Taber v. Missor CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/17/26 Taber v. Missor CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JULIA TABER, D086425

Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 25HR011460C)

v.

GEORGE JOSEPH MISSOR III,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Blair Soper, Judge. Affirmed. George Joseph Missor, III, in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.

I INTRODUCTION George Joseph Missor, III appeals a civil harassment restraining order prohibiting him from contacting or harassing Julia Taber, a woman to whom Missor made unwanted sexual advances. On appeal, Missor does not present a cogent argument for reversal of the civil harassment restraining order. Instead, he denies Taber’s underlying harassment claim and presents his own narrative account of the parties’ interactions with one another. Because Missor does not present a cogent argument for reversal of the order, he has forfeited his claim that the trial court erred by issuing the order. Even if we were to construe Missor’s appellate brief as presenting a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the civil harassment restraining order, Missor has waived his claim of error because his appellate brief fails to discuss any of the evidence supporting the order. Further, the hearing on Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order was not reported by a court reporter and Missor did not provide us with a suitable alternative record of the oral proceedings below. Thus, we must presume the evidence from the unreported hearing was sufficient to support the order. We affirm. II BACKGROUND Taber, a 24-year-old woman, filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order against Missor, a 66-year-old man who lives in the same apartment complex as Taber. In Taber’s request and declaration, she described two instances in which Missor allegedly initiated improper contact with her and caused her to suffer from severe emotional distress. The first incident occurred a week before Taber filed her request for a civil harassment restraining order. According to Taber, Missor approached her while she was wearing a bikini and lying by the pool at her apartment complex. Missor sat near her and made unwelcome sexual comments to her while he stared at her breasts and vagina. In particular, Missor said, “Excuse me, look at you, are you some sort of model,” and, “How yummy!” At that point, Taber began recording a three-minute video of the interaction. During the recorded portion of the encounter, Missor said, “You are waiting 2 to be devoured,” “You have treasures inside of me,” and, “Did that turn you on?” Taber replied, “No sir,” and Missor asked, “Was that perverted?” Taber laughed nervously and scanned the area for bystanders to help her. Missor leaned close to her, asked who she was looking for, and said, “There is nobody here to rescue you.” Taber gathered her clothes to leave, and Missor reached toward Taber’s bikini bottoms and touched her thigh. She slapped his hand away and screamed at him not to touch her. Missor then asked Taber not to report the incident to law enforcement. He also said he felt like he needed a lawyer to hang out with her. Taber later reported the incident to the police. The second incident took place one day before Taber requested a civil harassment restraining order. According to Taber, she left her apartment and heard Missor yell, “Oh shit,” from his apartment balcony. Missor then ran to the corner of his balcony and repeatedly yelled “hello” at her. Taber walked to the apartment complex leasing office to report the incident and, as she was returning to her apartment, Missor again yelled “hello” at her and tried to get her attention. Taber reported the incident to the police and obtained a criminal protective order prohibiting Missor from harassing her.

3 Missor opposed the request for a civil harassment restraining order.1 He claimed he did not engage in violent conduct or conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. He added that his intention when speaking with Taber by the pool was to make her laugh. He denied the second incident in which he allegedly shouted at her from his balcony. The trial court held a hearing on Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order, which was not reported by a court reporter. According to the court’s written minute order, the court received witness testimony and video evidence during the hearing and found that clear and convincing evidence warranted a civil harassment restraining order. The court issued a three-year civil harassment restraining order requiring Missor to stay 100 yards away from Taber, except as needed for Missor to access his residence and the shared common areas of the apartment complex, and to refrain from harassing or contacting Taber.

1 We grant Missor’s motion to augment the record with his opposition to Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order. We deny his motion to augment the record with the emergency protective order, which is already part of the record. We also deny his motion to augment the record with an unfiled written declaration, an unfiled response to Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order, a second version of the emergency protective order, and letters that Missor purportedly sent to the police and the parties’ landlord after the hearing on Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order, as there is no indication in the record that these documents were presented to the trial court. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court.”].)

4 III DISCUSSION Missor challenges the civil harassment restraining order. In his appellate brief, he claims Taber presented “no evidence of any violence or credible threat,” “no documentation of [Taber’s] emotional distress,” and “no testimony” that he yelled at her from his balcony.2 However, he does not articulate a cogent argument for reversal supported by legal analysis. “ ‘To prevail on appeal, an appellant must establish both error and prejudice from that error. [Citation.] In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record. [Citations.] Similarly, we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority.’ ” (Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597; see United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 [“ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis 2 Taber did not file a respondent’s brief. We do not consider her failure to file a respondent’s brief as an admission of error. Rather, we examine the record based on Missor’s arguments to determine whether reversal is required. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342, fn. 1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)

5 and citation to the record’ ”].)3 Because Missor does not present a cogent argument for reversal of the order, he has forfeited his challenge to the order. Even if we were to construe Missor’s appellate brief as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order, Missor’s claim would fail. “When an appellant’s opening brief states only the favorable facts, ignoring evidence favorable to respondent, the appellate court may treat the substantial evidence issues as waived and presume the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact. [Citations.] ‘As with all substantial evidence challenges, an appellant challenging [a finding of fact] must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. Failure to do so is fatal. A reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for appellant’s failure to carry his burden.’ ” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173–1174.) Missor’s appellate brief does not describe any of the evidence that was admitted at the civil harassment restraining order hearing, except to state that Taber’s recorded video of the parties’ poolside interaction did not depict “violence or [a] credible threat.” By omitting virtually any discussion of the evidence and purporting to state facts favorable only to his own version of events, Missor has waived his sufficiency of the evidence argument, to the extent he can be said to have asserted one at all. (See Hjelm v. Prometheus 3 These principles of appellate practice apply to Missor, even though he is a self-represented litigant. “ ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) “[W]hen a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by counsel.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.)

6 Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1166 [“ ‘What [Prometheus] attempts here is merely to reargue the “facts” as [it] would have them, an argumentative presentation that not only violates the [appellate] rules [of practice] …, but also disregards the admonition that [it] is not to “merely reassert [its] position at ... trial.” [Citations.] … [S]uch “factual presentation is but an attempt to reargue on appeal those factual issues decided adversely to it at the trial level, contrary to established precepts of appellate review. As such, it is doomed to fail.’ ”]; Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [“Where a party presents only facts and inferences favorable to his or her position, ‘the contention that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence may be deemed waived.’ ”].) We reject Missor’s evidentiary arguments for yet another reason. Where, as here, “no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error. [Citation.] The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992; see also, e.g., Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1124, fn. 4 [“In the absence of any record of [plaintiff’s] testimony at the evidentiary hearing, we must presume that testimony supports the court’s findings.”].) Here, no error is apparent from the face of the appellate record. A court reporter did not report the hearing on Taber’s request for a civil harassment restraining order, and Missor did not present us with a suitable 7 alternative for a reporter’s transcript. Because Missor did not present us with a reporter’s transcript or an alternative record of the oral proceedings below, we presume the unreported hearing testimony would have demonstrated an absence of error. IV DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Each party shall bear its own appellate costs.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.