In re Sergio M. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JJL001050
- Trial judge
- William D. Quan
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Laurence D. Rubin (author), William S. Dato, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court declared the minor a ward and set a maximum term of confinement of seven years to life for attempted murder, despite denying the People's request to amend the petition to include a willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new disposition hearing, holding that the life sentence was unauthorized because the trial court never expressly or impliedly found the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Setting the maximum term of confinement for attempted murder at seven years to life without an express finding that the offense was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.“Based on the foregoing, the trial court never found, whether expressly or impliedly, that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The seven-year-to-life maximum term of confinement for count 1 is therefore unauthorized.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the statutory requirement that a life sentence for attempted murder requires a specific finding of willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent, which was not made here. The court properly rejected the argument that the finding was implied from the trial court's general statements about intent or the probation report, as the trial court had explicitly denied the amendment to plead that specific allegation. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Establishes the procedure for appointed appellate counsel to file a brief raising no arguable issues when none are found.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed counsel to file a brief identifying any arguable issues or explaining why none exist.
- relied: People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253 — Holds that the mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the statutory prerequisite for a life sentence in attempted murder cases and applies it to the specific procedural history where the trial court denied the amendment to plead the necessary allegation. The court effectively distinguishes between general intent to kill and the specific premeditation required for the enhanced penalty, relying on appropriate authority.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court found true that Sergio M. committed attempted murder and robbery, denied the People's request to amend the petition to add a premeditation allegation (believing none had been pleaded), committed him to a secure track, and set the maximum term of confinement at seven years to life on the attempted murder count. On Wende review with supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeal held the life-maximum term was unauthorized because the trial court never expressly or impliedly found the attempted murder willful, deliberate, and premeditated, reversed the judgment solely as to the maximum term of confinement, and remanded for a new disposition hearing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Setting the maximum term of confinement for attempted murder at seven years to life under Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 without an express or implied finding that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated“Based on the foregoing, the trial court never found, whether expressly or impliedly, that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The seven-year-to-life maximum term of confinement for count 1 is therefore unauthorized.” | unclear | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The opinion does not name a standard of review, but it treats the question as one of law (whether the sentence is authorized by Pen. Code § 664, subd. (a), and Welf. & Inst. Code § 875, subd. (c)(1)(B)). Section 664(a) makes the life term available only if premeditation is charged and found true by the trier of fact; here the trial judge expressly declined to allow a premeditation allegation and stated it had to be pleaded and proven, so its 'allegations ... found to be true' statement cannot be read as a premeditation finding. The People's reliance on the 'intent to kill is clear' remark is properly rejected under Boatman, and the disposition-hearing comments actually suggest the shooting was unplanned. The court's result is correct; its one oddity is the aside that the premeditation allegation 'is found at section 189,' when section 664(a) is in fact the correct statutory reference for premeditated attempted murder, but the court expressly declined to decide whether the pleading was defective, and the absence of a trier-of-fact finding is dispositive regardless. |
Jurisdictional true findings on attempted murder and robbery, declaration of wardship, and secure track commitment (reviewed under Wende for arguable issues)“We find no other arguable issues on appeal.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Appointed counsel filed a Wende/Anders brief, and the court independently reviewed the record and found no arguable issue other than the maximum-term question it raised itself. Nothing in the opinion suggests any defect in the true findings or the commitment, and the court left those portions of the judgment intact. The record quoted is too limited for an independent judgment on the merits of the true findings, but the court's handling of the Wende review is procedurally proper. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appointed appellate counsel may file a brief raising no arguable issues and the Court of Appeal must independently review the record for arguable issues.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Constitutional framework for appellate counsel's no-merit brief and independent appellate review of the record.
- relied: People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253 — A mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill; evidence of intent to kill does not by itself establish premeditation and deliberation.
- missed: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — An unauthorized sentence may be corrected on appeal at any time even absent objection in the trial court; the court noted defense counsel did not raise the issue at disposition but did not address forfeiture.
- missed: People v. Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009 — Where the trier of fact did not make a finding that attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, the life term under section 664(a) cannot be imposed and the sentence must be reduced to the determinate term.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied section 664(a)'s requirement that premeditation be charged and found true by the trier of fact, and persuasively rejected each basis for an implied finding, using Boatman to dispose of the 'intent to kill' argument. It left gaps, however: it did not address forfeiture despite noting defense counsel's silence at disposition (People v. Scott), did not cite the directly analogous Arias line of authority, mischaracterized section 189 as the home of the attempted-murder premeditation allegation when the petition's citation to section 664(a) was in fact correct, and did not specify what the juvenile court may do on remand regarding the maximum term.
Opinion
Filed 8/20/26 In re Sergio M. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re SERGIO M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, D086210
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. JJL001050)
SERGIO M., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, William D. Quan, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Mulford and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION Sergio M. appeals from the juvenile court’s order of wardship following a true finding that he committed attempted murder and second degree robbery. His appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no arguable issues pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. We asked for supplemental briefing about whether the trial court erred by setting the maximum term of confinement as seven years to life for the attempted murder in the absence of an express finding that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. After reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefing, we conclude the maximum term of confinement is unauthorized, and we remand for a new disposition hearing. We find no other arguable issues on appeal. II. BACKGROUND In 2024, Sergio M. shot Victor Tamayo in the thigh during a planned robbery. The Imperial County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Sergio M. committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and robbery (§ 211; count 2). During the People’s closing argument at the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court incorrectly stated that the petition did not allege premeditation in count 1. The prosecutor agreed and asked the court to conform the petition to proof. The trial court found both counts true, determining that Sergio M. came within the definition of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Regarding the attempted murder, the trial court stated, 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 I think the People have proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt; and, therefore, the court will find that the allegations of the petition as to count 1 for attempted murder, I am not going to allow for the amendment to prove. I think it needs to be alleged and proven. Because of that, I think — though the intent to kill is clear — I think, therefore, the allegations in the attempted murder charge in count 1 will be found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.
A probation officer recommended that the trial court set the maximum time of confinement as seven years to life for count 1, plus one year for count 2.2 The probation officer’s report referenced the willful, deliberate, and premeditation allegation. At the disposition hearing, the trial court stated, We looked at the facts of this case and from the evidence that was presented at trial, it’s almost as if there was this conspiracy, or it seemed like it, in order to have this robbery take place and to then scare the individual, but it turned out different in terms of the shooting. That, almost to the court, noting the plan that was in place from what the evidence has shown, almost like setting him up. And that is conduct that the court cannot look away from. I do think that the only plan is Secure Track.
The trial court declared Sergio M. a ward of the court and committed him to the Imperial County Juvenile Hall Secure Track. The trial court set the maximum time of confinement at one year for the robbery count, and 2 The probation report refers to the S.M.’s disposition variously as “8 years to life” or “7 years to life [¶] [plus] 1/3 of the middle term of 3 years (1 year)”. 3 seven years to life for the attempted murder,3 with a 5-year baseline term. Sergio M.’s timely appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION A. The Parties’ Arguments Sergio M. argues that his life sentence is unauthorized because the trial court did not expressly find that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The People disagree, arguing that the trial court impliedly made such a finding. The People rely on the trial court’s statements at the jurisdictional hearing that “the intent to kill is clear,” and that “the allegations in the attempted murder charge” had been proven. They also rely on the reference to the willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation in the probation officer’s report, and the trial court’s statements at the disposition hearing where it described the robbery as planned. B. Attempted Murder and Juvenile Sentencing When committing a juvenile to a secure youth treatment facility as in the case here, the court must “set a maximum term of confinement.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875, subd. (c)(1).) “The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B).) Attempted murder is generally punishable by five, seven or nine years in state prison. (§§ 664, subd. (a), 190.) However, if the attempted murder is willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and that fact is charged in the accusatory pleading and found true by the trier of fact, the crime is punishable by life in prison with the possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).)
3 “An inmate imprisoned under a life sentence shall not be paroled until he or she has served . . . [¶] [a] term of at least seven calendar years.” (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).) 4 C. Analysis The trial court and the People believed that the petition contained no willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation regarding the attempted murder.4 With regard to the homicide count, the petition states, “It is further alleged that the above offense was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation within the meaning of . . . section 664(a).” (Italics added.) Section 664 describes the impact on sentencing of attempted crimes, murder among them. However, the first degree murder allegation itself is found at section 189, subdivision (a). Whether the reference to section 664 was a clerical error or a substantive omission is not before us, but the parties appeared to conclude the latter. For instance, when rendering his verdicts, the trial judge stated, “So before I move on, . . . the petition does not allege the premeditation.” The prosecutor responded, “Correct, Your Honor. It does not. We just would ask that the court, based on how the evidence came out — and, again, I would point out that we — the way the evidence came out and the whole agreement, how it went down. We didn’t have this information previously as we never interviewed or debriefed the codefendant. So given that circumstance, the People would ask that it be conformed to proof, that is [section] 187.” The trial court then denied the People’s request to amend the petition to add a willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation, stating that such an allegation had to be pleaded and proven. Given this context, although the trial court stated, “the allegations in the attempted murder charge in count 1 will be found to be true,” the trial court did not intend, nor did the People expect a finding of a willful, deliberate, or premeditated murder.
4 Defense counsel did not address this issue at the disposition hearing. 5 None of the other circumstances cited by the People establish an implied willful, deliberate, and premeditated finding. The trial court’s statement that “the intent to kill is clear” is insufficient because “the mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.” (People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264.) The trial court’s statements at the disposition hearing likewise fall short. The trial court was not making any findings on charged allegations but instead determining whether to commit Sergio M. to the Juvenile Hall Secure Track. Additionally, by stating “there was this conspiracy . . . to have this robbery take place and to then scare the individual, but it turned out different in terms of the shooting,” the trial court appears to have concluded that the robbery was planned, but the shooting was not. Finally, although the probation officer’s report referenced the willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation, the trial court did not discuss that allegation at the disposition hearing. Nor is there any indication that the trial court intended to reverse course from its previous determination that the People never pleaded the willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation. Based on the foregoing, the trial court never found, whether expressly or impliedly, that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The seven-year-to-life maximum term of confinement for count 1 is therefore unauthorized. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new disposition hearing.
6 IV. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, solely with respect to the maximum term of confinement, and the matter is remanded for a new disposition hearing.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Boatman E054852 · 2013-12-04
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12