In re C.S. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 In re C.S. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re C.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088065

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300455)

v. OPINION J.S., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina K. Ovanezova, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Timothy O’Crowley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Assistant County Counsel, and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights over her son. She argues (1) the county welfare department failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), (2) the juvenile court failed to determine the applicability of Welfare and Institutions Code section 306.6, which permits courts to allow a tribe that is not federally recognized to participate in dependency proceedings, and (3) the juvenile court lacked the power to amend its original termination order to add 1 an alternative name for the child’s father. We reject all three arguments and affirm.

I. FACTS

Defendant and appellant J.S. (mother) tested positive for amphetamine and fentanyl when she was admitted to the hospital for an emergency cesarean section in December 2023. Her child C.S. tested positive for fentanyl at birth. Mother admitted to relapsing during her pregnancy but said that she wanted to enter a residential drug treatment program after discharge from the hospital, so she could get clean for the child.

The child’s father, defendant R.Q. (father), also had a history of substance abuse. Mother said she had lived with father and his parents (paternal grandparents) on and off, but she and father were “just talking and dating when she got pregnant.” The status of their relationship was “unknown,” though she expressed wanting to coparent with him because he had been supportive and present.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. “In addition, because ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1, disapproved on another ground by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18.)

2 Plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a dependency petition for the child but did not request that he be removed from parental care. Mother went to a residential treatment program after her discharge from the hospital, and the child was able to live with her there after his release from the hospital about a week later.

At the initial hearing on the dependency petition in January 2024, father was found to be the presumed father of the child. The court found the department had made a prima facie showing and followed the department’s recommendation that the child remain in parental custody. In February 2024, the court sustained the dependency petition, finding the child came within section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court again ordered the child to remain in parental care, and ordered family maintenance services for the parents.

The department filed a supplemental dependency petition in August 2024, alleging that mother had relapsed, testing “positive for methamphetamine at a high concentration level” on June 25, 2024, and again on July 1, 2024, and that father knew or reasonably should have known about mother’s abuse of controlled substances and failed to intervene.

The juvenile court detained the child from parental care at the initial hearing on the supplemental petition. In September 2024 the parents signed a written waiver of rights, and the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition, removed the child from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for both parents.

Reunification services were unsuccessful. Neither parent was able to maintain sobriety and both acquired new criminal charges. In May 2025, the juvenile court 3 terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. On March 4, 2026, the juvenile court found it was likely C.S. would be adopted and ordered parental rights terminated. There was no discussion of ICWA at this hearing, and the court made no express ICWA findings. However, the signed Judicial Council form JV-320 memorializing the court’s order was filed the next day, and that form included findings that the court and department had fulfilled their duty of inquiry and that ICWA did not apply.

On March 15, 2026, the department submitted an ex parte application requesting the original JV-320 order be amended to include father’s name as stated on the child’s birth certificate as an alternative name (“an AKA”) for him to facilitate the adoption 2 process. The juvenile court signed the amended order on March 17, 2026. Both the ex parte application and the signed amended order were file-stamped on March 18, 2026.

Meanwhile, on March 17, 2026, mother filed a notice of appeal from the original termination order. Mother did not file a notice of appeal as to the amended order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. ICWA

Mother argues that the department’s initial ICWA inquiry was inadequate because it did not do more to attempt to contact two paternal relatives, an unnamed aunt of the paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather’s aunt, identified by her first name Karen 2 On the original order, father’s name included his full first and last names, plus his middle initial and the Roman numeral suffix “III.” On the child’s birth certificate, the father’s name included his full first, middle, and last names, with no suffix.

4 and the information that she lives in Whittier. Citing section 224.2, mother also argues the department failed to “contact the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the State Department of Social Services for assistance as required by statute.” We are not persuaded.

1. Additional facts During the dependency, many of the child’s relatives were asked about possible Native American ancestry. Initially, mother and father both denied that they had any Native American ancestry or affiliation, and father continued to do so throughout the dependency. In January 2024, however, mother indicated on her Parental Notification of Indian Status form that she may be a member of or eligible for membership in the Juaneño Band of Mission Indians. In August 2024, a maternal great aunt told the social worker “we are San Juan Capistrano Indian, a part of the Ojan Tribe Mission Indian, also known as Juaneño Band Mission Indian.” In September 2024, the department confirmed 3 that “the Juaneño tribe is not federally recognized.”

In August 2024, paternal grandmother responded to a social worker’s ICWA inquiry: “I don’t think so, but my aunt stated we have a little Native American Ancestry.”

In September 2024, the juvenile court asked paternal grandmother if she had Native American ancestry, and she responded “As far as I know, no. I heard we kind of do, but I’m not sure.” She had not heard mention of any specific nation or tribe, and said she would have to talk to her paternal aunt to get more information because “[s]he’s the one 3 Mother’s counsel had conceded in January 2024 that “the Junaneño Band of Mission Indians” is “not federally recognized.”

5 that said we might have a little bit, so I don’t know.” When the department followed up with paternal grandmother, however, she said she did not know her aunt’s contact information. She told the social worker she would call her other paternal aunt instead.

Paternal grandfather also said that his family may have Native American ancestry but did not have any information as to any specific tribe. He identified two older relatives who may have had information, but both were deceased. He also said his “uncle’s daughter’s son” has Native American ancestry, but that person’s father, who is “deceased and not related to their family,” was the one who had Native American ancestry. He said a half-sister of that person’s father has Native American ancestry, but he did not know her name or any other contact information. Paternal grandfather also said he had “an aunt named Karen who lives in Whittier that might have knowledge on Native American ancestry,” but he had no way to contact her.

The department also asked several other paternal relatives about ICWA matters. A paternal great-aunt and paternal cousin both denied any Native American ancestry, and a paternal aunt said she did not know.

2. Applicable Law The federal Indian Child Welfare Act establishes minimum standards “for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Cal-ICWA, California’s counterpart to ICWA, imposes on juvenile courts and county welfare departments “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”

6 whether a child subject to a section 300 petition may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.

(a); see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (Ibid.)

The initial duty applies in every dependency. (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) The initial duty expands under section 224.2, subdivision (b), when a child is removed from their home. Under that provision, if a child is “received and maintained in temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to . . . Section 306, or if they were initially taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340,” the department’s obligation includes 4 asking the “extended family members” about the child’s Indian status. (§§ 224.2, subd.

(b)(2), 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) California Rules of Court, rule 5.481 implements section 224.2, subdivision (b), by requiring inquiry of extended family in every case in which the department seeks to place the child. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)

Nevertheless, reversal is not required “in all cases in which every possible extended family member has not been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry.” (In re Dezi C.

(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140 (Dezi C.).) Instead, ICWA requires the department to ask for information from individuals who are reasonably available. (Ibid.; see also id. at p.

4 “‘Extended family member’ has the same meaning as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) [same].)

7 1143 [“‘the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry’”].)

When the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or social worker “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), the court and social worker must conduct further inquiry to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) There is reason to believe an Indian child is involved if the court or the social worker “has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Further inquiry includes, among other things, interviewing the parents and extended family members to gather the information required for the ICWA notice. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd.

(a)(5).)

“[E]rror resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with [California Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain whether the agency’s error is prejudicial.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136.)

Although Dezi C. did “not have occasion to decide what constitutes an adequate and proper inquiry necessary to satisfy section 224.2,” our Supreme Court noted there that “the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and 8 duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.”’” (Ibid.)

Here, we are not reviewing a juvenile court’s resolution of an evidentiary conflict, but the juvenile court’s implied finding that the department’s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) We thus are “not concerned with the outcome” as to the likelihood of whether the child is an Indian child.

(Id. at p. 1144.) We do not limit our review to “[e]nforcing the requirement of an adequate inquiry only in cases in which the record affirmatively demonstrates a reason to believe the child is an Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Instead, we must “ensur[e] that tribal heritage is acknowledged and inquired about in dependency cases.” (Id. at p.

1148.) This requires us to engage in a searching review to protect the tribal interests, which Dezi C. emphasized are compelling and legally protected. (Ibid.) Yet the deferential standard means an inquiry need not be perfect to be adequate.

3. Analysis We find no error in the juvenile court’s determination that the department’s initial inquiry was adequate. Neither paternal grandmother’s unnamed aunt nor paternal grandfather’s aunt Karen from Whittier were reasonably available for inquiry. Although paternal grandmother initially said she would provide her aunt’s contact information, she 9 later said she could not do so. The paternal grandfather said he had no way to contact his aunt Karen. Moreover, unlike an aunt, “[a] great-aunt is not an ‘extended family member’ for purposes of the mandatory initial inquiry requirements of ICWA.” (In re J.F. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 468, 471; see § 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) The two relatives at issue here are yet another generation older than a child’s great-aunt. They are distant relations, not “extended family members” as that term is used in ICWA and Cal-ICWA.

We also find no error in the department’s failure to contact the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the State Department of Social Services. The purpose of contacting these agencies as part of a further inquiry is “for assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member or citizen, or eligible for membership or citizenship in.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B).) Here, neither father nor any other paternal relative provided sufficient information about possible tribal affiliation to identify specific tribes in which the child might be a member, so the department did not need assistance in identifying the names and contact information of any tribes. (See In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184 [department’s duty of further inquiry did not require contacting the BIA because it did not need assistance identifying name or contact information for the tribes].) The child’s maternal family identified a specific tribe, but there was no dispute that it is not a federally recognized tribe. “The requirements of the ICWA apply only to federally recognized tribes.” (In re A.C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 282, 286; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8).)

10 B. Section 306.6 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by failing to determine whether section 5 306.6 applied. We find no error.

“Section 306.6 permits the court in a dependency action to allow a tribe which is not federally recognized to appear in the proceeding and present information to the court.” (In re A.C., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) Under the statute, a tribe “may”

participate in a juvenile dependency proceeding “upon request of the tribe.” (§ 306.6, subd. (a).) The tribe may “upon consent of the court: [¶] (1) Be present at the hearing . . .

[¶] (2) Address the court. [¶] (3) Request and receive notice of hearings. [¶] (4) Request to examine court documents relating to the proceeding. [¶] (5) Present information to the court that is relevant to the proceeding. [¶] (6) Submit written reports and recommendations to the court. [¶] (7) Perform other duties and responsibilities as requested or approved by the court.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)-(7).) The statute says the court “shall, on a case-by-case basis, make a determination if this section is applicable and may request information from the tribe, or the entity claiming to be a tribe, from which the child is descended for the purposes of making this determination, if the child would otherwise be an Indian child pursuant to subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (e); see also id., subd. (a) [section 306.6 applies in “a dependency proceeding involving a child who 5 The department argues mother forfeited the argument by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. Applying the general preference for deciding cases on their merits where possible, we exercise our discretion to decide mother’s argument on the merits, without deciding whether the argument could be deemed forfeited.

11 would otherwise be an Indian child, based on the definition contained in [ICWA], but is not an Indian child based on the child’s Indian tribe not having federal recognition”].)

Tribal participation under section 306.6 is thus discretionary. Section 306.6, subdivision (d), explains that the statute “is intended to assist the court in making decisions that are in the best interest of the child by permitting a tribe in the circumstances set out in subdivision (a) to inform the court and parties to the proceeding about placement options for the child within the child’s extended family or the tribal community, services and programs available to the child and the child’s parents as Indians, and other unique interests the child or the child’s parents may have as Indians.”

“By its terms, the statute does not require that any notice be sent to a nonrecognized tribe. (§ 306.6.) Further, the statute specifically does not apply either notice provisions found in the ICWA or provisions in state law implementing notice provisions of the ICWA to this situation. (§ 306.6, subd. (d).)” (In re A.C., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286-287.)

Mother’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, we reject its premise that the juvenile court in fact failed to decide whether section 306.6 applies. The record shows it did not make any express determination under section 306.6, subdivision (e).

On appeal, however, the general rule is that, “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) Applying this presumption, the record here is compatible with either an implicit finding that section 306.6 does not apply or an implicit exercise of discretion 12 not to request information from the tribe. The juvenile court learned of the asserted connection to the Juaneño Band of Mission Indians from mother’s Parental Notification of Indian Status form and the Department’s reports, but did not act on it.

Second, the evidence does not require the conclusion that the child “would otherwise be an Indian child” if his tribe were federally recognized. (§ 306.6, subds. (a), (e).) ICWA defines “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)

There is evidence that the child may have some connection to a tribe that is not federally recognized. Mother’s own claim of Native American ancestry, however, was ambiguous, checking a box to indicate that she “[is] or may be a member of, or may be eligible for membership in” the “Juaneño Band of Mission Indians.” And she did not check the box indicating that the child is, or may be, a member of, or eligible for membership in that tribe. Mother never affirmatively established that either she or the child is a member of that tribe.

And finally, even assuming mother and/or the child are tribal members, neither the department nor the juvenile court was obligated to give notice to the tribe of the proceedings. (In re A.C., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286-287.) Nothing prevented mother from notifying the tribe of the proceedings and inviting it to request to participate in the proceedings. There is no evidence the tribe ever made such a request, however, so 13 we have no cause to consider whether the juvenile court would have abused its discretion by denying it.

C. Amended termination order Mother argues the juvenile court “was without power to amend the termination of parental rights order after Mother filed the notice of appeal.” This argument, as phrased, muddles together two separate issues: (1) the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to amend a judgment or appealable order after the filing of a notice of appeal, and (2) the statutory prohibition against collateral attacks on orders terminating parental rights codified in 6 section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1). Nevertheless, the argument raises several potential questions, including (1) whether mother’s March 17, 2026 notice of appeal from the original, March 4, 2026 termination order was filed before or after the amended termination order, which was signed by the court March 17, 2026, even though it was not file-stamped until a day later, (2) whether the juvenile court had the power to amend the March 4, 2026 order after it was issued, given section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1)’s language that “[a]fter making the order, the juvenile court shall have no power to set aside, change, or modify it,” and (3) the interplay between that statutory language and a court’s “inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records 6 “An order of the court permanently terminating parental rights under this section shall be conclusive and binding upon the child, upon the parent or parents and, upon all other persons who have been served with citation by publication or otherwise as provided in this chapter. After making the order, the juvenile court shall have no power to set aside, change, or modify it, [with an exception not relevant here], but nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the right to appeal the order.” (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(1) (italics added).)

14 reflect the true facts,” which “exists independently of statute” and is “unaffected by the pendency of an appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding.” (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705; see In re Z.H. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1025-1026 [distinguishing clerical error from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment].)

Before considering any of these questions, however, we must consider the scope of our own jurisdiction. (See California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 252 [“we have an independent obligation in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists”].) The department argues we lack jurisdiction because mother did not file a notice of appeal from the amended termination order.

“A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).) “The dispositional order is the ‘judgment’ . . . and all subsequent orders are appealable.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532.) Thus, the amended termination order is an appealable postjudgment order.

An appeal from a juvenile court order generally must be filed within 60 days of the order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a).) “This is a jurisdictional deadline, meaning that courts lack the power to extend it, regardless of whether failure to meet the deadline was ‘wilful [sic] or inadvertent,’ ‘reasonable or unreasonable,’ or rooted in ‘good faith or not.’” (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 246.) Nevertheless, while the “timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite . . . technical accuracy in the contents of the notice is not.” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.

15 (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882-883.) “Once a notice of appeal is timely filed, the liberal construction requirement compels a reviewing court to evaluate whether the notice, despite any technical defect, nonetheless served its basic function—to provide notice of who is seeking review of what order or judgment—so as to properly invoke appellate jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 883.)

A “notice of appeal must be liberally construed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) That is, the appeal must be “‘liberally construed . . . to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.’” (In re Joshua S.

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272.) The liberal construction rule exists to “‘implement the strong public policy favoring the hearing of appeals on the merits.’” (K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 882.)

To be sure, a notice of appeal must “identif[y] the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3).) Under the liberal construction rule, though, once a notice of appeal is timely filed from one appealable order, a court can construe it as encompassing a separate, related appealable order as to which it is timely filed, if doing so aligns with the filer’s intent and there is no unfair prejudice to the respondent. For example, in a recent opinion, our Supreme Court construed a notice of appeal filed by an appellant to include a sanctioned attorney who was not listed as an appellant in the notice. (K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 878.) In doing so, the court stated that this was a less common type of liberal construction and stated that “the rule of liberal 16 construction is most commonly employed to remedy defects in a notice’s designation of the order or judgment that is being appealed from.” (Id. at p. 885.) An example of this more common employment of liberal construction is In re Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 131, fn. 9, where our Supreme Court construed a notice of appeal listing only one of the petitioner’s two convictions as an appeal from both, where judgment and sentencing had been “rendered simultaneously in both cases.”

In this case, mother filed a notice of appeal from the original order terminating her parental rights. There is a technical defect in the notice’s designation of the order being appealed from, in that it does not also specify an appeal from the amended termination order. Nevertheless, mother’s intent to challenge the termination of her parental rights— whether in the original order or any amended order—is manifest. The notice of appeal was either timely filed or slightly premature as to the amended termination order. Either way, we discern no prejudice to the department from construing the notice of appeal to constitute notice as to both orders, which differ only by the insertion of an additional name for father. Thus, we find it appropriate, in the interests of justice, to permit mother’s appeal to be heard on the merits as to both the original and amended termination orders.

As to the merits of mother’s arguments about the amended termination order, however, we are not persuaded. The purpose of section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1) is to “prohibit[] virtually all collateral attacks on orders terminating parental rights,” thereby protecting both the state’s and the child’s “exceptionally strong interests in making sure 17 the matter is determined conclusively.” (In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 360-361.)

The modification at issue here did not alter the substance of the original termination order, only adding father’s name as stated on the child’s birth certificate to allow the adoption process to proceed. This is not a collateral attack on the termination order, but rather correction of a clerical error to facilitate its purpose and without amendment to its substance. We find such an amendment well within the scope of the juvenile court’s authority, no matter whether the amendment was filed before or after mother’s notice of appeal, and notwithstanding section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1).

III. DISPOSITION

We affirm the orders terminating mother’s parental rights.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________

J.

We concur:

MILLER _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ Acting P. J.

MENETREZ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________

J.