People v. Jones CA5

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Jones CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F089240 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF196953A) v. NATHANIEL JONES, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany E. Organ-Bowles, Judge. Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Lowe and Cameron M. Goodman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Defendant Nathaniel Jones was convicted by jury trial of three counts of attempted carjacking, and a single count of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and misdemeanor resisting arrest. On appeal, he contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support one of his attempted carjacking convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting highly prejudicial evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by finding his prior conviction for gang participation constituted a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Penal Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)),1 and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The People concede the error as to Jones’s third contention but otherwise disagree. We vacate the true findings on the prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction, remand for retrial or resentencing, and in all other respects, affirm. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY On January 26, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information, charging Jones with attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a); counts 1 through 3), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 4 and 5), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 7). As to counts 2 through 5, the information alleged that Jones personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and, as to counts 2 and 3, that he personally used a firearm during the commission of a crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The information further alleged that Jones had suffered a 2015 conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) which qualified as a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and a serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The information also alleged numerous circumstances in aggravation. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) During trial, Jones filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1), as to all counts, which was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, on May 17, 2024, the jury found him guilty as charged on counts 1 through 4, 6, and 7, and found true the firearm 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except as otherwise noted.

2. enhancements on counts 2 and 4. However, the jury did not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial, on the firearm enhancements on count 3 and the assault with a firearm charge on count 5, which were dismissed on the prosecution’s motion. Jones had a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction and sentencing allegations, in which the court found true that he suffered a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction, and numerous circumstances in aggravation. On June 26, 2024, the trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 27 years, 4 months, as follows: on count 2, the upper term of nine years, plus a consecutive 10- year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), plus a consecutive five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement; on counts 1 and 3, consecutive terms of one year eight months, one-third the middle term; and on count 7, one year, to be served concurrently with the term on count 2. The court imposed and stayed the following: as to count 2, an upper-term, 10-year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a); on count 4, four years, plus an upper-term, 10-year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a); and on count 6, six years. FACTUAL SUMMARY The People’s Case The First Incident - Counts 3 and 5 On November 11, 2023, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Sarah H. and her teenage daughter, Haylie H., were riding bikes near their home, in Bakersfield. Sarah observed two men fighting in the road and heard a female screaming, and Haylie heard yelling and fighting. Sarah and Haylie rode their bikes home, got in their car, and drove back to the scene to see if anyone needed help. Sarah called 911 while driving. Once they returned to the scene, Haylie observed one of the men who was fighting stop fighting, get into a car, and quickly drive away. The remaining man, Jones, began “attacking cars” which included him running up to a truck that was driving by and 3. kicking it. Jones quickly and angrily approached Sarah’s car on the passenger side, where Haylie was sitting. Sarah reversed her car because Jones “was trying to attack [her] car.” Jones continued to approach the passenger side of the vehicle, raised his hands, and Sarah and Haylie believed they saw a gun. Haylie screamed to Sarah that Jones had a gun, and Sarah placed the car in drive and swerved around Jones to avoid hitting him. Sarah drove to a nearby supermarket and waited until she felt it was safe to return home, because the incident occurred near her residence and she was still afraid. The Second Incident – Counts 2 and 4 A short time later, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Nadia Q. was driving with her two friends, Kristopher B. and Riley S., near the same area where the first incident occurred. Nadia observed Jones and two females leave the sidewalk and run into the middle of the street she was driving on. Jones then stood in front of Nadia’s vehicle and she stopped her car close enough to him that she could not see his legs. Nadia stated Jones then extended his arms, pointed a firearm at her, and screamed at her to “get the f[**]k out of the car.” Nadia then quickly reversed her vehicle, shifted to drive, “floored … the pedal,” and drove around Jones to flee the scene. Kristopher called 911 while Nadia drove to a fast food restaurant to await law enforcement. The Third Incident – Count 1 Minutes after the second incident, Jessica M. drove near the same location with her two children. Jessica observed three people stumbling into the street she was driving on, which caused her to stop her car in the middle of the road. Jessica initially believed the group was “roughhousing,” but soon noticed Jones crouched down and pointing what appeared to be a gun at her. He then came to the hood of Jessica’s car, leaned forward, and slammed both hands on the hood, which she interpreted as his intimidating her. Jones then approached the driver’s side door and yanked the door handle more than once as her children were screaming. He then used his hand to hit the rear driver door. Jessica drove away and turned into an area to hide and call 911.

4. Officers Apprehend Jones – Count 7 Bakersfield police officers found Jones and the two women within close proximity to the area where the incidents occurred. Officers pointed their firearms at Jones and the two women and ordered them to show their hands and get on the ground. At first, Jones complied with the officers’ commands to get on the ground, but he did not stay down; he got up and down twice, advanced toward officers, and made a third attempt to get up. Jones was yelling throughout the time police were trying to arrest him and appeared to ask if officers were going to shoot him.2 DISCUSSION 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence Jones contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on count 3 for attempted carjacking, and in conjunction with the prior denial of his motion for acquittal, violated his due process rights. He argues the evidence presented did not prove he had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Sarah and/or Haylie of their car by taking it from their immediate presence, against their will, with force or fear, and that he committed a direct but ineffectual act toward that end. The People disagree, as do we. A. Additional Background During trial, Haylie testified that she would not be able to tell if the gun was real or not, and Jessica testified that she could not be sure what she had seen was a firearm. Before closing arguments, Jones moved under sections 1118 and 1118.1 to dismiss all charges and enhancements and specifically challenged the evidence on whether he possessed a firearm. His counsel argued no firearm was ever recovered, and he did not think any witness stated with confidence they saw a gun. The prosecution responded that apart from witness Jessica, who was a little uncertain of what she observed, the other 2 One of the officers testified Jones said “[t]hat he wanted us to kill him.”

5. witnesses provided direct testimony that a gun was involved in the incidents. The court denied the motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. During deliberations, the jury asked the following question regarding count 3, the attempted carjacking of Sarah and/or Haylie: “Count 3 – if we do believe that no firearm was included, and no physical contact to the vehicle was made, or any command given, does [it] negate the direct act of carjacking?” The trial court referred the jury to the instructions on the elements of carjacking and attempt. The jury reached a guilty verdict but was unable to come to a unanimous decision on the enhancement allegations for this count. B. Standard of Review “ ‘ “The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction[.]” ’ ” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 442.) In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review “the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence, that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66, overruled on other grounds in People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 120.) “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility,’ ” and “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) We may not reverse the judgment 6. unless “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) C. Analysis We conclude from our review of the record that substantial evidence supports Jones’s conviction for attempted carjacking. Carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 215, subd. (a).) An attempted crime “consists of two elements: a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” (§ 21a.) Jones insists that there was insufficient evidence to prove he intended to take Sarah and Haylie’s vehicle through force or fear because there was no evidence he made a demand for them to give him the keys or vehicle, nor substantial evidence that a gun was used. He cites to People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973 (Gray), for the proposition there is insufficient evidence in the instant case that he intended to take the car by force and fear, because he made no demand for the vehicle or car keys, and did not try to open the car doors. However, Gray does not support Jones’s argument. In Gray, the court concluded that the owner or possessor of a vehicle may be deprived of possession not only when the perpetrator physically forces the victim out of the vehicle, but also when the victim remains in the car and the defendant exercises dominion and control over the car by force or fear. (Id. at p. 985.) The Gray court found there was substantial evidence of the defendant’s attempted carjacking because he threatened the victim with physical violence by pretending to have a gun and demanding her keys. (Ibid.) Gray does not create a limitation that there must be a demand for the keys in an attempted carjacking, nor that 7. pointing a real or fake gun, on its own, is insufficient to show attempted carjacking. In making this assertion, Jones views the evidence in a fashion that is both factually narrow and most favorable to his defense. However, that is not the applicable standard on appeal. In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460.) The testimony of Sarah and her daughter Haylie demonstrated Jones’s intent to take their car and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission. The evidence showed that after the man Jones was fighting with got into a car and sped off, Jones began approaching cars in an attacking manner and angrily approached Sarah and Haylie’s car twice, while raising what they believed at that time to be a gun, to Haylie. Haylie testified that she was scared and believed she could get shot. Sarah testified she put her car in drive, swerved around Jones to avoid hitting him, and then drove to a local market until it was safe for her to go home. Moreover, the jury could reasonably have concluded based on all the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the judgment—including that Jones attempted two additional carjackings in less than an hour after this first incident—that he intended to take Sarah’s vehicle against her will by use of fear or force. (See People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1020–1021 [sufficient evidence supported an attempted robbery conviction where the defendant robbed others on the same date, before and after the challenged attempted robbery].) On appeal, the court will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence. Rather, we will decide only whether upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt. Here, the jury could readily infer from the entire sequence of events that Jones attempted 8. to get into Sarah and Haylie’s car. Substantial evidence supports the judgment of conviction and reversal is not warranted. 2. Jones’s Prearrest Statements Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and thus violated his due process rights, by declining to exclude his prearrest statements in which he told police to “shoot him” because the evidence was cumulative of other evidence admitted and was substantially more prejudicial than probative. He further argues there is no forfeiture, and he preserved the alleged evidentiary error on all the arguments raised on appeal, by opposing the prosecution’s motion in limine and arguing the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. In the alternative, Jones contends the failure to preserve the issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the issue is forfeited, and Jones was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to preserve the issue. A. Additional Background At a hearing on pretrial motions in limine, the prosecution moved to admit Jones’s prearrest statements as admissions of a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220). The prosecution’s motion in limine stated while officers were trying to apprehend Jones, he yelled to police “y’all are going to have to kill me” and “f[**]k that, they gonna have to kill me.” Defense counsel argued the statements should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 because they were prejudicial and testimony would suffice to show that Jones failed to comply with orders with respect to the resisting count. Defense counsel then stated, “[w]e don’t need statements that he’s requesting to be shot,” but did not seek to exclude any reference to Jones questioning if he was going to be shot. The prosecution argued the statements were relevant to show Jones resisted police in count 7, and to show consciousness of guilt. The court noted the “limited evidence” before it and stated “at this time[,] absent some other showing” it was going to grant the prosecution’s motion to admit Jones’s prearrest statements that officers were going to have to kill him.

9. Also, during the motions in limine hearing, the trial court ruled on defense counsel’s request for an order that the record show, as to any in limine motion, no further objection shall be required to preserve the issue for appeal. The court denied the request and stated to defense counsel, “I do expect both counsel to pay attention to the proceedings and make sure that objections are appropriately made at the appropriate times, okay.” During trial, the prosecution moved to admit People’s Exhibit 6, Bakersfield Police Officer Quentin Croney’s body camera footage, and People’s Exhibit 6A, the corresponding transcript. The judge asked defense counsel if he had any objection to the admission and he responded “Submitted, Your Honor” and the evidence was admitted. During trial, the jury was shown People’s Exhibit 6, which was nearly six minutes of body camera footage recorded prior to Jones’s arrest. The footage showed officers arriving on scene, ordering Jones to get down, his getting up from the ground, against the officer’s commands, and stating, as characterized in transcript, “You going to shoot me” and “You going to shoot me?” Croney testified that prior to arrest, Jones said “he wanted us to kill him” and “he wanted us to kill him and to shoot him.” In the prosecution’s closing argument, references were made to Jones wanting officers to kill him to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. B. Analysis i. Jones Has Forfeited His Appellate Claim. Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) prohibits reversal for the erroneous admission of evidence unless “[t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion[.]” Our Supreme Court has instructed that, in accordance with section 353, subdivision (a), “ ‘no “particular form of objection” is required,’ ” but “ ‘the objection must “fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the 10. evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” ’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130.) First, Jones contends his counsel preserved the alleged evidentiary error on all the arguments made on appeal, which includes many bases never raised in court, by opposing the prosecution’s motion in limine to admit his statements and arguing they were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree. During the hearing on motions in limine, Jones’s counsel argued the prearrest statements, in which Jones yelled “y’all are going to have to kill me” and “f[**]k that, they gonna have to kill me” should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because the “full quotes are quite prejudicial” and with respect to the resisting arrest charge, “that would be satisfied by testimony that he didn’t comply with orders.” Jones’s counsel provided no other legal basis for why the statements should be excluded at trial. When Croney’s body camera footage was admitted into evidence at trial, the transcript characterized Jones’s statements as “You going to shoot me” and “You going to shoot me?” Jones’s counsel did not object during trial to the proffered body camera footage, nor to the transcript, nor to Croney’s testimony that Jones wanted officers to shoot him and to kill him. Generally, “ ‘ “when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal[.]” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1108.) However, in limine motions or argument on in limine motions can, in some cases, be sufficient to preserve an objection for appeal if a “ ‘sufficiently definite and express ruling’ ” is made by the trial court. (Ibid.) An objection is preserved when the motion in limine is “clearly and unequivocally denied” and the objection was “specific…directed to an identifiable body of evidence, and …advanced at a time when the trial judge could give fair consideration to the admissibility of the evidence in its 11. context. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189 (Morris), disapproved on another ground by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) Here, when the trial court ruled on the prosecution’s motion in limine, the judge qualified her ruling by stating the denial was being made “at this time” and was based on the “limited evidence” before her. Defense counsel’s objection to the statements during the motions in limine hearing was not advanced at a time when the court could give “fair consideration,” because of the limited evidence before it. (Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 189.) Therefore, the pretrial objection was not preserved. Furthermore, the court admonished both counsel to pay attention during the proceedings and object when appropriate, when it denied defense counsel’s request that no further objections were required to preserve the issue for appeal. However, when the prosecution moved to enter the evidence during trial, the court asked defense counsel if he had any objection, and he did not. Jones’s counsel failed to object during trial when the evidence was proffered, and therefore, failed to preserve any alleged error under Evidence Code section 352. Jones’s Evidence Code section 352 argument is therefore forfeited. ii. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s shortcomings. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 2, 2013).) “A reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both elements if one is not satisfied.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, 12. or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.) The record does not affirmatively disclose why Jones’s counsel did not object under Evidence Code section 352 to the admission of the “shoot me” statements within the body camera footage and transcript, or to Croney’s testimony as such. Even if his counsel had no valid tactical reason for failing to object, Jones’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be rejected because he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different absent his counsel’s alleged shortcomings. First, even if Jones’s counsel had objected to the admission of the “shoot me” statements within the body camera footage, transcript, or testimony, it would not likely have led to the exclusion of the evidence because the statements were highly probative of Jones defying officers’ orders. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 924 [“counsel is not ineffective in failing to make an objection when the objection would have likely been overruled by the trial court”].) Jones was charged with resisting arrest in count 7 and his statements tended to prove his willful resistance, delay, or obstruction of a peace officer. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 546 [section 148 is not limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible interference with an officer’s activities].) Even if the statements were objected to as cumulative to other evidence, they did not have to be excluded on that basis, particularly when the statements were likely the best evidence of Jones’s actions and state of mind with respect to consciousness of guilt. (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 871 [“Evidence that is identical in subject matter to other evidence should not be excluded as ‘cumulative’ when it has greater evidentiary weight or probative value.”].) Jones was not prejudiced because even had counsel raised the objection, it likely would not have resulted in 13. exclusion of the evidence, and therefore would not have resulted in a different or more favorable outcome for Jones. Additionally, the record is replete with evidence of Jones’s criminal actions that night. With regard to the three attempted carjackings in counts 1 through 3, the assault with a firearm in count 4, and the possession of a firearm by a felon in count 6—multiple witnesses testified that Jones obstructed their path, came toward their cars, and brandished what appeared to be a firearm. This is in addition to testimony that Jones demanded Nadia get out of the car, and repeatedly yanked Jessica’s car door handle. Further, each witness identified Jones through infield identification procedures conducted shortly after the attempted carjackings. Jones’s counsel’s failure to object did not adversely affect the outcome of his trial because of other overwhelming evidence of his guilt. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 280 [a defendant suffers no possible prejudice from admission of evidence and any related ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming].) iii. Harmless Error Assuming, without deciding, that Jones’s counsel preserved the objection to the admission of Jones’s “shoot me” statements and admission of such statements was error, any such error was harmless. As discussed above, given the overwhelming evidence in support of the finding that Jones was guilty, it was not reasonably probable that he would have obtained a different result at trial had his prearrest statements to police been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 448 [erroneous admission of evidence is harmless under Watson where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt].)3 3 Jones contends the purportedly erroneous admission of evidence violated his due process rights and right to a fair trial. “ ‘[E]ven erroneous admission of evidence does not offend due process unless it is so prejudicial as to render the proceeding fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1, 20; People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 [a trial may be rendered fundamentally unfair 14. 3. Jones’s 2015 Conviction/Assembly Bill No. 333 Jones contends and the People concede that Assembly No. Bill 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 333) affects whether Jones’s 2015 gang conviction still qualifies as a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. They agree that this court should vacate the true findings on the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction allegations, and remand for retrial under the current law. We accept the People’s concession. A. Additional Background In the information, the prosecution alleged Jones had suffered a 2015 conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) which qualified as a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)– (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). Jones agreed to a bifurcated court trial on the prior conviction allegations. At the bifurcated trial, the prosecutor urged the court not to consider whether Assembly Bill No. 333 invalidated the prior conviction such that the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction allegations could not be found true, contending the matter was not before the court at that time. The court declined to consider the effect of Assembly Bill No. 333 on the prior conviction and found true that Jones had suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. B. Analysis Assembly Bill No. 333 applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony. (People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608.) In light of the parties’ agreement, and in accordance with current law as amended by if there are no permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence and the evidence is “ ‘ “of such quality as [to] necessarily prevent[ ] a fair trial” ’ ”].) As explained above, there were permissible inferences to be drawn from the challenged evidence; for instance, Jones resisted arrest and was conscious of his guilt. Any possible error did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

15. Assembly Bill No. 333, the true findings that Jones suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction are vacated and the matter is remanded. (Fletcher, at p. 608.) On remand, if the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, Jones will be entitled to a full resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”].) The court has a “duty … to ensure that all components of [a] sentence are authorized by the law and the facts at the time any new sentence is imposed.” (People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206). DISPOSITION The true findings on the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction are vacated and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction allegations under the law as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

SNAUFFER, J. WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

GUERRA, J.

16.