People v. Hefner CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Hefner CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant, E087092 v. (Super.Ct.No. INF2402455)

KILLIAN CHRISTOPHER HEFNER, OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Susanne S. Cho, Judge.

Affirmed.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Janinda Gunawardene, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Annie Fraser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

1 INTRODUCTION

Defendant and respondent Killian Christopher Hefner was charged by felony complaint with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. (Pen. Code1, § 21310.) Defendant pled not guilty and moved to suppress the prosecution’s evidence against him pursuant to section 1538.5. The trial court granted the motion, and the People now appeal. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office charged defendant with one count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger on his person. (§ 21310, count 1.) Defendant filed a motion under section 1538.5 to suppress all evidence obtained. On August 14, 2025, the court held a combined preliminary hearing and hearing on the motion.

The prosecution presented one witness, Officer Jordan Belchamber. He testified that on December 11, 2024, he responded to an anonymous call for service regarding possible narcotics use in public by a group of individuals sitting in an area in between a park and the library. The officer could not recall any details about the call, such as the gender, age, or race of the alleged drug users, what they were wearing, or what drugs they were using, since he did not review the notes of the call before the hearing.

The officer testified that he and his partner went to the library located at 400 South Sunrise and saw a group of individuals sitting in an area between the library and the 1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 2 grass. He said he “detained seven individuals on the possibility of narcotics use at that location.” The officer advised the individuals of the nature of the call he was responding to and said he was going to conduct an investigation. He recognized defendant from previous contacts and arrests. Defendant was wearing multiple layers of clothing, including a baggy jacket. The officer said he could not tell if defendant had any weapons concealed by looking at him, but was concerned because he (the officer) knew from his training and experience that homeless people often carried knives for defense.

When the officer spoke with defendant, defendant advised that he was on felony probation. The officer testified that he got defendant into a position where his hands were wrapped around the back of his head, and asked defendant whether he had anything that could poke, prod, or hurt him. Defendant said he had a knife. The officer asked if he could retrieve the knife, and defendant said yes. The officer did a patdown search and recovered a straight four-inch knife in a sheath.

The officer testified that he did not know what defendant was doing prior to being ordered to come to him and admitted that defendant could have just been in or around the library. When asked specifically what defendant was doing when the officer showed up at the scene, the officer said, “He was in the area with the group.”

Defense counsel argued that the detention of seven people, based on an anonymous call that did not describe the race, gender, or what the alleged drug users were using, was unreasonable. The prosecutor asserted that the information given to the officer was that several people were in the area potentially consuming narcotics in public 3 and argued that “seeing several people in that exact area shortly after contributes to a specific articulable fact that they may be engaged in smoking narcotics in public.” The prosecutor confirmed that the officer did not see any criminal activity when he arrived.

The court responded, “No. You need some reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not the fact that it matched that there were several people there.” The court asked the prosecutor to explain what “about the scene that we’ve heard testimony about that leads us to believe that they were engaged [in] criminal activity such that he needed to detain them.”

The prosecutor reiterated, “Right now, we’re at reasonable suspicion to detain, and when the officer arrives, after having dispatch inform them—the call came out that several individuals were using narcotics in the public—and sees that same amount of individuals in public, while he doesn’t know if they were using drugs, he has the right to detain to determine.”

The trial court pointed out that the only reasonable suspicion the prosecution was offering was there was a call by someone saying there was large group of people using drugs. However, there was no evidence the people were using drugs at that point. The prosecutor stated, “I would agree with that.” The court then summarized: “So the issue is: Is an uncorroborated . . . call about this case sufficient enough to detain all the individuals that were there so that the officer could investigate potentially whether or not these people are engaged in criminal activity? [¶] The corroboration can’t simply be 4 there’s a large group of people that someone called about . . . . There has to be something more.”

The prosecutor added that the officer recognized defendant, defendant told him he was on probation, and defendant was wearing baggy clothes. She then stated, “He’s subject to search terms, and unless [defense counsel] can articulate how this is harassing or otherwise a prohibited execution of search terms, then it’s an inevitable discovery issue, and [the knife] would have been located anyway.” The court said the defense had no burden to produce evidence of harassing conduct. The court then summarized that there was an unknown call which was uncorroborated, and the only corroboration offered was that “there was, in fact, a large group.” The court found such fact insufficient to justify the detention and granted the motion to suppress. It then dismissed the case.

DISCUSSION

The Court Properly Granted the Motion to Suppress The People contend the court erred in granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the case because the detention and search of defendant were valid. We conclude the court properly granted the motion and dismissed the case.

A. Standard of Review A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that “[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 5 119, 127 (Williams).) “The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)

“[A] detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56 (Zaragoza).)

Reasonable suspicion means “‘the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 (Hernandez); People v. Holiman (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 825, 831.) In other words, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity has taken place or is about to occur. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) “An anonymous tip can support a lawful detention where the information provided is ‘sufficiently corroborated to furnish [the requisite] reasonable suspicion that [the suspect] was engaged in criminal activity . . . .’” (People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1614 (Ramirez).) “The purpose of requiring corroboration of an anonymous tip is to ensure that there are probative indications of criminal activity along the lines suggested by the informant.” (Id. at p. 1616.)

6 B. The Detention Was Not Supported by Reasonable Suspicion The record indicates the officer responded to an anonymous call regarding possible narcotics use in public by a group of individuals sitting in a certain area. The People assert that the anonymous tip “described a specific area with a group of seven individuals and when the officer arrived on the scene, he found the described group in that particular area, which gave the officer reasonable suspicion to investigate what was going on.” We conclude the record does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the detention.

The officer testified that he did not know the “fine details” of the anonymous call.

He could not recall if the caller described the race and gender of, or the type of clothing worn by the alleged drug users, or the type of drugs they were using. He merely testified that he observed a large group of individuals sitting in the area described by the caller, and he detained them “on the possibility of narcotics use at that location.” Notably, the officer did not testify that he observed any indication they were using, or had used, drugs.

The officer specifically testified that he did not know what defendant was doing right before he ordered him to come over and admitted that defendant could have just been in the library. When directly asked what defendant was doing when the officer arrived at the scene, the officer merely said, “He was in the area with the group.” We note that, when questioned by the court, the prosecutor confirmed that the officer did not observe any criminal activity.

7 In other words, the officer could not point to any specific articulable facts that caused him to suspect defendant was involved in any criminal activity. Thus, because there was nothing to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the detention was unlawful. (Hernandez, supra, 45 Cal.5th at p. 299 [the officer must be able to point to specific articulable facts that the person detained was involved in criminal activity];

Zaragoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 56 [“a detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity”]; Ramirez, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1614 [“An anonymous tip can support a lawful detention where the information provided is ‘sufficiently corroborated to furnish [the requisite] reasonable suspicion that [the suspect] was engaged in criminal activity.’”].) Because the People offered no corroboration of the anonymous tip which pointed to defendant’s involvement in criminal activity at the time he was detained, we conclude the detention was unlawful.

C. There Was No Evidence the Officer Was Aware That Defendant Had a Search Condition The People argue that the warrantless search was proper as a probation search, since defendant voluntarily told the officer he was on probation prior to the search being conducted. Additionally, they assert the officer was concerned for his safety since defendant was wearing baggy clothes and could have been concealing a weapon.

“‘A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”’ [Citation.] One such exception exists for probation searches.” (People v. 8 Rosas (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 17, 24 (Rosas).) However, it is well settled that “‘the [probation] exception is inapplicable if police are unaware of the probation search condition at the time of a warrantless search.’” (Ibid.; see People v. Miller (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 545, 549.)

The People merely claim that defendant told the officer he was on probation before the search occurred. However, there was no evidence that the officer was aware of a probation search condition at the time of the search, or that defendant was even subject to a probation search condition. Accordingly, the warrantless search of defendant’s person cannot be upheld as a probation search. (Rosas, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.)

Further, the People’s assertion that the officer was concerned for his safety “because [defendant] was wearing layers of baggy clothing that could easily conceal a deadly weapon unbeknownst to [the officer]” is immaterial, since the search came after defendant had already been unlawfully detained. Moreover, wearing baggy clothes alone is insufficient to justify the detention and search by the officer. (See People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490-491 [baggy clothes insufficient where defendant was dressed appropriately for the weather, made no furtive or sudden movements, and there was no evidence of conduct suggesting defendant was trying to hide a weapon].) There was no evidence presented below indicating defendant was dressed inappropriately for the weather; nor was there any evidence that he made any furtive movements or engaged in conduct suggesting he was attempting to hide a weapon.

9 Ultimately, the prosecution failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the detention and search. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 127.)

Therefore, the court properly granted defendant’s suppression motion.

DISPOSITION

The orders granting defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissing the case are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS J. We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MENETREZ J.