LS Carlson Law v. Sedgwick CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 8/17/26 LS Carlson Law v. Sedgwick CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LS CARLSON LAW, P.C., Plaintiff and Appellant, G065811 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025- 01457608) KATIE SEDGWICK, OPINION Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly A. Knill, Judge. Affirmed. LS Carlson Law, Kirk C. Pearson and Shelby L. Daws for Plaintiff and Appellant. Asuncion Appellate Law and Catherine M. Asuncion for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff LS Carlson Law appeals from an order granting an anti- SLAPP motion striking its complaint. It claims a former client’s Yelp review is not protected and, in any event, it showed a probability of prevailing on its defamation and contract claims. We conclude the Yelp review criticizing the law firm is a protected statement in a public forum on an issue of public interest. We further hold the firm has not shown a probability of prevailing because the statements are not defamatory as a matter of law and the contract clause prohibiting disparagement is unenforceable. We affirm. FACTS The firm sued defendant Katie Sedgwick for breach of contract and defamation.1 It alleged Sedgwick was a former client who posted a bad review on Yelp, despite a fee agreement clause (Section 16) in which the parties “‘agree not to directly or indirectly disparage each other either electronically or otherwise.’” The complaint also identifies seven defamatory statements in Sedgwick’s review: (1) “‘Do not be fooled by this law firm’s website. They are either scam artists or complete crooks’”; (2) “‘In my initial meeting, I was told it would be $10,000-$15,000 to take it through eight steps through the mediation process’”; (3) “‘LS Carlson law did nothing but offer to write yet another demand letter’”; (4) “‘In a highly volatile situation, the six week delay on their part was detrimental to my situation’”; (5) “‘Then they said there was not much else they could do but go to trial’”; (6) “‘After only going through 2 of 1 The firm also asserted a declaratory relief claim requiring no separate analysis because it was based on the unviable contract breach. “[T]he mere existence of a controversy is insufficient to overcome an anti- SLAPP motion against a claim for declaratory relief.” (South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 670.)

2 the 8 steps outlined in our agreement, I ended up spending almost as much as my custody battle!’”; and (7) “‘They are not tough, they are not effective and they will rob you blind.’” Sedgwick moved to strike the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Her supporting declaration justified each alleged defamatory statement. She noted she had revised her post, removing the first and seventh statements to “avoid any further dispute.” Sedgwick also attached the fee agreement. In opposition, the firm offered evidence including a declaration from the partner assigned to her case. The partner justified the fees charged, maintained the firm is reputable—“neither a scam artist nor a crook—” and described the firm’s harm. The court granted the motion. It found Sedgwick’s statements were protected activity, discussing a long line of apt cases including Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 939, 947 (Yang) and Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 888 (Abir Cohen). It noted the firm alleged the Yelp review breached Section 16 because it was “false, misleading, and defamatory” but the firm had not shown the statements were defamatory, which doomed both its contract and defamation claims. DISCUSSION “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) First, the defendant must show that the challenged claim arises from protected activity. (Ibid.) Second, if the initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing. (Ibid.)

3 First, we readily agree with the trial court that the Yelp review criticizing the firm’s representation of Sedgwick is protected activity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(3) [protecting written statements made in “a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest”]; Yang, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 947 [statements implicating “the qualifications, competence, and professional ethics of a licensed physician” concern an issue of public interest]; Abir Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 888 [“reviews posted to an Internet website meet this definition of protected activity”].) While the firm unpersuasively tries to distinguish Yang, it does not even discuss Abir Cohen, a case squarely on point. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a law firm’s defamation claim against a former client’s daughter for posting a negative Yelp review. (Abir Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 885.) The court held “reviews posted to an Internet website meet [the] definition of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 888.) Here, the trial court aptly cited Abir Cohen in its order and Sedgwick discussed Abir Cohen in her respondent’s brief. When asked at oral argument, “Are there any cases on point concerning online reviews of law firms and whether or not the anti-SLAPP statute would protect those reviews,” the firm’s counsel answered: “I am not aware of a case specific to law firms . . . . I am not aware of a case that gets specifically to law firm representation.” Second, we further agree with the court that the firm has not shown the reviews are defamatory. There is no factual dispute about what 4 Sedgwick posted. The only question is whether the statements are false.2 (See Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369 [defamation elements].) To be defamatory, a statement must declare or imply a “provably false factual assertion.” (Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 344.) A “defendant need not justify the literal truth of every word of the allegedly defamatory matter. It is sufficient if the substance of the charge is proven true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1180–1181 (Ringler).) Moreover, statements of opinion are constitutionally protected. (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) “[S]atirical, hyperbolic, imaginative, or figurative statements are not actionable because ‘the context and tenor of the statements negate the impression that the author seriously is maintaining an assertion of actual fact.’” (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385 (Franklin).) In particular, calling someone crooked is “merely rhetorical and hyperbolic language” and not defamatory. (Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury News (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 172, 190–191 (Fletcher) [“‘a crook and a crooked politician’”]; see also Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1176 [anonymous poster described company executives as “‘boobs, losers and crooks’”]; Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 264–265 (Rosenaur) [in a “heated confrontation . . . between political opponents,” one called the other a “‘thief’”]; Hoang v. Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 534 [businessman labeled a “‘crook’” and “‘pettily cunning’” by journalist]; Troy Group, Inc. v. 2 Because we will conclude Sedgwick’s statements are not provably false statements of fact, we need not address the firm’s claim they are protected by the common interest privilege. (See Civ. Code, § 47.)

5 Tilson (C.D.Cal. 2005) 364 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1151, 1156, 1159 [email to colleagues about a rival company: “Are these guys the biggest crooks on the planet or what?”].) Also, “‘when the facts underlying a statement of opinion are disclosed, readers will understand they are getting the author’s interpretation of the facts presented; they are therefore unlikely to construe the statement as insinuating the existence of additional, undisclosed facts.’” (Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) Courts “apply a ‘“totality of the circumstances”’ test to determine both whether (a) a statement is fact or opinion, and (b) a statement declares or implies a provably false factual assertion.” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 289.) Applying that test here, we agree with the trial court that, as a matter of law, none of Sedgwick’s challenged statements are provably false statements of fact. Statement No. 1: the firm’s lawyers “are either scam artists or complete crooks.” This is hyperbole. (See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [“hyperbolic statements”]; Fletcher, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 190– 191 [“‘crook,’” “‘crooked’”].) Statement No. 2: the firm told Sedgwick “it would be $10,000- $15,000 to take it through eight steps through the mediation process.” This is not provably false. The fee agreement does lay out several stages in its “scope of legal services,” though it does not number them one through eight. At most, there is an unactionable “slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Ringler, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1180–1181.) Statement No. 3: the firm “did nothing but offer to write yet another demand letter.” This is not provably false and/or is a statement of opinion. The firm notes it offered Sedgwick multiple options: to send another demand letter (threatening litigation or a small claims action) or initiate 6 litigation. But the firm’s evidence also confirms its understanding that litigation would be “cost-prohibitive” for Sedgwick. Sedgwick could reasonably conclude (or reach the opinion) that the firm gave her only one feasible option—sending another letter. Moreover, Sedgwick’s Yelp review disclosed “‘the facts underlying a statement of opinion,’” helping “‘readers [to] understand they are getting the author’s interpretation of the facts presented.’” (Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) Sedgwick stated she thought she had hired a “top notch” firm and revealed her disappointment with the firm’s services. A reasonable reader would understand they were getting Sedgwick’s interpretation of the situation, not hard-and-fast facts. This is also true of all of the other challenged statements. Statement No. 4: “the six week delay on [the firm’s] part was detrimental to my situation.” This is not provably false and/or is a statement of opinion. The firm asserts it offered evidence the delay was harmless, but no particular evidence was identified and review of all pages referenced in a lengthy string cite did not reveal any supporting evidence. (See Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 596 [we may “‘disregard contentions unsupported by proper page cites to the record’”].) Conversely, Sedgwick’s email to the firm shows delay by listing all the inquiries she made into the status of the letter and asking when it would be ready. Sedgwick could reasonably conclude (or reach the opinion) that the delay was detrimental. Statement No. 5: the firm “said there was not much else they could do but go to trial.” As with Statement No. 3, this is not provably false or is a statement of opinion.

7 Statement No. 6: “After only going through 2 of the 8 steps outlined in our agreement, I ended up spending almost as much as my custody battle!” As with Statement No. 2, this statement about eight litigation steps is not provably false. Any implied statement that Sedgwick did not get value for her money (the firm’s recurring concern about most of these statements) is unactionable opinion. Statement No. 7: the firm is “not tough, they are not effective and they will rob you blind.” As with Statement No. 1, this is hyperbole and opinion. (See Fletcher, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 190–191 [“‘crook,’” “‘crooked’”]; Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264–265 [a “thief”].) Turning to the contract claim, the firm pleaded it in such a way that, as the trial court recognized, it falls with the defamation claim. The firm alleged: “Sedgwick has materially breached the fee agreement by engaging in a campaign of disparagement against Plaintiff by posting false, misleading, and defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff and the services provided to Sedgwick.” Because Sedgwick’s statements are not defamatory, they are not “false, misleading, and defamatory.” The firm therefore had no probability of prevailing on its contract claim, as pleaded. Because the trial court’s analysis was spot-on, it had no need to reach Sedgwick’s observation that Section 16 is unenforceable. Sedgwick’s opposition brief noted Civil Code section 1670.8 is “referred to as ‘California’s Yelp Law’” and “prevents businesses from using contract language to limit or waive a customer’s right to complain about the product or services.” We agree Section 16 violates Civil Code section 1670.8. That statute provides: “A contract . . . for the sale . . . of consumer goods or services may not include a provision waiving the consumer’s right to make any statement regarding the seller . . . or its employees or agents, or concerning 8 the goods or services.” (Civ. Code, § 1670.8, subd. (a)(1).) By its plain language, it precludes a provision that, like Section 16, purports to require Sedgwick “‘not to directly or indirectly disparage’” the firm. We do not share the firm’s concern that this statute “would negate existing law and permit consumers to defame businesses . . . with impunity.” The statute cannot be reasonably read to immunize defamation. In our context, the statute does not prevent the firm from suing for defamation, if the firm could prove defamation sufficiently to survive an anti- SLAPP motion. The statute merely prevents the firm from including Section 16 in its fee agreement—or thereafter enforcing it. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, ACTING P. J.

SCHWARM, J.* *Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution