Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 INTERNATIONAL UNION, SECURITY, Case No.: 25-cv-2888-RSH-BLM POLICE AND FIRE PROFESSIONALS OF 12 AMERICA, AND LOCAL UNION 5, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 VACATE ARBITRATION Petitioner, AWARD, GRANTING IN PART 14 v. MOTION TO CONFIRM 15 ARBITRATION AWARD, AND STARSIDE SECURITY AND REMANDING CASE FOR 16 INVESTIGATION, INC., ARBITRATOR’S 17 Respondent. DETERMINATION OF “MAKE WHOLE” REMEDY 18 19 [ECF Nos. 9, 10]

21 On October 27, 2025, Petitioner filed a verified petition pursuant to Section 301 of 22 the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), to confirm a June 23 23, 2024 arbitration award (the “Award”) entered in connection with a labor grievance. 24 ECF No. 1. On February 27, 2026, Respondent filed a verified answer, as well as a verified 25 counterclaim. ECF No. 6. 26 On March 31, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to confirm the Award [ECF No. 9], 27 and Respondent filed a motion to vacate, correct, or modify the Award [ECF No. 10]. The 28 1 Parties then each filed oppositions to the other’s motion. See ECF Nos. 13, 14. Thereafter, 2 the Court directed supplemental briefing as follows: 3 (1) Respondent shall address Petitioner’s argument that Respondent’s request to vacate or modify the arbitration award is time-barred under 4 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1288.2. (2) Petitioners shall, for those elements of 5 relief identified in paragraphs 3 through 6 of their motion [ECF 9-1], identify every basis, assumption, and arithmetic calculation underlying 6 the amounts claimed by Petitioners therein as well as Petitioners’ 7 formulas for continued accumulation.

8 ECF No. 15. The Court also invited each side to respond to the other side’s supplemental 9 briefing. See id.; ECF No. 19. The Parties duly filed supplemental briefs. See ECF Nos. 17, 10 18, 20, 21. 11 As set forth below, the Court denies Respondent’s motion to vacate, grants in part 12 Petitioner’s motion to confirm, and remands the case for the arbitrator’s determination of 13 the “make whole” remedy. 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 Government security officer (“GSO”) Kristhine Martin was an employee of 16 respondent Starside Security and Investigation, Inc. (“Starside”) beginning in 2013, in a 17 bargaining unit represented by petitioner International Union, Security Police and Fire 18 Professionals of America and its Local Union 5 (collectively, “SPFPA”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 9. 19 Starside terminated Martin.1 At the time, SPFPA and Starside were parties to a collective 20 bargaining agreement in effect from December 1, 2020 through November 30, 2023 (the 21 “Agreement”). Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. 1. 22 Article 10.2 of the Agreement provides that an employee can only be discharged by 23 Starside for just case. Article 11 of the Agreement sets forth grievance procedures. Article 24 11.12 states that an arbitrator’s “decisions shall be final and binding upon the Employer, 25 26 27 1 There is no dispute that Martin was removed from the Starside’s payroll effective 28 1 the Union and the grievant.” Article 11.14 further provides that where an arbitrator awards 2 back pay, such pay “shall be limited to the amount of wages an officer would otherwise 3 have earned from employment with the Employer less any unemployment compensation, 4 intervening earnings or other off sets deemed appropriate by the arbitrator.” 5 On May 4, 2023, Martin filed a grievance pursuant to Article 11, alleging that 6 Starside violated the Agreement by discharging her without just cause. Starside denied the 7 grievance, and after the parties were unable to resolve the dispute through the grievance 8 procedure, SPFPA demanded arbitration. Id. ¶ 10. The Parties mutually selected arbitrator 9 Audrey B. Eide to hear the grievance. Id. ¶ 11. 10 Following hearings on February 2, 2024 and April 1, 2024, the arbitrator issued the 11 Award on June 23, 2024. Id. ¶ 14 & Ex. 2. The Award explained, “[a]t Arbitration the 12 parties stipulated to the issue: Did Starside Security and Investigation, Inc. have just cause 13 to dismiss Government Security Officer Kristhine Martin? If not, what is the remedy?” Id., 14 Ex. 2 at 2. After an analysis of the facts, the arbitrator determined that “Starside did not 15 prove by a preponderance of the evidence the reasons they relied on at the time of the 16 dismissal to dismiss the Grievant.” Id., Ex. 2 at 11. Turning to the question of remedy, the 17 arbitrator addressed Starside’s argument that Martin could not be reinstated, because 18 subsequent to Starside’s termination of Martin, the parties had entered into a new three- 19 year collective bargaining agreement, effective December 1, 2023 through November 26, 20 2026 under which Martin was no longer qualified. Id., Ex. 2 at 11-12. The arbitrator 21 rejected Starside’s argument, determining that the Agreement, rather than its successor, 22 governed both the merits of the case and the remedy available. Id., Ex. 2 at 12. After the 23 analysis, the Award concluded as follows, under the separate heading “AWARD”: 24 Starside Security and Investigation, Inc. did not have just cause to dismiss Government Security Officer Kristhine Martin. 25 26 Government Security Officer Kristhine Martin shall be reinstated and made whole including, but not limited to wages, benefits and seniority 27 in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 11.14 of the 28 December 1, 2020-November 30, 2023, Collective Bargaining 1 Agreement.

2 The Grievance is hereby GRANTED. 3 Id., Ex. 2 at 14. The Award further provided that by stipulation of the parties, “the 4 Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of resolving any disputes that 5 might arise in implementation of this Award,” for a period of 90 days unless invoked or 6 extended for good cause. Id. 7 Starside did not reinstate Martin or make her whole for loss of pay or other benefits. 8 The Parties returned to the arbitrator for assistance. After extending the 90-day period twice 9 based on mutual request by the Parties, on April 17, 2025, the arbitrator stated that based 10 on Starside’s refusal to respond, the arbitrator could go no further in resolving disputes 11 about implementation of the award: 12 SPFPA through their representative … requested a conference call on 13 April 9, 2025, with Starside Security’s representative and the 14 Arbitrator. The parties had not reached agreement on the implementation of the Arbitration Award. The Arbitrator sent an email 15 on April 10, 2025, in response to SPFPA’s request for a conference call 16 to the parties and requested Starside Security’s representatives inform the Arbitrator if they needed clarification of the Award to facilitate 17 implementation. As of April 17, 2025, Starside Security has not 18 responded.

19 ORDER: I do hereby invoke the functus officio doctrine. At this point 20 the Arbitrator is without further authority or jurisdiction because the duties and function of the Arbitrator have been fully performed and 21 accomplished. 22 ECF No. 1, Ex. 3 at 2. 23 This lawsuit followed. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Section 301 of the LMRA allows federal courts to hear “[s]uits for violation of 26 contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an 27 industry affecting commerce[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Because federal labor policy strongly 28 1 favors the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration, judicial scrutiny of an 2 arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.” United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, Loc. 3 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). “An arbitration 4 award must be confirmed ‘[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or 5 applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority.’” Id. (quoting Van 6 Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 56 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th 7 Cir.1995)). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized three narrow exceptions to the general rule 8 of deferring to an arbitrator’s decision”: 9 (1) when the arbitrator’s award does not “draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” and the arbitrator is dispensing “his 10 own brand of industrial justice”; (2) when the arbitrator exceeds the 11 boundaries of the issues submitted to him; and (3) when the award is contrary to public policy. 12 13 Id. at 173 (citations omitted). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Starside’s Motion to Vacate 16 Starside argues that the Award should be vacated for two reasons. First, Starside 17 alleges that “the arbitrator’s pre-selection resume and disclosure materials were materially 18 incomplete when compared to post-award resume and background materials that surfaced 19 after issuance of the award, depriving Starside of informed consent to the arbitrator’s 20 selection.” ECF No. 10-1 at 6. Second, Starside contends that “the proceedings were not 21 fundamentally fair[,]” claiming that “specific evidentiary and procedural limitations 22 prevented Starside from fully developing material issues[.]” Id. at 6, 7. 23 A petition to vacate an arbitration award is subject to a statute of limitations. Section 24 301 of the LMRA does not expressly provide a limitations period, and the Ninth Circuit 25 has held that courts should generally apply the forum state’s statute of limitations. See San 26 Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 1982). 27 California law allows a party 100 days to request to vacate an arbitration award. See id. at 28 1139; see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1288.2. Starside does not dispute that the 100-day 1 time limit applies here. See ECF No. 18 at 3. Starside filed its counterclaim on February 2 27, 2026, over ten months after the arbitrator’s April 17, 2025 order of functus officio. See 3 ECF No. 6. 4 Starside argues that the 100-day limitation period should be equitably tolled. ECF 5 No. 18 at 3. In Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 840 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 6 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that the time limit for filing a motion to vacate under the 7 Federal Arbitration Act is subject to equitable tolling. Assuming arguendo that equitable 8 tolling likewise applies to a motion to vacate under the LMRA, a different federal statute, 9 this Court applies the federal standard rather than the California standard for equitable 10 tolling. See White v. U.S. Center for SafeSport, No. 24-cv-8028-DMR, 2025 WL 2772482, 11 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025) (“Federal courts confronted with motions to vacate 12 arbitration awards have analyzed equitable tolling under federal law.”) (collecting cases). 13 Under that federal standard, “a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of 14 establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 15 some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 16 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). 17 Starside states that on February 25, 2026, over four months after this lawsuit was 18 filed, Starside’s representative was performing internet research on the arbitrator and 19 discovered a “resume/biography” of the arbitrator that “was not provided to Starside during 20 the arbitrator selection process[,]” and that Starside “did not possess or know of … before 21 issuance of the June 23, 2024 arbitration award.” ECF No. 18-1 ¶¶ 3-10. Starside explains 22 the significance of the later resume/biography as follows: 23 At selection, the parties received the arbitrator’s resume/disclosure materials (now attached as Exhibit A, pp. 1–2), which describe her 24 background in generalized terms and list limited professional 25 affiliations and panels. (Ex. A, pp. 1–2.) Post-award, Starside obtained a different version of the arbitrator’s resume/biography (attached as 26 Exhibit A, pp. 3–4.), which reflects additional and materially expanded 27 labor-organization affiliations, panel memberships, and labor-side practice experience that were not conveyed in the selection materials. 28 1 (Ex. A, pp. 3–4.) For example, the post-award resume expressly highlights “LABOR EXPERIENCE: 30+ years” as union general 2 counsel and then lists “CURRENT AND PAST ARBITRATION 3 PANELS,” including multiple specific labor panels and joint grievance panels. By contrast, the pre-selection resume describes professional 4 affiliations more narrowly and does not present the same breadth of 5 panel participation and labor-side emphasis that later surfaced.

6 ECF No. 10-1 at 10 (citing exhibits at ECF No. 10-3). Starside’s representative states that, 7 “[h]ad Starside been provided the later resume/biography during the arbitration selection 8 process, Starside likely would not have agreed” on the selection of the arbitrator in this 9 case. ECF No. 18-1 ¶ 13. 10 Starside has not met its burden of establishing that it is entitled to equitable tolling. 11 Reviewing the two resumes side by side, both list the arbitrator’s approximately 30 years 12 of experience as counsel for labor unions, identically identifying the union employers and 13 the years of employment. Although the later resume has a longer list of panels than the 14 earlier resume on which the arbitrator has served, Starside does not explain how the 15 additional panels listed on the later resume render the first resume inaccurate or are 16 otherwise material to equitable tolling. Starside also does not explain what steps it took at 17 any time before February 25, 2026 to research the arbitrator’s background beyond simply 18 receiving and reviewing a two-page resume from the arbitrator at some point during the 19 selection process. Starside has established neither a diligent pursuit of its rights nor some 20 extraordinary circumstance preventing it from evaluating the arbitrator’s professional 21 background. Starside’s motion to vacate is therefore denied as untimely.2 22 23 24 2 Starside’s stated reasons for applying equitable tolling—relating to the arbitrator’s 25 biography that Starside discovered on February 25, 2026—have no bearing on Starside’s separate argument that “evidentiary and procedural limitations prevented Starside from 26 fully developing material issues” during the arbitration. See ECF No. 10-1 at 7. The 27 limitations that Starside describes, id. at 12-14, were apparent to Starside at the time of the arbitration, and Starside presents no reason for why it did not timely raise these challenges 28 1 Starside’s motion also requests that the Court “correct” or “modify” the Award, ECF 2 No. 10-1 at 14, but in substance, Starside is instead arguing that the Award should not be 3 confirmed as to an award of back pay and benefits, for the same reasons Starside provides 4 in its opposition to SPFPA’s motion to confirm. Compare ECF No. 10-1 at 14-21, with 5 ECF No. 13 at 6-14. To the extent Starside seeks to correct or modify the Award, such a 6 request is untimely; to the extent Starside is simply opposing SPFPA’s motion to confirm, 7 the Court addresses that motion below. 8 B. SPFPA’s Motion to Confirm 9 In seeking confirmation of the Award, SPFPA asks the Court to order the following 10 relief: (1) reinstating Martin as an employee; (2) awarding back pay, based on the amount 11 Martin would have earned minus interim earnings actually received, continuing to accrue 12 up to the date of her future reinstatement; (3) awarding 401(k) benefit contributions, based 13 on the amount of contributions to which Martin would have been entitled, continuing to 14 accrue up to the date of her future reinstatement; (4) crediting annual and sick leave that 15 Martin would have earned, up to the date of her future reinstatement; and (5) awarding 16 attorneys’ fees. See ECF No. 9-1 at 17-18. 17 1. Reinstatement 18 The Award provided that Martin shall be reinstated as an employee. ECF No. 1, Ex. 19 2 at 14. Although Starside’s opposition brief asserts generally that SPFPA’s motion to 20 confirm should be denied, the Court does not read that brief to raise any objections to 21 Martin’s reinstatement, apart from a passing mention of the general arguments about the 22 arbitrator’s disclosures and purportedly unfair procedures made in Starside’s separate 23 motion to vacate. See ECF No. 13 at 3. In any event, Starside has not established that any 24 exception applies to the rule requiring that this Court defer to the arbitrator’s decision to 25 reinstate Martin. Accordingly, this Court will order Martin to be reinstated. 26 2. Make whole 27 The Award provided that Martin shall be reinstated, and also that she shall be “made 28 whole,” including with respect to “wages [and] benefits … in accordance with the 1 provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 11.14 of the December 1, 2020-November 30, 2023, 2 Collective Bargaining Agreement.” ECF No. 1, Ex. 2 at 14. Article 11.14 in turn provides 3 a formula for calculating a back pay award, based on the amount of wages the employee 4 “would otherwise have earned from employment with the Employer” less any intervening 5 or offsetting earnings. Id., Ex. 1 at 16. 6 The Agreement provides for an amount of wages and benefits based on the number 7 of hours actually worked. Appendix A provides an hourly wage rate. Article 14 provides 8 for “health and welfare contributions” by Starside in the amount of $4.22 per hour worked, 9 up to a maximum of 40 hours per defined workweek and 2,080 hours per year. Article 15 10 provides for 120 hours of annual vacation time for employees working 2,080 annual hours 11 with five or more years of service, amounting to 2.3 hours per week. Article 15 also 12 provides for one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked, to a maximum of 56 13 hours per hear, amounting to 1.08 hours per week. 14 The Agreement does not, however, provide or guarantee a set number of working 15 hours. The Parties are in agreement that Martin did not in fact work a uniform set of hours 16 every week. See ECF No. 17 at 3-4 (SPFPA: “Some weeks may be less than 40 hours, other 17 weeks may be in excess of 40 hours with the overtime premium (time and a half) paid for 18 working in excess of 40 hours.”); ECF No. 21 at 4 (same). Thus, although the Agreement 19 establishes an hourly wage rate and a framework for determining benefits based on hours 20 worked, it does not by itself provide the inputs needed to determine Martin’s “make whole” 21 remedy. Nor does the Award provide these inputs. 22 In these circumstances, the proper course is to remand the matter to the arbitrator to 23 further specify how Martin shall be “made whole” with respect to her wages and benefits 24 under the Agreement. See ILWU Loc. 142 v. Land & Constr. Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 201, 206 25 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming remand to arbitrator to determine amount of backpay); Hanford 26 Atomic Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Gen. Elec. Co., 353 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 27 1965) (“[W]here the parties have elected to submit their disputes to arbitration, they should 28 be completely resolved by arbitration, rather than only partially resolved. In some cases the 1 carrying out of this philosophy will require remanding the matter to the arbitrators, and we 2 think that this is such a case.”); United Nat. Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 117, 3 No. 2:19-CV-1736-LK, 2024 WL 1344065, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2024) (“[C]ourts 4 generally remand awards containing the same or a materially identical ‘make whole’ 5 remedy so that the arbitrator may specify that remedy in more definite terms and calculate 6 back pay.”); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers & Pro., Clerical, Pub. 7 and Miscellaneous Emps., Local Union No. 533 v. Keolis Transit Am., Inc., No. 21-cv- 8 00167 (CLB), 2021 WL 4097136, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Sep. 8, 2021) (remanding case to 9 arbitrator where “the award does not specify the exact amount of back pay, nor does it 10 provide a clear formula for how to determine the amount”). 11 In remanding the matter, the Court is mindful that the reason given by the arbitrator 12 in its April 17, 2025 order for not proceeding further was Starside’s refusal to participate. 13 Starside has not argued or offered evidence to the contrary. The Court is also mindful that, 14 despite being directed to reinstate Martin over two years ago, Starside still has not done so. 15 Starside has provided no adequate explanation for this refusal either, and the Court finds 16 that such a refusal was unjustified. Starside’s noncompliance does, however, not confer on 17 this Court the power to act as an arbitrator, imposing the Court’s own formula for 18 calculating back pay and benefits due. 19 The Court defers ruling on SPFPA’s request for attorneys’ fees. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons: 22 1. Starside’s motion to vacate [ECF No. 10] is DENIED. 23 2. SPFPA’s motion to confirm [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED IN PART as follows. 24 Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order, Starside shall reinstate Martin’s 25 employment. The Court defers ruling on the remainder of SPFPA’s motion, including its 26 request for attorneys’ fees, pending further proceedings. 27 3. The case is REMANDED to the arbitrator for further specification of the 28 “make whole” remedy contained in the June 23, 2024 Award. 1 4. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order, the Parties shall jointly 2 correspond with the arbitrator requesting that she reassert jurisdiction and take such steps 3 ||as may be necessary to complete the “make whole” remedy. The Parties shall act in good 4 || faith in timely pursuing this determination from the arbitrator. 5 5. The Parties shall file a joint status report no later than twenty-one (21) days 6 ||of the date of this order (1) confirming Martin’s reinstatement, and (2) addressing the 7 || timetable for completion of arbitration proceedings. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘ Dated: July 31, 2026 febut ¢ Lowe 1 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28