gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-01239 · 2026-08-03 · Unknown

Dale Sundby and Edith Littlefield Sundby v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company; Marquee Funding Group, Inc.; Platinum Loan Servicing, Inc.; Scot Fine; Ryan Joe (R.J.) Solovy; Troy H. Slome; Jeffrey Myers; Kathleen Myers; Andres Salsido, Trustee; Benning

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:23Z · confidence high

Defendant Marquee Funding Group, Inc. moved to declare co-plaintiff Edith Sundby a vexatious litigant and impose a pre-filing order, arguing her litigation history and potential to circumvent a similar order against her husband warranted the extreme remedy. The Court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that Edith’s litigation record was less extensive than her husband’s, who was not deemed a vexatious litigant, and that the motion was primarily motivated by speculation regarding circumvention.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's motion for an order declaring Edith Sundby a vexatious litigant and entering a pre-filing order is denied without prejudice.
“For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Marquee’s motion for an order declaring Edith Sundby a vexatious litigant and entering a pre-filing order against her. ECF No. 159. The denial is without prejudice to refiling if certain aspects of Edith’s conduct—identified herein—should continue.”
agree with court
The Court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's standard for pre-filing orders, which are considered an extreme remedy. The Court relied on its prior determination in a related case that the primary litigant (Dale Sundby) did not meet the threshold for such an order due to a lack of evidence of intent to harass and the availability of lesser sanctions. Logically, if the primary litigant does not qualify, a co-litigant with a less extensive record (Edith Sundby) also does not qualify, particularly when the motion is driven by speculative concerns about circumvention rather than independent, flagrant abuse by Edith. The denial without prejudice allows for future review if the conduct continues, which aligns with the 'narrowly tailored' requirement.
Plaintiffs' request for Rule 11(c)(3) review of Defendant's conduct is denied.
“Thus, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to pursue Rule 11(c)(3) review of Defendant’s conduct. ECF No. 161, at 17–18.”
agree with court
The Court found that the motion was not baselessly or improperly filed and lacked no evidentiary support. Given that the motion was a good-faith attempt to seek relief based on a substantial litigation history, even if ultimately unsuccessful, it does not meet the high bar for Rule 11 sanctions.
Plaintiffs' objection to Defendant's reply brief and request for sanctions/striking of the Notice of Errata are denied.
“Accordingly, the Court does not find sanctions to be appropriate and declines to strike the Notice of Errata, ECF No. 190, from the record or enter the order to show cause requested by Plaintiffs, ECF Nos. 189, 191.”
agree with court
The Court noted that while the Defendant's briefing contained misstatements, the Defendant made an effort to correct them via a Notice of Errata. This good-faith effort to correct errors typically precludes sanctions for misstatements in briefing.

The order itself: sound — The order is well-reasoned and applies the correct legal standard from the Ninth Circuit. It correctly identifies that pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy and relies on the court's prior, detailed analysis of the primary litigant's conduct to support its decision regarding the co-litigant. The court appropriately warns the plaintiff of potential future sanctions if the conduct continues, satisfying the 'narrowly tailored' and 'notice' aspects of the standard by providing a clear path for future review.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11

12 DALE SUNDBY and EDITH Case No.: 3:23-cv-01239-GPC-AHG 13 LITTLEFIELD SUNDBY, 14 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 15 v. PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PREFILING 16 FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE ORDER FINDING EDITH INSURANCE COMPANY; MARQUEE 17 FUNDING GROUP, INC.; PLATINUM SUNDBY A VEXATIOUS LOAN SERVICING, INC.; SCOT FINE; LITIGANT 18 RYAN JOE (R.J.) SOLOVY; TROY H. SLOME; JEFFREY MYERS; 19 KATHLEEN MYERS; ANDRES [ECF No. 159] SALSIDO, TRUSTEE; BENNING 20 MANAGEMENT GROUP 401(K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN; 21 CHRISTOPHER MYERS; VICKIE MCCARTY; DOLORES THOMPSON; 22 KIMBERLY GILL RABINOFF; EQUITY TRUST COMPANY, CUSTODIAN FBO 23 STEVEN M. COBIN TRADITIONAL IRA; TODD B. COBIN, TRUSTEE; 24 BARBARA A. COBIN, TRUSTEE; FASACK INVESTMENTS LLC; 25 STEVEN M. COBIN, TRUSTEE; SUSAN L. COBIN, 26 TRUSTEE; and DOES 1-X, inclusive, 27 Defendants.

28 1 Before the Court is Defendant Marquee Funding Group, Inc.’s motion for an order (1) declaring Edith Sundby a vexatious litigant and (2) entering a pre-filing 2 3 order requiring Edith Sundby to obtain leave of this Court before filing new claims 4 or motions related to the events underlying this litigation in the Southern District of 5 California. ECF No. 159.1 The Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without 6 oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and therefore VACATES the 7 hearing set for August 7, 2026. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 8 the motion without prejudice. 9 BACKGROUND 10 Defendant Marquee Funding Group, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Marquee”) filed 11 this motion concurrently with a motion in Case No. 3:19-cv-390-GPC-AHG (“Case 12 390”) seeking the same relief against Dale Sundby, Edith’s co-Plaintiff in this case. 13 Case No. 390, ECF No. 460. In adjudicating that motion, the Court provided a 14 detailed overview of each federal case filed by the Sundbys—including those where 15 Dale is the sole plaintiff and those where Dale and Edith are both plaintiffs. See Case 16 No. 390, ECF No. 486, at 2–9. The Court will not repeat the full background here. 17 However, the Court will briefly mention the aspects of the Sundbys’ litigation history 18 where Edith is directly involved.2 19 20 1 Record citations will be to the record for the instant case, Case No. 3:23-cv-1239, 21 unless the citation indicates otherwise. When citing to the record in other cases, the ECF citation will be preceded by the relevant abbreviated case number. For example: 22 Case No. 390, ECF No. 1. 23 2 Defendant requests judicial notice of various court orders, memorandum 24 dispositions, motions, and dockets from across the Sundby litigation. ECF No. 159- 4. The Court may take judicial notice of court filings. Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa 25 USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court 26 filings and other matters of public record.”). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice. However, it takes notice of each document 27 “not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion [or 28 filing.]” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 1 Of the seven related federal court cases broadly arising from the same underlying loan documents and subsequent foreclosure of the Sundbys’ La Jolla, 2 3 California residence (“the Prope rty”), Edith is a co-plaintiff in three: this case, Case 4 No. 3:23-cv-1239-GPC-AHG; Case No. 2:24-cv-5790-MCS-BFM; and Case No. 5 2:24-cv-7276-MCS-BFM. Edith has appeared in each case in her individual 6 capacity.3 7 In two of the four cases where Edith is not a plaintiff, she has moved to 8 intervene. On December 22, 2023, Edith filed a motion to intervene in Case No. 3:21- 9 cv-2013-GPC-AHG, which the Court struck from the record. Case No. 2013, ECF 10 No. 69, 70. On January 31, 2024, Edith filed a notice of appeal as a proposed 11 intervenor. Case No. 2013, ECF No. 73. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s 12 striking of Edith’s motion. Case No. 390, ECF No 395-1, at 2–3. 13 On December 11, 2023, Edith sought to intervene in Case No. 3:19-cv-390- 14 GPC-AHG. Case No. 390, ECF No. 388. The Court denied the motion while the 15 appeal was pending. Case No. 390, ECF No. 389. On November 4, 2025, Edith again 16 moved to intervene in Case 390. Case No. 390, ECF No. 401. The Court again denied 17 intervention. Case No. 390, ECF No. 440. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 It is well-established that “[f]ederal courts can ‘regulate the activities of 20 abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under . . . appropriate 21 circumstances.’” Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th 22 Cir. 2014) (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990)). 23 “Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one 24 person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the 25 meritorious claims of other litigants.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148. Thus, “[p]ursuant 26 27 3 Though Edith originally appeared in this case in her individual capacity and in her capacity as trustee, the First Amended Complaint made it such that Edith now appears 28 1 to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), ‘enjoining litigants with abusive and lengthy [litigation] histories is one such . . . restriction’ that courts may impose.” 2 3 Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1061 (alteration in original) (quoting De Long, 912 4 F.2d at 1147). 5 However, “pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used.” 6 Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “Further, 7 courts should exercise particular caution before using such measures against a pro se 8 plaintiff.” In re Greenstein, 576 B.R. 139, 186 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 589 9 B.R. 854 (C.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 788 F. App'x 497 (9th Cir. 2019). 10 In De Long v. Hennessey, the Ninth Circuit “outlined four factors for district 11 courts to examine before entering pre-filing orders.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057. 12 First, the litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the order is entered. Second, the district court 13 must compile “an adequate record for review.” Third, the 14 district court must make substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature of the plaintiff's litigation. 15 Finally, the vexatious litigant order “must be narrowly 16 tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” 17 Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057 (citations omitted). The first two factors speak to 18 “procedural considerations” that the district court must attend to before imposing a 19 pre-filing order, and the second two are “substitutive considerations” that “help the 20 district court define who is, in fact, a ‘vexatious litigant.’” Id. at 1058. 21 DISCUSSION 22 Defendant begins its motion by stating that “[t]his motion has a precise and 23 limited purpose: to close the circumvention avenue that would remain open if a 24 prefiling order issues against Dale Sundby alone.” ECF No. 159-1, at 4. Essentially, 25 Defendant states that its primary motivation in seeking a pre-filing order against 26 Edith Sundby would be to further limit Dale Sundby’s access to the courts if Dale is 27 subject to a pre-filing order. Defendant continues: “If a prefiling order issues against 28 Dale Sundby only, Edith remains an unrestricted filing vehicle for the same claims 1 against the same defendants arising from the same transactions.” ECF No. 159-1, at 4. 2 3 The Court agrees with Pla intiffs that it would be inappropriate to enter a pre- 4 filing order against Edith based primarily on (1) her husband’s litigation conduct, and 5 (2) Defendant’s speculation that Dale Sundby might use Edith Sundby to circumvent 6 a pre-filing order against him. ECF No. 161, at 8, 11. 7 Defendant continues that Edith’s own conduct is sufficient to merit a pre-filing 8 order against her, but the Court is unconvinced. This Court has already decided that 9 a pre-filing order against Dale Sundby would be inappropriate at this time. See 10 generally Case No. 390, ECF No. 486. The Court summarized its decision as follows: 11 Mr. Sundby’s filings appear made with a good faith expectation of prevailing, and his arguments are not 12 uniformly patently without merit. There is also no evidence 13 that Mr. Sundby’s conduct displays an intent to harass as opposed to mere litigiousness. Further, Mr. Sundby has not 14 previously been put on notice that his conduct might result 15 in a pre-filing order restricting his access to the courts, and the courts have yet to exercise lesser sanctions in an 16 attempt to deter Mr. Sundby’s conduct. Thus, it is not at all 17 clear that a pre-filing order—an “extreme remedy that should rarely be used”—would be appropriate at this 18 juncture. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057. 19 Case 390, ECF No. 486, at 20–21. Thus, it follows that a pre-filing order against 20 Edith Sundby—whose litigation record is less extensive than Dale’s—would also be 21 inappropriate at this time. The Court declines to declare Edith a vexatious litigant or 22 enter a pre-filing order against her.4 23 24 4 Though the Court finds in Edith’s favor, the Court does not believe Defendant’s 25 motion was baselessly or improperly filed nor that it lacked evidentiary support. Thus, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to pursue Rule 11(c)(3) review of 26 Defendant’s conduct. ECF No. 161, at 17–18. 27 The same applies to Plaintiffs’ objection to Defendant’s reply brief. ECF No. 189. 28 The Court takes note of the misstatements contained in the Defendant’s briefing and 1 However, the Court offers Edith the same warnings that it offered to her husband: Should Edith continue to raise claims and file motions that ask defendants 2 3 to litigate and the courts to adjud icate arguments that have been uniformly considered 4 and rejected by three federal judges—including those relating to Mr. Sundby’s 5 capacity to represent the Trust pro se, the Sundbys’ standing to bring claims related 6 to the foreclosure of the Property in their individual capacities, and the efficacy of 7 the assignment and quitclaim deed from the Trust to the Sundbys in conveying 8 standing—the Court may impose Rule 11 sanctions to deter such repetitious conduct 9 or reconsider its current stance regarding the frivolous and vexatious nature of Edith’s 10 litigation practice.5 The Court further cautions Edith that if she continues to file new 11 lawsuits related to the same underlying events as those at issue here—the underlying 12 loans and subsequent foreclosure of the Property and the related unlawful detainer 13 proceedings—the Court may consider such new suits in a future order assessing 14 vexatiousness. 15 The Court advises Edith to read the entirety of its order entered in Case 390 16 providing a more extensive analysis of her husband’s litigation conduct and the 17 aspects that veer towards frivolousness. Case No. 390, ECF No. 486. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Marquee’s motion 20 for an order declaring Edith Sundby a vexatious litigant and entering a pre-filing 21 order against her. ECF No. 159. The denial is without prejudice to refiling if certain 22 aspects of Edith’s conduct—identified herein—should continue. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 that Defendant has made an effort to correct the misstatements. ECF No. 190. 26 Accordingly, the Court does not find sanctions to be appropriate and declines to strike 27 the Notice of Errata, ECF No. 190, from the record or enter the order to show cause requested by Plaintiffs, ECF Nos. 189, 191. 28 1 Dated: August 3, 2026 72 alo Ox 2 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 3 United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28