Roger Edwards v. Chula Vista Police Department, et al.
- Proceeding
- writ
- Outcome
- other — 12 LEGAL STANDAR
- Area
- civil
Analysis
The court considered a pro se plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, specifically a likelihood of success on the merits or an inability to articulate his claims.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Denied Without Prejudice“For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases, requiring a showing of exceptional circumstances based on a cumulative assessment of the likelihood of success and the complexity of the issues relative to the litigant's ability. The court found that the case was too early to predict success and that the plaintiff had demonstrated the ability to navigate the procedural aspects of the case, such as surviving initial screening and filing motions. The denial without prejudice allows the plaintiff to renew the motion if circumstances change, which is consistent with the discretionary nature of the relief. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the governing legal standard from binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Cano v. Taylor) and applies it to the specific facts of the case. The court addresses both prongs of the test: likelihood of success (finding it premature to determine) and the plaintiff's ability to litigate (finding the plaintiff has demonstrated competence through prior filings). The reasoning is logical and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ROGER EDWARDS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03825-AJB-DDL 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL WITHOUT PREJUDICE 13 CHULA VISTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 14 [Dkt. No. 7] Defendants. 15 16 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Roger T. Edward’s Motion for Appointment of 17 Counsel. Dkt. No. 7. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT 18 PREJUDICE. 19 I 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 29, 2025. 22 Dkt. No. 1. On July 1, 2026, the Court issued an Order (1) Dismissing All Claims Except 23 Plaintiff's Excessive-Force Claim Against Defendants Moreno and Menna, and (2) 24 Directing U.S. Marshal to Effect Service of the Complaint and Summons on Defendants 25 Moreno and Menna Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) & Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Dkt. No. 26 5. On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Appointment of Counsel currently before 27 the Court. Dkt. No. 7. In the instant motion, Plaintiff references Edwards v. CDCR et al., 28 1 3:26-cv-01245. Id. In Edwards, Plaintiff filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 2 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 2024 San Diego County Superior Court judgment of 3 conviction. On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel in Edwards based 4 on his limited law library access and the challenging nature of completing tasks due to the 5 “inhumane conditions” as well as his belief that “the last assigned attorney pretended to 6 read the record but did nothing.” Edwards v. CDCR et al., 3:26-cv-01245, Dkt. No. 5 at 1. 7 On June 8, 2026, the Court found that the appointment of counsel was not necessary to 8 assist Plaintiff or to prevent due process violations and denied Plaintiff’s motion. Id., Dkt. 9 No. 6. In the pending motion for appointment of counsel, Plaintiff states that “it may be a 10 good idea to have the same attorney appointed in both cases if needed.” Dkt. No. 7. 11 II. 12 LEGAL STANDARDS 13 “[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution 14 Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the Court has discretion to 15 appoint an attorney to represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional 16 circumstances.” See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “That a pro 17 se litigant may be better served with the assistance of counsel is not the test.” Okler v. 18 MCC IMU Prison, 2018 WL 11299539, at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2018). Instead, the Court “must 19 determine whether . . . there is a likelihood of success on the merits” and whether “the 20 prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues 21 involved.” Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014). Neither factor is 22 “dispositive” but “must be considered cumulatively.” Id. 23 III. 24 DISCUSSION 25 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances that 26 warrant the appointment of counsel to represent him at taxpayer expense. 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. Likelihood of Success 2 Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood of success that is required to support 3 the appointment of counsel. Given the early stage of the proceedings, even though plaintiff 4 sufficiently pleaded a plausible claim at this preliminary stage, there is no basis upon which 5 the Court can predict Plaintiff's success at trial. See Campos v. K.U.S.I. News Media, 2019 6 WL 4674290, at 2 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (denying motion to appoint counsel where it was 7 “simply too soon to tell whether he will be likely to succeed on the merits of any potential 8 constitutional claim”); see also Hucker v. Daub, 2021 WL 2550089, at 6 (S.D. Cal. 2021). 9 The Court therefore finds that this factor weighs against the appointment of counsel. 10 B. Plaintiff’s Ability to Pursue his Claims 11 Plaintiff has not shown that he lacks the ability to pursue his claims. As an initial 12 matter, apart from stating that he would like assistance with his case, Plaintiff does not 13 provide any reasons at all in the pending motion for the purported need for counsel. Dkt. 14 No. 7 at 1 (“I’d like to request an attorney to be appointed for this case to assist w/ 15 proceedings.”). In addition, neither the facts nor the legal issues involved in this case are 16 unusually complex. Plaintiff has brought a relatively straightforward excessive force 17 claim. The desire for additional assistance is common to many self-represented litigants. 18 Although the Court recognizes the challenges of completing tasks without legal training, 19 this hardship does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. See Rodriguez v. United 20 States, 2021 WL 1172777, at 1 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“Circumstances common to most 21 prisoners . . . do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for 22 voluntary assistance of counsel”). That it would be easier or better for an attorney to 23 perform matters on Plaintiff’s behalf is also not enough to demonstrate exceptional 24 circumstances. Moreover, the record before the Court belies any assertion that Plaintiff is 25 not capable of pursuing his claims. To date, Plaintiff has filed a complaint that partially 26 survived screening and has submitted several motions on a variety of issues, including 27 proceeding in forma pauperis and appointment of counsel. Throughout these filings, 28 Plaintiff has demonstrated his basic understanding of litigation procedure and ability to 1 ||competently petition the Court for relief. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor 2 || weighs against the appointment of counsel. 3 IV. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Dkt. 6 ||No. 7] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may renew his request if his 7 || situation changes such that he can make the necessary showing that he is both likely to 8 ||succeed on the merits of his claims and unable to competently articulate those claims. 9 || Cano, 739 F.3d at 1218. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Dated: July 27, 2026 ae 12 TC lho a 13 “Hon. DavidD.Leshner SCS 14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28