Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center Inc. CA1/4

Opinion

Filed 8/21/26 Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center Inc. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ALEXANDER BEHREND, Plaintiff and Appellant, A171997 v. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER (San Francisco County INC. et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-22-602068) Defendants and Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Alexander Behrend appeals a judgment entered in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center Inc. (Center) and individual defendants Linda Galijan and Mike Smith on his claims for unpaid wages and related interest and penalties under Labor Code2 sections 98.1, 203, and 1194.2. He contends the trial court erred in concluding that his claims were barred by the “ministerial exception”—a constitutional doctrine that provides a complete 1 This matter is proper for disposition by a memorandum opinion in accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853 [a memorandum opinion is “appropriate . . . where the result is consistent with a[] . . . state appellate decision with which the court agrees”].) 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. defense to certain employment claims brought against religious institutions by or on behalf of persons classified as ministerial employees. This appeal is the third before the First District Court of Appeal involving nearly identical facts and raising the identical issues.3 First, in Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 258, 265, 275 (Lorenzo), Division Five of this court held that the ministerial exception does not bar claims under California’s minimum wage and overtime laws in the absence of “evidence that those claims would interfere ‘with an internal church decision that affects the faith and the mission of the church itself.’ ” The court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants on the ground that it had not presented any such evidence in support of its motion. (Ibid.) Thereafter, our Supreme Court granted review.4 Next, in Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 977 (Ehrenkranz), Division Two, pending guidance from the Supreme Court, agreed with the reasoning of Lorenzo and held that “the trial court erred in finding that the ministerial exception barred Ehrenkranz’s wage-and-hour claims because defendants presented no evidence that his 3 Although the cases are otherwise separate, the plaintiffs in all three are former staff members of the Center; they all asserted wage-and-hour claims; the defendants are the same in all cases; the parties are represented by the same attorneys; and the briefs are almost identical. 4 The question currently pending review is: “Does the ministerial exception arising under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution categorically preclude wage and hour claims by a minister against a religious organization without any inquiry into whether the claim touches upon any ecclesiastical concern?” (Lorenzo, review granted Feb. 11, 2026, S294565.) The Center’s request for a stay of the present appeal pending decision by the Supreme Court in Lorenzo is denied.

2 claims raised an ecclesiastical concern.” (Id. at pp. 984–985.) The Supreme Court has also granted review in Ehrenkranz (May 27, 2026, S296143). Like the court in Ehrenkranz, we agree with the analysis in Lorenzo and, pending further guidance from the Supreme Court, we too adopt it as our own. Because defendants failed to present evidence that Behrend’s claims raised an ecclesiastical concern, we also reverse the summary judgment. Behrend also argues on appeal that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue judgment in favor of the individual defendants because the superior court proceeding was commenced solely by the Center under section 98.2 following entry of a decision by the Labor Commission in Behrend’s favor. We note that in Lorenzo, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pages 280 to 283 and Ehrenkranz, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pages 1001 to 1008, the divisions reached different conclusions on whether section 98.2 required the individual defendants to post an undertaking as a condition of the de novo appeal in the trial court of the Labor Commissioner’s decision. In those cases, however, the issue was raised by way of an appeal from a ruling on motions to dismiss filed by Lorenzo and Ehrenkranz respectively. No such motion was filed in this case. Rather, Behrend merely asserted in a footnote in his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment that “[d]espite being listed on the motion caption page, neither Linda Galijan nor Mike Smith appealed the Labor Commissioner’s [order, decision or award] and are not parties to this case. Judgments were entered against each of them in this Court in December 2023. (See Case No. CPF-23-518386 and Case No. CPF-23-518388.) If the Court is inclined to issue an order on [the Zen Center’s] motion for summary judgement as to Linda Galijan and Mike Smith, Plaintiff requests additional briefing on the issue of their inclusion.” Accordingly, insofar as we 3 reverse the summary judgment on the merits, we have no occasion to address this additional issue. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. Behrend shall recover his costs on appeal. GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J. STREETER, J.