Malik Sair Jan v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Daniel Brightman, Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Malik Sair Jan filed a second habeas corpus petition arguing that his prolonged detention violated his due process rights. The court denied the petition without prejudice because the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention under Zadvydas v. Davis had not yet expired.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus denied without prejudice“Accordingly, the Petition is denied without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the ripeness doctrine. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the detention of an alien subject to a final order of removal is presumptively reasonable for a period of six months. The final removal order became effective on March 23, 2026. The six-month period would expire on September 23, 2026. Since the petition was filed on June 7, 2026, and the order was issued on July 29, 2026, the presumptively reasonable period had not yet elapsed. Therefore, the claim that the detention was unreasonably prolonged was not ripe for judicial review. Denying without prejudice is the appropriate procedural mechanism to allow the petitioner to refile once the statutory period has passed. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)) and the controlling precedent (Zadvydas v. Davis). It accurately calculates the timeline based on the final removal order date (March 23, 2026) and the filing date (June 7, 2026), concluding that the six-month presumptive period had not expired. The decision to deny without prejudice is procedurally correct for a non-ripe claim.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26cv3443 DMS VET MALIK SAIR JAN, 12 O R D E R D E N Y I N G W I T H O UT 13 Petitioner, PREJUDICE PETITION FOR WRIT v. OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden, 15 Otay Mesa Detention Center; DANIEL 16 BRIGHTMAN, Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal; 17 TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, 18 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 19 (“DHS”); U.S. Department of Homeland 20 Security; and PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice. 21 Respondents. 22 23 24 This is the second case filed by Petitioner in this Court. In the first case, Case No. 25 26cv0017 DMS VET, Petitioner alleged his continued detention without a bond hearing 26 violated his due process rights. Case No. 26cv0017 DMS VET, ECF No. 11. The Court 27 agreed with Petitioner and ordered Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing. 28 Because the Court’s order was silent on the burden of proof for the bond hearing, the 1 immigration judge placed the burden on Petitioner to establish his entitlement to bond. The 2 immigration judge found Petitioner did not meet that burden, and therefore denied 3 Petitioner’s request for bond. (Return, Ex. 5.) 4 After that bond decision, the immigration judge held a merits hearing on Petitioner’s 5 case following a remand order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).1 After 6 that hearing, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for deferral of removal 7 under the CAT, and ordered Petitioner removed to Afghanistan. (Return, Ex. 6.) Petitioner 8 did not appeal that decision to the BIA, therefore his removal order became final on March 9 23, 2026. 10 On June 7, 2026, Petitioner filed the present case, again arguing that his prolonged 11 detention violates his due process rights. In their Return, Respondents assert that in light 12 of Petitioner’s removal order, Petitioner’s detention is now governed by 8 U.S.C. § 13 1231(a). Under that statute, Petitioner must be detained for the first 90 days post final 14 removal order, or until June 21, 2026.2 Thus, Respondents argue Petitioner’s claim is not 15 yet ripe, and will not be ripe until at least September 24, 2026, according to Zadvydas v. 16 Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 17 Petitioner did not file a Traverse, so his position on these issues is unclear. The 18 record, however, is clear that Petitioner is currently subject to a final removal order, and 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 25 1 In his original merits hearing, the immigration judge granted Petitioner’s request for deferral of removal 26 to Afghanistan under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). (Return, Ex. 2.) The Department of Homeland Security appealed that decision to the BIA, (Return, Ex. 3), which vacated the immigration 27 judge’s decision and remanded the case back to the immigration judge for further fact finding. (Return, Ex. 4.) 28 | six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention under Zadvydas has not yet 2 ||expired. Accordingly, the Petition is denied without prejudice. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: July 29, 2026 am Sebo 5 in YA. ‘ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28