Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FREDDY EVARISTO GARMENDIA Case No.: 26-CV-3996 JAO (GC) RUIZ, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Petitioner, 13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 (ECF No. 1) MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of 15 the United States Department of 16 Homeland Security, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 Before the Court is Petitioner Freddy Evaristo Garmendia Ruiz’s Petition for Writ 20 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 21 Respondents, Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), 22 David Venturella’s (Acting Director of ICE), Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General 23 of the United States), and Jeremy Casey’s (Warden of Imperial Regional Detention 24 Facility) (collectively, “Respondents” or the “Government”) Return to the Petition (ECF 25 No. 4). 26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition on due 27 process grounds. 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a Nicaraguan citizen who fled persecution by the Sandinista 3 dictatorship and entered the United States on January 11, 2022 to seek asylum. ECF No. 4 1 ¶¶ 2, 4. At that time he was subject to the “Migrant Protection Protocol” or “MPP,” 5 which required him to remain in Mexico while waiting for an Immigration Court date. 6 See id. ¶ 5. He underwent a credible fear interview and was found to have a credible fear 7 of being persecuted or tortured if he returned to Nicaragua. See id. ¶ 8. Immigration 8 officials thereafter necessarily determined that he was neither a flight risk or danger to the 9 community and paroled him into the United States of April 14, 2022 to continue pursuing 10 his asylum claim. See id. ¶ 8. 11 On December 9, 2025, Petitioner was driving to work when ICE stopped him at a 12 highway checkpoint, detained him, and took him to Imperial Regional Detention Facility, 13 where he has remained since. See id. ¶¶ 15–16. He received no notice or pre-detention 14 hearing before being detained. See id. ¶¶ 14, 21. The Government issued him a Notice to 15 Appear charging him as removable, see id. ¶ 17, and an Immigration Judge summarily 16 denied his asylum claim on March 2, 2026, see id. ¶ 18. Petitioner appealed the denial, 17 which remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, meaning there is no 18 final order of removal against Petitioner. See id. ¶ 18. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 21 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 22 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 23 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 24 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 25 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 26 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 27 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 28 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 1 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 2 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 3 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 4 DISCUSSION 5 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release from his 2022 6 detention without notice or a hearing violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 72– 7 81.1 Respondents maintain that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 8 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts in this District, have 9 repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar facts.” See 10 ECF No. 4 at 2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. at 3. The Court 11 concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates the Due Process Clause. 12 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 13 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 14 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 15 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 17 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 18 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 19 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 20 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 21 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 22 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 23 Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 24 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 25 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 26 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 27 28 1 Because the Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s rights to Due Process and orders his 1 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 2 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 3 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 4 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 5 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 6 Petitioner has been out of custody since 2022, when the government implicitly 7 determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and paroled him into the 8 country. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. Since his parole, Petitioner has complied with the law and 9 conditions of his parole. See id. ¶ 20. Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest 10 continuing to remain out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 11 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after [his] initial apprehension reflected a 12 determination by the government that [he] was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the 13 community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless [he] no 14 longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner 15 is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a 16 year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s 17 guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 18 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his 19 release). 20 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 21 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. 22 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 23 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. 24 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: 25 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 26 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 27 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the 28 1 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 2 Id. 3 The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the 4 Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an 5 opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed 6 above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to 7 his release in 2022. Petitioner has been cut off from his community in the United States, 8 including his sister and many friends. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 23. “Freedom from 9 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 10 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 11 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of 12 his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to 13 form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 14 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as 15 Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with 16 notification, reasoning, or a hearing. See id. ¶¶ 14, 21. Since the government’s initial 17 determination in 2022 that Petitioner should be released because he posed no danger to 18 the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have 19 changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 20 (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger 21 to the community or a flight risk.”). Indeed, after his release from custody, Petitioner has 22 apparently complied with all conditions of release. “Once a noncitizen has been released, 23 the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to 24 removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of 25 materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 26 dangerous or has become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as 27 here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an 28 1 erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] 2 has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” 3 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 4 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 5 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 6 and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. 7 Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the 8 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 9 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). 10 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 11 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy 12 Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of 13 habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was 14 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 15 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the 16 conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 17 CONCLUSION 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 20 Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court 21 ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of 22 the reasons for revocation of his release on bond and a hearing before a neutral decision 23 maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the 24 burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger 25 to the community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The 26 27 28 1 || Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by August 12, 2026, confirming that 2 || Petitioner has been released.” 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: July 29, 2026 5 Ly © g — Jill A. Otake 9 », —" @& United States District Judge 10 ay i > 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ———__ 27 ? Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 41. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate 28 || EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).