Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEAN STEEVES, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00568-BAS-VET 12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. FOR ORDER DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION TO 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, QUASH INTERNAL REVENUE 15 SERVICE SUMMONS AND Defendant. GRANTING UNITED STATES’ 16 MOTION TO ENFORCE IRS 17 SUMMONS 18 [ECF Nos. 1, 4] 19 20 21 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to Chief District Judge Cynthia 22 Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1. 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 On January 28, 2026, Dean Steeves (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to Quash Internal 25 Revenue Service Summons (“Petition to Quash”), challenging an Internal Revenue Service 26 Form 6637 Summons Collection Information Statement (“IRS Summons”) directed to 27 Petitioner. ECF No. 1. In response, the United States (“Respondent”) filed a Motion to 28 Summarily Deny Petition to Quash and Enforce IRS Summons (“Motion to Enforce”). 1 ECF No. 4. Following Plaintiff’s timely reply, see ECF No. 5 (“Reply”), Respondent filed 2 a supplemental response with leave of Court, see ECF No. 8 (“Supplemental Response”). 3 Having considered the Petition and related pleadings, the record before it, and for 4 the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition to Quash be 5 DISMISSED and the Motion to Enforce be GRANTED. 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 This matter arises from Petitioner’s assessed federal income tax liabilities for tax 8 years 2011 through 2023 (“subject tax years”), which exceed $10,000,000. ECF Nos. 4-1 9 at 6, 4-2 at 2 (¶ 8). To aid in the collection of Petitioner’s tax liabilities, IRS Revenue 10 Officer Joseph A. Unger (“Officer Unger”) seeks to locate and verify assets available to 11 satisfy those assessed tax liabilities. ECF No. 4-2 at 2 (¶ 9). Officer Unger is not 12 investigating for purposes of auditing the federal tax liabilities of Petitioner or any other 13 person or entity. Id. 14 On May 18, 2023 and August 10, 2023, Officer Unger mailed to Petitioner Notices 15 of Intent to Levy and Right to Collection Due Process Hearing (“2023 Notices”), covering 16 tax years 2011–2012 and 2013–2018, respectively. Id. at 2–3 (¶ 10). Additionally, on 17 November 27, 2025, Officer Unger mailed to Petitioner and his authorized representative 18 a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Right to Collection Due Process Hearing for tax 19 years 2019–2020 and 2022–2023. ECF Nos. 1-2 at 24–30, 4-2 at 3 (¶ 11). 20 On August 27, 2025, approximately 832 and 748 days following the mailing of the 21 2023 Notices, Petitioner requested a collection due process (“CDP”) or equivalent hearing 22 for tax years 2011–2012 and 2013–2018. ECF Nos. 1-2 at 2 (¶ 5), 7–8, 4-1 at 7, 4-2 at 2– 23 3 (¶ 10). The IRS Appeals Office determined that these requests were untimely. ECF Nos. 24 4-1 at 7, 4-2 at 2–3 (¶ 10). 25 On January 8, 2026, furthering his investigation, Officer Unger issued the IRS 26 Summons at issue. ECF Nos. 4-1 at 7, 4-2 at 3 (¶ 13). The IRS Summons seeks Petitioner’s 27 “testimony” and an “examination” of documents and records related to the “collection” of 28 Petitioner’s federal income tax liabilities for the subject tax years. ECF No. 4-2 at 6. On 1 the same day, Officer Unger served an attested copy of the IRS Summons by leaving it at 2 Petitioner’s “last and usual place of abode” and mailing it to his authorized representative. 3 ECF No. 4-2 at 3 (¶¶ 14–15), 6–8, 10–12. 4 On January 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a request for a CDP hearing for tax years 2019– 5 2020 and 2022–2023. ECF Nos. 1-2 at 21–22, 4-1 at 8, 4-2 at 3–4 (¶ 16). The request was 6 submitted seven days after the deadline to request a CDP or equivalent hearing. ECF Nos. 7 4-1 at 8, 4-2 at 3–4 (¶ 16). Petitioner was granted an “equivalent CDP lien hearing” for tax 8 years 2019–2020 and 2022–2023. ECF No. 8 at 7–8. 9 On January 28, 2026, Petitioner petitioned the Court to quash the IRS Summons on 10 the ground that the IRS Summons constitutes harassment, oppression, or abuse, in violation 11 of 26 U.S.C. § 6304.1 ECF No. 1 at 2. Petitioner argues that he requested a CDP hearing 12 months before Officer Unger issued the IRS Summons, which should have temporarily 13 ceased all collection activity against Petitioner. Id. 14 On February 9, 2026, Petitioner timely requested a CDP hearing for tax year 2021. 15 ECF No. 4-2 at 3–4 (¶ 16). 16 On March 18, 2026, Respondent moved to summarily deny the Petition asserting 17 that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 18 §§ 7609(c)(2)(A) and 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). ECF No. 4-1 at 9. In addition, Respondent seeks 19 enforcement of the IRS Summons on the basis that the United States established the 20 “summons’ prima facie validity” under United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), and 21 Petitioner failed to overcome the prima facie validity. Id. at 12. 22 In his Reply, Petitioner argues again that the issuance of the IRS Summons 23 constitutes harassment, oppression, or abuse. ECF No. 5 at 4–6. Petitioner further contends 24 that the IRS’ method of service of the IRS Summons violates the fourth prong of the Powell 25 test. Id. at 6–7. Additionally, Petitioner requests that, if the Court enforces the IRS 26 27 1 All references to a “Section” refer to a section of Title 26 of the United States Code 28 1 Summons, the Court narrow the IRS Summons to exclude tax years 2019 through 2023 2 because those tax years pertain to upcoming CDP or equivalent hearings. ECF No. 5 at 8. 3 On April 27, 2026, with leave from the Court, Respondent filed the Supplemental 4 Response, asserting that Petitioner fails to show that the Court has jurisdiction over the 5 Petition, service of the IRS Summons was unlawful, or the IRS Summons was issued to 6 harass, oppress, or abuse Petitioner. ECF No. 8 at 2–3, 6. 7 III. PETITION TO QUASH (ECF NO. 1) 8 A. Legal Standard 9 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 10 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citation 11 modified). Because it is presumed that a cause lies outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction, 12 “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hunter 13 v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). Significantly, “[a] private party 14 may sue the United States only if the United States has waived sovereign immunity.” 15 United Aeronautical Corp. v. United States Air Force, 80 F.4th 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2023). 16 Accordingly, “[j]urisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear 17 statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling 18 within the terms of the waiver.” Mollison v. United States, 568 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 19 2009). Moreover, “limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be 20 sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Id. (citation 21 modified). If the United States has not waived sovereign immunity, then the Court must 22 dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. United Aeronautical Corp., 80 F.4th 23 at 1022. 24 The Internal Revenue Code provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 25 7602 authorizes the IRS to issue a summons for the purpose of “ascertaining the correctness 26 of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any 27 person for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any such liability.” 26 U.S.C. 28 § 7602(a); see also Action Recycling Inc. v. U.S., 721 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) 1 (same). In turn, if the IRS issues a summons to a third party, the IRS must generally give 2 “notice of the summons” to “any person . . . identified in the summons.” See 26 U.S.C. 3 § 7609(a)(1), (b)(1). Anyone entitled to notice under Section 7609(a) can bring a motion 4 to quash the summons. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A). And the Internal Revenue Code gives 5 district courts jurisdiction to hear and determine a motion to quash, “thereby waiving the 6 sovereign immunity of the United States.” Polselli v. IRS, 598 U.S. 432, 435 (2023) 7 (citation modified); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h) (“The United States district court for the 8 district within which the person to be summoned resides or is found shall have jurisdiction 9 to hear and determine any proceeding brought under subsection (b)(2), (f), or (g).”); 10 Mollison, 568 F.3d at 1075 (“Section 7609(b)(2) constitutes the government’s consent to 11 waive sovereign immunity and subject itself to a legal challenge in court.”). 12 However, there are exceptions to the notice requirement. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2). 13 In relevant part, Section 7609(c)(2) provides that notice is not required if the summons is: 14 (i) “served on the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued, or any 15 officer or employee of such person;” or (ii) “issued in aid of the collection of . . . an 16 assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability 17 the summons is issued.” See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(D)(i); see also Polselli, 598 18 U.S. at 435 (identifying the exceptions to the notice requirement in 26 U.S.C. 19 § 7609(c)(2)). “By ‘assessment,’ the Code refers to the official recording of a taxpayer’s 20 liability.” Polselli, 598 U.S. at 438. 21 Because only a party entitled to notice of an IRS summons may bring a motion to 22 quash against the United States, the exceptions in Section 7609(c)(2) effectively limit the 23 sovereign immunity waiver found in Section 7609(b). Viewtech, Inc. v. United States, 653 24 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The issue of who gets notice is highly significant because 25 only a person who is entitled to notice may bring a proceeding to quash such a summons.”) 26 abrogated on other grounds, Polselli, 598 U.S. 432; Goddard v. United States, No. 24- 27 5449, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 14343, at *1–2 (9th Cir. June 11, 2025) (“But no notice is 28 needed—and sovereign immunity is thus not waived—when the summons is ‘issued in aid 1 of the collection’ of ‘an assessment made . . . against the person with respect to whose 2 liability the summons is issued.”). As such, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition to 3 Quash only if Petitioner is entitled to notice. 4 B. Discussion 5 Here, the IRS Summons is directed to Petitioner and relates to Officer Unger’s 6 investigation “to locate and verify assets to satisfy the federal tax liabilities that have 7 already been assessed against” Petitioner. ECF No. 4-2 at 2 (¶ 9), 6, 10. Per Officer Unger, 8 Petitioner’s assessed federal income tax liabilities for the subject tax years exceed 9 $10,000,000. ECF Nos. 4-1 at 6, 4-2 at 2 (¶ 8). Accordingly, the IRS Summons directs 10 Petitioner to produce his “account and financial records” from January 1, 2025 through the 11 date of compliance and documents related to “current vehicle registrations, real property, 12 stocks and bonds, accounts stored value cards, online and mobile accounts, virtual currency 13 notes and judgement [sic] receivables, and life insurance policies pertaining to him.” ECF 14 No. 4-2 at 4 (¶ 18), 6, 10. As Officer Unger explains, the information and documents sought 15 are relevant to the IRS’ collection activities regarding Petitioner as it seeks records in his 16 possession, custody and control that would enable the IRS to create a collection 17 information statement and determine whether Petitioner “possesses collectable assets that 18 can satisfy his assessed tax liabilities for the subject tax years.” ECF No. 4-2 at 4–5 (¶ 19). 19 Officer Unger further confirms that he issued the IRS summons “in aid of collection of 20 [Petitioner’s] previously assessed federal tax liability for the subject tax years, namely to 21 identify sources of assets.” Id. at 4 (¶ 17). 22 The IRS Summons coupled with Officer Unger’s Declaration confirms that 23 Petitioner is not entitled to notice. Specifically, the exceptions to notice under 26 U.S.C. 24 §§ 7609(c)(2)(A) and (c)(2)(D)(i) apply. First, because the IRS Summons was directed to 25 and served on Petitioner and relates to his own federal tax liability, the IRS Summons was 26 “served on the person with respect to whose liability the summons [was] issued.” See 26 27 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(A); see also Steeves v. United States, No. 24-cv-1300-DMS-AHG, 28 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178065, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-7086, 1 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1747 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (holding that plaintiff did not have 2 standing to bring a motion to quash the IRS summons because the summons was issued to 3 plaintiff in his capacity as an officer of Camp Noble Inc. with respect to that entity’s tax 4 liability). Second, the IRS Summons was issued to aid in the collection of federal tax 5 liabilities already assessed against Petitioner for the subject tax years. ECF No. 4-2 at 2 6 (¶ 9). It seeks records for purposes of collecting on the assessment against Petitioner by 7 locating and verifying available assets to satisfy Petitioner’s federal tax liabilities. Id. Thus, 8 the subject of the assessment and the subject of the collection effort concern the same 9 taxpayer—Petitioner, exempting the IRS from providing notice under 26 U.S.C. 10 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). See Polselli, 598 U.S. at 438 (explaining that the components excusing 11 notice in Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) require that the subject of the assessment and the subject 12 of the collection effort be the same delinquent taxpayer). 13 Accordingly, pursuant to the exceptions in 26 U.S.C. §§ 7609(c)(2)(A) and 14 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), Petitioner is not entitled to notice of the IRS Summons and may not move 15 to quash the IRS Summons. And notably, Petitioner makes no argument that he is entitled 16 to notice or otherwise points to any authority to support jurisdiction, presumably because 17 multiple courts previously denied his petitions on the same grounds. See, e.g., Bros. Keeper 18 Ministries v. United States, No. 24cv803 DMS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11548, *4 (S.D. 19 Cal. Jan. 21, 2025) (in determining that petitioner is not entitled to notice and therefore 20 cannot bring a petition to quash the IRS summons at issue, the court highlighted that 21 “Mr. Steeves [is] familiar with these legal issues”); Steeves, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22 178065, at *4 (denying Mr. Steeves’ motion to quash because he lacked standing under 23 Section 7609(c)(2)); Steeves, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1747, at *1 (holding that “[t]he 24 district court properly denied Steeves’s motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction because 25 Steeves was not entitled to notice of the summons and thus could not seek to quash it”). 26 Because Petitioner is not entitled to notice and cannot move to quash under 26 U.S.C. 27 § 7609(b)(2)(A), no applicable waiver of sovereign immunity exists to support this action 28 against the United States, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear his 1 Petition. This Court therefore recommends that Petitioner’s Petition to Quash the IRS 2 Summons be DISMISSED and Respondent’s Motion to Summarily Deny the Petition to 3 Quash be GRANTED. 4 IV. MOTION TO ENFORCE IRS SUMMONS (ECF NO. 4) 5 Next, the Court turns to Respondent’s Motion to Enforce. ECF No. 4. Respondent 6 argues that the IRS Summons is valid under Powell and Petitioner failed to overcome its 7 prima facie validity. ECF No. 4-1 at 12–13. 8 A. Legal Standard 9 To enforce a summons, the Government must establish that (1) its investigation is 10 conducted for a legitimate purpose, (2) the material sought is relevant to that purpose, 11 (3) the information is not already in the IRS’ possession, and (4) the IRS complied with all 12 the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57– 13 58. “The government’s burden is a slight one, and may be satisfied by a declaration from 14 the investigating agent that the Powell requirements have been met.” Crystal v. United 15 States, 172 F.3d 1141, 1144 (1999) (citation modified); see also Combs v. United States, 16 No. 24-cv-2310-DMS-MSB, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43121, *8 (S.D. Cal. March 10, 2025) 17 (same). “The burden is minimal because the statute must be read broadly in order to ensure 18 that the enforcement powers of the IRS are not unduly restricted.” Crystal, 172 F.3d at 19 1144 (citation modified). 20 Once the Government satisfies the Powell elements, the burden shifts to Petitioner 21 “to disprove the actual existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose” 22 by the IRS. Crystal, 172 F.3d at 1144. “Without a doubt, this burden is a heavy one,” and 23 “enforcement of a summons is generally a summary proceeding to which a taxpayer has 24 few defenses.” Id. (citation modified). To make the required showing, the objecting 25 taxpayer must present specific facts and evidence to support claims of bad faith or improper 26 purpose. Id. “The taxpayer may challenge the summons on any appropriate grounds, 27 including failure to satisfy the Powell requirements or abuse of the court’s process.” Id. 28 1 The “dispositive question in each case is whether the Service is pursuing the authorized 2 purposes in good faith.” Id. at 1144–45 (citation modified). 3 B. Discussion 4 1. Prima Facie Validity 5 In support of its Motion to Enforce, Respondent offers the declaration of Officer 6 Unger (ECF No. 4-2), who addresses each of the Powell elements. See ECF No. 4-1 at 6. 7 First, Officer Unger is conducting an investigation to aid in the collection of 8 outstanding federal tax liabilities assessed against Petitioner for the subject tax years. ECF 9 No. 4-2 at 2 (¶ 9). As such, he seeks to locate and verify assets to satisfy those tax liabilities. 10 Id. And in furtherance of that investigation, Officer Unger issued the IRS Summons. Id. at 11 4 (¶ 17). The collection of federal tax liabilities is a legitimate purpose that satisfies the 12 first Powell element. Keith Ngo v. United States, 699 F. App’x 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2017) 13 (finding that the IRS summons was issued for the legitimate purpose of investigating the 14 claimant’s earnings and assets for the collection of the claimant’s outstanding tax liability). 15 Second, the IRS Summons directs Petitioner to produce account and financial 16 records as well as “all current vehicle registration certificates, real property, stocks and 17 bonds, accounts stored value cards, online and mobile accounts, virtual currency notes and 18 judgement receivables, and life insurance policies pertaining to him.” ECF No. 4-2 at 4 19 (¶ 18), 6. Officer Unger confirms that the documents and information summoned “may be 20 relevant to the IRS’s collection activities with respect to [Petitioner’s] outstanding tax 21 liabilities for the subject tax years.” Id. at 4–5 (¶ 19). Such records will “enable the IRS to 22 create a collection information statement for the subject tax year,” which in turn will allow 23 the IRS “to determine whether [Petitioner] possesses collectable assets that can satisfy his 24 assessed tax liabilities.” Id. Thus, the information sought is relevant to the IRS’ collection 25 efforts against Petitioner, meeting the second Powell element. 26 Third, Officer Unger confirms that the IRS Summons seeks information regarding 27 Petitioner’s “assets, liabilities, or account[s] held in his name or for his benefit” that is in 28 Petitioner’s “custody, possession, or control.” Id. at 4–5 (¶ 19). Officer Unger further 1 confirms that the information sought is “not currently in the possession of the IRS,” id., 2 and Petitioner makes no argument to the contrary. Respondent therefore satisfies the third 3 Powell element. 4 Finally, Officer Unger attests that he “followed all administrative steps required by 5 the Internal Revenue Code for issuance and service of the summons,” meeting the fourth 6 Powell element. Id. at 5 (¶ 20). 7 Accordingly, based on Officer Unger’s declaration, Respondent has met its slight 8 burden of establishing a prima facie case for enforcing the IRS Summons. United States v. 9 Clarke, 573 U.S. 248, 254 (2014) (the IRS can satisfy its burden “by submitting a simple 10 affidavit from the investigating agent”). 11 2. Petitioner’s “Heavy” Burden to Disprove the Validity of the IRS Summons 12 The burden now shifts to Petitioner to present specific facts and evidence to disprove 13 the validity of the IRS Summons. Crystal, 172 F.3d at 1144 (once the government 14 establishes the Powell elements, the petitioner bears the burden to disprove the actual 15 existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose by the IRS). Petitioner 16 fails to carry his burden. 17 As an initial matter, Petitioner argues at length that issuance of the IRS Summons 18 following his requests for and/or the setting of CDP or equivalent hearings is somehow 19 improper. ECF Nos. 1 at 2–3, 5 at 3, 5–6. Except Petitioner admits that “no law or 20 administrative regulation prohibits Officer Unger from issuing a summons for the same tax 21 years that are subject to a CDP or equivalency hearing.” ECF Nos. 5 at 5–6, 5-2 at 2 (¶ 6). 22 As such, this argument fails to establish that the IRS Summons is invalid. 23 Petitioner also suggests that Officer Unger’s personal service of the IRS Summons 24 at Petitioner’s residence constitutes a “communication” that violates 26 U.S.C. § 6304 and 25 the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”). ECF No. 5 at 4–7. As such, Petitioner contends that 26 the IRS does not meet the fourth Powell element, i.e., compliance with the Internal 27 Revenue Code. ECF No. 5 at 6–7. In relevant part, Section 6304 prohibits communications 28 with “a taxpayer in connection with the collection of any unpaid tax . . . if the Secretary 1 knows the taxpayer is represented by any person authorized to practice before the Internal 2 Revenue Service with respect to such unpaid tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 6304(a)(2). 3 Here, Officer Unger knew Petitioner was represented by counsel, see ECF No. 4-2 4 at 3 (¶¶ 11, 15), but the Court is not persuaded that service alone is the equivalent of a 5 “communication” prohibited by Section 6304(a)(2). First, Petitioner fails to cite any case 6 law to support this contention. ECF No. 5 at 4–7. Second, Petitioner does not identify any 7 direct communication or even contact between him and Officer Unger at the time of service 8 regarding any matter, including Petitioner’s unpaid taxes. See generally ECF Nos. 1, 5; see 9 also ECF No. 4-2 at 7 (Officer Unger left the IRS Summons with “Doreen Angelucci” at 10 Petitioner’s residence). Third, the act of service alone does not demonstrate a 11 “communication” given that the Internal Revenue Code expressly authorizes Officer Unger 12 to issue and serve the IRS Summons. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602, 7603; Angelucci v. United 13 States, No. 26-cv-00563-BAS-GC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73992, *18 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 14 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95661 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15 30, 2026) (rejecting argument that Officer Unger’s personal service and minimal 16 communications with petitioner violated Section 6304(a)(2)). In the absence of any actual 17 communication between Petitioner and Officer Unger at the time of service, and case law 18 supporting Petitioner’s position, Officer Unger’s personal service of the IRS Summons 19 does not invalidate the IRS Summons. 20 In a similar vein, Petitioner argues that issuance of the IRS Summons constitutes 21 harassment, oppression, or abuse in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6304(b). ECF Nos. 1 at 2, 5 22 at 4. Section 6304(b) prohibits the IRS from engaging “in any conduct the natural 23 consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the 24 collection of any unpaid tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 6304(a)(2). Conduct that violates Section 25 6304(b) includes: (i) the “use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm 26 the physical person, reputation, or property of any person;” (ii) the “use of obscene or 27 profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or 28 reader;” (iii) calling or “engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or 1 continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number;” and 2 (iv) placing telephone calls “without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” 26 3 U.S.C. § 6304(b)(1)–(4). 4 Other than his bare assertions and conclusory allegations that Officer Unger was 5 harassing him, Petitioner points to no specific facts or evidence showing that Officer Unger 6 engaged in any conduct that violates Section 6304(b). See generally ECF Nos. 1, 5. 7 Moreover, while Petitioner believes that Officer Unger harbors some personal “animus” 8 against him, Petitioner points to no conduct other than the issuance and service of the IRS 9 Summons and mailing of correspondence notifying Petitioner of his tax liabilities and 10 procedural rights. ECF No. 5 at 4–6. None of this conduct rises to the level of harassing, 11 oppressive, or abusive conduct that violates Section 6304(b) or otherwise supports the 12 conclusion that Officer Unger was acting in bad faith or for an improper purpose. In short, 13 Petitioner does not meet his heavy burden to disprove the validity of the IRS Summons. 14 See Crystal, 172 F.3d at 1152 (affirming that the taxpayer must allege specific facts and 15 evidence to support his allegations of bad faith or improper purpose). 16 Finally, to the extent Petitioner asks the Court to narrow the IRS Summons by 17 excluding those tax years that are the subject of an upcoming CDP or equivalent hearing, 18 the Court lacks authority to consider this request. As already noted, this Court lacks 19 jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s request to quash the IRS Summons. See Steeves, 2024 20 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178065, at *4 (denying petitioner’s motion to quash because he lacked 21 standing under Section 7609). It therefore follows that any request by Petitioner concerning 22 the IRS Summons also fails for lack of jurisdiction. Notably, even if jurisdiction existed, 23 as Petitioner admits, no law or regulation prohibits the issuance of a summons for tax years 24 that are subject to a pending CDP or equivalent hearing. As such, there is no legal basis for 25 narrowing the IRS Summons as Petitioner suggests. Therefore, the Court recommends that 26 Petitioner’s request to amend the IRS Summons be DENIED. 27 28 1 In sum, because Respondent establishes that the IRS Summons is valid and Petitioner 2 does not meet his heavy burden to disprove its validity, the Court recommends that 3 Respondent’s Motion to Enforce be GRANTED. 4 3. Petitioner’s Evidentiary Objections 5 Lastly, Petitioner raises several evidentiary objections to Officer Unger’s declaration 6 (ECF No. 4-2 at 1–5). See ECF No. 5-3. Respondent argues that the objections are 7 “background facts that are not necessary to determine the validity of the summons” and 8 asserts that the “objections should be summarily denied.” ECF No. 8 at 9–10. The Court 9 RECOMMENDS OVERRULING the objections for the following reasons: 10 1. “Page 2, lines 9–10;” “Page 2, lines 11–13;” “Page 2, line 26 through Page 3, line 11 1;” “Page 3, lines 1 through 3;” “Page 3, line 27 through Page 4 line 2;” and 12 “Page 4, lines 4 through 5”: The Court does not rely on these statements as a basis 13 for its conclusions, and therefore the objections are MOOT. 14 2. “Page 3, lines 9 through 12;” “Page 3, lines 12–13;” “Page 3, lines 24 through 15 25;” and “Page 5, lines 4 through 5”: Petitioner states no legal basis in support of 16 the objections. 17 V. CONCLUSION 18 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Judge Bashant issue an Order: 19 (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) dismissing for lack of 20 jurisdiction the Petition to Quash Internal Revenue Service Summons (ECF No. 1), 21 including Petitioner’s request to amend the IRS Summons (ECF No. 5); and (3) granting 22 the Motion to Summarily Deny Petition to Quash and Enforce IRS Summons (ECF No. 4). 23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written objections 24 to this Report and Recommendation with the Court and serve a copy on all parties by no 25 later than August 10, 2026. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 26 Recommendation.” 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed with the 28 Court and served on all parties by no later than August 24, 2026. The document should be 1 || captioned “Reply to Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 2 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 3 || waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. 4 || Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 5 || (9th Cir. 1991). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: July 27, 2026 | SK 8 Honorable Valerie E. Torres 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14