People v. Perez CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Perez CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B345013 (Super. Ct. No. 25CJCF00592) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

MANUEL SOLOMON PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Manuel Solomon Perez appeals from the judgment after he pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and placed on probation. He contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officer who conducted a “patdown” search lacked reasonable suspicion. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Prosecutors charged Perez with being a felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) He was held to answer and later 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence recovered during the detention, including the firearm. At the hearing, Officer Oregel testified that he and his partner were patrolling an area at night in Los Angeles County in January 2025. Oregel said, “It’s an area is what we call R.V. Road. There must be about 50, 60 R.V.’s lined up, high crime area known for shootings, firearm possession, thefts.” Oregel saw an R.V. make an illegal U-turn in front of him, a violation of the Vehicle Code, and conducted a traffic stop. The driver was Perez. Oregel asked Perez for his driver’s license, but he did not produce one. Instead, Perez provided a piece of paper that was “wet” and “torn up” and provided his “ID.” Oregel returned the paper to Perez because he “couldn’t read it” and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Oregel had recovered over 10 firearms from R.V.’s located in the same area. Perez exited the R.V. and Oregel stated, “I’m going to pat you down for weapons. Is that cool[?]” He positioned Perez “in a disadvantage” in order to pat him down by pulling his “oversized” shirt up and down. Perez did not respond and Oregel then asked, “Do you have any weapons?” Perez said he had a BB gun. After Perez said he had a BB gun, Oregel conducted the patdown. He felt “the shape and the weight of what [he] believed to be a firearm, not a BB gun.” The detention, consisting of asking Perez for his license through the patdown, took approximately 30 to 45 seconds. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that once Perez said he had a BB gun it was “absolutely appropriate for the officer, for his own safety, to reach in and find what appeared to be a pat-down and find what appeared to be a weapon and retrieve it.” Perez then pleaded no contest and was placed on probation with credit for time served.

2 DISCUSSION Perez contends that the police officer patted him down without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We are not persuaded. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (Terry).) However, an officer may pat down a suspect for weapons if that officer has reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether probable cause exists to arrest the individual for a crime. (Terry, at p. 27.) “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that [their] safety or that of others was in danger.” (Ibid.) An inchoate, unparticularized suspicion or hunch is insufficient. (Ibid.) Instead, the officer must point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (Terry, at p. 21; People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176.) We exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts presented, the patdown search here was reasonable. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.) “In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” ’ ” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 (Flores).) We also consider that “experienced police officers develop an ability to perceive the unusual and suspicious, and [courts] recognize the right and duty of officers to make reasonable investigation of such activities.” (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.) The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying a warrantless 3 search. (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 729.) In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s express and implied factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 592.) Substantial evidence must be “ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” ’ ” (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937.) We conclude the patdown here was lawful. Police may stop a vehicle and detain the occupants based on a traffic law violation. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564 (Lomax) [illegal lane change].) Perez concedes that he made an illegal U-turn, justifying the stop. Perez then failed to produce a valid driver’s license in violation of Vehicle Code section 12951, subdivision (a). Having violated two Vehicle Code sections, Officer Oregel lawfully ordered Perez to exit the vehicle. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 109–111; Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 564.) Once Perez stepped outside his vehicle, Officer Oregel stated, “I’m going to pat you down for weapons. Is that cool[?]” Perez did not respond and when Officer Oregel asked him if he was armed, Perez said he had a BB gun on his person. Because a BB gun can qualify as a dangerous or deadly weapon (see, e.g., People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8; People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 535), Perez’s admission could reasonably increase Officer Oregel’s safety concerns. And once Perez said he had a BB gun, Officer Oregel had specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that Perez could be armed and dangerous. (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24.) As our high court stated in Terry, the police officer “need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed.” (Id. at p. 27.) Given Officer Oregel’s personal knowledge of firearm offenses in the area, and that Perez admitted he had a weapon, it was not unreasonable to conduct a weapons search. (Ibid.) To conclude 4 otherwise would “deny [an] officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” (Id. at p. 24.) Perez nevertheless contends that his presence in a “high crime” area at nighttime cannot justify the patdown. We agree that these factors, alone, cannot justify a patdown. “But looking at ‘factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] Instead, it employs a segmented analysis that Terry precludes.” (People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1092; see also Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) And here, we conclude the motion to suppress was properly denied based on the totality of the circumstances.2 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.

2 Exhibit 1 (body-worn footage of arresting officer) was transmitted by the superior court and has been received by this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224.) Accordingly, appellant’s motion to transmit the exhibit is denied as moot.

5 Laura F. Priver, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Michael J. Wise and Margaret Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.