People v. Tran CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Tran CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064785 v. (Super. Ct. Nos. 12WF2714)

TUAN THANH TRAN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed. Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene Servidal, Robin Urbanski and Brendon Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. This matter is before this court for a third time. The first time, a panel of this court affirmed appellant Tuan Thanh Tran’s convictions and his indeterminate sentence of 37 years to life, without addressing any sentencing issues. (People v. Tran (Sept. 27, 2017, G053008) [nonpub. opn.] (Tran I).) The second time, Tran appealed from a resentencing that corrected parts of his sentence but denied full resentencing. This court reversed and remanded for the trial court to correct illegal sentences on one count and several enhancements. We also ordered the trial court to consider whether full resentencing would be warranted. (See People v. Tran (Dec. 21, 2023, G062173) [nonpub. opn.] (Tran II).) Following issuance of the remittitur, the trial court corrected the errors and imposed a new sentence totaling 37 years to life. Although the court declined to conduct a full resentencing, it stated it would impose the same sentence if it had conducted a full resentencing. Tran appealed. Tran contends the trial court erred in denying full resentencing. The Attorney General disagrees. The Attorney General argues this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the trial court lacked an independent basis to correct the illegal sentences. Alternatively, the Attorney General argues the denial of full resentencing is harmless because the trial court stated it would impose the same sentence in a full resentencing. As discussed below, we conclude any resentencing error was harmless, and thus affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE I. THE UNDERLYING FACTS The underlying facts in this case are undisputed and summarized in our prior opinion. “In May 2015, a jury found [Tran] guilty of willful, 2 deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (count 1; §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter (counts 2 & 3; §§ 192, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (count 4; § 246). It also found true all alleged firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d)). Prior to sentencing, the trial court found true Tran had a prior serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)), and a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7).” (Tran II, supra, G062173.) Tran was sentenced to a total term of 37 years to life. (Ibid.) II. THE PRIOR APPEAL In July 2010, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the trial court. The CDCR letter notified the court that the abstract of judgment and/or minute order “may be in error, or incomplete” and identified three possible sentencing errors. The court filed the letter and reassigned the matter to a different judge. After the parties filed their briefing, the court made various modifications to the abstract of judgment, but left the sentence as to count 4 and its associated enhancement unchanged. “As to that count, it reasoned as follows: ‘And then on count 4[,] the sentence which is not stated is stayed under [section] 654. And that’s the one that has a 3-5-7 sentence. So I’m not going to correct that. I’m just going to leave it as stayed by [section] 654 because [the original sentencing judge] doesn’t make it clear, and I don’t know what he intended.’” (Tran II, supra, G062173.) Tran appealed, arguing “his sentences as to count 4 and several firearm enhancements are illegal because the original sentencing court stayed execution of the sentences pursuant to section 654 without first 3 imposing a term for each, and the trial court erred in not correcting the problem when brought to its attention after the CDCR’s letter. The Attorney General agrees the sentence is unauthorized, as do we.” (Tran, supra II, G062173.) This court concluded that “[d]ue to the original sentencing court’s error in applying section 654 in this case, and the subsequent trial court’s failure to remedy the error, we must remand the matter for correction of the unauthorized sentences. The parties’ appellate briefing does not address, and we express no opinion regarding, whether such correction will trigger the need for a full resentencing as to all counts.” (Ibid.) We ordered the trial court to “take appropriate steps to correct the unauthorized sentences on count 4 and the enhancements for which a sentence term was not imposed prior to its stay pursuant to section 654, which shall include consideration of whether full resentencing on all counts is necessary under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) III. RESENTENCING Following issuance of the remittitur, Tran filed a supplemental resentencing brief arguing the trial court should fully resentence him and apply newly enacted legislation to reduce his sentence to the minimum of 7 years to life. On October 4, 2024, the trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing. It declined to fully resentence Tran, but instead “restate[d]” the original sentence while vacating and correcting the sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4. Specifically, it corrected the sentences for count 4 and the firearm enhancements attached to counts 2, 3 and 4. The total term remained 37 years to life. The court expressly stated that if full resentencing was required, it would resentence Tran to the same sentence.

4 Tran appealed. On April 28, 2025, appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record. Tran filed a supplemental brief, noting the issue of full resentencing but providing no argument. On September 25, 2025, this court independently reviewed the record and ordered the parties to brief two questions. First, whether the trial court erred in denying full resentencing. Second, whether any sentencing error is reviewable in this appeal or must be raised in a petition for habeas corpus. DISCUSSION I. JURISDICTION The Attorney General argues this appeal should be dismissed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Tran in response to the CDCR’s letter. We disagree. “Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.) Additionally, subject to certain exceptions, “once a judgment is rendered, . . . the sentencing court is without jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.” (People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326.) Important exceptions to this common rule concerning the trial court’s jurisdiction include: (1) recall and resentencing provisions set forth in specific statutes; (2) petitions for habeas corpus challenging unlawful sentences; (3) the court’s inherent power to correct clerical errors; and, in 5 some cases, (4) the unauthorized sentence doctrine. (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 637.) As to correcting clerical errors, “[i]t is not open to question that a court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.] The power exists independently of statute and may be exercised in criminal as well as in civil cases. [Citation.] The power is unaffected by the pendency of an appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citation.] The court may correct such errors on its own motion or upon the application of the parties.” (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705 (Candelario).) “Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is ‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered. ” (Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705.) “If the error is in rendering judgment, then it is judicial error.” (People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63 (Boyd).) For judicial errors, the appellate courts are split on whether the trial court has jurisdiction under the unauthorized sentence doctrine to correct such errors. (Compare Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 [“We are unaware of any controlling authority holding that trial courts possess inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences where cases are final.”] with People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990, fn. omitted [“A trial court that imposes a sentence unauthorized by law retains jurisdiction (or has inherent power) to correct the sentence at any time the error comes to its attention, even if execution of the sentence has commenced or the judgment imposing the sentence has become final and correction requires 6 imposition of a more severe sentence, provided the error is apparent from the face of the record”].) Here, the original sentences on counts 4 and several firearm enhancements were unauthorized because of judicial error, that is, the trial court failed to impose a term before staying the sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [concluding “the trial court committed unauthorized sentencing error by failing first to pronounce sentence on count 9 and then stay execution of that sentence”].) The Attorney General argues this court should follow Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 56, and conclude Tran cannot challenge any sentence error except by a habeas petition. We disagree. The Attorney General’s argument essentially challenges our jurisdiction in Tran II, supra, G062173, to order the trial court to correct the unauthorized sentences. “Under the doctrine of ‘law of the case,’ a party may not in subsequent appeals relitigate an appellate court's jurisdiction in an earlier appeal for the purpose of attacking the prior rulings as void; this is true whether or not the earlier opinion expressly considered jurisdiction.” (Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State University (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660, fn. 2.) As to the current appeal, to the extent that an independent basis is required to consider the current sentencing claim, in the interest of judicial economy, we would exercise our discretion to treat the instant appeal as a habeas petition. (See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71–72 [exercising discretion to “treat Boyd's appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the interest of judicial economy” where “the parties have already submitted appellate briefing” on “the contested and purely legal issue of whether remedying the 2006 sentencing error must include a full resentencing”].)

7 II. FULL RESENTENCING Turning to the merits of the instant appeal, we note the question of whether review of one aspect of a defendant’s sentence in habeas corpus proceedings would require the trial court to apply newly enacted ameliorative legislation is currently pending in the California Supreme Court. (See People v. Powell (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 595, 605 [noting the California Supreme Court is considering: “‘Does the issuance of an order to show cause to review one aspect of a defendant's sentence in habeas corpus proceedings render applicable all ameliorative laws taking effect after the defendant’s judgment became final?’”].) Regardless of how the high court decides that issue, we conclude any sentencing error in denying full resentencing is harmless in this case. Under the full resentencing rule as stated in People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’” When a court sentences without full awareness of its discretionary powers, “‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.”’” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.) Here, the trial court expressly stated that if it conducted a full resentencing, it would impose the same sentence. Remand for full resentencing would be a futile and idle act. Thus, any error in not conducting a full resentencing is harmless.

8 DISPOSITION The postjudgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

MOORE, J.