Marriage of Dillon CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 Marriage of Dillon CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of KIRA LINDSAY and JAMIE ALEXANDER DILLON.

KIRA LINDSAY DILLON, D085064

Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. 22FL008830C)

JAMIE ALEXANDER DILLON,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michelle Ialeggio, Judge. Affirmed. Bickford Blado & Botros and Andrew J. Botros for Appellant. Kira L. Dietz, in pro. per., for Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

To facilitate their marital dissolution, Jamie Alexander Dillon (Husband) and Kira Lindsay Dillon (Wife) entered a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that confirmed the family home as Husband’s personal property but required him to “refinance the home or remove Wife from the [million-dollar] mortgage within [one] year of” executing the MSA. When Husband still had not refinanced the mortgage or removed Wife from title as the MSA’s anniversary approached, Wife requested that the court order Husband to sell the home. After determining that Husband still had about two weeks to comply with the MSA’s retitling requirement, the court ordered that “[i]f Wife is not removed from the mortgage by [the one-year mark], then the home is to be listed pursuant to the MSA.” Husband appeals this ruling, arguing the forced-sale remedy is neither within the trial court’s discretionary equitable powers nor authorized by the MSA. We disagree and affirm the order.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Husband and Wife were married in December 2015, had two children together, and separated in July 2018. Wife filed a petition for dissolution in August 2022. About a year later, on August 15, 2023, Husband and Wife signed the MSA, which resolved all property, custody, and support issues. On September 8, 2023, the trial court incorporated the MSA into a judgment of dissolution.

1 We base our factual and procedural summary on matters in the appellate record when the trial court ruled on Wife’s request. (See In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1102 [“Ordinarily, appellate courts review a trial court’s judgment based on the record as it existed when the trial court ruled.”]; Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1307 [“Documents not presented in the trial proceeding generally cannot be included as part of the record on appeal and must be disregarded on appeal as beyond the scope of review.”].) We disregard Wife’s appendix to the extent it does not comply with these rules. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g) [“Filing an appendix constitutes a representation that the appendix consists of accurate copies of documents in the superior court file.”]; further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.)

2 A. The MSA’s Real Property Provisions This appeal concerns the MSA’s treatment of the family’s house on Donley Street. In the MSA, the parties valued this property at nearly $2.3 million. It had a mortgage balance of just over $1 million. The MSA confirmed the Donley property as Husband’s sole and separate property but required him to pay Wife over $700,000 “for her community interest in the home and as reimbursement of her separate property funds used to purchase the home.” Three MSA provisions regarding the Donley property are at issue here. The first states: “Wife will execute a[n] Interspousal Transfer deed to Husband within 45 days of the execution of this agreement.” The second relevant provision states: “Husband will refinance the home or remove Wife from the mortgage within [one] year of the execution of this agreement.” We will sometimes refer to this as the “retitling clause.” The last relevant provision states: “Should Husband miss two consecutive mortgage payments, the home shall immediately be listed for sale.” We will periodically refer to this as the “missed-payment clause.”

B. Wife’s Request for an Order to Sell the Donley Property In May 2024, Wife requested that the trial court order the sale of the Donley property. In her supporting declaration, Wife stated that Husband missed the February and March mortgage payments and that the missed payments affected her credit. Wife also explained the status of Husband’s efforts to comply with the retitling clause: “[Husband] . . . stated through his attorney that he was in the process of removing my name from the mortgage and that the process would be completed by May 29th. Following this I contacted Chase [Bank]

3 and they informed that they are not processing any requests to remove my name from the mortgage. . . . [¶] [Husband] has been uncooperative with my attempts to resolve this issue to date. I believe this new claim that he is in the process of removing my name from the mortgage is another attempt by him to delay the repercussions of not following the [MSA] and avoid being forced to list the home for sale.” Husband opposed Wife’s request. In his responsive declaration, Husband explained that the supposedly missed mortgage payments resulted from a misunderstanding about an escrow account associated with the mortgage for property tax and insurance payments. Husband stated he had since brought the mortgage and escrow account current. Husband also explained the status of his efforts to remove Wife from title to the Donley property: “According to Chase [Bank], I have nearly completed the process of the loan assumption for the Donley . . . property. I have been working with Chase [Bank] for several months. I completed the mortgage assistance program in a timely manner, which was a requirement preceding the loan assumption. Part of the loan assumption process required [Wife] to complete the interspousal transfer deed to remove her name from the title. After several months of argument and refusal, and in violation of the terms of our MSA, [Wife] finally signed the interspousal transfer deed on August 9, 2024, and it was recorded with the city on August 12. Chase [Bank] confirmed as soon as they have a copy, they will be able to finalize the loan assumption by removing [Wife]’s name.” Husband urged the court to deny Wife’s request: “The stability of our children’s home, school district, and community is crucial, and with the current 2.75% mortgage rate, finding an equivalent home within our means would be nearly impossible.”

4 C. The Hearing and Order The court heard Wife’s request on August 27, 2024.2 Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing. The parties were present with respective counsel but did not testify. Accordingly, the court and counsel relied on the parties’ declarations. Wife’s attorney “argued that [Husband] had failed to remove [Wife]’s name from the mortgage within the one-year timeframe specified in the [MSA].” Counsel “alleged that [Husband] had not initiated the loan assumption process with Chase Bank and that his non-compliance warranted the immediate listing of the home for sale.” Husband “countered these claims,” arguing “there was no trigger to sell the Donley Street residence except if there were two consecutively missed mortgage payments.” He asserted that the mortgage was current and that the administrative error behind the underpayments had been resolved. After hearing argument, the trial court announced its ruling, which it later documented in a written Findings and Order After Hearing. The court took judicial notice of the judgment and MSA, noting that “neither side has complied” with the MSA’s real property provisions. As to Wife, the court found that she failed to execute an interspousal transfer deed within 45 days, as required. As for Husband, the court found that the MSA required him “to refinance the home or remove Wife’s name within [one] year of execution of the agreement.” The court clarified, however, that the starting date for this 2 The hearing was not reported but the trial court certified a settled statement.

5 compliance period was the date the court incorporated the MSA into the judgment — September 8, 2023 — rather than the date the parties signed the MSA — August 15, 2023. Based on that clarification, the court found that the one-year period had not yet elapsed as of the August 27, 2024 hearing. The court therefore ordered that “[i]f Wife is not removed from the mortgage by September 8, 2024, then the home is to be listed for sale pursuant to the MSA.” The court noted, “Husband has limited time to achieve this but had ample opportunity to comply.”

III. DISCUSSION

Husband contends the trial court erred by conditionally ordering the sale of the Donley property. We disagree.

A. Relevant Legal Principles “ ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.’ [Citation.] ‘The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties’ intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible. [Citation.] “The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) “ ‘When no extrinsic evidence is introduced, or when the competent extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court independently construes the contract.’ ” (Ibid.) “Family law cases ‘are equitable proceedings in which the court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve fairness and equity.’ ” (In re Marriage of Egedi (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 17, 22–23; see Fam. Code, § 2010 6 [“the court has jurisdiction to . . . make orders that are appropriate”].) Because “ ‘ “[e]quitable relief is by its nature flexible,” ’ ” courts of equity have “broad equitable power to fashion any appropriate remedies.” (Adoption of S.S. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 607, 626.) We review a trial court’s equitable decisions for an abuse of discretion. “Generally, where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the proper decision for that of the trial judge. The trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.] The burden is on the complaining party to establish abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The showing on appeal is insufficient if it presents a state of facts which simply affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion.” (In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 682; see Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162–1163.) “Appellate attack upon a discretionary trial court ruling is an ‘uphill battle.’ ” (In re Marriage of Bittenson (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 333, 335.)

B. Analysis Based on our de novo review of the MSA’s terms, we conclude the trial court acted within its broad equitable discretion in conditionally ordering the sale of the Donley property if Husband persisted in failing to comply with the MSA’s retitling clause. The MSA does not expressly require or prohibit any 7 particular remedy for a breach of this provision. And the court’s selection of a conditional-sale remedy reasonably balances equitable considerations affecting each party. As to Wife, the remedy protects her credit by removing her from the million-dollar mortgage and reducing her debt-to-income ratio for purposes of obtaining other financing or housing. As noted, Wife stated in her supporting declaration that Husband’s missed mortgage payments affected her credit. The court’s selected remedy reasonably addresses this concern more than a monetary damage award could. Turning to Husband, the court’s chosen remedy balances the equities by not requiring an immediate sale and instead giving Husband the benefit of a generous interpretation of the MSA’s one-year compliance period as providing him nearly two additional weeks to remove Wife from the mortgage. As Husband stated in his supporting declaration, the only thing preventing him from complying with the retitling clause was Chase Bank receiving Wife’s signed interspousal transfer deed, which was recorded weeks before the hearing. The trial court could reasonably have concluded that two additional weeks was enough time for Husband to complete this task. Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion in two ways. First, he implies the court abused its discretion by “impos[ing] catastrophic and disproportionate consequences” on him by threatening the loss of a below-market mortgage interest rate and jeopardizing the children’s stable homelife. As just discussed, however, the trial court’s ruling reasonably balances the parties’ competing interests. Second, Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to exercise any discretion at all” because the court “thought it had no choice but to” order a sale of the Donley property. To support this 8 contention, Husband cites a passage in the settled statement in which the court “stated that if [Huband] failed to remove [Wife]’s name by the September 8, 2024 deadline, the home must be listed for sale per the MSA.” (Italics added.) In other words, Husband believes the court read the MSA as requiring the court to order a forced sale as the remedy for a breach of the retitling clause. Notably, however, the trial court’s final order does not include the word “must” — it says “the home is to be listed for sale . . . .” (Italics added.) We review the trial court’s final order, not its oral comments during the hearing. (See In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1075, fn. 7 [a “judge’s oral comments ‘ “may never be used to impeach the final order,” ’ because ‘the court’s final order supersedes the tentative ruling’ ” (quoting Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300–301)]; rule 8.137(a) [“[a] settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings”].) And, in any event, we do not read the court’s comment in the separate statement as reflecting the court’s understanding that it had no choice of remedies. Rather, we view the word “must” as referring to the mandatory nature of the court’s direction to Husband to sell the home. And the reference to “per the MSA” indicates that the remedy pertains to a breach of the MSA, not that the MSA requires a forced sale. Husband also raises a variety of contract-interpretation arguments to support his claim that the trial court erred by conditionally ordering him to sell the Donley property if he failed to comply with the retitling clause. None of his arguments persuade us. First, Husband asserts the court’s order conflicts with the MSA’s express terms because the MSA specifies a forced sale as the remedy for 9 breaching the missed-payment clause but does not specify that same remedy for breaching the retitling clause. He maintains, generally, that reading these provisions together shows that “[w]hen the parties wanted to impose the drastic remedy of forced sale, they knew how to do so.” (See Camacho v. Target Corporation (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 306 [“We consider the contract as a whole, and interpret contested provisions in their context, not in isolation, with the aim of giving effect to all provisions, if doing so is reasonably possible.”].) Although this is a plausible reading, we find it more reasonable that the parties specified the remedy for missed mortgage payments because they intended for there to be no less severe remedy than a forced sale, whereas the parties intended that the full panoply of remedies — up to, and including, a forced sale — be available for a breach of the retitling clause. As a more specific gloss on this argument, Husband contends his interpretation is supported by the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means “the expression of one thing . . . ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things.” (In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209; see Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla (2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 514 (Howard Jarvis) [“Under the canon, the explicit mention of some things in a text may imply other matters not similarly addressed are excluded.”].) That is, the parties’ specification of a particular remedy for a breach of one contract provision implies that the parties intentionally excluded that remedy for breaches of other provisions. However, “[t]his maxim is ‘a “mere guide” to be utilized when a [contract] is ambiguous’; it ‘ “is no magical incantation, nor does it refer to an immutable rule.” ’ ” (Walker v. City of San Clemente (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1373.) Additionally, “[t]he expressio unius inference arises only when 10 there is some reason to conclude an omission is the product of intentional design,” such as when the “text . . . contain[s] a specific list or facially comprehensive treatment.” (Howard Jarvis, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 514.) In other words, “the canon ‘has force only when the items expressed are members of an “associated group or series,” justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.’ ” (Ibid.; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal (2002) 536 U.S. 73, 81 [the canon requires a “series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication”]; In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1411 [“The maxim . . . is generally applied to a specific statute, which contains a listing of items to which the statute applies.”].) These limitations render the canon inapplicable here. Husband does not cite a comprehensive series or grouping within a specific MSA provision. That is, the retitling clause does not list a comprehensive series of remedies that omits a forced sale, such that we might infer that the parties deliberately excluded a forced sale from the menu of available remedies. Nor does the missed-payment clause contain a comprehensive list of remedies, it lists only one: immediate sale. Because we see nothing comprehensive about the MSA’s designation of remedies, the expressio unius canon is unavailing. For his next argument, Husband asserts that the trial court improperly granted equitable relief when Wife “had multiple adequate legal remedies.” (See Wilkison v. Wiederkehr (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 822, 832 (Wilkison) [“equity will not grant quasi-specific performance . . . when [legal] remedies are available”].) He maintains, for example, that Wife could have sought sanctions under Family Code section 271 for dilatory conduct, pursued contempt proceedings for violating the court-adopted MSA, or sought money 11 damages for breach of the MSA. But the court could reasonably have concluded that these remedies would have been inadequate to address the intangible harm caused to Wife’s credit rating and debt-to-income ratio that accompanied being tethered to a million-dollar mortgage on property that Husband exclusively controlled. Relatedly, Husband argues “the court’s exercise of equity was particularly inappropriate given that [Wife] herself materially breached the MSA” and the court “never considered whether [Husband]’s delay was excused by [Wife]’s breach.” The court’s order, however, expressly acknowledges that Wife breached the MSA; therefore, that fact was squarely within the court’s contemplation. Moreover, Husband has cited no authority that compels the conclusion that Wife’s breach was material, and substantial evidence — Husband’s declaration regarding the timing of the loan assumption — supports a contrary conclusion. (See Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1051–1052, 1055 [whether a breached contract term is material is a question of fact subject to review for substantial evidence].) Next, Husband argues that the court’s selection of a forced-sale remedy for a breach of the retitling clause rendered the forced-sale remedy in the missed-payment clause “meaningless.” (See Civ. Code, § 1641 [courts should “give effect to every part” of a contract “if reasonably practicable”].) We do not see how. The forced-sale remedy was available for a breach of the missed-payment clause regardless of whether it was also available for a breach of the retitling clause. Husband also asserts the court improperly rewrote the MSA to insert an unintended remedy into the retitling clause. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“[i]n the construction of a statute or instrument, the . . . Judge is simply to 12 ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted”].) He reasons that “[t]he court’s order effectively rewrites [the retitling clause] to require [Husband] to ‘refinance the home or remove [Wife] from the mortgage, or else sell the home.’ ” (Italics added.) We are not persuaded. Husband’s own proposed interpretation of the MSA can just as easily be read as inserting the additional term that “the court shall not order a sale of the Donley property as a remedy for the breach of the retitling clause.” Moreover, taken to its extreme, Husband’s argument would leave the retitling clause without any remedy. That is, because the clause does not specify any remedies, the court’s selection of any remedy would, in Husband’s view, be inserting a term into the MSA. This is an unreasonable reading of the MSA. Finally, as Husband acknowledges, the MSA reserves jurisdiction to the trial court “to make orders and determinations that are necessary and/or appropriate to . . . enforce any of the terms of th[e] Agreement . . . .” Husband argues, for many of the same reasons discussed above, that this reservation did not authorize the trial court to order Husband to sell the Donley property as a remedy for breaching the retitling clause. For the same reasons discussed above, we find those arguments unpersuasive as applied to the MSA’s broad reservation of power to the trial court.

C. Wife’s Inaccurate Legal Citations Husband points out in his reply brief — and we have confirmed — that Wife miscited three cases in her respondent’s brief by attributing to them 13 quotations or legal propositions that do not appear in the cited opinions.3 The miscitations appear to be the result of Wife’s use of generative artificial intelligence without sufficient verification. We have disregarded the arguments in Wife’s brief that are based on the miscited authorities.4 Husband “has considered, but chosen not, to seek sanctions for violations of the relevant rules of court.” (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [requiring that assertions of law in a brief be supported by citation to legal authority]; Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 445 [“relying on fabricated legal authority is sanctionable”]; Sheerer v. Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 367, 371 [it is “a requirement of all attorneys and self-represented litigants responsible for briefs filed in this Court” to “verify citations”].) We decline to sanction Wife. We do, however, find it appropriate because of the hallucinated citations to deny her prevailing party costs on appeal. (See rule 8.278(a)(1) [“Except as provided in this rule or by statute, the party prevailing in the Court of Appeal in a civil case other than a juvenile case is entitled to costs on appeal.”]; rule 8.278(a)(5) [“In the 3 The cases are Wilkison, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 822, Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, and In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434. We do not repeat the misattributions here to reduce the chances of them becoming associated with the cases in online legal research databases. Husband’s description of the misattributions provides Wife with sufficient notice. 4 Still, Husband, as the appellant, bears the burden of establishing prejudicial error. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn. 1 [“appellant ‘still bears the “affirmative burden to show error whether or not [a] respondent’s brief has been filed,” and we “examine the record and reverse only if prejudicial error is found” ’ ”].) As explained above, he has not met that burden.

14 interests of justice, the Court of Appeal may also award or deny costs as it deems proper.”].)

IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.