In re J.J. CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 In re J.J. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.J. et al., Persons Coming B346807 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24LJJP00359A-B- C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LATRICIA M., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Dismissed. Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother Latricia M. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring her three children dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Mother contends there was insufficient evidence of harm or potential harm to support the juvenile court’s findings that Mother lacked the ability to adequately parent and provide for her children and that Mother failed to address one of her child’s mental health challenges, thereby placing the other children at risk of harm. While her appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction.2 Because we cannot grant Mother effective relief, we dismiss her appeal as moot.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 We grant the Department’s motion for judicial notice of the termination orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Dependency Proceedings Mother has three children, J.J. (born 2009), Jhk.J. (born 2010) and Jhr.J. (born 2013). On October 15, 2024, Mother made a call to a child protection hotline asking for removal of J.J. and Jhk.J. from her care because she was “in fear for her life” after being “physically, mentally and verbally abused by [the] children,” and any attempts at discipline were met with physical resistance. (Emphasis omitted.) Between September 2023 and October 2024, law enforcement had previously been called to Mother’s home nine times in response to reported disorderly behavior by J.J. and Jhk.J. These events included one instance where J.J. ran away from home and eight instances stemming from Jhk.J.’s mental health challenges, including suicidal statements and gestures, physical attacks on the family, and destruction of property at the home. Several calls to law enforcement were made by Mother because she stated she felt “overwhelmed.” On October 18, 2024, Jhk.J. assaulted Mother. Mother subsequently called law enforcement and asked if law enforcement could “send [Jhk.J.] to a facility to get . . . him psychologically evaluated.” Jhk.J. was “placed on a . . . psychiatric hold at Olive View Medical Center.” After conducting an evaluation, the medical center’s mental health evaluation team reported it did not “find anything wrong with [Jhk.J.]” and could not hold him. Mother subsequently took Jhk.J. to therapy. On November 4, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The petition 3 alleged J.J. and Jhk.J. suffered from “mental, emotional, and behavioral problems, including but not limited to aggressive and assaultive behavior” and that Mother lacked the ability to provide adequate parental care and supervision of the children, placing all the children at risk of serious harm or danger. On November 19, 2024, the court held a detention hearing on the section 300 petition.3 The court found the existence of a prima facie case on the section 300 petition. The court ordered the release of the children to Mother subject to Jhk.J. remaining in therapy and the Department social worker making “unannounced” visits to the home. On January 16, 2025, a social worker for the Department interviewed several family members, including the maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, maternal great aunt, and Mother’s ex-boyfriend. All gave positive reviews of Mother’s parenting and stated Mother was a good parent. The maternal grandmother also stated “she did not know why [Mother] was being investigated.” The court conducted the jurisdiction and disposition hearing over several days. At the hearing on February 7, 2025, minors’ counsel argued the children believed that the case could be resolved without court or Department intervention, felt very well taken care of by Mother, and asked for termination of dependency jurisdiction. The court heard from Mother regarding her frustrations with the “abrupt” visits from the social worker and her disagreement with the Department’s November 18, 2024 detention report. The court declined to stop the unannounced 3 There are three fathers. They are not parties to this appeal. We therefore limit our discussion of facts and findings to those most relevant to Mother.

4 visits from the social worker but agreed Mother needed help with her sons’ behavioral issues. The court explained, “I am saying exactly the same thing you are saying; that there were behavioral issues that you were finding difficult to deal with. You asked DCFS for help.” In an April 8, 2025 progress report, the Department stated Mother had found a mentor for her children, but the mentor subsequently moved and a replacement had not been identified. The Department reported Mother was provided with resources including a program to help teach her parenting skills and contact for a psychiatric mobile response team. The report stated Mother “ha[d] not made any effort to utilize [the] provided resources.” At the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the case because it stemmed from two mental health incidents involving Jhk.J. These incidents led to assessments, therapy, and placement in sports for Jhk.J., which improved his overall mood and behavior to a manageable stability. The juvenile court noted all three children were “extremely polite, respectful, and articulate . . . all to the mother’s credit,” but it stated J.J. had been parentified, in part, due to Mother “focusing everything on [Jhk.J.] and not providing services for herself or the other children.” The court found that because Mother failed to seek treatment for herself, J.J., and Jhr.J., and did not pursue referrals given to her by the Department, there was sufficient evidence for the children to be declared dependents under section 300. The juvenile court amended the petition to add the word “substantial” in front of “risk” as to each count so that it found Mother’s conduct “plac[ed] the children . . . at substantial risk of 5 serious physical harm, damage, and danger,” and it sustained the petition as amended. The court ordered the Department to provide family maintenance and therapy services for Mother, including parenting classes, individual counseling, and conjoint counseling. The court released all three children to Mother’s custody under the Department’s supervision. Mother timely appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order. On October 24, 2025, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and released the children to Mother’s custody. Mother did not appeal from the termination orders.

DISCUSSION

A. Mootness and Dependency Appeals “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” In other words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in legal status.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276-277 (D.P.).) “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163 6 (Rashad D.).) “However, dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness following termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 163.) Even when a case is moot, however, the reviewing court generally has “ ‘inherent discretion’ ” to reach the merits of an appeal. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The reviewing court generally will exercise that discretion when a case involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the court’s determination. (See ibid.) The California Supreme Court in D.P. identified several other factors for courts to consider in deciding whether discretionary review of a moot case is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may consider whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing a child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or a juvenile court’s determination about further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court may consider the allegations against the parent because “[t]he more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot because a parent promptly complied with his or her case plan: “It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)

7 B. Mother’s Appeal Is Moot 1. The Appeal Is Moot Because the Juvenile Court Terminated Jurisdiction Mother argues the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that she lacked insight regarding Jhk.J.’s mental health challenges and that she failed to supervise or protect J.J., Jhk.J. and Jhr.J. from a substantial risk of serious physical harm. We decline to address the issues raised by Mother because her appeal is moot. The juvenile court’s termination orders render it impossible to grant Mother any effective relief. The children have remained in her custody. Under these circumstances, “the jurisdictional findings are not the basis of any current order that is adverse to [Mother].” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61.) The appeal is also moot because Mother did not appeal from the termination orders. (See In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 [“ ‘in most cases ... for this court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status’ ”]; Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“to the extent an appellant argues, as here, that the challenged jurisdiction finding resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order . . ., an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is necessary”].)

2. No Exception to the Mootness Doctrine Applies Mother argues exceptions to mootness apply. Relying on In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042 (S.R.), Mother suggests she “may be” included in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI; Pen. Code, 8 § 11170) pursuant to the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA; Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.). The California Supreme Court held in S.R. that “a parent’s appeal from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding survives a mootness challenge where the parent shows that an agency must report the allegation underlying the court’s finding for inclusion in the CACI.” (S.R., at p. 1048.) S.R. stated that a case is not moot “where it is undisputed that the allegations trigger a reporting requirement.”4 (Id. at p. 1054.) In S.R., the Department conceded it was required to report the mother’s physical abuse for inclusion in the CACI. (Ibid.) S.R. contrasted its facts with those in D.P., “where the agency represented that the allegations were not reportable.” (S.R., at p. 1054.) D.P. found the father had “not shown that the general neglect allegation against him was reported for inclusion in the CACI, nor has he shown that this type of allegation is reportable. These two layers of uncertainty render Father’s CACI claim too speculative to survive a mootness challenge.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 280.) This court recently considered similar facts in In re Landon M. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 686 (Landon M.). In Landon M., the mother appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring her children dependents of the juvenile court. The court sustained allegations that the father brandished a weapon at a cashier while the mother and the children were in the store and then led the police on a high-speed chase with the younger child buckled into a car seat in the back of the vehicle. The juvenile court sustained a failure to protect 4 S.R. left open the question of whether an appeal is moot if “a parent shows the conduct at issue is likely but not indisputably reportable.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)

9 allegation against the mother on the ground she knew the father possessed guns but allowed him unlimited access to the children. (Id. at p. 689.) While the mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and granted the mother sole legal and physical custody. (Id. at p. 690.) Applying S.R. and D.P., Landon M. held the mother’s appeal was moot for two reasons: (1) neither the mother nor the father appealed from the termination order, and (2) the challenged jurisdiction order did not form the basis for an order that continued to impact the mother’s rights after termination. (Landon M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 694.) Like Mother in this case, the mother in Landon M. argued her appeal was not moot because the juvenile court’s findings “subject” her to inclusion in the CACI. (Ibid.) Landon M. rejected that argument because “[t]he facts in this case are more similar to those in D.P. than S.R.” That is, the mother had not shown the Department actually reported her for inclusion in the CACI. And if the Department had done so, mother would have received a notice of the report but the record did not contain any such notice. (Id. at p. 696; see Penal Code § 11169, subd. (c).) Additionally, the mother had not shown her conduct constituted “child abuse” or “severe neglect” as defined in CANRA. (Ibid.) Further, “the criteria for a CACI listing based on ‘child abuse or severe neglect’ under CANRA generally appear to be narrower than the grounds for juvenile dependency jurisdiction under . . . section 300.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 1056-1057.) Here, the facts also more closely align with those in D.P. rather than S.R. As in D.P., the Department does not argue it is required to report Mother for inclusion in the CACI. Nor has Mother met her burden to show her conduct either has been 10 reported or was required to be reported for inclusion in the CACI. First, Mother failed to show the section 300 allegations amounted to “child abuse” or “severe neglect” that must be reported under CANRA. As explained in Landon M., “CANRA defines ‘ “child abuse” ’ as ‘physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child.’ (Pen. Code, § 11165.6.) ‘ “Severe neglect” ’ is defined as either (1) ‘the negligent failure . . . to protect the child from severe malnutrition or medically diagnosed nonorganic failure to thrive’ or (2) ‘those situations of neglect where any person having the care or custody of a child willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation such that their person or health is endangered as proscribed by [Penal Code] section 11165.3.’ (Id., § 11165.2, subd. (a).) Penal Code section 11165.3, as relevant here, similarly defines ‘ “the willful harming or injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child” ’ to mean ‘a situation in which any person . . . having the care or custody of any child, [willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is endangered.].’ ” (Landon M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 696-697.) Unlike the mother in S.R., Mother did not have physical altercations with her children. Indeed, she was afraid of Jhk.J.’s escalating aggression and called law enforcement. The record reflects that Mother did not use physical force against the children. In short, Mother’s conduct did not amount to “child abuse” or “severe neglect.” (See S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1144.) At worst, Mother’s conduct rises to the level of general neglect, as Landon M. explains. “ ‘ “General neglect,” ’ which is not reportable in the CACI, is defined as ‘the negligent failure of 11 a person having the care or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred but the child is at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.’ (Pen. Code, § 11165.2, subd. (b), italics added; see § 11169, subd. (a) [agency ‘shall forward’ a report of every case of ‘known or suspected child abuse or severe neglect that is determined to be substantiated, other than cases coming within subdivision (b) of Section 11165.2’ (italics added)].)” (Landon M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 697.) Mother’s failure to protect or supervise her children from Jhk.J.’s mental health challenges is less endangering than the mother’s failure to protect in Landon M. Under these circumstances, Mother’s “CACI claim [is] too speculative to demonstrate a specific legal consequence that a favorable judgment could redress.” (D.P. at p. 282.) Second, there is no report or statement in the record from the Department that mentions Mother being issued a CACI notice, as general neglect is not reportable by CACI under Penal Code section 11169. As in Landon M., the record does not contain a notice the Department reported Mother for inclusion in the CACI. (See Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (c) [when an agency forwards a report of suspected child abuse or severe neglect to the California Department of Justice, it “shall also notify in writing the known or suspected child abuser that he or she has been reported to [the CACI]”]; D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 279; Landon M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) Nor did Mother state she received such notice. Next, Mother also contends her appeal is not moot because “[a]lthough [Mother] retains the same parental rights that she had before filing of the section 300 petition, the sustained 12 allegations are a blot on her record. The section 300 findings could have consequences for [her] beyond jurisdiction,” citing In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 (Drake M.), disapproved on another ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520. But Mother does not explain what other consequences, aside from the potential report to CACI, she would suffer. In Drake M., the trial court made detention findings against both the mother and father. As to the father, the Department alleged he abused marijuana, which made him unable to supervise or protect the child. The father argued his appeal was not moot even though the mother did not appeal the findings against her. (Id. at p. 762.) Drake M. explained, “Here, the outcome of this appeal is the difference between father’s being an ‘offending’ parent versus a ‘non-offending’ parent. Such a distinction may have far- reaching implications with respect to future dependency proceedings in this case and father’s parental rights. Thus, although dependency jurisdiction over [the child] will remain in place because the findings based on mother’s conduct are unchallenged, we will review father’s appeal on the merits.” (Id. at p. 763.) By contrast, in this case Mother has not explained what potential adverse harms or consequences follow from the jurisdiction findings. Further, as Mother correctly notes, she has “retain[ed] the same parental rights.” Mother has not demonstrated ongoing harm or that an appeal would provide her with meaningful relief since the children have remained in her custody. Finally, Mother’s appeal does not present circumstances that generally warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur or a 13 material question that remains for the juvenile court’s determination.

DISPOSITION

The appeal from the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders filed by Mother on June 6, 2025 is dismissed as moot.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.