gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03573 · 2026-08-03 · Unknown

Gabriel Adam Royall v. The Sherwin-Williams Company, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Robert Steven Huie (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:23Z · confidence high

The court considered a motion to dismiss filed by The Sherwin-Williams Company against pro se plaintiff Gabriel Adam Royall, who alleged emotional distress and unfair business practices arising from a lunch meeting where a defendant representative told a story about carbon monoxide poisoning. The court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint without leave to amend on the grounds of res judicata and failure to state a claim.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and res judicata principles. The dismissal is supported by the court's finding that the claims are barred by prior litigation (Case No. 25-cv-2379) involving the same parties and primary right, and that the complaint fails to plead non-conclusory facts establishing the elements of the claims. The denial of leave to amend is supported by the plaintiff's repetitive filing history and failure to seek leave.
The complaint is dismissed without leave to amend.
“The Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend.”
agree with court
The court found that amendment would be futile due to the res judicata bar and the plaintiff's history of repetitive, meritless lawsuits. This is a permissible exercise of discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the application of res judicata. It relies on the prior order in Case No. 25-cv-2379 to establish that the claims are barred. The court also independently finds the complaint fails to state a claim. The denial of leave to amend is supported by the plaintiff's history of repetitive filings. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for the procedural posture.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GABRIEL ADAM ROYALL, Case No.: 3:26-cv-3573-RSH-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 14 THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS [ECF No. 4] COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 10, 15 inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant The Sherwin- 19 Williams Co. ECF No. 4. As set forth below, the Court grants the motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On April 27, 2026, plaintiff Gabriel Adam Royall filed this lawsuit pro se in 22 California Superior Court for the County of San Diego. ECF No. 1-3 at 5–9. The Complaint 23 asserted claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotions distress against 24 Defendant, based on a lunch meeting that Plaintiff attended with a representative of 25 Defendant, during which the representative told Plaintiff a story about carbon monoxide 26 poisoning, which story caused Plaintiff emotional distress. The Complaint requested 27 damages in the amount of $299,000. Id. at 9. 28 1 On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, the operative pleading, in 2 the state lawsuit. ECF No. 4-3 at 5–12. The Amended Complaint was based on the same 3 underlying factual allegations, but added claims for unfair business practices in violation 4 of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and removed his demand for a specific amount of 5 damages. 6 On June 16, 2026, Defendant removed the action to this Court, invoking removal 7 jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 1 (notice of removal). At the time 8 of removal, Defendant had not yet been served with the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 9 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 2. 10 On June 26, 2026, Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 11 4. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. See Docket. 12 This case is Plaintiff’s ninth lawsuit against Defendant that has been assigned to the 13 undersigned. See Case Nos. 25-cv-1994, 25-cv-2257, 25-cv-2232, 25-cv-2379, 25-cv- 14 2455, 26-cv-56, 26-cv-355, 26-cv-631. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 17 sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) 18 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires only “a 19 short and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum, 21 a complaint must allege enough facts to provide “fair notice” of both the particular claims 22 being asserted and “the grounds upon which [those claims] rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007). 24 In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations of the complaint are 25 accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. 26 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, however, need not accept 27 all conclusory allegations as true. Rather it must “examine whether conclusory allegations 28 follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 1 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff’s 2 complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 4 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 5 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 6 556). 7 A complaint by a plaintiff proceeding pro se is “held to less stringent standards than 8 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 9 (citation omitted). Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Id. Nonetheless, courts may not 10 “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 11 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A pro se litigant’s pleadings still must meet some 12 minimum threshold in providing the defendants with notice of what it is that they allegedly 13 did wrong. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Defendant contends that this lawsuit is barred by res judicata because Plaintiff’s first 16 complaint, Case No. 25-cv-1994, was based on the same underlying facts but was 17 dismissed as time-barred.. Defendant further argues that one of Plaintiff’s subsequent 18 complaints, Case No. 25-cv-2379, was likewise based on the same carbon monoxide 19 conversation, and was dismissed based on res judicata. See Case No. 25-cv-2379-RSH- 20 DEB, Dkt. No. 8 (order of dismissal dated Oct. 3, 2025). Defendant asserts that this case 21 should be dismissed for the same reason. Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss based on 22 res judicata in Case No. 25-cv-2379, and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, but 23 has not opposed the motion to dismiss in the instant case. 24 The Court agrees with Defendant. The reasons stated in the Court’s October 3, 2025 25 order in Case No. 25-cv-2379 apply equally to Plaintiff’s operative pleading in the instant 26 case. Despite differences in wording between the operative pleadings in the two earlier 27 cases and in this one, and although he has apparently changed the date of the alleged 28 conversation, the cases involve the same primary right, pertaining to the harm that Plaintiff 1 || alleged suffered from the conversation in which he was told the carbon monoxide story. 2 || The Parties are the same in this case as in both prior cases. The requirements of res judicata 3 || are satisfied. See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 797 (2010). 4 The Court further determines that the Amended Complaint fails to plead non- 5 conclusory facts that plausibly establish the elements of any of his causes of action. 6 The Amended Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal. In light of the basis for 7 || dismissal, as well as Plaintiff's repetitive and meritless lawsuits, his failure to oppose the 8 || motion to dismiss, and his failure to seek leave to amend, the Court determines that leave 9 amend would be futile here. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is 12 || GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court 13 directed to close the case. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ 15 ||Dated: July 31, 2026 Jikut Howe 16 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cites, in this corpus