People v. Huerta CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Huerta CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B342723

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA418807) v.

NATHANIEL HUERTA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed. Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________ Nathaniel Huerta appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for vacatur of his manslaughter conviction and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (subsequently renumbered as Penal Code section § 1172.6).1 Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Huerta could still be convicted of murder under the current laws as a direct aider and abettor, who either intended to kill or acted with implied malice. On appeal, Huerta contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Huerta aided and abetted the murder with implied malice. We therefore affirm the court’s order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Charges An amended information filed on February 8, 2016, charged Huerta with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and alleged gang (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C) & (b)(5)) and gun enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d), (e)(1)).

B. Preliminary Hearing The preliminary hearing was held on October 7, 2017. Detective Brian Calicchia testified that on September 30, 2012, he responded to a report of a homicide. When he arrived at the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 scene, Detective Calicchia observed a north-south alleyway in which there was a bicycle, a shirt, and several spent cartridge casings. A person named Ever Marroquin had been shot, but Marroquin had been transported from the scene to a hospital before the detective arrived. Detective Calicchia canvassed the area and located three surveillance cameras. The detective reviewed the video and was able to locate a vehicle consistent with the vehicle that witnesses at the scene described to him. Detective Calicchia interviewed Horacheo Jones, who was a friend of Marroquin’s and had been with him prior to the shooting. The two had just separated and Marroquin was riding away on his bicycle. Jones said he saw a white vehicle and that it drew his attention because a rear passenger began opening the door while the vehicle was moving. The vehicle stopped next to Marroquin. A person got out of the back seat and punched Marroquin, causing him to fall off his bicycle. The person then shot a semi-automatic firearm at Marroquin while Marroquin was on the ground. Jones described the vehicle as a boxy 1980’s model with lightly tinted windows, possibly an Acura. The shooter was a thin black male, approximately five feet eight inches tall with a short fade haircut. Detective Calicchia also spoke to Leanna Billman, who was in a car with her husband or boyfriend when she heard several gunshots. She saw a boxy white vehicle stopped in the road. There was a male standing outside of the car. Billman saw him shoot two or three additional rounds from a handgun in a downward trajectory. Billman did not see Marroquin at first, but she noticed him when they drove further down the street. He was lying in the alleyway. Billman described the shooter as a 3 thin black male, five feet eleven inches to six feet tall, with a dark complexion.2 Detective Calicchia arrested Huerta in February 2013. Huerta agreed to speak with Detective Calicchia after the detective read Huerta his Miranda rights. Huerta said he had been a member of the Barrio Mojados gang for six years and that he went by the moniker “Wino.” Initially, Huerta denied being involved in the shooting. Later, Huerta said he was the driver and he had one front passenger and one rear passenger. The detective showed Huerta a still photo of the suspect vehicle taken from the surveillance video. Huerta said the vehicle in the still photo was his car, a white 1990 Toyota Corolla. Huerta was released. On November 26, 2013, police arrested Huerta a second time and placed him in a cell with a confidential informant. Detective Calicchia listened to a recording of the conversation and testified regarding its contents at the preliminary hearing. Huerta told the informant that on September 30, 2012, he was driving other gang members in his car when one of them exited the vehicle and shot a rival Sur 13 gang member. Huerta said they were driving to Hollywood to look for rival gang members and happened upon the victim in their own territory. After the shooting, Huerta drove home and cleaned his car. He wiped it down for prints and made sure there was no blood and no evidence in the vehicle. Huerta told the informant that he was in 2 As we discuss below, at the evidentiary hearing on Huerta’s petition to vacate his manslaughter conviction and to be resentenced, the trial court excluded, and did not consider Detective Calicchia’s testimony regarding the statements made to him by Jones and Billman.

4 custody for murder. The informant asked if Huerta was the driver. Detective Calicchia said Huerta responded, “ ‘Yeah, I was the driver, but I didn’t shoot,’ something to that effect.” The detective did not recall Huerta saying that he knew the shooter was going to get out of the car and shoot the victim. Huerta did not say that he encouraged the shooter to get out of the car and shoot the victim. Huerta never said that he knew that the shooter had a gun before the shooting. Officer Jordan Ornelas, who had significant experience with the local gangs and was assigned to monitor Barrio Mojados, testified regarding the gang’s territory, signs and symbols, and activities. Members of Barrio Mojados had engaged in narcotics sales, illegal weapons possessions, assaults with a deadly weapon, robberies, attempted murders, and murders. One of their rivals was the Su Trece gang. One of Su Trece’s cliques was located in Hollywood. Marroquin was a member of Su Trece. Huerta was a self-admitted member of Barrio Mojados and had tattoos associated with the gang. The prosecutor introduced a certified minute order reflecting that Jose Antonio Lomeli was convicted of murder on July 17, 2009. The prosecutor also introduced a certified minute order reflecting that Andres Prado was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on January 8, 2011. Officer Ornelas opined that Lomeli and Prado were Barrio Mojados members. The prosecutor gave Officer Ornelas a hypothetical mirroring the facts of the present case. Officer Ornelas opined that the shooting was done in association with and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The officer’s opinion was based on his knowledge that when a gang member commits a murder or a shooting of a rival gang member, it instills fear in the community and in rival gangs.

5 Other gangs will not want to confront them. It also increases the reputation of the gang members who are involved in the crime. The parties stipulated that on October 5, 2012, a coroner performed an autopsy and concluded that the cause of Marroquin’s death was multiple gunshot wounds.

C. Plea Colloquy and Sentencing In a hearing held on February 9, 2016, the People amended the information to add count 2, alleging voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) with associated gang (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C)) and gun enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Huerta pleaded guilty to manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the allegations that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that a principal discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). Huerta stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based upon the police reports and the preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court sentenced Huerta to six years for manslaughter, plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement, and stayed the gang enhancement.

D. Section 1172.6 Petition On October 25, 2022, Huerta filed in pro. per., a form petition for relief pursuant to section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). The People filed a response on April 30, 2024, arguing that the record of conviction showed Huerta was charged and convicted as the driver and direct aider and abettor in a gang- 6 motivated shooting. This was the only theory that the preliminary hearing transcripts supported. The People attached to the response the transcript of the plea colloquy and the preliminary hearing transcript. On May 20, 2024, Huerta filed a prima facie brief through appointed counsel. Huerta argued that police reports and the statements of officers relating the out-of-court statements of declarants offered for the truth of the matter asserted could not be considered at the prima facie stage. Huerta further argued that his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript was not a binding admission and could not be used to demonstrate that he acted with malice. Huerta asserted that the record of conviction did not eliminate the possibility that he could be tried on a natural and probable consequences theory of murder or that malice could not have been imputed to him based solely on his participation in another crime. Huerta contended that there was no evidence of his intent and no evidence that he knew the shooter was armed or that the shooter planned to use violence. At a prima facie hearing held on June 20, 2024, both parties relied on the preliminary hearing transcript. The court concluded that it could not find Huerta ineligible for prima facie relief because the court would have to engage in impermissible fact finding and make a credibility determination to do so. The court concluded that under the circumstances it had no choice other than to find Huerta prima facie eligible for relief, issue an order to show cause, and conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). On November 20, 2024, Huerta filed an evidentiary hearing brief. Huerta argued that Detective Calicchia’s testimony relaying the statements of percipient witnesses Jones and 7 Billman was inadmissible hearsay. Huerta also objected to Detective Calicchia testifying regarding statements that Huerta made to the confidential informant as inadmissible hearsay. Huerta asserted that the preliminary hearing transcript was not a binding admission. On December 13, 2024, the People filed an evidentiary hearing brief. The People claimed that Detective Calicchia’s testimony regarding Huerta’s statements to the confidential informant demonstrated that Heurta was convicted as the driver and an aider and abettor in a gang-motivated shooting. At an evidentiary hearing held on December 13, 2024, the trial court considered the preliminary hearing transcript except for the testimony of Detective Calicchia relaying the statements of witnesses Jones and Billman. Huerta chose not to testify on his own behalf. Defense counsel argued that Huerta’s statement to the confidential informant that they were “ ‘looking for’ ” rival gang members was not equivalent to a statement that he and his companions were planning to shoot a rival gang member. There was no indication in the record that Huerta knew there was a firearm in his car. The prosecutor responded that in his statement to the confidential informant Huerta mentioned a motive for a murder, which was proof that Huerta intended to kill. The trial court denied the petition because the court found that Huerta was an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life. The court further found that Huerta acted with implied malice.

8 DISCUSSION

Huerta contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Huerta could still be found guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt because he intended to kill or the court’s alternative finding that Huerta acted with implied malice. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Huerta could still be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder.3 A. Legal Principles 1. Section 1172.6 “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) As relevant here, the bill eliminated murder liability predicated on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 188, 3 Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied malice finding, we decline to discuss the court’s finding that Huerta intended to kill.

9 subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707, fn. 1.) “ ‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990 (Reyes).) “[A] defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder. (See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 588–591; People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 499; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710–714, (Powell); see also People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979– 983.)” (Ibid.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, to provide a procedure for those convicted of murder to seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)−(c).) If the sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to 10 the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty [of murder under a still-valid theory] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) We will not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)

2. Implied Malice Murder “Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller).)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) “[T]he defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; see ibid. [under the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’

11 means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will result in death” ’]; People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 513 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [‘Although an act that will certainly lead to death is not required, the probability of death from the act must be more than remote or merely possible[ ]’].)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)

3. Direct Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder “ ‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. ([People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122].) In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ [Citations.]” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.) In contrast, “ ‘[t]he natural and probable consequences doctrine did not require that the aider and abettor intend to aid the perpetrator in committing a life-endangering act . . . . What was natural and probable was judged by an objective standard 12 and it was enough that murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime aided and abetted.’ (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 711, fn. 26.)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.)

B. Analysis Huerta argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support the finding that he knew the shooting was going to take place before it occurred, and thus he could not have aided and abetted the shooting, which was the life-endangering act. We conclude there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to infer that Huerta knew the perpetrator intended to shoot a rival gang member.4 At the preliminary hearing, Officer Ornelas testified that he was assigned to monitor the Barrio Mojados criminal street gang. A criminal street gang is defined as “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more [enumerated] criminal acts . . . having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) Officer Ornelas testified that Huerta was a self-proclaimed Barrio Mojados member, and that the officer believed Huerta to be a Barrio Mojados member. Detective Calicchia testified that in 2013 Huerta told him he had 4 Huerta does not argue that he did not know a shooting was a life-endangering act or that driving the perpetrator to search for rivals to shoot did not aid and abet the shooting.

13 been a Barrio Mojados member for six years—i.e., since approximately 2007. Officer Ornelas stated that the Barrio Mojados gang’s primary activities included assaults with deadly weapons, attempted murders, and murders, among other crimes. The prosecution introduced certified minute orders evidencing that Barrio Mojados members had been convicted of murder in 2009 and voluntary manslaughter in 2011. Both convictions occurred during the time that Huerta claimed he was a Barrios Mojados member. As a Barrio Mojados member during that time and as a long-standing member of the gang at the time of the shooting, it is a reasonable inference that Huerta would be aware that his fellow gang members engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct involving firearms and violence that resulted in death and severe bodily injury. Given a hypothetical mirroring the facts of this case, Officer Ornelas opined that the shooting was done in association with and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Officer Ornelas testified that gangs shot and killed rivals to discourage other gangs from confronting them and that individuals involved in these shootings and killings would enhance their reputations. Huerta told the informant that he and his companions were looking for rival gang members. There is sufficient evidence tending to show that Huerta and his companions were motivated to shoot a rival gang member and that they were looking for rivals with the intent to commit a shooting. Huerta also told the informant that he was arrested for murder. There was no evidence that Huerta told the informant that he did not know the perpetrator intended to shoot or that he tried to distance himself from the murder when speaking with 14 the informant, as one would likely do if surprised by the shooting. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Huerta acted with implied malice.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Huerta’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.