In re G.F CA2/4

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 In re G.F CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re G.F., B351526 a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01918C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.H., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed. Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 B.H. (mother)2 appeals the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over her son, G. She argues that the evidence is insufficient to support jurisdiction. We disagree with mother. G. was seven years old at the relevant times. He repeatedly escaped from the family home in ways that put him at risk. The juvenile court had before it extensive evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that G. was at substantial and ongoing risk of serious physical harm. That is enough to support the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. DISCUSSION The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over G. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A). That subdivision states that juvenile court jurisdiction is appropriate when the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of … [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” When reviewing juvenile court jurisdictional findings, “‘we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].) Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 B.H. had adopted G. and his sister, and had previously adopted G.’s biological mother. B.H. is in her seventies. 2 from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) Our discussion of the factual record reflects this standard of review. Here, G., age seven, had a history of escaping from his home. On June 3, July 28, August 1, August 2, and September 2, 2025, mother called police to report that G. was missing. The August 2 police report stated that G. took a scooter to the Metro station and rode two different trains. He had a scratch on his arm from falling off the scooter. The police report noted that mother was “unable to physically control the [child].” On September 3, 2025, G. ran away from mother at a shopping mall and tried to run into a busy street. Mother called police. Law enforcement stopped G. before he ran into the street. On September 27, G. ran away and mother followed him for an hour in her car until G. agreed to come home. The following day, G. unlocked the front door and left home at 9:30 p.m. G.’s therapist noted that although a safety plan was in place, G. continued escaping. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on October 7, 2025.3 On November 17, G. told a children’s social worker (CSW) that he leaves home when he wants to go play with his friends.

3 The family had a dependency history. In August 2024, the juvenile court sustained a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), in part because G.’s older sister, K., had episodes in which she ran away from home and mother did not stop her. K. was seven years old at the time. K. no longer lived with mother and G. Jurisdiction over G. was terminated in February 2025. 3 The CSW observed that G. “did not seem to understand that he is too young to leave the home without permission and/or to roam the neighborhood on his own.” The same day, mother told the CSW that she had several locks on the front door. Mother also moved her recliner closer to the front door so she could intervene if G. started to leave. Mother installed a deadbolt on the bedroom door that could only be unlocked with a key. G. had been diagnosed with ADHD, impulsivity, and oppositional defiant disorder. Mother felt that G. might benefit from wraparound services. At the jurisdiction hearing on December 4, the juvenile court sustained the petition but stated that it would not remove G. from mother. The court made clear that its intent was to provide mother with “more tools” to help keep G. safe. On appeal, mother argues that G.’s escaping was not “the result of neglectful parenting.” She also contends there was no “inference that Mother’s supervision was deficient in a manner that created a risk of harm.” Mother asserts she was “actively engaged in addressing [G.’s] needs,” rather than “being neglectful,” so a jurisdiction finding was not warranted. Mother misinterprets the relevant standard. Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) “authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) “Rather than focusing on parental fault or blameworthiness, the focus instead is on ‘whether the child is at “substantial risk” of “serious physical harm or illness.”’” (Guardianship of Saul H. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 827, 851, quoting R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Thus, jurisdiction may be appropriate despite a parent’s best efforts. Mother also argues there was no evidence of a risk of serious physical harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing in December 2025. She does not 4 argue that a seven-year-old escaping from home in the manner described above does not carry risk. Rather, she asserts that “circumstances had materially improved” because in December 2025, G. was in counseling and was taking medication. Mother is correct that there must be significant risk to the child at the time of the jurisdiction hearing in order to sustain a petition under section 300.4 (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.) However, evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions if there is “‘some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.’” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) Here, there was evidence that G.’s escaping would recur. Less than a month before the jurisdiction hearing, G. said he continued to leave home to play with his friends. G. did not understand the dangers inherent in wandering the neighborhood alone, riding a scooter unsupervised, running into traffic, or riding Metro trains without an adult. Although mother continued her attempts to keep G. inside the house when they were home, the evidence did not suggest that these efforts were conclusively successful or that G. was no longer at risk of escaping. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that G. remained at risk of serious physical harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.

4 DCFS filed an “update” with information post-dating the jurisdiction hearing. We have not considered this evidence. It is irrelevant to the issue presented on appeal. 5 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s jurisdiction order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DAUM, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.