Helidoro S. Gonzales v. Raymond Madden, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se prisoner's third motion for the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required for such an appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Denied“In sum, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances present for appointment of counsel. Gonzales’ motion, therefore, is DENIED without prejudice to renewal at a later stage of the proceedings.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and Ninth Circuit precedent (Palmer v. Valdez), which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' for the appointment of counsel in civil cases. The court evaluated the plaintiff's ability to litigate and the complexity of the case, concluding that the plaintiff had effectively articulated his claims and that the record was not sufficiently developed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. This is a defensible exercise of discretion based on the cited authorities. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, applies the statutory discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and utilizes the 'exceptional circumstances' test from Ninth Circuit precedent. The court's analysis of the plaintiff's filings to determine his ability to litigate and the current state of the record to assess the likelihood of success is appropriate. The order also properly acknowledges the duty to construe pro se filings liberally.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 HELIDORO S. GONZALES, Case No.: 23-cv-2181-AGS-DEB 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 RAYMOND MADDEN, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 [DKT. NO. 62] 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff Helidoro S. Gonzales’ third Motion for Appointment of 18 Counsel. Dkt. No. 62.1 Gonzales is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 19 pauperis on a civil rights claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1 (Compl.). 20 Gonzales largely reiterates the arguments raised in his prior motions for appointment of 21 counsel, asserting four grounds for relief: (i) his limited English proficiency; (ii) his 22 indigency; (iii) his lack of legal training; (iv) the difficulty of securing assistance from 23 24 25 1 Gonzales improperly combined his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and his Motion for Appointment of Counsel in a single document, in violation 26 of Civil Local Rule 5.1(m). The Court cautions Gonzales that future filings must comply 27 with the Local Rules and that multiple pleadings may not be combined in one filing. Dkt. No. 63 (“The document will remain as filed despite the discrepancy noted. . . . Any further 28 1 other inmates with his case. Dkt. No. 62 at 2–3. The Court DENIES Gonzales’ Motion for 2 the reasons set forth below. 3 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. See Palmer v. Valdez, 4 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 5 (9th Cir. 1981)). An indigent’s right to appointed counsel exists “only where the litigant 6 may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 7 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). In “exceptional circumstances,” however, a court may exercise its 8 discretion and “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. 10 There is currently no basis to support a finding of exceptional circumstances in this 11 case. Gonzales’ complaint and filings evidence he can and has effectively articulated legal 12 claims with proper spelling, grammar, and handwriting. See Dkt. No. 1 (Compl.); 13 Dkt. No. 2 (Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis); Dkt. No. 10 (Pl.’s Notice 14 of Intent to Proceed); Dkt. Nos. 39, 50 (Pl.’s Notices of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit); 15 Dkt. No. 62 (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.); Dkt. Nos. 25, 37, 62 (Pl.’s Mots. to 16 Appoint Counsel). 17 Although Gonzales’ complaint survived screening and has a pending motion for 18 summary judgment, the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to determine 19 whether Gonzales is likely to succeed on the merits, and Gonzales makes no such showing 20 in his Motion. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (holding that “[w]hen determining whether 21 ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the likelihood of success on the 22 merits . . . .’”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the Rand warnings, his 23 concerns about hearsay and the completeness of Defendants’ evidence, and his references 24 to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation policies and medical-care 25 statutes do not, by themselves, establish the kind of exceptional circumstances that would 26 justify the Court appointing counsel. See Leon v. Celaya, No. 20-cv-899-AJB-BGS, 2021 27 WL 533514, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2021) (citing Miller v. LaMontagne, No. 10-cv-702- 28 WQH-BGS, 2012 WL 1666735, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2012) (plaintiff did not present 1 exceptional circumstance warranting appointment of counsel because the case had not 2 || yet survived summary judgment)). 3 “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 4 || pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Jackson v. Carey, 5 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). This also applies to motions. 6 || Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to 7 || construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions ... .”). Accordingly, the Court 8 || will take Gonzales’ pro se status into consideration when reviewing his filings and afford 9 || him “the benefit of any doubt.” Jackson, 353 F.3d at 757 (citation omitted). 10 In sum, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances present for 11 |}appointment of counsel. Gonzales’ motion, therefore, is DENIED without prejudice to 12 renewal at a later stage of the proceedings. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 — 15 Date: July 22, 2026 —wuddrslal □□ 16 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28