Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IMAD HASSAN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-0869-CAB-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS 14 OPEIU LOCAL 30, [Doc. No. 23] 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 18 Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 23.] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is 19 DENIED. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Imad Hassan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, alleges that the Office 22 Professional Employees and International Union Local 30 (“Defendant” or “OPEIU”) 23 breached the duty of fair representation under the Labor-Management Relations Act 24 (“LMRA”). [Doc. No. 20 (“SAC”) at 4.] 25 Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on April 11, 2025, naming Annette Baxter 26 (“Baxter”)—OPEIU’s former Director of Member Services—as the sole defendant. [Doc. 27 No. 1 (“Complaint”).] On April 14, 2025, the Court sua sponte dismissed the Complaint 28 with leave to amend because it was “nearly blank” and therefore failed to show federal 1 jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 4.] On May 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, 2 alleging the LMRA as the basis for federal question jurisdiction and again naming Baxter 3 as the sole defendant. [Doc. No. 7 (“FAC”).] The FAC alleges that Baxter wrongfully 4 declined to arbitrate a grievance challenging Plaintiff’s termination. [FAC at 2, 7; Doc. 5 No. 16 at 3.] 6 After no docket activity occurred for over six months, the Court issued Plaintiff an 7 Order to Show Cause for failure to prosecute. [Doc. No. 9.] Plaintiff then mailed a copy 8 of the FAC and summons to the OPEIU San Diego office, which was received by an 9 OPEIU employee on January 5, 2026. [Doc. No. 16 at 3, 10.] This employee gave the 10 documents to Marianne Giordano—OPEIU’s Executive Director/CFO—who instructed 11 the employee to scan and send the documents to OPEIU’s counsel. [Doc. No. 16 at 10.] 12 On April 9, 2026, the Court dismissed the FAC with leave to amend because 13 individual union officers, employees, or agents cannot be liable for a union’s violation of 14 the LMRA. [Doc. No. 19.] 15 On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, removing Baxter 16 and naming OPEIU as the sole defendant. [SAC at 1.] OPEIU filed the instant motion to 17 dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s claim 18 is barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to a duty of fair representation 19 claim under the LMRA. [Doc. No. 23 at 4, 5.] 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 23 sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 24 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). If the 25 complaint exhibits that “relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the 26 complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 27 215 (2007); see also Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 28 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 OPEIU argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable six-month statute of 3 limitations because Plaintiff filed the SAC approximately one year after the statute of 4 limitations had elapsed. [Doc. No. 23.] See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 5 U.S. 151, 158 (1983) (concluding that National Labor Relations Act’s six-month statute of 6 limitations governs duty of fair representation claims under LMRA). 7 The Court allowed Plaintiff to amend his FAC to change a party, so Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) governs. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 9 541 (2010). 10 A. Relation Back under Rule 15 11 Rule 15(c) “governs when an amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely 12 filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was filed outside an 13 applicable statute of limitations.” Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires that “the amendment 14 asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out” 15 in the original pleading. Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) provides that “within the period provided by 16 Rule 4(m),” the amended party must have received notice of the action, so that it will not 17 be “prejudiced in defending on the merits.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires that the amended 18 defendant “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, 19 but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” 20 The Krupski Court determined that “constructive notice of the action” satisfies 21 notice under Rule 15(c). Id. at 545; see also Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 22 724 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he notice required under Rule 15(c) could be 23 either formal or informal so long as the party to be added was not prejudiced in maintaining 24 its defense on the merits”). The Ninth Circuit has found that a “community of interest” 25 relationship between the amended defendant and the original defendant amounts to 26 constructive notice. See Korn, 724 at 1400–01; G.F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 23 27 F.3d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding community of interest between shipping company 28 and its claims agent and noting shared legal representation). Other circuits recognize the 1 relationship when parties are “so closely related in their business operations or other 2 activities that the institution of an action against one serves to provide notice” to the other. 3 G.F. Co., 23 F.3d at 1503 (citing 6A Charles Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 4 § 1499 at 146 (2d ed. 1990)). 5 Further, the Ninth Circuit finds that a defendant brought in by amendment is not 6 prejudiced when they share counsel with the original defendant. See id.; Mayshack v. 7 Gonzales, 437 Fed. Appx. 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the amended defendant 8 was not prejudiced because his attorney conducted discovery for the original defendant). 9 The Krupski court held that a plaintiff’s knowledge of a party’s “existence does not 10 preclude her from making a mistake with respect to that party's identity.” 560 U.S. at 549. 11 “A plaintiff may know that a prospective defendant—call him party A—exists, while 12 erroneously believing him to have the status of party B.” Id. “The only question under 13 Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), then, is whether party A knew or should have known that, absent some 14 mistake, the action would have been brought against him.” Id. In determining whether an 15 amended defendant knew or should have known that the lawsuit was supposed to be filed 16 against it but for a mistake, the Ninth Circuit looks to the text of the complaint. See G.F. 17 Co., 23 F.3d at 1504; Krupski, 560 U.S. at 554. 18 B. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) Relates Back 19 Defendant does not dispute whether the SAC’s claim arises out of the same conduct, 20 transaction, or occurrence. Instead, Defendant argues that (1) the only complaint filed 21 within the statute of limitations was the “nearly blank” Complaint, which could not have 22 notified OPEIU of the action; and (2) OPEIU did not receive notice of the action “within 23 the period provided by Rule 4(m).” [Doc. No. 26 at 4.] 24 The Court disagrees and instead finds that the SAC relates back to Plaintiff’s original 25 Complaint, which was undisputedly filed within the statute of limitations on April 11, 26 2025. Though the form portion of the Complaint was largely blank, Plaintiff included a 27 narrative that stated in the very first sentence that “[t]he Union OBEUIE [sic] local 30 28 violated it[s] duty of representation.” [Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.] 1 Plaintiff then filed his FAC on May 7, 2025. The Court granted Plaintiff extended 2 time to serve Baxter by February 20, 2026. [Doc. No. 11.] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 4(m) provides that courts must “extend the time for service” if the plaintiff can show good 4 cause for their failure to serve the defendant. 5 An OPEIU employee attested to receiving the summons and FAC within this time 6 period, providing them to OPEIU’s Executive Director/CEO, and sending them to 7 OPEIU’s counsel. [Doc. No. 16-1 at 2–3.] The Court finds that OPEIU received notice of 8 the action against an employee, officer, or agent of the organization within the extended 9 Rule 4(m) period, used the same attorney to respond to the FAC against Baxter and the 10 SAC against OPEIU, knew or should have known that the action would have been brought 11 against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, and will not be 12 prejudiced by defending the merits of this action. See G.F. Co., 23 F.3d at 1503 (original 13 defendant was an agent of the amended defendant, so the court found that a community of 14 interest existed between the parties); Mayshack, 437 Fed. Appx. at 621 (original defendant 15 was amended defendant’s employer, and the parties shared an attorney, so the court found 16 a community of interest). 17 OPEIU also argues that Plaintiff does not establish a mistake concerning the proper 18 party’s identity, and therefore the SAC does not relate back. [Doc. No. 26 at 5.] Again, 19 the Court disagrees. In Krupski, the plaintiff sued the North American agent for a cruise 20 line rather than the Italian operator of the cruise line. 560 U.S. at 543. The court 21 determined the plaintiff made a mistake, as opposed to a “fully informed decision,” because 22 “the face of the complaint” showed that the plaintiff meant to sue the operator. Id. at 552, 23 555. Therefore, the amended defendant should have known that the action was meant to 24 be brought against it, but for the plaintiff’s mistake. Id. at 554–55. 25 Here, according to Defendant, Plaintiff’s decision to sue Baxter was a “fundamental 26 misunderstanding of which type of defendant bears liability” for this kind of lawsuit. [Doc. 27 No. 26 at 5.] However, a mistake regarding liability is comparable to the mistake regarding 28 “status” laid out in Krupski. Further, Plaintiff alleged that OPEIU “violated its duty of 1 || representation” on both the original Complaint and the FAC, wrote the Union’s address as 2 ||Baxter’s address in both complaints, and addressed Baxter as the Union’s Director of 3 Member Services in both complaints. [Complaint at 2, 8; FAC at 2, 13.] Thus, the face of 4 ||the Complaint shows that Plaintiff understood Baxter was acting on behalf of the Union 5 |}and wanted to sue a liable party. Defendant cites opinions on the distinction between 6 ||mistaken liability and mistaken identity; these opinions were decided before Krupski 7 || clarified the parameters of a mistake, are not binding on this Court, or have distinguishable 8 facts. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s decision to sue Baxter was a mistake under Rule 9 || 15(c) and Defendant should have known that this action was meant for it. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED. Defendant 12 file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint by August 21, 2026. 13 It is SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: July 29, 2026 ‘i 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28