In re A.F. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 In re A.F. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088198

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ700002)

v. OPINION S.F., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Judge. Conditionally reversed.

Sara N. Taylor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Larisa R-McKenna, Deputy County Counsel, and Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 S.F. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s February 2026 order at the permanent plan selection and implementation hearing terminating parental rights to A.F.

(born in September 2024; hereafter Minor), the daughter he conceived with J.W.

(Mother). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Minor was detained from her parents’ custody after Mother tested positive for methamphetamine at Minor’s caesarian birth, and Minor entered foster care directly from the hospital. Father contends the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to meet its duty of inquiry to ask any of Mother’s many relatives known to DPSS whether Minor may have Native American ancestry to qualify as an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)

and applicable state law (Cal-ICWA). (See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq; § 224.2, subds. (a) & (b); In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 278; In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (Dezi C.).) DPSS in a brief letter response concedes—and we agree—there was inquiry error and that conditional reversal is necessary to correct it.

“[A] social services agency has the obligation to make a meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family members to obtain whatever information they may have as to the child’s possible Indian status.” (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.) This step is essential: “ ‘ensuring a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry . . .

is foundational to fulfilling the purpose underlying ICWA and related California law.’ ”

(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.)

2 The juvenile court on several occasions throughout the dependency proceedings found that ICWA did not apply. “The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to a proceeding if it determines ‘that . . . inquiry and due diligence as required . . . have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child.’ ” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 589.) However, “[w]hen there is an inadequate inquiry and the record is underdeveloped, it is impossible for reviewing courts to assess prejudice because we simply do not know what additional information will be revealed from an adequate inquiry.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) In such instances, conditional reversal for the child welfare agency to make the proper inquiry is necessary.

(Ibid.)

DPSS acknowledges “inadvertent omissions in conducting [its] initial inquiry [into] whether [Minor] is an Indian child.” DPSS’s concession is well-taken and a model of forthright advocacy. DPSS does not dispute that Father may raise inquiry omissions as to Mother’s relatives, given that an appealing parent in effect acts as a surrogate for tribal interests protected by ICWA. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1138 [appellate standing for parents seeking conditional reversal to remedy inquiry error “best supports the interests of the tribes, which are independently protected by ICWA”].)

Here, despite agency contact with Minor’s maternal grandmother, Minor’s adult half sister on her maternal side, two maternal aunts, and another unidentified “relative,”

DPSS asked none of them about Minor’s Indian ancestry, if any. Additionally, Mother had told a DPSS social worker that her father lived in Lucerne Valley and that she had a 3 “really good” relationship with her siblings—including two brothers in addition to Minor’s two maternal aunts who were contacted—but nothing indicates Mother was asked how to reach these other relatives. Nor did the juvenile court ensure Mother filed an ICWA-020 Notification of Indian Status form with contact information.

Given these conceded omissions, DPSS “does not oppose a conditional reversal and remand” to ensure proper inquiry, which is the same relief Father requests. That is the correct outcome here. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125 [“an inadequate Cal- ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by record documentation.”].)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed.

On remand, the juvenile court shall direct DPSS to either: (a) fulfill and document its Indian ancestry inquiry obligations (§ 224.2), or (b) provide evidence of already having fulfilled that duty. Upon receipt of information documenting DPSS’s completed inquiry efforts, the juvenile court must determine whether ICWA applies in this case. If the court determines ICWA does not apply, then the court is directed to reinstate the order terminating parental rights. (In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 343.) If the 4 juvenile court determines that ICWA applies, then the court is directed to proceed in compliance with the provisions of ICWA and related California law. (Ibid.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS LEE J. We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MILLER J.