People v. Magee CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Magee CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B349499

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA106923) v.

JEREMIA RENEE MAGEE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Thomas R. Sokolov, Judge. Affirmed. Jeremia Renee Magee, in pro. per.; Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________ Jeremia Renee Magee appeals from a judgment entered after her no contest plea to issuing a check exceeding $950 without sufficient funds. The trial court sentenced her to two years formal probation and ordered her to make restitution to the victim in the amount of $9,950.10. We appointed counsel to represent Magee on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel for Magee filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 that did not identify any arguable issues. After independently reviewing the record, as well as the arguments raised in Magee’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2021 Magee checked into a resort hotel. Over the next 12 days, Magee used $15,510 worth of various amenities at the hotel, including in-room dining, restaurant dinners, parking, movie rentals, and use of the internet. On April 25 the hotel attempted to charge Magee’s credit card, but the card was declined. Magee provided a second credit card, but the hotel was only able to charge $50 to the card. On April 27 Magee checked out of the hotel and gave the hotel a personal check for the remaining balance. However, the check was returned due to insufficient funds. On November 21, 2022 Magee was charged in a felony complaint with one count of defrauding an innkeeper by nonpayment over $950 (Pen. Code,1 § 537, subd. (a)(2); count 1)

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 and one count of issuing a check without sufficient funds exceeding $950 (§ 476a, subd. (a); count 2). On April 6, 2023, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Magee entered a no contest plea to count 2 for issuing a check without sufficient funds. The prosecutor explained the terms of the plea agreement, under which the trial court would “put over sentencing for one year for [Magee] to pay restitution to the victim in a stipulated amount of $9,995.10,” and if Magee did not have any “new convictions or cases,” stayed away from the hotel, and complied with other conditions of the plea, the prosecution “would ask the court to sentence [Magee] to a misdemeanor on count 2 alone, and it will be one year of summary probation.” However, “[i]f for any reason [Magee] pick[s] up any new cases or [does] not pay the full restitution as stipulated by the one-year date, [she] would be sentenced to the felony and be put on felony probation for 24 months and still be required to pay full restitution to the victim as well as stay away from the [hotel].” In accepting the plea agreement, Magee acknowledged that no one had threatened her or anyone close to her in order to get her to change her plea, that she was changing her plea “freely and voluntarily because [that] is what [she] want[s] to do,” and that she was changing her plea “because after evaluating all the facts and circumstances [she] believe[s] it is in [her] best interest to take advantage of the deal today.” The trial court made a finding Magee provided the waivers knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that she understood the nature and consequences of the plea agreement. The court then set the matter for a sentencing hearing. At the probation and sentencing hearing held on April 8, 2024, the trial court granted Magee’s request for additional time 3 to pay victim restitution, and it continued the hearing. On September 2, 2025 Magee, represented by counsel, filed a motion to withdraw her plea pursuant to section 1018. In her supporting declaration, Magee stated she was “innocent of the charge(s),” she did not intend to commit any crime, she was a victim of domestic violence and “was escaping abuse,” and she was attempting to “secure stable housing” for herself and her children by staying at the hotel. In addition, at the time she entered the plea, her ability to assist her attorney and review discovery in the case “was limited by trauma, housing insecurity, and urgent life needs.” Further, at the time of the plea, she felt pressure to enter into the plea as a result of her circumstances, which “overcame [her] free judgment.” On September 4, 2025, after a hearing, the trial court denied Magee’s motion. The court explained that it “has at least read three times the transcript of the plea in this matter . . . [and it] puts great weight in the . . . reading of the transcript of the plea. And quite honestly, there’s been [an] insufficient showing to grant the withdrawal of the plea.” The court sentenced Magee to two years formal probation and imposed multiple conditions, including that she pay $9,950.10 in restitution to the hotel. The court dismissed count 1 and advised Magee that if she “pays all victim restitution, the court may reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor.” On October 1, 2025 Magee filed a notice of appeal challenging the validity of her plea and requested a certificate of probable cause. Magee asserted in her request that the case “was wrongfully criminalized following false and retaliatory reports by [the] opposing party” in the family law domestic violence context. Further, she was denied a fair hearing, and “the plea entered was 4 not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, but under duress, misinformation, and fear of further retaliation.” The trial court did not grant Magee’s request for a certificate of probable cause.2 Accordingly, on October 31, 2025 this court advised the parties that the appeal would be “limited to issues that do not require a Certificate of Probable Cause.”

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Magee in her appeal. After reviewing the record, appointed counsel did not identify any arguable issues. On April 15, 2026 appointed counsel advised Magee that she was filing a brief stating she was unable to find any arguable issues and that Magee could personally submit any contentions she believed the court should consider. Counsel also stated in her declaration that she sent Magee the transcripts of the record on appeal and a copy of the brief. On May 13, 2026 Magee filed a three-page supplemental brief in which she explained that the underlying “dispute” involving the hotel “arose during an extremely unstable and traumatic period” in her life, which included “domestic violence, housing instability, financial hardship, and ongoing coercive control” by her former husband. Further, following the events at the hotel, Magee attempted to increase her income and repay the debt she owed, but her former husband assaulted her, and when she attempted to relocate to Arizona, he “portrayed [her] planned relocation as evidence [of] attempting to flee prosecution.”

2 Although the request for a certificate of probable cause checks the box for the request being “granted,” the order is not signed.

5 Further, she lost public assistance and financial support during this time period, both of which were needed to “provide for [her] children.” Magee argued: “These circumstances severely affected my ability to fully advocate for myself and meaningfully understand the long-term consequences of the plea proceedings.” Following entry of a judgment based on a plea of no contest, with limited exceptions, a defendant must obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court to appeal the judgment, including to challenge to the validity of the plea or an admission. (§ 1237.5; see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75 [§ 1237.5 does not allow reviewing courts to hear the merits of issues going to the validity of the plea unless the defendant has obtained a certificate of probable cause].) Thus, without a certificate of probable cause, our review is “limited to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3).) Those limited issues include “(1) search and seizure issues for which an appeal is provided under section 1538.5, subdivision (m); and (2) issues regarding proceedings held subsequent to the plea for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed.” (Panizzon, at pp. 74-75.) We have examined the portion of the record that does not require a certificate of probable cause and are satisfied appellate counsel for Magee has complied with counsel’s responsibilities and there are no arguable issues. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118- 119; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.)

6 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FEUER, J. We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.