gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-04208 · 2026-07-30 · Unknown

Samuel Bustamante Jimenez v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:23Z · confidence low

The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the petitioner's immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court granted the petition, ordering an individualized bond hearing within seven days or the petitioner's release.

What the court decidedThe model
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted
“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rodriguez v. Bostock (issued the same day) to determine that the petitioner, apprehended in the interior, is subject to the discretionary detention regime of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than the mandatory detention regime of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because the petitioner is subject to § 1226(a), he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. The respondents did not oppose the petition. The order correctly applies the newly issued circuit precedent to the facts recited (interior apprehension after residing in the U.S. for three years).
Order to arrange individualized bond hearing or release
“Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of entry of this Order... If the noncitizen does not request a continuance, and no hearing occurs within seven (7) days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be released from Respondents’ custody.”
agree with court
This relief is consistent with the holding in Rodriguez v. Bostock and prior Ninth Circuit precedent (e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez) that indefinite detention without a bond hearing violates due process. The court imposes a specific timeline and consequence (release) for non-compliance, which is a standard equitable remedy in habeas proceedings.
Burden of proof set at preponderance of the evidence
“The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight.”
unsure · procedure
The court cites Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland for the proposition that the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. However, the court explicitly states in the text that it is including the petitioner's requested provisions 'With the exception of the requested burden of proof.' This creates a contradiction: the text says it is *not* including the requested burden of proof, but the operative order *does* set the burden of proof. If the petitioner requested a different standard (e.g., clear and convincing evidence for the government, or no burden), the court's action contradicts its own stated intent. If the petitioner requested the preponderance standard, the text is erroneous. Given the ambiguity, the court's reliance on Rodriguez Diaz is legally sound for the preponderance standard, but the internal inconsistency in the order is a drafting error.

The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally sound in its main holding, relying on a same-day Ninth Circuit decision to resolve the statutory ambiguity regarding interior apprehensions. However, it contains a significant internal contradiction regarding the burden of proof. The text states the court is excluding the petitioner's requested burden of proof, yet the operative order imposes a specific burden of proof (preponderance) on the petitioner. This inconsistency makes the order unclear and potentially unenforceable as written. Additionally, the court declines to address the remaining constitutional grounds (Fifth and Eighth Amendments), which is permissible given the statutory resolution, but the drafting error undermines the clarity of the relief.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

inconsistent with cited authority inconsistent with cited authority

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 SAMUEL BUSTAMANTE JIMENEZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04208-RBM-VET 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. [Doc. 1] Department of Homeland Security, et al., 13 Respondents. 14 15 16 Before the Court is Petitioner Samuel Bustamante Jimenez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 17 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the 18 lawfulness of his immigration detention. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the Court 19 GRANTS the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection some 22 time before November 2023. (See Doc. 4-1 at 4.) On November 27, 2023, Border Patrol 23 agents arrested Petitioner in Vermont because “he was the driver in an attempted human 24 smuggling event, in which he drove from Maryland to . . . Vermont to pick up a Mexican 25 citizen that had entered the United States illegally from Canada.” (Id.) Petitioner was 26 issued a Notice to Appear and detained pending his immigration hearing. (Id.) On 27 December 26, 2023, the immigration judge ordered Petitioner released from immigration 28 custody on a $3,000 bond. (Doc. 1-2 at 8.) 1 On November 15, 2025, Petitioner was charged with “Attempting to Drive Vehicle 2 While Impaired by Alcohol While Transporting a Minor.” (Doc. 4-1 at 5.) On June 9, 3 2026, Petitioner was convicted of that charge and sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment. 4 (Id.) On June 14, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where 5 he has remained since. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) Petitioner has not received a bond hearing because 6 immigration judges lack jurisdiction to hold them under agency precedent. (Id. ¶ 22.) 7 On July 22, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing 8 schedule the next day. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed their Response to Petition on July 29, 9 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Traverse later that same day. (Doc. 5.) 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 12 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 13 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 14 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 15 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 16 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 17 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 18 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 19 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 22 Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 24–38.) 23 Respondents argue “that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2),” 24 but also “acknowledge[ ] that this Court’s prior decisions will control the result here . . ., 25 as the facts are not materially distinguishable . . ., and on that basis [do] not oppose the 26 petition.” (Doc. 4 at 3.) 27 After the Petition was fully briefed, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Rodriguez 28 v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026). In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit rejected 1 Respondents’ argument, concluding that noncitizens “present without admission who are 2 apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to the detention regime of 3 § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at *10. Because there is no dispute that Petitioner was 4 detained in the interior of the United States after having resided here for at least three years 5 (see Doc. 4-1 at 4), the discretionary detention procedures of § 1226(a) govern Petitioner’s 6 detention. Therefore, and in light of Respondents’ non-opposition, the Court GRANTS 7 the Petition. Petitioner requests that the Court include several provisions in its Order 8 granting the Petition. (See Doc. 5 at 3–4.) With the exception of the requested burden of 9 proof, the Court will include each of these provisions. 10 IV. CONCLUSION1 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 12 1. Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for 13 Petitioner before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of entry of this 14 Order—unless the noncitizen requests a continuance—to determine whether his 15 continued detention is warranted. 16 2. The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of 17 the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight.2 If the 18 noncitizen does not request a continuance, and no hearing occurs within seven (7) 19 days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be released from Respondents’ custody. 20 3. If the immigration judge determines that bond is appropriate, the immigration judge 21 SHALL consider alternative conditions of release and the noncitizen’s ability to 22 pay.3 23 24 25 1 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief. 26 2 See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022). 27 3 See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A bond determination process that does not include consideration of financial circumstances and alternative 28 l 4. □□ □□ before August 21, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report indicating 2 whether Petitioner received a bond hearing, and the outcome of that bond hearing. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||DATE: July 30, 2026 eet Bourrnucle, Mottaryyes > 6 ON. RUTH BERM@GDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 |, 28 government’s legitimate interests.’’).