In re J.B. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 In re J.B. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E087861

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400092)

v. OPINION B.W., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed in part, conditionally reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Cecilia E. Rutherford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

B.W. (mother) appeals from an order denying her petition for additional family reunification services and liberalized visitation with J.B. (the child) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388, and from an order terminating her parental rights to the child. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her petition because she made a sufficient showing of changed circumstances and that additional services would be in the best interest of the child, and that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) made an inadequate inquiry into the child’s possible Indian2 heritage, as mandated by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901) and related state law. The order denying mother’s petition pursuant to section 388 is affirmed. The order terminating mother’s parental rights is conditionally reversed and remanded.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2024, DPSS received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of the child. Mother had called the police from a thrift store and reported 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 “The language of both federal and state law uses the term ‘Indian.’ California courts have used alternative terms, such as ‘American Indian’ or ‘Native American’; we use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory language . . . . No disrespect is intended.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1.)

2 domestic violence between herself and her boyfriend and said the child had been present during the physical altercations. Mother had a black eye. Mother also reported that her boyfriend and his friends used drugs in the home, and her boyfriend had been physically aggressive with the child in the past. Mother and child were reportedly dirty, and the mother said she had not been feeding the child because she was afraid her boyfriend had put methamphetamine on their food.

Mother and child were originally from Oregon but had moved to California to live with mother’s boyfriend. Mother said she had snuck out of the back of the home and went to a thrift store to call 911. There had been multiple calls to the home for services including child protective follow-ups, 5150 calls, and welfare checks. The boyfriend had been charged with child endangerment in the past. Mother reported there were guns and drugs present in the home. The social worker reported mother appeared to have a mental health history and drug history, and at the police station she kept repeating herself when talking to law enforcement officers. One police officer stated the child appeared to be scared around mother however he was more comfortable and smiled when away from her Mother reported the child’s father was incarcerated in Indiana, and she had not seen him since January 2021. Mother admitted that she had been an alcoholic and had attempted inpatient programs for alcohol use. She admitted to smoking methamphetamine but denied that she still drank alcohol. Mother reported she smoked marijuana and consumed mushrooms and acid when she was a teenager. She admitted to having history of domestic violence with her boyfriend and that she suffered from 3 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

as well as “oxygen deprivation,” but denied she was taking any medications. Mother also reported the child had a speech impediment due to having a tongue tie when he was an infant.

The child was taken into protective custody. Mother reported she had no family support or relatives to be considered for placement. On March 7, 2024, the child was placed into a foster home. Mother was charged with child endangerment and subsequently placed on summary probation for 48 months.

DPSS filed a petition alleging the child came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). When interviewed, mother reported that she had a physical altercation with her boyfriend and he punched her and gave her a black eye. After the incident, the boyfriend and his friends came to the home and smoked methamphetamine in the bathroom. She heard them talking about putting methamphetamine in the food, Nyquil, the child’s diapers, children’s Tylenol, and the child’s bottles. They allegedly sprinkled “‘dope’” on her and the child’s things. Mother found the opportunity to leave the home through the emergency window; she grabbed the child and they snuck out the back window, ran to the thrift store, and told the clerk to call 911.

Mother stated she smoked methamphetamine in the bathroom every couple of days with a ventilator on while the child was in another room. She reported ongoing domestic violence with the boyfriend that led to physical altercations in the child’s 4 presence, and that the boyfriend had been aggressive with the child and the boyfriend had slammed him and caused bruising to his arms and legs. Mother admitted to leaving the child alone in the boyfriend’s care even after learning of Jackson’s bruises. Mother reported she may have Cherokee ancestry, but denied receiving benefits from any tribe.

The child’s father denied having Native American ancestry. On March 10, 2024, the social worker attempted to call the Cherokee Nation tribal registration, but the office was closed.

On March 12, 2024, the juvenile court found that there was reason to believe the child was an Indian child and ordered DPSS to conduct further inquiry. Mother’s attorney informed the court that the mother claimed she had Cherokee ancestry through her paternal side of the family. The court found that a prima facie showing had been made that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and ordered the child to be detained.

Mother filed a parental notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) form indicating the child was or may be a member of or eligible for membership in the Cherokee tribe in Oklahoma, through her “dad’s side—PGM.” She did not have a tribal registration number. Mother reported she was raised by her mother (the child’s maternal grandmother), who had died a few years earlier, and she had no relationship with her father (the child’s maternal grandfather). She has a half brother who she did not speak with because the maternal grandfather refused to give her the half brother’s address.

Mother denied having any Indian heritage on her maternal side of the family.

5 DPSS conducted further inquiry with the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Eastern Band of Cherokee, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee. According to the social worker, mother reported she did not know the child’s maternal grandfather’s date of birth. Mother was not on speaking terms with the child’s maternal grandfather, and documents with his information had recently been stolen. She provided the child’s maternal grandfather’s name and again reported he was of Cherokee descent. On April 11, 2024, the juvenile court conducted an ICWA inquiry of mother, and mother stated that her father’s grandmother (the child’s maternal great-grandmother)

was half Cherokee.

DPSS filed an amended petition on March 11, 2024. On April 29, 2024, the juvenile court found ICWA may apply and found true the allegations in the amended petition, including the allegations that mother abused controlled substances such as alcohol and methamphetamines while caring for the child. The court removed the child from his parents’ physical custody and directed DPSS to offer mother family reunification services.

DPSS conducted further ICWA inquiry and notice and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation, and United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians all reported the child was not an Indian child or eligible for membership in the tribes.

In a report for the six-month review hearing, the social reported mother was living in a tent with her boyfriend under a freeway. Mother had four opportunities between July 6 and August 2024 to enroll in an inpatient substance program, but each time she declined to enroll because she did not want to leave the boyfriend because he depended on her.

She failed to enroll in any of the reunification services offered to her. During the reporting period, mother missed 16 visits with the child and attended six in-person, supervised visits. Mother was observed to be mostly “disengaged” with the child during the visits, and she had to be reminded numerous times not to be on her cell phone during visits and to engage with the child. The child mostly engaged in independent play during visits. Sometimes he would try to play with mother, but it did not last long. Mother was also observed to fall asleep during visits.

DPSS contacted the child’s older, adult sister. The sister reported she was estranged from mother and preferred not to be associated with mother until she got her life in order. The sister declined to be assessed for relative placement of the child and no other relatives presented themselves for assessment.

On October 29, 2024, the juvenile court continued reunification services for mother.

DPSS was unable to reach mother during the reporting period leading to the 12- month review hearing. Mother made no effort to visit the child during the reporting period and had still not enrolled in any of her reunification services. DPSS later learned mother had been incarcerated, and after her release mother enrolled in services and was in communication with the DPSS after an emergency hospital stay. Mother enrolled in a residential treatment center on April 11, 2025, and was estimated to complete her 7 commitment on June 9, 2025. On May 15, 2025, the mother told the social worker she had maintained housing through her sober living facility and was completing various programs. Mother reported she was nearing completion of parenting education and domestic violence classes.

The social worker reported that mother visited the child on March 13, 2025. The child was receptive to mother and the visit went well. The child seemed fine after the visit, but he had behavioral issues the next day, which were out of character. The child also became physically aggressive toward his foster sibling. Mother visited the child again on May 20, 2025, which the social worker described as “successful.”

At a 12-month review hearing conducted May 30, 2025, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother failed to regularly participate in her reunification services and had not made substantive progress in her case plan. The court found no substantial probability the child could be safely returned to mother’s custody with an additional six months of reunification service, terminated mother’s reunification services, and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for selection of a permanent plan for the child. The court inquired whether mother had any new information about the child’s possible Indian ancestry, and mother said she believed the child was eligible to apply for membership in a tribe because, “I’m Cherokee.”

The mother provided DPSS with more detailed information about her ancestry.

She reported no Native American ancestry on the maternal side of her family. The child’s maternal grandmother had passed away at the beginning of 2025, and the child’s 8 maternal aunt had passed away in 1992. Mother again reported possible Native American ancestry on the paternal side of her family, but stated she was not on speaking terms with the child’s maternal grandfather and she was unaware of his whereabouts or if he was still alive. She had no other information about her paternal relatives.

DPSS contacted the child’s paternal great aunt and inquired of possible Indian ancestry. She stated the family had Cherokee and Rogue River Indian ancestry, but DPSS reported Rogue River was not a federally recognized tribe. Further ICWA notice was conducted, and the tribes responded the child was not an Indian child.

In an addendum report, DPSS reported mother resided in a sober living home.

Mother resumed visitation on June 26, 2025, and had a weekly, two-hour visit with the child. The visits were positive, but the child’s caregiver reported she observed changes in the child’s behavior following visits. He would cry inconsolably, yell, and not follow instructions. The child exposed himself while in a store and acted aggressively in the home, including biting his foster brother. Although the child was potty trained, he had incidents of defecating on the couch. The caregiver expressed concern to the social worker that the child’s behaviors were not typical for a four-year-old child or consistent with his usual behavior. On September 29, 2025, visits between mother and the child were decreased to a minimum of once a month.

On December 23, 2025, mother filed a petition under section 388 petition requesting on order that she be provided with additional family reunification services and the opportunity for visits with the child to be liberalized toward the goal of being placed 9 on family maintenance. Mother stated circumstances had changed to warrant such an order because she was drug free and had obtained stable housing, she was actively participating in services, and she had a stable and supportive group she could rely on. As for whether the requested order was in the child’s best interests, mother alleged she and the child had a very strong bond prior to his being removed from her custody, and she consistently visited him after turning her life around. The juvenile court ordered a hearing be held on the petition.

On January 28, 2026, the social worker again spoke to the child’s adult half sister about possible Indian ancestry. The two siblings have different fathers. The half sister told the social worker she had no Indian ancestry on mother’s side, and she did not believe the child had Indian ancestry on father’s side either.

Although the court noted mother had made recent progress in addressing her substance abuse, it concluded her circumstances were merely changing and that the requested change or order was not in the child’s best interest. Therefore, the court denied mother’s section 388 petition. The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights.

Mother timely appealed.

10 II.

DISCUSSION

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Mother’s 388 Petition.

“Section 388 permits the parent of a dependent child to petition the juvenile court for a hearing to modify an earlier order on the basis of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The petitioning party bears the burden of showing that there is new evidence or changed circumstances and that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child.” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.)

“In determining whether the petitioning party has carried his or her burden, ‘the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.’ [Citation.] ‘Whether the juvenile court should modify a previously made order rests within its discretion, and its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’”

(Ibid.)

“A proper exercise of discretion is ‘“not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles . . . to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law[,] and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.”’ [Citation.] Exercises of discretion must be ‘“grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.”’ [Citation.] ‘“The denial of a 11 section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)

92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1291.)

“‘[T]he petitioner must show changed, not changing, circumstances.’ [Citation.]

‘The case law’s references to “changed” and merely “changing” circumstances are another way of describing the distinction . . . between changes that are material and those that are not. However expressed, the point is that section 388 requires a change that is relevant and substantial (rather than irrelevant or de minimis) when considered in light of all of the circumstances of the case.’” (In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 137.)

Because mother’s request for additional reunification services and liberalized visits had “the potential to disrupt an otherwise stable placement” for the child, she was required to show “‘the problem that initially brought the child within the dependency system [had been] removed or ameliorated.’” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1093; see In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 846 [parent must demonstrate “he or she has resolved the previously unresolved issues supporting juvenile court jurisdiction.”].)

“In any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity. [Citation.] ‘When custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) “After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no 12 longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Ibid.)

In her petition, mother alleged that in the six months since termination of reunification services, she had made a complete change in her life and she was now drug free. But the record indicated she started abusing drugs as a teenager and, just prior to the child’s detention, mother had used methamphetamine daily. At the hearing, the juvenile court acknowledged mother “has made steps towards changing her circumstances,” but stated, “I don’t believe that she is at changed circumstances. She’s in changing circumstances.” The court also noted, “We’re about five or six months in of her sobriety level, which I think is great. But it’s not where—it’s not done.” Therefore, the court concluded, “I do not find that there’s a changed circumstance to offer additional reunification services.”

Though commendable, mother’s recent sobriety did not sufficiently establish a changed circumstance to warrant reinstatement of reunification services. Mother’s ability to maintain her sobriety over time was still unproven, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding her circumstances were merely changing. As this court has noted, “In the context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted 13 treatment in the past, a showing of materially changed circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; see In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“Appellant’s recent sobriety reflects ‘changing,’ not changed, circumstances”].)

Considering mother’s lengthy history of substance abuse, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding mother’s recent period of sobriety for a little over five months was merely a changing and not a changed circumstance. (See, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681,686-687 [mother’s “substance abuse had begun more than 17 years earlier and while she had been clean for 372 days, she had previously relapsed twice during the course of this case, once after more than 300 days of sobriety”];

In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 817-818 [father’s seven months of sobriety since his last relapse, “while commendable, was nothing new”].)

With respect to the child’s best interests, mother stated she had a strong bond with the child prior to his being removed from her custody, and, in the period since the termination of reunification services, she had consistently visited with the child. Mother alleged the child “is always happy to see his mother and is upset when their visits end.

He will often take her hand and say ‘let’s go home mom.’” DPSS noted in opposition to the petition that the child’s caregivers reported the child exhibited atypical aggressiveness following visits with mother. Mother argues the fact the child acted out following visits demonstrates his strong bond to her. However, DPSS reported the child’s behavior 14 improved when mother’s visits were reduced to once a month, which suggests the child’s negative behaviors were the result of the visits themselves and not the result of distress caused by having to leave mother when visits came to an end. The juvenile court found it would not be in the child’s best interests to grant mother additional reunification services and liberalized visitation. The court noted the child needed the stability he was currently receiving from his caregivers.

Here, we agree with the juvenile court that mother did not meet her burden of demonstrating the requested order would be in the best interests of the child. Although mother visited the child regularly following the termination of reunification services, and there is no genuine dispute that mother and the child share some bond, mother did not allege, and the evidence presented with the petition simply did not show, that providing mother with additional services and liberalized visits would materially benefit the child.

Section 388 petitions may not rely on conclusory allegations. (In re Anthony W. (2001)

87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) The petition and supporting evidence must demonstrate how the child will tangibly benefit from the proposed change in order, because the child “should not be made to wait indefinitely for mother to become an adequate parent.” (Id.

at p. 252.) “Mother thus failed to establish that [the child’s] ‘best interests in permanency and stability would be furthered by’ derailing the child’s adoption.” (In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 122, quoting In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526.)

Therefore, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s petition.

15 B. The Order Terminating Parental Rights is Conditional Reversed and Remanded for Further ICWA Notice.

“The protective provisions of ICWA turn on a determination of whether a minor is an ‘Indian child’ as defined by statute. ‘A determination by an Indian tribe that a child is or is not a member of, or eligible for membership in, that tribe, or testimony attesting to that status by a person authorized by the tribe to provide that determination, shall be conclusive.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (h); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(4); 25 C.F.R. § 23.108 (2024).) Of course, a tribe may only make such determination, or exercise its right of intervention, if it is made aware of the ongoing proceedings. Accordingly, the scheme requires the appropriate tribe be notified when the court or county welfare agency has reason to know the child is Indian. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 224.3, subd. (a); see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a) (2024).)” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1098-1099, fns. omitted.)

“Fulfilling the notification duty requires sufficient inquiry into the child’s native heritage. ‘The court, county welfare department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . [facing a dependency or delinquency proceeding] is or may be an Indian child.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) California’s statutory scheme imposes a duty of initial inquiry on both the department and the court. The department’s duty arises when a report of abuse or neglect is made and/or when the county takes the child into its temporary custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) The inquiry 16 ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (b).) Then, on the first appearance upon a petition, ‘the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (c); see Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2024).)” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1099, fns. omitted.)

“A duty of further inquiry exists when ‘the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child . . . .’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e), italics added.) There is reason to believe a child is Indian when there exists ‘information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(1); see id., subd. (d).) Further inquiry includes, but is not limited to, interviewing the parents and extended family members, contacting the BIA and the State Department of Social Services for assistance, and contacting the relevant tribe and ‘any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’

17 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C); see id., subd. (e)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).)” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1099-1100.)

“If proper inquiry reveals information creating reason to know a minor is an ‘Indian child,’ the relevant tribe must be notified, and ‘the court shall treat the child as an Indian child unless and until the court determines on the record and after review of the report of due diligence . . . and a review of the copies of notice, return receipts, and tribal responses . . . that the child does not meet the definition of an Indian child . . . .’ (Welf.

& Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (i)(1); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3); 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.107(b) (2024).) Otherwise, ‘[i]f the court makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child, the court may make a finding that . . . [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) Further, if a court or party subsequently receives information suggesting a reason to believe the child is Indian, the court must order further inquiry. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1100.)

When the juvenile court has a well-developed record, it is afforded relatively broad discretion in making the fact-specific determination that the child services agency complied with the Cal-ICWA requirements. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) We will uphold the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply so long as the court’s 18 conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence and documentation in the record as required by California law. (Ibid.)

In her opening brief, mother argues DPSS did not conduct a sufficient inquiry into the child’s possible Indian heritage because, besides contacting her adult daughter, the agency spoke to no other “maternal relatives.” According to mother, there were other “available relatives” she identified but DPSS made no attempt to contact. DPSS responds that mother fails to identify who these other available relatives are, and that it did, in fact, contact and make inquiry of the only available maternal relative, mother’s adult daughter.

It was unable to contact the child’s maternal grandfather, through whom mother claimed possible Cherokee ancestry, because she provided very limited information about him and, in fact, she had no idea of his whereabouts or even if he was still alive. The only other maternal relatives identified by mother were not readily available because mother only provided their names and years of birth. In reply, mother contends DPSS misunderstands her argument and has misinterpreted the record. Mother claimed Cherokee ancestry through her paternal grandfather. But, whereas the ICWA notices should have identified relatives as they relate to the child, the notices mistakenly labeled them as “paternal” instead of “maternal.”

We agree with DPSS that it conducted reasonable and sufficient ICWA inquiry of mother’s available paternal relatives. “[S]ection 224.2 ‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available 19 to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140, italics added.) Social services agencies are “not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.) As noted, mother provided DPSS with her father’s name and that he had been born in Indiana. But she was not in contact with her father and did not know his date of birth, his whereabouts, or even if he was still alive, and she provided no information whatsoever about her grandparents.

Other than her adult daughter and a deceased aunt, mother provided very limited information about two additional relatives on her father’s side of the family, and, apparently, they could not be located. On that record, we conclude DPSS made adequate inquiry into the child’s possible Indian ancestry.

Mother’s contention about the mislabeling of relatives is well taken, but it pertains to the adequacy of the notice, not to whether DPSS conducted sufficient inquiry. As mother argues, the notice misidentifies her father and other relatives on her father’s side as “paternal” relatives, not as the child’s “maternal” relatives. Had there been no possible claim of Indian ancestry as to the child’s father, the error might have been harmless.

However, father’s great-aunt told DPSS that father had Rogue River Cherokee ancestry, but DPSS reported Rogue River is not a federally recognized Indian tribe. It is reasonably possible that by mislabeling mother’s relatives as “paternal” relatives, the noticed tribes made their determination about the child’s possible Indian ancestry based solely on the information about his father’s family and not on his mother’s family history.

20 Therefore, it is appropriate to conditionally reverse and remand for DPSS to provide corrected notice to the Tribes. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 594 [“Upon invalidating a termination order based solely on an ICWA notice error, a Court of Appeal can issue a conditional reversal, to wit, a reversal of the order with instructions to reinstate it ‘if no Indian tribe intervenes after proper notice is given.’”].)

III.

DISPOSITION

The order denying mother’s petition pursuant to section 388 is affirmed.

The order terminating mother’s parental rights is conditionally reversed and remanded for the juvenile court to direct DPSS to provide corrected notice to the relevant Indian tribes, and for the court to determine the adequacy of the notice. If the juvenile court determines notice given was adequate (and, if after receiving notices, the relevant tribes do not respond or respond that the child is not an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA), the orders terminating parental rights to the child shall immediately be reinstated and further proceedings shall be conducted as appropriate.

In the alternative, if the juvenile court determines the notice was inadequate, it shall direct DPSS to provide additional notice to the relevant Indian tribes and provide any additional relevant information DPSS might have received. The court shall then determine whether the additional notice was adequate. If, after receiving notices, the relevant tribes do not respond or respond that the child is not an Indian child within the 21 meaning of ICWA, the orders terminating parental rights to the child shall immediately be reinstated, and further proceedings shall be conducted, as appropriate.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER J.

LEE J.