In re A.G. CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 In re A.G. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re A.G. et al., Persons Coming B347952 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01687A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.W., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge, and Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed. Jordan Brown and Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________

INTRODUCTION

S.W. (Mother), the mother of A.G. (born 2013) and H.M. (born 2023), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition order declaring A.G. and H.M. dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).1 Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdiction findings relating to a domestic violence incident against her involving T.M., the father of H.M. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with exit orders granting Mother the same custody she had before the dependency proceedings were initiated. We requested supplemental briefing regarding whether Mother’s appeal is moot and conclude that it is.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Petition and Detention Proceedings In June 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a section 300 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 petition against Mother and T.M.2 The petition alleged the children were at risk of nonaccidental physical harm due to domestic violence between Mother and T.M. (§ 300, subd. (a); count a-1); Mother and T.M. failed to protect the children from T.M.’s violent conduct, placing them at risk of physical harm (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-1); Mother and T.M. were unable to provide regular care and supervision of H.M. due to substance use, and Mother failed to protect H.M. from T.M.’s substance use (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); counts b-2 and b-3); and A.G. was at risk of harm due to Mother’s failure to protect H.M. from T.M.’s substance use (§ 300, subd. (j); count j-1). The children have remained with Mother throughout the dependency proceedings. The Department’s detention report stated it was notified of a domestic violence incident between Mother and T.M. in the children’s presence on April 1, 2025: “[T.M.] accused mother of hiding his wallet and when she told him she didn’t know where it was, [T.M.] pulled mother by her hair through the home, attempted to push mother over the second level balcony, and when mother tried to defend herself by hitting father [T.M.] with a wrench[,] father snatched the wrench away from mother and hit her in the back of her head twice. Father also choked mother to the point where she almost lost consciousness. The child [H.M.] and the child [A.G.] were present during the incident. It is unknown if [H.M.] witnessed the incident or not, but it is presumed she heard the commotion. . . . [A.G.] saw mother and stepfather fighting and ran out of the home to get help calling the police.”

2 T.M. is not a party to this appeal. A.G.’s non-offending father, E.G., is also not part of this appeal.

3 Officers from the Long Beach Police Department responded to the scene and reported that Mother sustained “ ‘a 1 ½ inch scratch on her left arm, redness to her neck and blood shot, watery eyes, and complaint of soreness to the back of her head.’ ” Mother was also “ ‘observed to have difficulty breathing and was coughing while she was reporting what occurred.’ ” A neighbor reported seeing T.M. “trying to throw mother over the 2nd floor balcony.” Mother told police that T.M. “verbally told [her] that he was going to kill her” and “cho[]ked her for 15-20 minutes causing her to feel like she was going to faint.” The Department reported that T.M. had a prior dependency history from 2011 to 2016 regarding two other children, including sustained allegations of domestic violence with a previous partner and illegal drug use, which resulted in T.M. losing legal and physical custody of the children after failing to comply with court orders. T.M. also had “criminal history that includes, but is not limited to, arrests and/or convictions for violations of controlled substance, theft, violence, and weapons-related offenses, including a 2019 arrest for attempted murder,” which resulted in a conviction for assault with a firearm and a two-year prison sentence. T.M. later told the Department that he smoked marijuana “ ‘responsibly’ ” and “ ‘[d]aily’ ” since the age of 24 or 25. At a detention hearing on June 20, the juvenile court released A.G. and H.M. to Mother but detained the children from T.M. with an order for monitored visitation.3 3 The juvenile court also declined to detain A.G. from E.G.

4 B. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Proceedings In one of the Department’s reports to the court, it stated that:

[H.M.] was detained from the presumed father, [T.M.,] and based on his interview with the [Department] there is good reason to continue detention from the father as he appears to struggle with . . . domestic violence and substance abuse. The father, [T.M.], denied the allegations and minimized substance use. There is no restraining order in place and/ or family custody order, thereby placing the minor child, [H.M.] at risk.

In addition, the Department continues to have concerns with the mother’s lack of accountability and that she still has not grasped the risk she placed the minor children in by allowing the father, [T.M.] to frequent the home . . . two weeks [after] being assaulted by [T.M.] The mother presented as ambivalent and un[faz]ed by the father, [T.M.]’s prior child welfare history.

The juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on July 29, 2025. The court sustained count a-1 alleging T.M.’s domestic violence against Mother. The court also sustained count b-3 alleging Mother failed to protect the children from T.M.’s substance use. The court “note[d] that substance abuse issues did play a part in the act of domestic violence that did occur. [T.M.] had a positive toxicology screen for 5 marijuana. The mother was aware of [his] substance abuse issues and was still allowing him around the children.” The court sustained count b-1 but struck the language alleging Mother’s failure to protect the children from T.M.’s violent conduct, finding that “this was a first-time domestic violence incident, and, yes, while the mother still allowed [T.M.] to come back one time to obtain his property and she did not obtain a restraining order, that doesn’t indicate to the court that she wasn’t protecting the children and that she was routinely allowing him back in the home and allowing him around the children . . . [S]he has acted appropriately with care since the removal order was granted.” The court entirely struck count b-2 alleging Mother’s substance use rendered her unable to care for the children, reasoning that “[i]t does appear to be a one-time positive toxicology screen for the Mother. There is no nexus of harm. There is no significant history of use from the Mother.” Finally, the court struck count j-1 “given that [T.M.] is not the father for [A.G.], and therefore j-1 cannot be sustained regarding [T.M.]” The court further found “the mother’s statements to the law[]enforcement to be credible, [and that] the mother’s statements are supported by [A.G.]’s observations as well as the visible injury that the mother suffered, which are consistent with the conduct that was alleged. [¶] This is a very significant incident of domestic violence. This isn’t a low level. This would be characterized as a very significant incident where there were weapons involved, and therefore the court does believe there is a significant risk and a nexus of harm based off of the prior incident of domestic violence and the injuries that were suffered and the fact that [T.M.] has not done anything to indicate that he 6 understands the seriousness of the conduct.” The court found the children were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and adjudicated them dependents of the court. As to disposition, the court removed H.M. from T.M.’s physical custody and released her to Mother with family maintenance services, and monitored visitation for T.M. The court released A.G. to his parents, Mother and E.G. The court ordered Mother to submit to drug and alcohol testing as well as individual counseling to “address case issues, child protection, domestic violence, and anger management.” Mother timely appealed.

C. Post-appeal Proceedings On April 28 and May 14, 2026, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction, awarding sole custody of H.M. to Mother and joint custody of A.G. to Mother and E.G.4 Mother did not appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) We requested supplemental briefing on mootness. The Department filed a supplemental letter brief arguing Mother’s appeal was moot and should be dismissed. Mother did not file a supplemental brief.

4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s orders terminating jurisdiction. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) [judicial notice may be taken of “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state”], 459.)

7 DISCUSSION

A. Mootness and Dependency Appeals “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” In other words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in legal status.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276-277 (D.P.).) “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163 (Rashad D.).) “However, dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness following termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 163.) Even when a case is moot, however, the reviewing court has “ ‘inherent discretion’ ” to reach the merits of an appeal. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The reviewing court may exercise that discretion when a case involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the court’s determination. (See ibid.) The California Supreme Court in D.P. identified several other factors for courts to consider in deciding whether discretionary review of a moot 8 case is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may consider whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing a child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or a juvenile court’s determination about further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court may consider the allegations against the parent because “[t]he more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot because a parent promptly complied with his or her case plan. (Ibid.)

B. Mother’s Appeal Is Moot The circumstances before us present a quintessentially moot case. First, as stated, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction as to both children, awarding sole custody of H.M. to Mother and joint custody of A.G. to Mother and E.G. Mother did not appeal the orders terminating jurisdiction. “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 163; accord, D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285; see also In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 [“ ‘in most cases . . . for this court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status’ ”].) The juvenile court’s termination orders render it impossible to grant Mother any effective relief. Under these circumstances, “the jurisdictional findings are not the basis of any current order 9 that is adverse to [Mother].” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61.) Second, Mother’s appeal seeks review of some but not all of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings. Specifically, Mother argues the juvenile court lacked substantial evidence for its jurisdiction findings relating to T.M.’s domestic violence (count a- 1 and b-1) because there was only a single domestic violence incident. But Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that she failed to protect H.M. from T.M.’s substance use (count b-3).5 That means that even if we were to accept Mother’s arguments, the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings would continue to support its orders relating to H.M. (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.”].) Additionally, T.M. did not appeal any of the jurisdiction findings against him involving either of the children and these unchallenged findings would support exercise of dependency jurisdiction. (See id.; cf. In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [“a jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both”].) A reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to reach the merits of the appeal when a case involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the court’s determination. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) This case does not present these circumstances, and Mother did not submit a supplemental brief explaining why her 5 As stated, the juvenile court struck count j-1, which alleged Mother failed to protect A.G. from T.M.’s substance abuse.

10 case is not moot or asking us to exercise our discretion to hear her appeal. Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to review Mother’s appeal.

DISPOSITION

The appeal from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order is dismissed as moot.

MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.