Lafortune B Tanyie Angel v. Christopher Larose, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas petition from an immigration detainee arguing that her nine-month detention without a bond hearing violated due process. The court dismissed the petition with leave to amend, finding that the detention was not yet unreasonable under the applicable multi-factor test.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with leave to amend“For the above reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Petition WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to allow Petitioner to file an Amended Petition in the event that her detention extends beyond a year.” | agree with court The court applied the six-factor test from Banda v. McAleenan to determine if the detention was unreasonably prolonged. It found that the most important factor, the total length of detention (nine months), weighed against the petitioner, while the anticipated duration of future detention and conditions of detention weighed in her favor. The remaining factors were neutral. The court concluded that the detention was not yet unreasonable. This follows the logic of the cited authorities and the specific facts of the case. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the jurisdictional issue and applies the narrow construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) from Reno and Ibarra-Perez. It then correctly applies the Banda six-factor test to the specific facts of the case, weighing the factors and reaching a defensible conclusion that nine months of detention is not yet unreasonably prolonged. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LAFORTUNE B TANYIE ANGEL, Case No.: 3:26-cv-3090-CAB-GC 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 13 v. FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Lafortune B Tanyie Angel’s amended petition for a 18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 9 (“Petition”).] Petitioner 19 claims her nearly nine-month detention by immigration authorities is unconstitutional. [Id. 20 at 2.] She seeks a bond hearing or immediate release. [Id.] Respondents filed a response 21 to the Petition. [Doc. No. 10.] For the reasons below, the Court DISMISSES the Petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a Cameroonian citizen who first entered the United States on February 24 1, 2025. [Petition at 3.] On February 13, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security 25 (“DHS”) removed Petitioner to Panama. [Id.] On October 30, 2025, Petitioner re-entered 26 the United States and was taken into DHS custody. [Id. at 3–4.] A DHS official conducted 27 a credible fear interview with Petitioner and made a negative determination. [Id. at 4.] 28 However, on appeal, an immigration judge found Petitioner did have credible fear. [Id.] 1 On February 18, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Uganda. [Id.] 2 Petitioner appealed that order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 3 [Petition at 4.] She has remained in custody since October 30, 2025. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks 6 to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may 7 grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the 8 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” The petitioner bears the burden of 9 demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJC- 10 BJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025). 11 III. JURISDICTION 12 Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). [Doc. 13 No. 10 at 3–4.] Section 1252(g) provides in relevant part: “[N]o court shall have 14 jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision 15 or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 16 removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 17 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 18 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), § 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney 19 General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 20 execute removal orders.’” See also Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 991 (9th 21 Cir. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read § 1252(g) narrowly.”) 22 Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not bar “many . . . decisions or actions that may be part of the 23 deportation process[.]” Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. Moreover, “[i]t is implausible that the 24 mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of 25 referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” Id. 26 Here, Petitioner does not contest the decision to commence proceedings, the 27 adjudication of her removal case, or any action to execute a removal order. Rather, she 28 seeks review of the legality of her detention, arguing that the length of time she has been 1 detained without a bond hearing violates due process. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied 2 of its jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits. 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 Petitioner argues that her nine-month detention without a bond hearing is 5 unconstitutional. [Petition at 18.] Respondents counter that the relevant statutory language 6 of § 1225(b)(1) and Supreme Court precedent require Petitioner’s detention until the 7 resolution of her removal proceedings. [Doc. No. 10 at 5–10.] The Court has previously 8 discussed that while Supreme Court precedent does establish that the statutory language 9 of § 1225(b) mandates detention, the Supreme Court did not decide the constitutional 10 question of whether indefinite detention is permitted. See L.R.G. v. LaRose, 3:25-CV- 11 3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 5–6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026). 12 As to the constitutional question, like most of the district courts that have confronted 13 this question, this Court held in L.R.G. that a due process violation may occur when 14 § 1225(b) results in practically indefinite civil detention. 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. 15 No. 13, at *6; see Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he 16 Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding that an unreasonably 17 prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing 18 violates due process.”). Respondents’ position has also been questioned by the Ninth 19 Circuit: 20 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our 21 democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation 22 of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial 23 or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Civil detention violates 24 due process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” 25 26 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) 27 (alteration in original). 28 1 Though there is no brightline test for a violation, this Court and many others have 2 used the Banda test which considers the following six factors to determine when detention 3 under § 1225(b) violates due process: (1) the total length of detention to date, which is the 4 most important factor; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of 5 detention; (4) delays in removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in removal 6 proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings 7 will result in a final order of removal. Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 8 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 9 The first factor, which is the most important, weighs against Petitioner given that 10 she has only been detained for nine months. See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933- 11 LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are 12 typically wary of continued custody without a bond hearing when detention extends 13 beyond one year). Regarding the second factor, which consists of the “anticipated duration 14 of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial appeals[,]” Petitioner’s 15 appeal to the BIA is pending, and the “undetermined, but likely significant, period of 16 mandatory detention through the appeals process” weighs in favor of Petitioner. Gao v. 17 LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2025). Accordingly, the second factor 18 weighs for Petitioner. As to the third Banda factor, Petitioner’s confinement is similar to 19 penal confinement because, as the Court explained with respect to the petitioner in L.R.G., 20 who was also detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center, Petitioner is detained “in a secure 21 facility, guarded by armed personnel, and has restricted access to outdoor space, activities, 22 and communication.” No. 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 23 January 16, 2026). Thus, the third factor favors Petitioner. 24 As to the fourth and fifth factors, neither party has caused any delays. Thus, these 25 two factors are effectively neutral. Finally, the Court finds the sixth factor neutral as it is 26 unclear what the result of Petitioner’s removal proceedings will be. 27 In sum, factor one (the most important) weighs against Petitioner, factors two and 28 three weigh for Petitioner, while factors four, five, and six are neutral. The Court thus 1 || concludes that at this stage, Petitioner’s detention is not unreasonable such that due process 2 requires her to be released or given a bond hearing. 3 Vv. CONCLUSION 4 For the above reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Petition WITH LEAVE TO 5 || AMEND to allow Petitioner to file an Amended Petition in the event that her detention 6 || extends beyond a year. 7 The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. If a Second Amended Petition is filed, 8 Court will reopen the case. 9 Itis SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: August 5, 2026 (GR 11 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28