Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DICSON OBEL AGUILAR- Case No.: 26cv3758-LL-AHG MAZARIEGOS, 12 ORDER GRANTING AMENDED Petitioner, 13 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS v. CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of 15 [ECF No. 5] the Department of Homeland Security, et 16 al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 Before the Court is Petitioner Dicson Obel Aguilar-Mazariegos’s Amended Petition 20 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 5 (“Pet.”). 21 Respondents filed a Response [ECF No. 6], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 7]. 22 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 23 Habeas Corpus. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States in 2018 when he 26 was 16 years old. Pet. at 2; see also Exh. A to Pet., Declaration of Dicson Obel Aguilar- 27 Mazariegos (“Decl.”). On November 9, 2018, Petitioner went to a port of entry, along with 28 his father and brother, and asked for asylum. Pet. at 2; Decl. ¶ 2. Petitioner was held in 1 custody for eight days before being released on conditional parole. Pet. at 2; Decl. ¶ 2. 2 After his release, Petitioner went to Miami, Florida with his family and applied for asylum. 3 Pet. at 2; Decl. ¶ 3. He has since attended all his check-in appointments and complied with 4 the conditions of his release. Pet. at 2, 4; Decl. ¶ 3. Since his release, Petitioner has obtained 5 a work permit and Social Security number. Pet. at 2, 4; Decl. ¶ 3. On May 4, 2026, 6 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner without any notice or 7 opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 2; Decl. ¶ 4. Petitioner has no criminal record. Pet. at 2; 8 Decl. ¶ 3. 9 On July 7, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition, claiming that the 10 revocation of his parole without proper notice, reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing 11 violates the Administrative Procedures Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 12 Clause. Pet. at 3–7. 13 Respondents argue in the Response that they “concede Petitioner was previously 14 released from immigration custody on parole, however, Respondents have insufficient 15 information regarding whether [his] parole terminated or expired to provide to the Court.” 16 ECF No. 6 at 2. Respondents further argue that “Petitioner’s habeas petition is ambiguous 17 as to the parole authority he was released under, citing both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) and 8 18 C.F.R. § 212.5 (e )(2)(i).” Id. Respondents argue that it is their position that Petitioner is 19 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), but acknowledge that Courts in this 20 District have repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar 21 facts. Id. Respondents also state in their Response that “the government does not oppose 22 the petition and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. at 3. 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 25 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 26 his or her confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 27 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal 28 is the court of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 1 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 2 § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 3 independently from the removal process – for example, a claim of indefinite detention – 4 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 5 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 6 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or 9 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at 10 6–7. Specifically, Petitioner argues that he was “entitled to notice of the reasons for 11 revocation of his parole and a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether 12 detention is warranted before ICE revoked his parole.” Id. at 6 (internal quotation and 13 citation omitted). The Court agrees. 14 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 15 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 16 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 17 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 18 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to 19 due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 20 The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the State 21 deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 22 “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty 23 the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” 24 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although 25 the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government’s 26 discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an 27 implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked 28 only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 1 Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to 2 detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released 3 from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 4 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508-TSH, 2022 WL 1443250, 5 at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 6 Petitioner entered the United States in 2018. Pet. at 2. Petitioner is not a newly 7 arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border. Id. Petitioner is not merely an 8 “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; he was previously 9 released by the Government from custody in 2018 and has a protected liberty interest in 10 remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release 11 from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the 12 government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and 13 [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those 14 criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is 15 not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. 16 This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed 17 due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128– 18 29 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). 19 Respondents do “not oppose the petition and defer[] to the Court on the appropriate relief.” 20 ECF No. 6 at 3. 21 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 22 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 23 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 24 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. See id. Courts 25 must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the 26 risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 27 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 28 1 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 2 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 3 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 4 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 5 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 6 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his initial release. 7 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 8 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” 9 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he 10 most elemental of liberty interests [is] the interest in being free from physical detention by 11 one’s own government.” (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))). Petitioner 12 has an interest in remaining with his family. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (“Subject to 13 the conditions of his parole, he . . . is free to be with family and friends and to form the 14 other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 15 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 16 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an 17 opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 6–7. Since the determination that Petitioner should be 18 released because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is 19 no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 20 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the 21 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has been 22 released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject 23 to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of 24 materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 25 dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. Respondents 26 concede that Petitioner was previously released on conditional parole. See ECF No. 6 at 2. 27 Respondents also state in their Return that “the government does not oppose the petition 28 and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. at 3. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner 1 has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 2 liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to 3 determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 4 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned 5 up). 6 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 7 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 8 1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the government 9 wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; 10 but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail to point to any 11 burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice, reasoning, and a pre- 12 deprivation hearing. See generally ECF No. 6. Additionally, Respondents’ argument that 13 they have “insufficient information regarding whether Petitioner’s parole terminated or 14 expired to provide to the Court” does not overcome Petitioner’s liberty interest. See, e.g., 15 Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (finding the 16 government’s argument unpersuasive that a noncitizen did not have a liberty interest where 17 his one-year parole had expired shortly before he was re-detained); see also Omer G.G. v. 18 Kaiser, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“Respondents point out that 19 petitioner’s parole expired… and that they were permitted to re-detain him under the statute 20 and its implementing regulations. However, petitioner’s liberty interest did not expire along 21 with his parole.” (citation omitted)). 22 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 23 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful.1 See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. 24 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting 25 26 27 1 The Court declines to reach Petitioner’s remaining argument that his detention violates the Administrative Procedure Act. 28 1 |}a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre 2 || deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 3 *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner 4 || from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition. 6 CONCLUSION 7 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ 8 ||of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 5]. The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 9 || Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court 10 |} ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the 11 |/reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to 12 ||determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the burden of 13 |/establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 14 ||community or a risk of flight.” 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: July 29, 2026 NO 17 DE 18 Honorable Linda Lopez 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 || 26 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; 27 || Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1096-97 (E.D. 28 Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez vy. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).