Ivan Goodlow, Jr. v. Mr. Valdez, Correctional Officer
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Michelle M. Pettit (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se prisoner's motion for appointment of counsel in a civil rights action alleging excessive force. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required for such an appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for appointment of counsel denied“Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's two-part test for appointing counsel in civil cases: (1) likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the prisoner's ability to articulate claims given the complexity of the issues. The court found the case not complex enough to warrant counsel, noting the plaintiff had successfully navigated the initial screening and IFP process. It also noted that the likelihood of success was too early to determine because discovery had not yet occurred. This is a standard application of the discretionary standard for civil counsel appointment. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for appointing counsel in a civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and Ninth Circuit precedent. It applies the two-part test from Cano v. Taylor, analyzing both the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims. The court's finding that the case is not complex enough to warrant counsel is supported by the record, which shows the plaintiff has successfully filed a complaint that passed screening and an IFP motion. The court's observation that it is too early to assess the likelihood of success on the merits because discovery has not yet occurred is a standard and reasonable procedural determination. The reasoning is complete and directly addresses the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 IVAN GOODLOW, JR. Case No.: 26-cv-1008-JES-MMP CDCR #AX-3970, 8 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 9 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL v. 10 [ECF No. 9] MR. VALDEZ, Correctional Officer, 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Ivan Goodlow, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for 16 appointment of counsel. ECF No. 9. On February 9, 2026, pro se Plaintiff filed this 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 action under the Eighth Amendment and filed a motion to proceed in forma 18 pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. ECF No. 19 3. On May 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed a new motion to proceed IFP. ECF No. 4. The Court 20 subsequently granted in forma pauperis status and found the Complaint survived screening 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). ECF No. 5. Now, more than five 22 months after commencing this action, Plaintiff requests this Court appoint him counsel. 23 ECF No. 9. 24 “[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution 25 Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). District courts have discretion, however, 26 to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants in “exceptional circumstances.” Palmer v. 27 Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In 28 considering whether to appoint counsel in a civil suit, the court should assess: (1) whether 1 the prisoner is likely to succeed on the merits and (2) whether “the prisoner is unable to 2 articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Cano v. Taylor, 3 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970). “Neither of these 4 factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision[.]” 5 Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff bears the burden of 6 showing exceptional circumstances exist. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. 7 To support his request for counsel, Plaintiff argues the case is very complex due to 8 Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) “alter[ing],” “re-edit[ing],” and 9 withholding relevant video footage which is inconsistent with witness testimony. ECF No. 10 9 at 1–2. Additionally, Plaintiff states RJD is attempting to “cover up” the correctional 11 officer’s actions. Id. at 2. 12 Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating “exceptional circumstances.” 13 First, the Court considers whether this case is so “exceptional” in its complexity to 14 warrant the appointment of civil counsel. See Cano, 739 F.3d at 1218 (citing Palmer, 560 15 F.3d at 970). It is not. Plaintiff alleges on March 6, 2024, while he was incarcerated at RJD, 16 correctional officer Valdez attempted to “force” Plaintiff into his cell. ECF No. 1 at 3. 17 Plaintiff protested and Valdez attempted to “slam” and “grab” Plaintiff. Id. After Plaintiff 18 shoved Valdez’s hand away, Valdez “began punching [Plaintiff] in [his] facial region 19 repeatedly.” Id. Plaintiff fell to the ground and threw a couple of “wild” punches to protect 20 himself. Id. Plaintiff claims despite several witnesses to the incident stating Valdez was the 21 instigator and Plaintiff was defending himself, Plaintiff was charged with a rule violation 22 and found guilty. Id. Plaintiff states bodycam and other video footage of the incident will 23 show Valdez assaulted him. Id. He further states his criminal defense attorney requested 24 video of the incident in a different case but has yet to receive it because of a “cover up.” 25 Id. 26 The Court sees nothing in this factual circumstance so complex as to constitute an 27 “exceptional circumstance.” Plaintiff’s filings show he is capable of articulating his Eighth 28 1 || Amendment claims and arguments regarding video footage of the incident. Plaintiff will 2 || be able to seek video footage during discovery, which has not yet commenced. 3 Moreover, Plaintiff has litigated this case on his own for more than five months. 4 || During that time, he filed a complaint that passed screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a 5 ||motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which was subsequently granted, and the 6 motion to appoint counsel currently before this Court. ECF Nos. 1, 2, 4, 9. 7 Second, in assessing “exceptional circumstances,” the Court should consider the 8 || likelihood of Plaintiff's success on the merits. However, in this case it is too early for the 9 || Court to determine likelihood of success on the merits. As described above, discovery has 10 yet begun, and the Court’s knowledge of the facts 1s limited to Plaintiffs allegations in 11 complaint. See, e.g., Reed v. Paramo, No. 18-cv-361-JLS-LL, 2020 WL 2767358, at 12 ||*1 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2020); Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv-1187-AJB-RBB, 2012 WL 13 2499003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012). 14 Though discussed above individually, the Court has also cumulatively considered 15 || Plaintiffs arguments, factual circumstances, and the “exceptional circumstances” criteria. 16 || Even when considered together, they fail to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Given 17 lack of complexity of Plaintiff's claims, it is not in the interest of justice to appoint 18 || Plaintiff counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 ||Dated: July 24, 2026 Wible. th. eta 71 HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28