defendant disagrees with Plaintiff’s allegation that he did not provide 20 express consent to receive marketing calls from real estate agents and argues that 21 documents produced in discovery show he “wanted to be called by real estate agents” 22 because he provided his phone number for inquiries on his house listed for sale. (Doc. 47 23 at 4 (emphasis omitted).) However, “since a challenged motion for leave to amend operates 24 like a motion to dismiss, the Court [must] accept[ ] all factual allegations in the proposed 25 amended complaint as true and construe[ ] them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff[ ] 26 for the purposes of [the] Motion.” Harper Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 27 Pittsburgh, PA, Case No. 3:18-cv-00471-BAS-NLS, 2020 WL 1820124, at *9 (S.D. Cal. 28 Apr. 10, 2020). Additionally, “[e]xpress consent under the TCPA is an affirmative 1 defense[,]” not an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Haghayeghi v. Guess?, Inc., 2 No. 14cv00020 JAH-NLS, 2015 WL 1345302, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (citing 3 Grant v. Cap. Mgmt. Servs., L.P., 449 Fed. Appx. 598, 600 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2011)). As 4 Plaintiff specifically alleges that he “did not provide prior express written consent to be 5 contacted using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice” (Doc. 46-3, Ex. B ¶ 10), 6 Defendant disputes an issue of fact. See Haghayeghi v, 2015 WL 1345302, at *5 (denying 7 motion to dismiss TCPA claim based on consent where “there [was] a dispute as to whether 8 Plaintiff consented to receive text messages from Defendant.”). As such, “a resolution of 9 this issue involves questions of fact, which is not a basis on which to deny a motion for 10 leave to amend due to futility.” Rastgouie v. Michael Kors Stores Cal., Inc., Case No. LA 11 CV19-00012 JAK (JEMx), 2021 WL 4786886, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2021). 12 Defendant further claims documents produced in discovery show that real estate 13 agents are independent contractors which is “fatal to Plaintiff’s claim” based on vicarious 14 liability. (Doc. 47 at 5.) But a contract “which designates a contracting party as an 15 independent contractor and not an employee, does not necessarily negate a finding of an 16 employment relationship.” Soto v. Diakon Logistics (Del.), Inc., Civil No. 08cv33-L(AJB), 17 2009 WL 690178, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009) (citing Estrada v. FedEx Ground 18 Package Sys., Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2007)). Such a determination involves “a fact 19 intensive analysis” that Defendant did not engage with. See id. And “whether an agent- 20 principal relationship exists is a question of fact and is not an issue appropriately resolved 21 on a motion to dismiss.” Clark v. PAR, Inc., No. CV-15-02322 MWF (FFMx), 2015 WL 22 13781846, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015); see Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. 23 Alarm.com Inc., Case No. 15-cv-06314-YGR, 2018 WL 3707283, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 24 2018) (noting that for vicarious liability under the TCPA, “[t]he existence of an agency 25 relationship generally presents a question of fact.”) (quoting Ward v. Mgmt. Analysis Co. 26 Emp. Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d in part on other 27 grounds, UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999)). 28 Thus, the Court will not deny the Motion based on futility and defers ruling on the 1 sufficiency of the allegations presented in the Proposed FACC. See Entangled Media, LLC 2 v. Dropbox Inc., 348 F.R.D. 649, 656 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Where a proposed amended claim 3 involves complicated factual or legal issues, it is generally preferable for the sufficiency of 4 that claim to be addressed on a fully briefed motion to dismiss rather than under the more 5 circumscribed Rule 15(a) ‘futility’ analysis.”). As Defendant acknowledges (see Doc. 47 6 at 6), Defendant is free to challenge the sufficiency of such allegations in a subsequent 7 motion. See FlatWorld Interactives LLC v. Apple Inc., Case No. 12–cv–01956–WHO, 8 2013 WL 6406437, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) (“Granting leave to amend does not 9 necessarily mean that the underlying allegations ultimately have merit.”). 10 2. Bad Faith 11 Defendant argues that the Proposed FACC was not made in good faith because 12 Plaintiff “completely le[ft] out” that he “wanted to be called by real estate agents,” and 13 makes allegations that are “false,” “irrelevant,” and “are expressly contradicted by the 14 discovery taken in the action to date.” (Doc. 47 at 2–4 (emphasis omitted).) 15 “Finding bad faith requires courts to focus on the plaintiff’s motives for not 16 amending the complaint to assert the proposed new claims earlier.” Larios v. Nike Retail 17 Servs., Inc., No. 11cv1600–GPC–NLS, 2013 WL 4046680, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) 18 (citing Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)). “A party acts in bad faith 19 when it seeks to amend its pleadings solely for a ‘wrongful motive’ such as unnecessary 20 delay or harassment.” Delgado v. Orchard Supply Hardware Corp., No. 1:09–cv–01839 21 SMS, 2011 WL 4627073, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011). “Bad faith will not be found ‘where 22 the record demonstrates that plaintiffs’ allegations were not frivolous and that they were 23 endeavoring in good faith to meet the pleading requirements.’” Larios, 2013 WL 4046680, 24 *3 (quoting Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1053). 25 Here, as previously discussed (see Sec.III.B.1.), Defendant contests factual and legal 26 issues that do not automatically render Plaintiff’s proposed vicarious liability allegations 27 “false” or frivolous. And Defendant cites “no authority to establish that mere factual 28 disputes constitute evidence of bad faith.” Van Steenwyk, 2021 WL 12295260, at *3 1 (internal citation omitted). Nor does Defendant present any evidence indicating that 2 Plaintiff sought leave to amend for a wrongful motive. See Delgado, 2011 WL 4627073, 3 *3. Under these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff acted in bad faith. 4 3. Remaining Factors 5 Plaintiff argues that undue delay does not exist because he moved for leave to amend 6 “mere weeks after he discovered . . . new facts underlying his amendment,” namely the 7 phone call he allegedly received from a Compass real estate agent on February 11, 2026. 8 (Doc. 46 at 10–11.) Plaintiff also argues that the “proposed amendment will cause no 9 prejudice,” because “a single cause of action for violation of the TCPA’s prerecord and 10 artificial voice provisions—does not significantly alter the factual or legal landscape of the 11 case.” (Id. at 13.) Defendant does not refute or respond to these arguments. 12 Even so, there is no evidence that Plaintiff “knew or should have known the facts 13 and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 14 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990). Rather, Plaintiff’s proposed changes are based on 15 conduct that took place after the Parties’ deadline to file amended pleadings (see Doc. 35 16 at 1), and Plaintiff sought leave to amend promptly after he received the alleged phone call 17 on February 11, 2026. See Larios, 2013 WL 4046680, at *5. 18 Moreover, Defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice from Plaintiff’s proposed 19 changes. To determine potential prejudice to the opposing party, the Court considers 20 whether the amendment would “greatly change the parties’ positions in the action, and 21 require the assertion of new defenses.” Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 09–CV–2371–IEG 22 (BLM), 2010 WL 2612942, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 2010) (citing Phoenix Sols., Inc. v. 23 Sony Elec., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Morongo Band of Mission 24 Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Prejudice is generally mitigated 25 where the case is still in the discovery stage, no trial date is pending and no pretrial 26 conference has occurred.” Calderon v. Tulare Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 1:17-cv-0040-BAM, 27 2018 WL 4473626, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018). As Plaintiff points out, “this litigation 28 is still in its early stages, with ample opportunity for [Defendant] to conduct discovery and 1 || depose Plaintiff about his additional claims.” (Doc. 46 at 14 (citation omitted).) Based on 2 ||the procedural posture of this action, the Court finds that any prejudice Defendant may 3 || suffer does not rise to the level necessary to warrant denial of leave to amend. 4 Finally, the Court finds that “[t]he interests of judicial economy and the liberal 5 interpretation of Rule 15(d) favor granting leave to file the supplemental complaint in this 6 ||case.” Volpe, 858 F.2d at 476. Plaintiff's proposed changes have “‘some relation” to the 7 || TCPA claim already in the Complaint—Plaintiff asserts a TCPA claim against Defendant 8 ||for violations of the same statute concerning Defendant’s alleged cold calling and 9 ||messaging practices. See id. at 474 (“While some relationship must exist between the 10 newly alleged matters and the subject of the original action, they need not all arise out of 11 same transaction.”) (citation omitted); Sywula v. Teleport Mobility, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 12 }}3d 1195, 1213 (S.D. Cal. 2023). Allowing Plaintiff to supplement his pleading would 13 || further “promote judicial efficiency” because a separate action for his proposed new TCPA 14 |/claim would likely result in duplicative efforts through separate rounds of substantially 15 || similar discovery, motion practice, and trial. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 16 || 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To determine if efficiency might be achieved, courts 17 || assess ‘whether the entire controversy between the parties could be settled in one action.’”’) 18 ||(quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 19 Procedure: Civil 2D § 1506 (1990)). These factors therefore weigh in favor of Plaintiff. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Motion (Doc. 46) is GRANTED. Plaintiff 22 ||SHALL file the Corrected Proposed FACC, attached to the Notice of Errata (Doc. 53-2, 23 || Ex. A at 2-32), on or before August 14, 2026. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||DATE: August 7, 2026 pA trormdes, Moatagge 7 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 11