Tripathi v. City of La Canada Flintridge CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 Tripathi v. City of La Canada Flintridge CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DANIEL J. TRIPATHI et al., B343214 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC633162) v. CITY OF LA CAÑADA FLINTRIDGE, Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Evan D. Williams and Evan D. Williams for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Hennelly & Grossfeld and Paul T. Martin for Defendant and Respondent. ____________________________ Plaintiffs Daniel J. and Leanna Tripathi appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant and respondent City of La Cañada Flintridge (the City). The Tripathis argue the trial court erred in precluding one of their witnesses from offering expert testimony, and that error prevented them from offering evidence in support of their claim for an easement by necessity on their property. We affirm. The Tripathis do not explain what theory or circumstances entitle them to an easement by necessity. They do not address the trial court’s findings that led the court to deny them an easement by necessity. They do not explain how their witness’s anticipated testimony might have altered those findings or otherwise supported their unstated theory of easement by necessity. They therefore fail to demonstrate the trial court’s purported error prejudiced them.

BACKGROUND

1. Complaint and summary adjudication The Tripathis sued the City and others for declaratory relief, quiet title, inverse condemnation, and property-damage negligence in an action concerning easements for access to the Tripathis’ property. In their first amended complaint, filed in May 2019, the Tripathis alleged that at the time they purchased their property in 2011, a City-issued certificate of compliance led them to believe the property included an easement allowing access. They further alleged the easement in fact was unusable because of a flood control channel created in the 1960’s. The Tripathis sought, inter alia, an order creating a different easement to allow them to enter and exit their property.

2 In February 2022, the trial court granted summary adjudication on the causes of action for inverse condemnation and property damage, and the parties prepared for trial on the remaining two causes of action.

2. Proceedings concerning the Tripathis’ expert witness In September 2022, the Tripathis served on the City a “Written Exchange of Expert Witness Information.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) In this document, the Tripathis indicated they intended to offer at trial the opinions of Aghjan Yakob, a civil engineer identified as a “non-retained expert witness,” and Richard L. Kadow, a title consultant listed as a “retained expert witness.”1 The Tripathis also served a declaration of their counsel attaching Kadow’s curriculum vitae and describing the general substance of his expected testimony. No such information was provided regarding Yakob. The trial court held a bench trial in May 2024. Before the Tripathis called Yakob as a witness, the City’s counsel objected to Yakob providing any expert opinion testimony because the Tripathis had not provided an expert witness declaration for him. The Tripathis’ counsel stated Yakob had worked on developing the Tripathis’ property since 2015, and could testify as a percipient witness to the work he had done. Citing Fatica v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 350, the Tripathis’ counsel argued Yakob also could “give his opinions as an engineer” concerning how various documents addressed access to the property. Counsel stated the Tripathis “were making decisions as to how to proceed with building [on the property] . . . based on 1 The document identifies Yakob as “John Jacobs,” but at trial he identified himself as Aghjan Yakob.

3 the assistance of this hired engineer who was helping them through the process.” The trial court observed Fatica involved a treating physician providing expert testimony, and Yakob “isn’t exactly a treating physician.” The court concluded the Tripathis had not properly designated Yakob as an expert witness, and limited his testimony to that of a percipient lay witness.

3. Statement of decision and judgment Following trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision. The court explained the question raised under the declaratory relief cause of action was the Tripathis’ right to an alternative easement. The Tripathis’ claimed that right under (1) the City-issued certificate of compliance; (2) a condemnation order issued in 1967; and (3) “theories of equitable easement, prescriptive easement, and easement by necessity.” The court interpreted the certificate of compliance not to guarantee the Tripathis’ the easement they sought, and the Tripathis could not claim to have been misled by the certificate when they had constructive notice of the flood control channel “ ‘since those facts were open and notorious.’ ” The court disagreed with the Tripathis’ assertion that the 1967 condemnation order granted the flood control district an exclusive easement that voided the Tripathis’ easement. The court cited case law holding an easement is only exclusive if expressly made so by the instrument creating it, and found nothing in the condemnation order expressly granting the flood control district an exclusive easement. The court found the Tripathis were not entitled to an easement by necessity, which the court concluded would require the Tripathis to prove “strict necessity,” i.e., that the easement 4 they sought “constitutes the only access to their property.” The court noted the Tripathis’ property had not one but two existing easements, and therefore the Tripathis “cannot prove strict necessity.” The court further found the Tripathis’ easement-by- necessity argument “necessarily relies on their argument that the [condemnation order] gave the County an exclusive easement,” an argument the court had rejected in its discussion of the condemnation order. The court found the Tripathis failed to put forth clear and convincing evidence of continuous and uninterrupted use of their desired easement over a period of five years, and therefore were not entitled to a prescriptive easement. The court denied the Tripathis an equitable easement because the easement they sought would “turn [a City-owned] recreational area into [the Tripathis’] personal driveway,” which would “be a significant hardship to the City and the residents who enjoy the [recreation area].” The court found the quiet title cause of action concerned the same easements at issue in the declaratory relief cause of action, and the quiet title claim thus failed for the same reasons as the declaratory relief claim. The court entered judgment in favor of the City. The Tripathis timely appealed.

DISCUSSION The Tripathis’ sole argument on appeal is the trial court erred in precluding Yakob from offering expert opinion testimony, and that error prejudiced them as to their claim for easement by necessity. The Tripathis’ briefing does not challenge any of the trial court’s other rulings, including the grant of summary adjudication or its rulings regarding the certificate of compliance, 5 the condemnation order, and prescriptive and equitable easements. The Tripathis argue Yakob was exempt from the expert declaration requirement because that requirement applies only to an expert who is “a party or an employee of a party, or has been retained by a party for the purpose of forming and expressing an opinion in anticipation of the litigation or in preparation for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210, subd. (b).) The Tripathis contend Yakob was not a “retained” expert because they hired him not for purposes of litigation but to help them develop their property, and his opinions would be based on knowledge he acquired independent of the litigation. They analogize to case law holding that treating physicians may offer expert opinion without submitting an expert declaration. (See, e.g., Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31, 34.) The City disagrees, arguing Yakob is not analogous to a treating physician. We decline to decide whether the trial court erred in excluding Yakob’s testimony, because as set forth below, the Tripathis fail to demonstrate prejudice from that purported error. (J.R. v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115, fn. 2 [appellant bears “burden of demonstrating both error and prejudice”].) In their opening brief, the Tripathis argue, “A miscarriage of justice resulted here because the trial court was not presented with any expert testimony regarding access to the property and the suitability of the easements for access. [Citation.] A central issue of the trial here was the question of whether or not the existing easements were suitable for the Tripathi[s’] right to ingress and egress on a developed lot. Mr. Yakob, as an engineer 6 who was in conversation with the city concerning this very issue, could have opined as to the suitability of access and whether or not the right to ingress and egress truly existed for the purposes of building a single family home. [Citation.] Such testimony would have greatly affected the decisions of the trial court, specifically as it relates to a finding of an easement by necessity.” As the City observes, an easement by necessity requires “strict necessity for the claimed right-of-way, as when the claimant’s property is landlocked.” (Murphy v. Burch (2009) 46 Cal.4th 157, 163.) “No easement will be implied where there is another possible means of access, even if that access is shown to be inconvenient, difficult, or costly.” (Id. at p. 164.) The City notes the parties stipulated below two existing easements passed to the Tripathis when they purchased the property, and therefore the Tripathis cannot demonstrate strict necessity for an alternative easement. The City argues, “[T]he alleged ‘suitability’ of an express grant of easement for ingress and egress is irrelevant to whether an easement by necessity was created by implication.” In their reply, the Tripathis argue the law does not require that a property be landlocked to meet the strict necessity requirement — rather, the question is “whether the existing easements allow for occupancy or successful cultivation of the Tripathi property.” The Tripathis contend, “Mr. Yakob intended to testify concerning the legal requirements for access to the Tripathi property and whether such access existed with the existing easements. [Citation.] Therefore, the error of excluding Mr. Yakob’s testimony was not harmless.”

7 Whether or not a property need be landlocked to meet the strict necessity requirement, the Tripathis on appeal do not explain the theory under which they are claiming strict necessity. It is not clear if they are claiming their property actually is landlocked, or if not, what other circumstances make an implied easement strictly necessary. They offer only unspecific assertions about the “suitab[ility]” of the existing easements or “legal requirements for access,” and claim Yakob would offer opinions relevant to these issues, again without specificity. They do not discuss the trial court’s findings that there are not one but two existing easements allowing access to their property, and that the flood control district’s easement is not exclusive and therefore does not void the Tripathis’ easements. Because they do not discuss these findings, they provide no explanation as to how Yakob’s anticipated testimony might alter those findings or offer an alternative basis to grant an easement by necessity. In the absence of that explanation, we cannot determine whether the exclusion of Yakob’s expert testimony prejudiced the Tripathis. The Tripathis therefore have not met their burden to show prejudicial error.

8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The City of La Cañada Flintridge is awarded its costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.