People v. Crowell CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Crowell CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B348155

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. XSONA045758) v.

VICTOR ANTHONY CROWELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT: Victor Anthony Crowell appeals the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.61 petition for resentencing on the ground he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We appointed counsel for Crowell, who filed a brief raising no issues and requesting we apply the review framework established by People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232 (Delgadillo). Accordingly, Crowell was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, which he duly filed. (See ibid.) We are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion,” but we need 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. not and do not conduct “an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Id. at p. 232.) We have considered Crowell’s supplemental brief and conclude his arguments have no merit. We affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On July 15, 2000, Crowell was working as a security guard at a motel in Long Beach where Cheng Kan Fei worked as a clerk.2 Fei had previously accused Crowell of taking money from him, and Fei raised the issue again upon Crowell’s arrival at work that day. Surveillance video from Fei’s office showed Crowell wrestling Fei into a store room, where Fei’s body was later found. Police determined Fei was strangled. Crowell later told police he struck Fei several times with his fist and a clothes iron, and tried to strangle Fei with Fei’s own belt; when that was unsuccessful, he strangled Fei with the iron’s electrical cord. Crowell said he took money from an office drawer, broke a video monitor in the office, took a videotape, and left the scene. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 5, 2001, Crowell pled guilty to first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)). He also admitted he had previously been convicted of a prior strike felony (§ 1170.12). Crowell was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life, doubled for the prior strike, for an aggregate sentence of 50 years to life. On November 14, 2023, Crowell filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing in propria persona and requested appointment of counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent him, who argued the trial court should issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine if Crowell was the actual killer or acted with an 2 We draw this factual summary from Crowell’s record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript. (See People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564, 567.)

2 intent to kill. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) After our Supreme Court decided Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, the People argued Crowell was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the preliminary hearing transcript showed he was the sole assailant and actual killer. Crowell’s counsel then requested the court independently review the record to determine his eligibility for relief. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) At a hearing on July 30, 2025, the trial court determined “the record of conviction unequivocally reflects [Crowell] was the actual killer and is not entitled to relief.” Crowell timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).) DISCUSSION Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), allows those “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” to file a resentencing petition in certain circumstances. (Ibid.) “[T]he section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met ([id.], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to . . . Section 188 or 189.” ’ ” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724 (Antonelli); see also § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The changes to sections 188 and 189 “altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) “First, [they] narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule” by limiting it to certain circumstances, including where “ ‘[t]he person was the actual killer.’ ” (Ibid.; see also § 189, subd. (e).) Second, they imposed a new requirement that “ ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought,’ ” which effectively eliminated aiding and abetting liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 449; see also § 188, subd. (a)(3).)

3 When a petitioner files a facially adequate section 1172.6 petition, the trial court “afford[s] the parties an opportunity to submit briefing [and] ‘hold[s] a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724.) If the court concludes the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, it issues an order to show cause, but “ ‘[i]f the petition and the record . . . establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court denied Crowell’s petition at the prima facie stage on the ground the record conclusively established he was ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer. Crowell pled guilty to first degree murder, he told police he beat and strangled Fei, and the record showed he acted alone. Crowell’s supplemental brief does not explain how or why he, Fei’s undisputed actual killer and sole assailant, “ ‘ “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to . . . Section 188 or 189.” ’ ” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724; see also § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Instead, he argues Fei’s killing was “accidental[].” Even if true, that does not render Crowell eligible for resentencing because he remains “the actual killer.” (§ 189, subd. (e); see also People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1168 [resentencing relief “is only available when certain conditions enumerated in [section 1172.6] apply”].) Crowell therefore has not shown the trial court erred in denying his petition. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [relief is unavailable where “the record . . . makes clear [the defendant] was the actual killer and the only participant”].) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

_________________________________________________________________ LUI, P. J. RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.